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Ethiopia’s Deepening Crackdown on Dissent

Human Rights Watch - Monday, March 4, 2024
Click to expand Image Men in downtown Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 3, 2021. © 2021 Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images

In February, plainclothes security officers detained Batte Urgessa, a spokesperson for the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an opposition political party, and French journalist Antoine Galindo, as they met for an interview in a hotel in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa.

More than twenty-four hours later, they were brought before the Addis Ababa City Administration Court. The court granted the police’s request to detain them until March 1 to pursue their investigation.

An international outcry led to Galindo’s release from a police station in Bole sub-city, Addis Ababa, where the two were apparently being held. He left Ethiopia on February 29.

Batte appeared in court on March 1, where the prosecutor said he was under investigation for links to the banned Oromo Liberation Army. He was returned to detention until March 6.

This is not Batte’s first stint in jail. He was wrongfully detained in March 2021 and held for a year. The authorities repeatedly moved him between detention facilities, denied him access to relatives and legal counsel, and was only released after developing serious health issues that reportedly persist to this day. Seven other OLF political leaders detained in the months preceding Batte’s 2021 detention remain behind bars, despite multiple court orders for their release.

The authorities have also recently arrested five other politicians, including Christian Tadele,  a member of parliament and critic of the government’s actions in the Amhara region, and Dessalegn Chanie, another outspoken Amhara opposition lawmaker.

Galindo’s detention, the first lengthy detention of a foreign correspondent in four years, is happening in a context of an uptick in intimidation of journalists, which has received scant international attention.

In February, Ethiopia’s federal parliament extended the state of emergency in Amhara region, which had been in place since August and affords the government sweeping powers.  The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that four of the eight journalists in detention as of early 2024 were detained under these emergency powers.

These latest arrests demonstrate that in Ethiopia today, no one is safe from arbitrary arrest and detention. Ethiopia’s long-time partners should condemn the spate of wrongful detentions and challenge the government’s growing intolerance of peaceful dissent. 

Mali: Security Force Whistleblower Arrested

Human Rights Watch - Monday, March 4, 2024
Click to expand Image Soldiers of the Malian armed forces at the ceremony of the 60th anniversary of Mali's independence in Bamako, September 22, 2020. © 2020 MICHELE CATTANI/AFP via Getty Images

(Nairobi) – Mali’s military authorities have arrested a colonel from the gendarmerie who recently published a book about abuses by the Malian armed forces, raising fears of an enforced disappearance, Human Rights Watch said today.

Various sources, including one who spoke to Human Rights Watch, said that on March 2, 2024, unidentified men abducted gendarmerie Col. Alpha Yaya Sangaré from his home in Bamako, Mali’s capital, and drove off with him in a vehicle without a license plate. The military has since confirmed Sangaré’s arrest but has yet to divulge where he is being detained.

“Mali’s military has responded to allegations of serious abuses by going after the whistleblower instead of addressing the abuses themselves,” said Ilaria Allegrozzi, senior Sahel researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The authorities should immediately announce where Colonel Sangaré is being held and safely release him.”

On February 24, Sangaré published his book, Mali: The Challenge of Terrorism in Africa, which denounced human rights abuses by the Malian armed forces in their fight against Islamist armed groups. The book’s reporting includes extracts from a 2017 Human Rights Watch report on extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrests of men accused of supporting Islamist armed groups.

After the book’s publication, Mali’s defense minister said that Sangaré made “false accusations against the Malian armed forces” and that the officer would face the law. The minister of territorial administration also denounced the book.

Mali’s military junta has increasingly cracked down on peaceful dissent, political opposition, and the media, shrinking the country’s civic space. On February 28, 2024, the authorities dissolved the political organization Kaoural Renouveau (Karoual Renew in English), citing “defamatory and subversive remarks,” against the junta. On December 20, 2023, the authorities dissolved the Observatory for Elections and Good Governance (Observatoire pour les élections et la bonne gouvernance), a civil society group tasked with observing the fairness and transparency of elections, accusing its chairman of “statements likely to disturb public order, including his forecasts on the participation rate in the June 2023 referendum” to amend the constitution.

Sangaré’s arrest comes as Mali’s relationships with the United Nations and neighboring countries have sharply deteriorated, raising concerns about human rights violations monitoring and reporting as well as accountability for abuses. On January 28, 2024, the Malian government announced that it would leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a move that would deprive victims of gross human rights violations from seeking justice through the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice.  

In December 2023, the UN peacekeeping mission, known as the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), officially pulled out from the country at the request of Malian authorities. MINUSMA included a strong human rights mandate. On August 30, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have extended the work of a panel of experts tracking abuses by armed groups and Malian security forces and fighters from the Russia-linked Wagner Group, harming efforts toward accountability for conflict-related abuses.

The UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression said that “whistleblowers are essential for the public’s right to know, for the public’s participation in political affairs, democratic governance and accountability,” and “deserve the strongest protection in law and practice.”

Human Rights Watch and others have previously reported on serious abuses during counterinsurgency operations by the Malian security forces and allied fighters believed to be from the Wagner Group since 2022, including mass killings, torture and other ill-treatment, often in unauthorized detention facilities, and enforced disappearances. International law defines enforced disappearance as the detention of a person by state officials or their agents followed by the refusal to acknowledge the detention or to reveal the person’s fate or whereabouts.

Mali’s government should enact a law protecting government whistleblowers from arrest and other retributions, Human Rights Watch said.

“Colonel Sangaré took a bold step by choosing not to remain silent in the face of human rights abuses,” Allegrozzi said. “This case highlights the need for the government to protect those who publicly disclose wrongdoings.”

Proposed EU Forced Labor Regulation Should Focus on Workers

Human Rights Watch - Monday, March 4, 2024
Click to expand Image Migrant workers prepare to unload their catch at a port in Samut Sakhon province, Thailand on January 22, 2018.        © 2018 Reuters / Athit Perawongmetha

European Union governments meeting today in Brussels to discuss a proposed ban on products linked to forced labor, should allow forced labor victims in companies’ supply chains to receive remediation. Companies and business associations have called for remediation to be included in the draft regulation.

For victims of forced labor, remediation—finding a remedy for harms done—could vary depending on the circumstances. Typically, remediation requires a combination of measures including paying unpaid wages; reimbursing foreign worker recruitment fees; returning withheld passports; enabling workers to access worker rights organizations and to form and join unions; and ensuring access to physical and mental health care. Companies should consult with workers and their representatives on appropriate forms of remediation, and on rolling out and monitoring them.

The proposed regulation should encourage companies to better remediate forced labor in their supply chains. For example, after the nongovernmental organization Transparentem alerted PVH, Second Clothing, and Barbour to the high risk of forced labor in Mauritius, the three apparel brands—which were sourcing from the same factory—contributed towards reimbursing workers the recruitment fees they had paid. Recruitment fees typically put low-paid workers in debt, compelling them to endure poor working conditions and increasing the risk of forced labor.

The nongovernmental Remedy Project examined how US Customs and Border Protection had dealt with nine complaints of forced labor and found that the agency’s powers and procedures to impose, modify, or revoke import bans could be used as steps to provide remediation for harmed workers. Such approaches should be more consistently applied by US authorities and adopted by the EU.

Human Rights Watch and other civil society organizations have suggested how the proposed EU forced labor regulation could incentivize and facilitate robust prevention, mitigation, and remediation of forced labor in supply chains. This includes providing opportunities for companies to produce evidence of corrective actions they have taken in response to allegations of forced labor before the EU imposes an import or export ban. The regulation should also require companies to provide evidence of corrective actions, including remediation for victims, before deciding whether to reverse a ban.

The EU should not miss this important opportunity to introduce a powerful legal tool to assist workers.

Türkiye: Big Tech Should Protect Online Expression, Resist Censorship

Human Rights Watch - Monday, March 4, 2024

(Istanbul) – Social media companies should resist intensifying efforts by Turkish authorities to control their platforms through demands that they block content critical of the government ahead of important municipal elections on March 31, 2024, Human Rights Watch, ARTICLE 19, and 20 other human rights and journalists’ groups said in a statement released today.

Social media companies have restricted access to critical content in response to a January 2024 court order, demonstrating a greater willingness to bend to government pressure, rather than challenge censorship requests where they violate international human rights law. This approach undermines the platforms’ responsibility to respect human rights under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which include resisting pressure to restrict freedom of expression.

Social media platforms should take a firm, united stance against formal and informal pressure targeting expression protected under international human rights law, and adopt heightened transparency in the face of increasing online censorship.

The following is the groups’ statement:

Ahead of Türkiye’s municipal elections on March 31, 2024, ARTICLE 19, Human Rights Watch, and 20 other rights groups and journalists’ organisations jointly call on social media platforms to uphold the free expression rights of their users and resist state censorship. They should also fully disclose all government requests to restrict accounts or content and be transparent about informal government pressure to restrict content on their platforms.

The rights groups and journalists’ organisations also call on the Turkish government to cease pressuring online platforms to block content.

As important country-wide local elections loom, the Turkish authorities are once again intensifying efforts to control social media platforms through use of the restrictive internet law, demanding the blocking of content critical of the government. Social media platforms should take a firm, united stance against formal and informal pressure targeting expression protected under international human rights law, and adopt heightened transparency in the face of increasing online censorship.

Escalating Pressure and Inadequate Platform Response

A recent striking instance of the Turkish authorities’ readiness to escalate censorship – along with an inadequate response from platforms – concerned a January decision of the Ankara 9th Criminal Peace Court.

On January 10, the X (formerly Twitter) Government Affairs account published a January 6 order from the Ankara court with a list of social media content to be blocked on several platforms. The court order targeted 210 items including profiles and content on X, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok that relate to Muhammet Yakut, a businessman from Türkiye accused of criminal activities, who has made allegations on social media of government corruption and organised criminal activity in Türkiye. While the court deemed the content a threat to “national security and protection of public order” under Article 8(a) of the Internet Law, the decision violated international freedom of expression standards and the platforms should not have blocked the content.

X also stated that the Turkish government had told the company that it was the only platform not fully complying with the court order. X had subsequently “taken action” on 12 accounts and 15 tweets among those identified in the court order. It did so despite acknowledging that the content should be protected under freedom of expression and that the company would challenge the order in court, indicating in its statement that these steps were necessary to prevent its entire platform from being blocked in Türkiye. While none of the accounts or tweets listed in the order is accessible from within Türkiye, many remain accessible from other countries.

A week after X’s announcement, Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, published a case study andsubmitted a report to the Lumens database (a database run by the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University) referring to the same court order in Meta’s Transparency Center. Noting that the restricted content did not violate its policies, Meta announced the blocking of 65 posts and 14 accounts for users in Türkiye based on the Turkish court order and indicated that its refusal to comply might have triggered sanctions including administrative fines, advertising bans for up to 6 months, and throttling of Meta’s entire services in Türkiye.

Although YouTube and TikTok have not commented publicly on the court order, research indicates that both platforms seem to have restricted access to the content specified in the court order. This includes several URLs on both the YouTube and TikTok platforms. On TikTok, the listed items are either completely inaccessible from multiple countries or only restricted in Türkiye. On YouTube, all listed URLs are inaccessible inside Türkiye and from multiple countries.

While some content restrictions were clearly labelled, in many instances platforms failed to indicate that the content was unavailable due to a court order. When attempting to access within Türkiye, the content was often labelled unavailable “because of a technical error” or showed messages of “video currently unavailable,” yet the same content remained accessible elsewhere. Similarly, entire accounts appeared as having posted “no content” when viewed from Türkiye, but displayed several posted videos when viewed from outside the country. This lack of transparency means that people navigating platforms from within Türkiye may never know that the content is purposefully restricted at the request of Turkish authorities and that the content may be accessible with the use of circumvention technologies.

In February 2024, ARTICLE 19 wrote to Google, YouTube’s parent company, and TikTok inquiring, among other topics, how they responded to the court order. TikTok shared their general commitment to human rights and their routine practice of handling government requests for content removal in Turkey, without addressing the specific questions raised about the January content removals. Google, on the other hand, did not respond.

Misguided Compliance Driven by Fear

It appears that the October 2022 legal amendments to Türkiye’s internet law have resulted in social media companies’ greater willingness to bend to government pressure, rather than use legal means to challenge censorship requests where they violate international human rights law. X and Meta’s admission that they have blocked content demonstrates this fear-driven response to the Turkish authorities’ escalating censorship demands. X cited explicit concerns about potential sanctions, such as service throttling. Meta made general reference to possible sanctions in their case study.

This approach undermines the platforms’ responsibility to respect human rights under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), which include resisting pressure to restrict freedom of expression.

While the legislation allows for bandwidth throttling of up to 90 percent for noncompliance with even one takedown order, experience shows that, independent of the platforms’ actions and the provisions for throttling stipulated in the law, the Turkish authorities have on occasion precipitously blocked all access to certain platforms with little justification. An example of this came after the February 6, 2023, earthquakes, when the authorities resorted to a short period of throttling to block content.

However, evidence suggests extensive throttling over long periods before the elections is unlikely given the government and its supporters’ reliance on the platforms. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) spent considerable amounts of money on political advertisements in the run-up to the May 2023 national elections, according to Meta’s Ad Library. In the same period, Meta also reported removing an extensive network of inauthentic accounts spreading commentary supportive of the AKP, including through manipulated content, which had about 1.3 million followers and spent close to $700,000 on advertisements to circulate its content.

Navigating Legal Pressures with Coordinated Response and Heightened Transparency

As four major platforms decided to appoint local representatives in compliance with the 2020 amendments, civil society organisations warned YouTube, Meta, X, and TikTok against complying with laws that violate human rights standards. While all four companies reaffirmed their commitment to freedom of expression, they provided very little explanation as to how they intended to navigate the new legal environment. At the time Meta stated that there was a potential to withdraw the local representative if faced with increasing political pressure.

While the government’s censorship has undoubtedly been increasing in recent years, and particularly intensified since the legal amendments to the country’s internet regulations in 2020 and 2022, the Turkish government has to date relied on a lack of transparency and coordination among platforms to isolate and pressure them individually into compliance. Shortly before Türkiye’s 2023 national elections, the Turkish authorities subjected platforms to threats of throttling for failure to comply with content removal demands. On two separate occasions, X has publicly indicated that Turkish authorities claimed it was the only platform failing to comply with a removal request and that this informed its decision to action the content.

This pressure is likely to continue as local elections draw closer. It is essential that platforms resist being subjected to individualized pressure by adopting a coordinated response and heightened transparency measures and challenging removal demands in court. Continued compliance with these orders may encourage the Turkish authorities to make further similarly arbitrary or excessive requests to remove content that falls within the boundaries of protected expression, ultimately implicating these companies in state censorship, said the rights group.

It is also crucial that platforms create contingency plans providing some means of access to their platforms in case shutdowns do occur at key moments during the upcoming elections, and to maintain access to content throughcircumvention technologies.

Recommendations for Social Media Platforms and the Turkish Government

As social media platforms operating in Türkiye are faced with increasing government pressure, ARTICLE 19, Human Rights Watch, and the 20 other rights groups and journalists’ organisations urge them to take the following steps, in consultation with civil society organisations and impacted communities:

Resist complying with blocking orders that restrict access to protected expression, including by challenging them in court and limiting the scope and duration of implementation. Assess blocking orders against international freedom of expression standards, considering in particular that political speech enjoys the highest level of protection. Conduct additional human rights due diligence ahead of Türkiye’s March 2024 municipal elections to evaluate and mitigate the risk of becoming complicit in censorship and the freedom of expression implications of the potential sanctions by the government both on election day and the period leading up the election. This should include establishing a contingency plan to maintain platform access throughout the election period in the event of shutdowns or throttling. Be transparent about government requests for censorship. This includes notifying users that content is not available at the URL where the content was hosted, the reason for its blocking (e.g., a government order) and publishing the order (including through the Lumens database) and case studies, when relevant. Publicising these actions expeditiously is key to holding governments accountable and mitigating isolated, informal pressure. Engage with other companies to share information about formal and informal government pressure and commit to taking a united stance against particularly excessive censorship demands, particularly during election periods. Engage with Turkish civil society for a better understanding of the implications of company policy and practices, the relevance of content or accounts that are subject to blocking orders, as well as the actual threat and implications of sanctions.


The Turkish government is the primary duty bearer to ensure the right to freedom of expression and free and fair elections. To comply with these obligations, it should:

 

Adhere to international freedom of expression and human rights standards and repeal provisions of Türkiye’s internet legislation that do not comply with international human rights law. Refrain from using legal and extra-legal means to exert pressure on social media platforms to censor online content in violation of the human rights obligations, particularly content involving political discourse. Increase transparency in dealings with social media platforms, including public disclosure of all content removal requests. Ensure that any actions taken against online platforms strictly comply with the principles of legality, legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality. Refrain from throttling or shutting down the platforms at any time, whether before, during or after the elections.
 

Signatories:

ARTICLE 19 Human Rights Watch Access Now Committee to Protect Journalists Danish PEN Digital Action English PEN European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) Freedom House International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) International Press Institute (IPI) Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA) OBC Transeuropa PEN America PEN Canada PEN International PEN Norway P24 Platform for Independent Journalism SMEX South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO) Swedish PEN

Yemen: Warring Parties Restrict Women’s Movement

Human Rights Watch - Monday, March 4, 2024
Click to expand Image Women walk at the “Change Square” outside Sanaa University’s gate, Sanaa, Yemen.  © 2021 Reuters / Khaled Abdullah  The authorities across Yemen are increasingly restricting women’s freedom of movement. The restrictions have harmed women’s ability to access work, education, and health care, and are a form of discrimination. All governing authorities should immediately end policies that restrict women’s movement and ensure that checkpoint officers are trained to protect all Yemeni residents’ fundamental rights.

(Beirut) – Parties to the conflict in Yemen, including the Houthis, the Yemeni government, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), are systematically violating women’s right to freedom of movement, Human Rights Watch said today.

The authorities are barring women from traveling between governorates, and in some cases from travel abroad, without a male guardian’s permission or being accompanied by an immediate male relative. Houthi authorities have drastically expanded restrictions against women’s movement in their territories since taking control of Sanaa, the capital, and much of northern Yemen in the last nine years. Yemeni government forces and STC have restricted women’s movement in the south.

“Instead of focusing their efforts on ensuring that people in Yemen have access to clean water and adequate food and aid, warring parties are spending their energy raising barriers to women’s freedom of movement,” said Niku Jafarnia, Yemen and Bahrain Researcher at Human Rights Watch. “These restrictions have a terrible impact on women’s lives and impedes their ability to get health care, education, and work, and even to visit their families.”

Human Rights Watch spoke with 21 women, mostly activists or women working with nongovernmental organizations, between August and November 2023 about the movement restrictions that they faced, and the impact this has had on their lives; as well as two men who work as private drivers transporting people between governorates. The women are from governorates around Yemen, including Aden, Taizz, Hudaydah and Sanaa. In addition, Human Rights Watch reviewed Yemeni laws and regulations, as well as recent Houthi guidances to car companies and travel agencies that restrict women’s movement.

Based on Human Rights Watch research, movement restrictions have affected women across all sectors of Yemeni society. Several people interviewed also said that some checkpoint officials specifically targeted women working with nongovernmental organizations and humanitarian workers. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen in its 2023 report said it has received reports of women being prevented from traveling in Houthi-controlled areas.

Human Rights Watch specifically researched movement restrictions in areas under Houthi, Yemeni government, and STC control, as they control the majority of territory in Yemen. However, several people interviewed said that groups that control other areas, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islah, have also restricted women’s movement.

While Yemen’s law does not require women to travel with an immediate male family member, Human Rights Watch has previously reported that some of Yemen’s laws and practice restricted women’s movement long before the outbreak of the current conflict in 2014. Yemen’s 1992 Personal Status Law says that women can lose their right to spousal maintenance if they leave the marital home without their husband’s consent or for a “legitimate reason.”

In practice, if a male guardian reports a woman to the police for traveling against their wishes, the Interior Ministry and security offices can arrest her at checkpoints. Furthermore, while Yemen’s 1990 Passports Law gives all Yemenis over age 16 the right to obtain an ordinary passport, in practice, the authorities require a woman to have both the permission and presence of their male guardian to obtain or renew their personal identity cards or passports.

An activist living in Aden, said that “even though what [women] had before the war wasn’t great,” since the conflict began in 2014, “the women’s movement has regressed more.”

In the north, Houthi authorities increasingly began requiring women to travel with a male relative or to provide evidence of their male guardians’ written approval after taking control of Sanaa, a policy that had not existed before the war. In 2019, local media reported that the Houthi authorities had issued directives to local bus transportation companies requiring women be escorted by a male relative when traveling between cities in Yemen.

In December 2022, UN human rights experts reported that the Houthis’ Land Transport Regulatory Authority had issued a verbal directive in August 2022 requiring women who travelled anywhere within Houthi-controlled areas or outside the country to be accompanied by a male relative.

Two women said they had decided to leave Sanaa, Houthi-controlled territory, and move to Aden, in STC-controlled territory, in 2023 because of the increasing restrictions on women and nongovernmental organizations that the Houthis have imposed over the last few years. “I personally can’t rent a car because I have no husband, brother, or father,” one woman said.

A political activist living in Taizz described the challenges her sister, who lives in Sanaa, faces when traveling. “[She’s] a woman in her 50s and was forced to get her approval from her son – who was 14 years old – to travel. What a shame! That means that the Houthi[s] don’t recognize women as full citizens.”

In the south, while there has been no reported official guidance from the Yemeni government or the STC that similarly requires a woman to travel with a male relative, all but one of the 21 women interviewed said that they have been forced to turn around or been stopped at checkpoints, sometimes for many hours, when trying to move from one governorate to another without a male relative.

Many also reported being harassed and humiliated at checkpoints. The activist from Aden said she had been stopped for hours at an internationally recognized, government-controlled checkpoint entering Marib. She said that after five hours someone she had called to help her came to the checkpoint with a military ID and told the checkpoint officer that he was her relative and would guarantee her stay. The checkpoint officer’s response was, she said, “But she’s working with NGOs and women who work with NGOs are [a derogatory expletive].”

The UN has reported that these movement restrictions have forced many Yemeni women to leave their jobs at local and international nongovernmental organizations and UN agencies, because they do not have a relative who can accompany them on their crucial work travel, losing much-needed income for their families, and cutting off Yemeni women and girls from receiving humanitarian aid.

The restrictions have also impacted women’s ability to access higher education. In some cases, drivers have refused to take women to campus because they know what they will face at checkpoints, including in the south. “I dreamed of studying for a master’s degree in political science,” said a woman in Taizz. ”But this simple dream seems to be impossible now because of the mahram [male relative] requirement.”

“Psychologically we’ve been broken down,” a women’s rights activist told Human Rights Watch. “To speak about women’s empowerment feels ridiculous when we can’t even move around.”

The Yemeni government, the STC, and the Houthi’ movement restrictions violate Yemen’s obligations under the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and contradict Yemen’s constitution which also guarantees these rights.

Human Rights Watch wrote to the Human Rights Ministries of the Houthis, the Southern Transitional Council, and the Yemeni government on January 8, 2024. The STC replied on January 17, denying that checkpoints under their authority have stopped women if they were traveling without a male relative. Human Rights Watch evidence directly contradicts this. The Houthis and the Yemeni government did not respond.

“The impacts that these movement restrictions have on women’s lives are disastrous not only for women, but for all of Yemeni society,” Jafarnia said. “All governing authorities should immediately cease any policies in place that restrict women’s movement and ensure that checkpoint officers are trained to protect all Yemeni residents’ fundamental rights.”

Houthi Violations of Women’s Freedom of Movement

Since the Houthis took over the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, the group increasingly began imposing restrictions on women throughout its territories, which now includes most of northwest Yemen where the majority of the population lives. Mwatana for Human Rights, a Yemeni civil society organization, has documented how the Houthis have introduced requirements that women travel with an immediate male relative or with their male guardian’s permission, imposed dress codes, required gender segregation in some public spaces, and impeded access to women’s contraceptives. The Houthis have also imprisoned women based on charges relating to “indecency,” including the Yemeni model and actress Intisar al-Hammadi, who remains unlawfully detained.

Mwatana has said that before 2021 the Houthis’ imposed restrictions on women’s movement at random and mainly through harassment at checkpoints but that after 2021 checkpoints around Sanaa began to consistently block women traveling without a male relative.

The UN reported that in July 2022, the Houthi Land Transport Regulatory Authority (LRTA) directed travel and car rental offices to require women to obtain written consent by a male guardian, attested by the neighborhood leader, to travel or rent a car. In August 2022, according to the UN, the LRTA issued orders to transportation offices and car rental companies, instructing them to prohibit women from traveling without the accompaniment of a male relative.

In February 2023, the Houthi authorities responded to the UN, stating there was no new directive from the Land Transport Regulatory Authority, and that “all the rules in force today have existed for many years” and otherwise claiming that “the requirement of a male reltive is not a discriminatory measure.” However, Human Rights Watch has reviewed permission forms from local transportation companies that reflect these Houthi directives.

In practice, the authorities will allow women to travel without a male relative only if they have the prior written approval of a male guardian, and began actively overseeing the implementation of this order within their territories. A doctor from Aden who works in Sanaa told Human Rights Watch that for women to get permission to travel alone without a male relative, “the relative needs to go to the transportation offices or car rental companies, prove that they are the women’s guardian, state that they don’t mind [their female relative] traveling alone. Then, the transportation office or rental companies should communicate with Houthi authorities to get their approval and have the women’s name sent to their checkpoints, so that they can travel without being stopped or harassed.”

Since the new directives, many Yemeni women have faced significant problems traveling in and out of Sanaa. Two women interviewed said that in the last year, they made the difficult decision to leave their homes in Sanaa and move to Aden, in large part because of the difficulties of getting in and out of Sanaa, which they regularly needed to do for work and to visit their families in other areas of the country.

“[The restrictions] forced me to rent a house in Aden,” said one woman. She said that despite having lived in Sanaa since 2007, and feeling more at home there than in Aden, she had returned to Aden in December 2022 because of the difficulty of traveling in and out of Sanaa as a single woman.

Many women do not have a father, husband, or brother, who can serve as their guardian to provide permission or accompany them when they need to travel. One woman said that in November 2022, authorities at the Yasleh checkpoint at the entrance of Sanaa stopped the bus she had taken from Sanaa to Aden because she was traveling without a male relative. She said the officer at the checkpoint reprimanded the driver, stating that it was forbidden to transport a woman without a male relative. Though the driver told the officer that the woman’s father was unwell, the officer stated that regardless of the father’s health or other circumstances, the father, as the woman’s male guardian, was required to obtain permission from Houthi authorities for the women to travel alone.

“I cried and told them that my mother had a stroke, and that I will travel to Aden even if I have to walk all the way,” she said. She said that after three hours and a fine to the bus driver, the male travelers on the bus were able to pressure the guards to let the bus through.

Even for women who do have a male relative, the restrictions impose an undue burden to their movement, and are a form of discrimination.

A woman from Sanaa working at a nongovernmental organization in Aden said that in July 2023 she was stuck in Sanaa for two days when trying to return home to Aden with her mother and sister after visiting family in Sanaa. The officer at the Yesleh checkpoint in Sanaa stopped them, stating that her brother or father would need to get approval from the Interior Ministry for the women to travel without a male relative. “My brother is good, he lets me go,” she said. “But what if there is a girl with a different family or a different environment? She can’t go anywhere.”

Another woman said that: “Women traveling alone can face real dangers. They might be stopped, interrogated, insulted, and humiliated by the Houthi forces. Even if they have the travel consent signed by their families and male relative, they will still face challenges at checkpoints.”

The UN also reported that since December 2020, Houthi authorities have increasingly enforced a requirement that aid agencies, including local and international nongovernmental organizations and UN agencies, must include a male relative’s name when submitting travel requests for any female Yemeni staff traveling for work. According to the UN, Many female staff do not have such a male relative, which led many to leave their jobs, losing much-needed income for their families.

In addition, as part of the Houthi Land Transport Regulatory Authority’s August 2022 guidance, they issued restrictions in areas they control requiring that women no longer be permitted to travel outside the country without a male relative.

In December 2022, several United Nations human rights experts sent a letter to the Houthis detailing the group’s “systematic violations of women’s and girls’ rights,” including their rights to freedom of movement, freedom of expression, health, and work, as well as widespread discrimination.

Government and STC Violations Against Women’s Freedom of Movement

Women traveling in areas of the country controlled by the Yemeni government and Southern Transitional Council (STC) have also reported being blocked from traveling at various checkpoints, despite no official guidance restricting women from traveling without a male relative from either group.

Several women said that they had been stopped many times at various Yemeni government and STC checkpoints, particularly at the entrances of governorates, including al-Hangar checkpoint in Taizz, al-Rebat and al-Hadid checkpoints in Aden, and Nihm checkpoint in Marib.

They said that these restrictions had not existed prior to the conflict and have grown more common in the last few years. Several women said that a social media campaign in 2022 by a fake account under name of “Sumaia al-Khoulani” against Yemeni women working in nongovernmental organizations, and subsequent religious discourse, had led to increased discrimination against and restrictions on women. “In Taizz, they spoke about this [social media campaign] at Friday prayers,” one woman said. “These hate speeches pushed some of the parties to the conflict to create all of these restrictions to ’protect’ women.”

An activist living in Aden, describing the government’s and religious leaders’ increasing repression of women across southern Yemen, said, “There’s no electricity, there’s no water, but what do they do? They focus on women.”

Interviewees said they believed that checkpoint officers specifically target women who appear to be working for nongovernmental organizations, and as a broader practice often treat women – and men – worse if they believe they are from Houthi-controlled areas.

Al-Rebat checkpoint, controlled by the STC, is at the border between Aden and Lahj governorates. Several women reported being harassed, humiliated, and in some cases blocked from traveling by officers at the checkpoint when trying to pass through it without a male relative.

One woman said that when she traveled to Aden with a female colleague in February 2023, they were stopped by the STC officers at the al-Rebat checkpoint and were told to get out of the car. “They asked where we were going and why we were traveling without a mahram,” she said. “I told them we are the relatives for each other, and we are traveling for work, but he refused to allow us in.”

A private driver who frequently makes the journey between Taizz and Aden said that al-Rebat checkpoint “doesn’t respect women.” He said that checkpoint officers at al-Rebat allow women traveling with their families to easily pass through, but that women traveling alone, “especially women working with nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations” are stopped and interrogated.

Several women also reported problems crossing through al-Hangar checkpoint in Taizz. “Once, I left Aden a bit late, so I arrived in Taizz in the evening, around 7 p.m.,” one woman said about a february 2023 incident “They stopped me at al-Hangar checkpoint, and ask me why I came late, and why I’m alone.” She said the only reason she was ultimately let through was because she told the officer that a person on the bus was her relative.

Women reported being harassed at checkpoints by officers, including verbally and physically. A woman who described being harassed by officers at multiple checkpoints around the south, said, “When I arrived at the first checkpoint in Al-Dhalea, I showed them five IDs for the university and the hospital that I work with in Sanaa, but they kept asking why I’m traveling alone and questioning what I’m doing in Sanaa, implying to unethical and dishonorable things. They continued harassing me very badly.”

Several women said that they had complained directly to the government and the STC but didn’t believe that either group had taken any action to address their complaints.

Dr. Olfat Al-Dubai, a prominent Yemeni women’s rights activist, said that the Yemeni government is aware of the violations and problems women are facing, but are not doing anything to respond to them. “[Civil society organizations] are reporting these violations to them regularly, but the government doesn't do anything to stop these behaviors and violations,” she said. “I myself submitted an official complaint to the prime minister about the incitement campaign against women, but they did nothing … they claim that they care about women’s rights, but in reality they are doing nothing in response to the challenges and the violations women are facing.”

She added that the government agencies concerned with women have failed to address violations against women, including the Ministry of Human Rights, the National Committee of Women, and the Ministry of Religious Endowments, none of which have done anything to halt these violations.

Harm Caused by Movement Restrictions

Male guardianship policies deprive women of their legal status to make decisions about their own lives and can cause deep harm. Discriminatory restrictions on women’s mobility within their country and to travel abroad violate women’s rights to freedom of movement, work, and study, to access health care, and to marry.

“My wedding is in December, and I can't travel,” one woman said. “That's why I'm sitting here planning and thinking about how I can get to Aden because I don't have a male guardian who can take me from Sanaa to Aden.”

Movement restrictions have also taken a mental health toll on women. “Travel becomes a big thing that must be well planned, and women must think a thousand times before making the decision [to travel],” another woman said.

Many women described how the movement restrictions have affected their work, and the work of their colleagues and friends.

“I had a colleague from al-Hudaydah who used to come from al-Hudaydah to Aden for training opportunities,” said one woman. “[Checkpoint officers] turned her away from the checkpoints multiple times … she was deprived of participating in these training programs.”

A pharmacist living in Aden said, “Many [job] opportunities have come my way, but I couldn’t seize them due to the challenges with travel.”

Women said that checkpoint officers, both in the north and the south, specifically target women believed to be working with nongovernmental organizations. “At checkpoints, they ask us whether we are affiliated with organizations or not, and if we say yes, they conduct harsher interrogations, which may lead to additional risks,” one woman said.

The restrictions have also had critical impacts on aid agencies, including on women who have jobs with these organizations who must travel to various areas of Yemen; on families who rely on humanitarian aid; and on aid assessments that include the needs of women and girls. In their letter to the Houthis regarding the requirement to be accompanied by a male relative, several UN special rapporteurs said that “[i]nability to travel means critical work tasks cannot be performed, which leads to loss of work experience, and there are many reports of female aid workers leaving employment and therefore losing much needed income for their families.”

They also said that the requirements are “effectively cutting off” Yemeni women and girls from receiving humanitarian aid … as it is generally considered inappropriate for male staff to deliver support.”

The increase of restrictions on women’s movement has also limited women’s access to education, particularly as many women in Yemen must travel to larger cities like Aden, Taizz, and Sanaa to attend a university. A student living in Taizz said that, “Women's opportunities to pursue higher education are very limited, and there are very few options, and even with these very few options women are restricted by requirements for a male relaive.”

One woman desribed her diffculty in continuing to attend college after her brother died in 2019. “After my brother’s death, I wanted to travel, and there was no one who could travel with me, especially with my father’s deteriorating health. I contacted my family, my paternal and maternal uncles, but due to divisions and fear of traveling to areas under the control of Ansar Allah, they refused to travel with me. My cousin said, ‘We are not male relatives to travel with you.’”

She said that on one of her visits back home from her university in 2022, she was stopped at al-Hangar checkpoint in Taizz and asked where her male relative was. She stated it was only after she was able to verify that she had family in Taizz that they let her through.

The woman who lives in Taizz, wanted to travel to Sanaa to attend graduate school in 2022, but said that her father refused because he was concerned about her safety traveling back and forth between the two cities. She said that her father told her, “I can’t let you go there, it is not safe. How can you freely travel back and forth through the checkpoints? It will pose a big risk for you, especially since we can’t afford to pay a relative’s expenses each time.”

The requirements also have an impact on women’s health, as many women must travel to other governorates, or even abroad, for health care. One woman said that her aunt, who is an older woman, needs a male relaive to escort her back and forth between Houthi-controlled Taizz and government-controlled Taizz to get treatment. She stated that once, her mother’s health deteriorated and she needed to go to the hospital, but she had to wait for her son to first travel from Sanaa to Hawban in Taizz (a 6-8 hour journey) to then take her.

The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen and the World Health Organization, among other international actors, have described the severe impacts that movement restrictions have had on women’s abilities to access health services. According to the International Rescue Committee, “Lifesaving and urgent services, including for sexual and reproductive health, the treatment of sexual violence related injuries, and the prevention of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, cannot reach women and girls who need them.”

Legal Obligations

Yemen’s constitution provides that “all citizens are equal in rights and duties,” and that “freedom of movement from one place to another within the country is guaranteed for all citizens and may not be restricted except by law and for reasons necessitated by the security and safety of the people. The law shall regulate entry and exit from Yemen.”

Restrictions on women’s movement also violate international human rights law. Yemen is a state party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, all of which obligate states to ensure freedom of movement and nondiscrimination, including to enter one’s own country and to leave any country, including their own, and freedom of movement within the country.

Discriminatory movement restrictions also breach women’s right to equality before the law, as well as their related rights including to work, study, marry, access health care, provide care to their children in their child’s best interests on an equal basis with men, and be free from violence.

The Houthis and the STC, as armed non-state groups that exercise de facto control over territory and populations, are obligated to respect and protect the human rights of individuals and groups living under their territory. The Houthis have controlled large swathes of Yemen since 2014, and the STC controls Aden, as well as other areas in southern Yemen, and both exercise significant governance-like functions. Their control over these territories obligates them to protect the right to freedom of movement for those living within their territories.

Iraq: Unregistered Marriages Harm Women and Children

Human Rights Watch - Sunday, March 3, 2024
Click to expand Image A wedding dress store in Duhok, Iraq, October 12, 2015. © 2015 Felix Kleymann/laif/Redux Religious leaders in Iraq conduct thousands of marriages each year, including child marriages, that flout Iraqi laws and are not officially registered. These marriages create a loophole around legal restrictions on child marriage and have disastrous effects on women and girls’ ability to get government services, register their children’s birth, and claim their rights. Iraq should prosecute religious leaders who officiate at marriages in violation of Iraqi law, facilitate the legalization of unregistered marriages, and ensure that all Iraqis have the full range of their rights.

(Beirut) – Religious leaders in Iraq conduct thousands of marriages each year, including child marriages, that flout Iraqi laws and are not officially registered, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. These marriages violate women and girls’ rights and may leave them in precarious positions without social or financial support.

March 3, 2024 “My Marriage was Mistake after Mistake”

The 40-page report, “‘My Marriage was Mistake after Mistake’: The Impact of Unregistered Marriages on Women’s and Children’s Rights in Iraq,” documents the impacts of unregistered marriages on women and girls who enter them, and the downstream effects on their children. The unregistered marriages function as a loophole around legal restrictions on child marriage and have disastrous effects on women and girls’ ability to get government services and social services linked to their civil status, obtain birth certificates for their children, or claim their rights to dowry, spousal maintenance, and inheritance.

“Iraqi authorities need to recognize that unregistered marriages are opening the door to child marriage on a large scale,” said Sarah Sanbar, Iraq researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Iraqi authorities should take steps to halt the practice and not make women’s and children’s access to critical services like identity documents or health care dependent on their civil status.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed eight women and two men, all of whom married outside the courts, one child whose parents had married outside the courts, four local nongovernmental groups, and two international groups. Human Rights Watch also interviewed a judge at Al Bayaa court in Baghdad, and a judge at the Supreme Judicial Council.

Over the last 20 years, child marriage rates have steadily been increasing in Iraq. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 28 percent of girls in Iraq are married before age 18. According to the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq, 22 percent of unregistered marriages involved girls under age 14. Child marriage puts girls at increased risk of sexual and physical violence, adverse physical and mental health consequences, and being denied access to education and employment.

Although many communities in Iraq consider the religious marriages culturally legitimate, they are illegal under Iraq’s Personal Status Law and are not officially recognized until registered with the Personal Status Court, after which the couple is issued a civil marriage certificate.

Without a civil marriage certificate, women and girls are unable to give birth in government hospitals and are forced to opt for at-home births with limited access to emergency obstetric services. This increases the risk of medical complications that can threaten the life of both the mother and her baby, particularly when the mother herself is a child.

One woman interviewed, from southeast Baghdad, was married at 14 and was divorced by age 15. “My husband refused to ratify the marriage or divorce contract so legally [on my ID] I am still single,” she said. “I can’t claim the monthly [governmental financial support] of 105,000 IQD (about US$80) for divorced women since I have no proof of my marriage or divorce.”

Under Iraq’s Birth and Death Registration Law of 1971, parents can only obtain birth certificates for babies born in wedlock. A child without a birth certificate cannot secure any other identity document and is at risk of losing their legal identity or becoming stateless. If their status is left unresolved, these children may be barred from enrolling in schools, getting jobs, obtaining travel documents, owning property, or getting married.

“I was married when I was 14, and soon after I became pregnant, my husband abandoned our family and took my ID and our [religious] marriage contract with him,” one woman interviewed said. “I was so young, and I had to give birth in my mother’s house with a midwife because I couldn’t go to the hospital. I couldn’t get my daughter her documents, and now she is 16 and still has no documents.”

Her daughter said, “Not having documents really affects my mental health. I can’t go anywhere, and I never feel safe.”

When asked how her life would change if she were able to get her documents, she said, “It would allow me to go to school and experience a sense of citizenship within my nation. Compared to others, my aspirations might seem modest. I want to get an ID, go to school, earn a degree, and eventually get a job.”

The process to legalize an unregistered marriage is lengthy, complicated, and bureaucratic. The process becomes significantly more difficult in cases involving divorce or the death, disappearance, or denial of the marriage by one spouse. For many women, the social, financial, and emotional burdens associated with undergoing this process seem insurmountable, leading them to forego legalization, and thus, their rights.

When a couple in which one or both spouses are underage goes before the court to have their marriage legalized, the judge faces a fait accompli, Human Rights Watch said. If the judge refuses to legalize their marriage, it leaves the couple and their children in a precarious position. But when judges ratify religious marriage contracts involving children, it weakens the rule of law and facilitates the growing prevalence of child marriage in Iraq. Most judges opt to legalize child marriages.

In a case in which a Human Rights Watch researcher was in the courtroom, at Al Bayaa court in Baghdad in May 2023, a 17-year-old girl, visibly pregnant, entered with her father and her 20-year-old husband. They had married a year earlier and were seeking to legalize their marriage ahead of the birth of their child. Without deeper inquiry into the circumstances of the marriage and wishes of the underage bride, the judge asked her, her father, and her husband whether they consented to the marriage and then certified it.

There are no provisions in Iraqi law that explicitly punish religious leaders who officiate marriages that go unregistered, including in cases in which one spouse is a child. This enables religious leaders to sidestep Iraqi law with impunity, Human Rights Watch said.

A judge at the Supreme Judicial Council said that it may be possible to initiate prosecutions against religious leaders by using article 240 of the Iraqi penal code, which punishes any person “who contravenes an order issued by a public official or agent, municipal council or official or semiofficial body in accordance with their legal authority or who disobeys an order issued by those entities.” However, he said this provision has never been used.

“The impacts of not having a civil marriage contract can be devastating for women and girls, and their children,” Sanbar said. “Iraq should prosecute religious leaders who officiate marriages in violation of Iraqi law, facilitate the legalization of unregistered marriages, and ensure that all Iraqis are able to enjoy their full range of rights.”

Australia: Youth Thought Dead May Be Held in Northeast Syria

Human Rights Watch - Saturday, March 2, 2024
Click to expand Image Yusuf Zahab in a photo he sent to Human Rights Watch from a besieged prison in northeast Syria in January 2022. © 2022 Private

(Sydney, March 2, 2024) – An Australian youth forced as a child to live under the Islamic State, who was believed to have died while wrongfully detained by anti-ISIS forces, appears to be alive in a prison in northeast Syria, Human Rights Watch said today. The Australian government should take immediate steps to confirm whether the young man is Yusuf Zahab and repatriate him.

During an interview videotaped on February 25, 2024, and subsequently aired on Australian media, the young man said he was Sydney-born Yusuf Zahab, who was reported missing in January 2022 during a battle between the Islamic State (ISIS) and US- and UK-backed, Kurdish-led forces at a prison in al-Hasakeh, northeast Syria. A close family member told Human Rights Watch that relatives “have no doubt” that the youth in the video is Zahab.

“The great news that Yusuf Zahab appears to have been found alive is tempered by the apparent failure of the Australian government to locate him for two long years,” said Letta Tayler, associate crisis and conflict director at Human Rights Watch. “Australian authorities should promptly confirm whether this man is Zahab and reinvigorate their efforts to bring home each and every Australian still held in northeast Syria.”

The family member said the videotaped interview prompted a “roller coaster” of emotions. “At first we were overjoyed, but then you go from pure joy to grief to anger. And then you think, okay now we know where he is, where do we go from here, and you realize you have so many questions and no one is giving you answers.”

Family members in Australia said Zahab was taken to Syria in early 2015, when he was 11, by adult relatives to live under ISIS rule. A predominantly Kurdish regional force, backed by a US-led international coalition that includes Australia, captured him and his relatives in early 2019, during the fall of the so-called ISIS caliphate.

The forces separated Zahab from his family and detained him in a severely overcrowded prison in al-Hasakeh holding thousands of foreign men suspected of ISIS links. The prison detainees were held incommunicado; lacked adequate food, water, and medical care; and had no way to contest the legality or necessity of their detention. In 2021, the family received word that Zahab had contracted tuberculosis, which was rampant in the prison.

In desperate voice messages to Human Rights Watch in January 2022, Zahab begged for help, saying he was wounded in the head and one arm as ISIS and Kurdish-led forces fought for control of the prison. About 500 detainees, fighters on both sides, and guards were killed during the battle, sparked by an ISIS takeover of the prison. Regional authorities have never answered questions on the number of the dead, injured, and missing, or on how many were children.

Since the fighting at the prison, conflicting accounts have emerged about what happened to Zahab. In July 2022, family members announced that Zahab was dead and held a memorial service for him. Human Rights Watch also reported at that time that he was dead, based on information from family members and sources close to the authorities in northeast Syria. In August 2023, a video emerged of a detainee in northeast Syria whom family members believed to be Zahab, allegedly from September 2022, but relatives received no proof that he was still alive. Human Rights Watch and others had also received isolated, secondhand reports that he had been seen in detention since the 2022 prison battle.

Neither the Australian government nor the Kurdish-led authorities governing northeast Syria have commented on whether Zahab was alive or dead, despite repeated inquiries from United Nations representatives, Human Rights Watch, and the media.

In the February 25 interview on the Australian network SBS, a young man with an Australian accent identifies himself as Zahab. An SBS story accompanying the brief video interview said the man was in his early 20s. Speaking from an undisclosed location that the report says is in northeast Syria, the man tells an SBS Dateline reporter, Colin Cosier, that he was taken by older relatives from Australia to Syria in 2015 after a vacation in neighboring Lebanon and Türkiye. He said he had no idea that his relatives were going to Syria until they crossed the border.

“I went through a lot of stuff, mostly bad,” the man said, his voice cracking. “I wish to go back to Australia. I wish to go back to my normal life I used to live 10 years ago. I wish to see my family again. … I think about them day and night.”

The Australian government told SBS it cannot comment on the SBS report for privacy reasons, but that the authorities are providing consular assistance to the family of a man currently detained in Syria. The close family member told Human Rights Watch that relatives are in contact with Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade but are not receiving any consular assistance, and that there is “zero information flow.” To their knowledge, the family member said, Australian officials had not visited Zahab since 2019. At that time, they had promised to return.

Tens of thousands of Syrians and foreigners from nearly 60 countries, including about 40 Australian women and children and several Australian men, are entering a sixth year of unlawful detention in dire and often life-threatening conditions in camps and prisons for ISIS suspects and family members in northeast Syria. Most are children, and none of the foreigners have been locally charged or have a way to contest the necessity and legality of their detention.

The Australian government has repatriated 24 citizens but stalled on bringing home the rest. In 2023, a Federal Court judge dismissed an application from the humanitarian organization Save the Children that sought to compel the Australian government to repatriate 20 Australian children and 11 women from the camps.

Research by both Human Rights Watch and the then-UN Special Rapporteur on upholding human rights while countering terrorism Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, found that the authorities in northeast Syria routinely separate foreign boys from their mothers in the camps when they approach adolescence and place them in locked “rehabilitation centers.” In many cases, boys that age are forcibly moved from these centers to prisons for adults that also hold young men captured as boys.

Human Rights Watch and the UN expert spoke with boys and mothers in the camps who were severely traumatized by the separations. Removing boys from their mothers without an expert determination that separation is in the best interest of the child is a grave violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It also can hinder the authorities’ stated efforts to “rehabilitate” these children.

Two Australian boys in the camps are approaching adolescence, family members said. The boys’ families fear they will also be forcibly transferred to so-called rehabilitation centers and to adult prisons.

Human Rights Watch has repeatedly pressed Australia and other governments to repatriate their nationals who are unlawfully and indefinitely detained in northeast Syria for rehabilitation, reintegration, and prosecution of adults as appropriate.

“Yusuf Zahab’s case highlights the horrors of mass, indefinite detentions of ISIS suspects and their families in northeast Syria,” Tayler said. “Australia and all other governments should repatriate their citizens now and prosecute adults as appropriate, before any more die or go missing.”

Thousands Flee New Violence in Northern Mozambique

Human Rights Watch - Friday, March 1, 2024
Click to expand Image Displaced people from the province of Cabo Delgado gather to received humanitarian aid from the World Food Program in Namapa, Mozambique, February 27, 2024.  © 2024 Alfredo Zuniga/AFP via Getty Images

A new wave of deadly attacks in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado by an armed group linked to the Islamic State (ISIS) is forcing thousands of people to flee. The attacks, by fighters known as Al-Shabab or Mashababos, include raids on villages in Chiure district, where at least four civilians were killed, and a clash in Macomia district, in which 25 Mozambican soldiers died.

Officials estimate that over 67,000 people have fled from villages across Cabo Delgado’s southern districts in the past two months, many to the neighboring province of Nampula, where the government has set up camps. The United Nations reported that those who have fled urgently need assistance and protection. Mozambican authorities should work with humanitarian agencies to ensure camps have adequate shelter, sanitation, and access to food, clean drinking water, health care, and education.

The armed group also destroyed houses, churches, schools, and health centers, according to media reports. This puts pressure on already degraded public services in the region, which has been engulfed in an armed conflict between the ISIS-linked group and regionally backed government forces since October 2017.    

The government has downplayed the insurgents’ threat, insisting that the security forces, which are backed by troops from Rwanda and countries of the Southern African Development Community, have the situation under control. But recent events show that people in Cabo Delgado are far from being safe even in places previously considered secure and able to accommodate those displaced by the conflict.

Mozambican authorities should improve security for residents in threatened areas and ensure better protection and reintegration plans for people who decide to return to their homes. Authorities should also move swiftly to bring to account all those responsible for killings of civilians and other abuses. 

Chad: Prominent Opposition Leader Killed

Human Rights Watch - Friday, March 1, 2024
Click to expand Image Political opposition leader Yaya Dillo gives a press conference on April 30, 2021, in N’Djamena, Chad. Dillo was killed on February 28, 2024, by security forces at his party’s headquarters in the capital. © 2021 Photo by Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images

(Nairobi) – The killing of a potential presidential candidate during an assault by Chadian security forces on an opposition party headquarters raises serious concerns about the environment for elections scheduled for May 6, 2024, Human Rights Watch said today.

On February 28, members of the security forces killed Yaya Dillo, the president of the Socialist Party Without Borders (Parti socialiste sans frontières, PSF), during an attack on the party’s headquarters in N’Djamena, the country’s capital. The state prosecutor, Oumar Mahamat Kedelaye, said at a news conference that Dillo was killed during an exchange of gunfire with security forces.

Click to expand Image The headquarters of the Socialist Party Without Borders (Parti socialiste sans frontières) in Klemat , N’Djamena, Chad on the morning of February 29, 2024, after a shootout with security forces the day before. © 2024 Private

“The circumstances of Yaya Dillo’s killing are unclear, but his violent death highlights the dangers facing opposition politicians in Chad, particularly as elections approach,” said Lewis Mudge, Central Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The prime minister and other key national figures should publicly call for an independent investigation into his death with an eye toward ensuring greater accountability before the election.”

Dillo, 49, was considered a leading political opponent of the current transitional president, Gen. Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno. The two men are reported to be cousins from the same Zaghawa ethnic group. While Dillo had not announced his intention to run for president, he was widely reported to be preparing to do so.

Earlier in the week, on February 27 into February 28, a high-ranking PSF member, Ahmed Torabi, was reported by the media to have been arrested for trying to assassinate the president of the supreme court. Some media outlets stated that Torabi had actually been killed by the security forces. The government alleged that PSF members attacked an office of the national security agency, which responded by attacking the party headquarters on February 28. Before he was killed, Dillo told Agence France-Presse that the claimed assassination attempt was staged and that his party members never attacked the security agency.

Human Rights Watch reviewed several photos sent by a reliable source close to Dillo, showing him dead with a single bullet wound to his head.

The day Dillo was killed marked three years since security forces attacked his home, on February 28, 2021, killing his 80-year-old mother and injuring five other family members.

Internet services across N’Djamena were cut following the attack and remained off through February 29, 2024, making communication with the capital very difficult.

The lack of clarity surrounding the attack on the PSF headquarters, the threats previously faced by Dillo, and the general political repression in the country all point to the need for an independent investigation with foreign assistance into the February 28, 2024 events, Human Rights Watch said.

Since President Idriss Déby’s death in April 2021, the transitional government headed by Déby’s son, Gen. Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, has on several occasions carried out violent crackdowns on opposition-led protests demanding civilian democratic rule and on independent media.

On October 20, 2022, security forces fired live ammunition at protesters during demonstrations organized by civil society groups and opposition parties, killing and injuring scores, and beating and chasing people into their homes. Hundreds of men and boys were arrested, and many were taken to Koro Toro, a high security prison 600 kilometers from N’Djamena. Several detainees died en route, some due to lack of water. At Koro Toro, protesters suffered further abuse, including ill-treatment by other detainees, and some died. The detainees were held for months and eventually released or pardoned. Chadian authorities refused to carry out prompt, effective, and impartial criminal investigations into the violations.

On November 23, 2023, the national transitional council passed an amnesty law that removed the possibility of prosecuting security forces or others responsible for serious violations, including killings against participants in the October 20 demonstrations, enshrining impunity and rewarding the abusers.

Dillo’s killing comes a week after the government’s removal of the president of the National Human Rights Commission (Commission nationale des droits de l'homme, CNDH), the only government institution willing to publish an accurate accounting of the deadly October 20 crackdown. Succès Masra, the current prime minister and president of Les Transformateurs – the political party whose members made up the bulk of the political detainees and victims after the October 20, 2022 protests – expressed his “total and unconditional support to the Head of State” in a February 28 tweet.

The president of the African Union, in a February 29 statement, expressed his concern over events in Chad, but did not call for an investigation.

“The African Union should take the lead in calling for an independent investigation into Yaya Dillo’s death and offer to provide assistance,” Mudge said. “A transparent reckoning of the circumstances surrounding Yaya Dillo’s death is needed to reassure Chadians of all political persuasions that the transitional government is committed to holding free and fair elections in May.”

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