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Cambodia: Threats, Bribes Tainted Senate Elections
(Bangkok) – Cambodian opposition politicians have reported intimidation and threats plus bribes and other unlawful inducements from government officials to withhold their support from opposition candidates in the recent Senate elections, Human Rights Watch said today. On April 3, 2024, the Cambodian Senate voted to approve former longtime Prime Minister Hun Sen of the ruling Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) to be Senate president.
Cambodia’s donors should call on the Cambodian government of Prime Minister Hun Manet to seriously and transparently investigate all interference related to the February 25 elections and the targeting of opposition councilors and activists.
“The allegations by opposition commune councilors and party activists raise serious concerns that Cambodia’s Senate elections were neither free nor fair,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Concerned governments should press Phnom Penh for accountability and reject this subversion of Cambodia’s remaining remnants of democracy.”
The official election results provided the CPP with 55 of the 58 elected Senate seats, while the Khmer Will Party (KWP) won three seats. Another 2 Senate seats appointed by King Norodom Sihamoni went to the CPP, and the final two seats, appointed by the CPP-controlled National Assembly, also went to CPP members.
Under Cambodia’s constitution, commune councilors elect most senators. Six elected commune officials and party officers from the opposition Candlelight Party (CLP), KWP, and National Power Party described to Human Rights Watch what appeared to be organized efforts by local and provincial government officials to unlawfully discourage Candlelight commune councilors from voting for candidates for Senate other than those from the longtime ruling CPP. They also said that financial inducements, gifts, and promises of political support were offered to opposition commune councilors willing to miss the Senate elections, or to vote for candidates from the CPP.
In May 2023, the governmental National Election Committee banned the CLP from registering candidates to run in the July 2023 national elections. The ban was also later applied to the February 2024 Senate elections. The election committee said that the CLP had failed to produce their original party registration document issued by the Ministry of Interior.
But the CLP said that the police refused to allow party members access to the shuttered headquarters of the Candlelight Party predecessor, the Cambodian National Rescue Party, where the original CLP registration document is stored. Although the National Election Committee accepted a copy of the registration paper to allow participation in the June 2022 commune councilor elections, it inexplicably refused to allow a copy of the registration paper for the national and Senate elections.
The CPP holds the vast majority of the 11,622 commune councilor seats across the country. The Candlelight Party holds 2,198. Yet, due to the CLP’s exclusion from the Senate elections, many senior and prominent former CLP members seeking election to the Senate moved to two other parties, the Khmer Will Party and the National Power Party.
On February 15, the National Election Committee issued a statement “that one political party not registered for the election threatened its commune/Sangkat councilors, electors, to vote for this or that political party, which results in violation of voting right[s]” and threatened to take legal action against the political party, presumably the Candlelight Party. The election committee did not provide any evidence to substantiate its claims, nor did it mention reported election malfeasance by the CPP.
A CPP spokesperson denied allegations that the party had intimidated voters or bought votes in Kampong Cham province and Phnom Penh, where 25 percent of Candlelight commune councilors voted for the ruling party based on preliminary Senate election results.
Human Rights Watch in February spoke to four Candlelight commune councilors and two opposition party officers. They described harassment and intimidation, including threats against them and their families, as well as promises of advantageous political positions, bribes of up to 12 million Cambodian Riel (US$3,000), mobile phones, and motorbikes – if they agreed to either not vote in the Senate election or if they voted for ruling party candidates.
Human Rights Watch wrote to the National Election Committee on March 27 regarding Human Rights Watch’s election findings but has not received a response.
The opposition councilors interviewed said government officials either offered good positions with the CPP now, or that the councilors could be listed with the CPP as candidates in the 2027 commune elections. The officials also assured them that aligning their vote with the CPP would not result in their losing their current positions as commune councilors for the remainder of their terms.
The councilors also said that government officials promised protection from Candlelight Party attempts to replace them as commune councilors, if they did not vote or voted to support the CPP. These pledges are consistent with a promise then-Prime Minister Hun Sen made in a speech in October 2022 to allow Candlelight commune councilors to leave their party but retain their positions through the protection of the Ministry of Interior.
A commune councilor said “[the government officials] did not say exactly how much money I would receive this time but said that after voting for the CPP, I can get money and be given a good position with the CPP in the future, and that I can keep my position as commune councilor even if the CLP tries to replace me.”
On January 22, Ly Sothearayuth, the CLP secretary general, told VOA News that the party was struggling to replace its commune councilors who had died, resigned, or moved to support the ruling CPP, and that requests to the Ministry of Interior had still not been processed after more than five or six months.
The commune councilors also said they feared that the CPP would take politically motivated legal action against them if they refused to comply with CPP election demands. One opposition councilor said, “I am worried that if there is legal action against me the courts are not independent: there is a 100 percent chance they will side with the ruling party. When the courts go after you, there is a 100 percent chance that you will lose.”
“I have become increasingly concerned for my safety,” said one. “Especially when I travel during nighttime alone.” A third councilor said, “I am afraid I will be attacked in the streets and left bloody like the CLP members who were attacked last year.” And another said all the commune councilors he had spoken to feared for their safety if they did not do as the CPP asked.
In the run-up to the February elections, Cambodian authorities arrested four opposition officials and members between January 15 and 31 for “forgery” crimes and placed them in pretrial detention. Police arrested the Kakab 2 area commune councilor, Khem Chanvannak, who was the acting head of CLP’s Phnom Penh operations, on January 15. The police stated that Chanvannak was being questioned for forgery related to crimes committed on November 7, 2023.
Police also arrested Chhay Chinda, a CLP official who works with the party’s women’s wing, on January 15, on forgery charges dating back to 2022. And on January 31, authorities arrested Ma Chinda, the head of the CLP youth movement in Phnom Penh’s Daun Penh district, and Hak Kosal, an opposition political activist, for forgery-related crimes. These arrests resemble politically motivated forgery arrests reported on by Human Rights Watch ahead of the May 2023 national assembly election.
“Cambodian government and ruling party targeting of opposition officials and activists to compel them not to vote shows an outrageous contempt for democracy,” Pearson said. “Cambodia’s partners should publicly condemn these politically motivated harassment and threats, and make it clear to the government that future engagement depends on the opening of democratic space in the country.”
For additional details and accounts by opposition members, please see below.
Accounts from Opposition Politicians
Human Rights Watch conducted in-person and phone interviews between February 9 and 27 with six opposition politicians from three opposition political parties, the Candlelight Party (CLP), the Khmer Will Party, and the National Power Party. Among the six opposition politicians were four commune councilors from different districts. Human Rights Watch used pseudonyms and removed location specific information to protect their security.
Direct Attempts by Authorities at Vote Interference or Buying
All four commune councilors interviewed said that they repeatedly received direct or implied offers of money, “gifts,” or other rewards to either vote for the CPP, or not vote at all.
“Sophal,” CLP commune councilor, said:
During the first meeting, a district officer … said that all I had to do was to not vote, I could keep my position as commune councilor. He assured me that even if the CLP tries to replace me in my position, the government will not allow this to happen. He also told me that in the next commune elections in 2027 I can be listed as a CPP candidate and would surely win. He told me there would be other benefits but did not specify what they would be. In the fifth and final meeting, a former member of the Candlelight Party who had defected to the CPP and a high-level ministry adviser told me that I did not have to join the CPP, but that if I either did not vote or if I voted for the CPP, I would later have the possibility of becoming a ministry advisor like he was.
“Vathanak,” CLP commune councilor, said:
In mid-January, I met three people in the commune council hall. Present on their side was a district officer, the provincial governor, and a commune chief. I was told that I would receive benefits and rewards for not voting, or for voting for either the CPP or for the government-aligned [royalist] FUNCINPEC Party, but that if I voted for the CPP I would receive a greater reward. I was told that if I voted for the CPP or for FUNCINPEC, I would be able to keep my position as commune councilor, even if the CLP tried to replace me and that I could be listed as a CPP candidate in 2027.
“Pheakdey,” CLP commune councilor, said:
I received a request to meet authorities to discuss the Senate elections at a coffee shop. The first meeting was on January 27. Present on their side was one CPP party officer from my province, one district governor chief, one district deputy, one commune chief, and two other district officials. I was told that I have the option to vote for the CPP or not vote at all, both options are okay. If I vote for the CPP or just not vote at all, I will receive 4 million Riel (US$1,000) from either option. The difference is, if I vote for the CPP, the CPP would ensure that I keep the same position during the rest of my term as commune councilor and when the next commune elections are contested in 2027, I can be listed as a CPP candidate.
“Vanna,” CLP commune councilor, said:
I was asked to meet authorities multiple times in January and February. During these meetings they said they could offer me US$1,000 if I did not vote and up to $3,000 if I voted for the CPP. During my second meeting they threatened me that if I do not join and vote for the CPP I might get a court complaint against me, they did not specify what type of complaint it would be. The next two meetings happened in early February at the commune hall where I worked. In both meetings, they tried to offer me money and a mobile phone if I joined the CPP and voted for the CPP in the Senate elections, but I refused their offer.
Reports of Attempts by Authorities to Influence Commune Councilors
“Sophal” said that the authorities tried to influence other councilors:
I know there are well over 100 commune councilors in my province, I have met 35 of those commune councilors. These commune councilors are people I know and have spoken to in person about authorities asking for commune councilors to either not vote or to vote for the CPP. Every single one of the 35 commune councilors shared with me that they had similar meetings and requests from authorities. In my case I was not offered money for my vote, or to not vote, but among the 35 other councilors I spoke to, I heard about offers they received from 4 million Riel ($1,000) to 20 million Riel ($5,000) for voting for the CPP. As an administration officer with the CLP, I am involved with a lot of internal communications within the party. From what has been reported from CLP commune councilors across the country, I have heard that 95 to 99 percent of commune councilors have received offers of bribes or “gifts as rewards” for either not voting at all or voting for the CPP. All of these reports I heard occurred similar to my timeline of meetings with authorities, in January and February 2024.
Other CLP councilors interviewed said they too had spoken to other opposition councilors in their districts and that almost all of them had experienced similar pressures and inducements to join the CPP.
“Pisey,” a party officer for the National Power Party said:
Based on my knowledge, the threats and bribes for commune councilors to not vote or to vote for the CPP have occurred since late last year and continued in January and February this year. There is usually an offer or promise of money or future positions in 2027 if they vote for the CPP or even not vote at all in the upcoming Senate elections. For what our activists report back to us, over 95 percent of commune councilors we work with have received threats or offers of rewards based on how they vote in the upcoming elections.
“Davuth,” a party officer for the Khmer Will Party, said:
In provinces around Phnom Penh, in the remote provinces such as Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, and Preah Vihear, and all the provinces around the Tonle Sap Lake, which are generally much poorer than the capital, the ruling party uses different methods to convince CLP councilors to sell their votes by offering them money, new phones, or even motorbikes. From what has been reported to me as a party organizer, the total amount of these gifts ranges up to $3,000 per vote. The arrests, intimidation, the vote buying attempts are happening at a scale that we have never seen before.
Concerns for Safety and Reports of Intimidation
Opposition commune councilors and party officials also expressed fears for their own safety.
“Vathanak” said:
I just want to share that I feel very concerned for my safety because I have never been previously contacted by the authorities [in this way]. Now that I have been called in to betray my party and officially support the CPP, I feel like I will be targeted by the government if I do not follow their requests. I am concerned about my safety all the time now. I’m afraid I will be attacked in the streets and left bloody like the CLP members who were attacked last year. I am also afraid of being targeted by the government through politically motivated legal means and placed in jail as has happened to so many opposition members.
“Pheakdey” said:
Personally, while traveling, I know that I must be careful. I am worried about attacks while in traffic because opposition members have been attacked before and the perpetrators were never caught. I am worried that if there is legal action against me the courts are not independent: there is a 100 percent chance they will side with the ruling party. When the courts go after you, there is a 100 percent chance that you will lose, you have zero chance of winning a case in Cambodia if the ruling party wants you to suffer.
“Pisey,” the National Power Party officer, said:
We also experience harassment whenever we organize a meeting. Local police come to almost every single meeting we organize, whether it is just an NPP meeting or a meeting with the CLP. Usually, three to five people from the local police come and take pictures of us and ask for a list of participants’ names. We feel like they do this because they want us to be worried and threatened, and so that they can keep track of us to find us later if they feel they need to. I always fear that my party or I will face consequences any time the opposition is successful, and we will face consequences for our actions if we go against the government.
Cambodian Election Law
Various Cambodian laws ostensibly provide protection to political parties, candidates, and party officials – which in practice have not been adequately enforced. The Law on the Election of Commune/Sangkat Councils, in article 39, establishes that political parties should be in charge of their own party candidate lists.
The Law on Administrative Management of Communes/Sangkats, in article 14, states that a valid councilor must fulfill the qualifications as stated in the law covering elections, including being on the candidate list, which the political parties oversee.
The Ministry of Interior’s failure to process requests by political parties to change commune councilor electors subverts the legal process for managing commune councilor lists based on the rights established in Cambodian law.
Article 71 of the Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly is applicable to the National Election Committee for the Senate Elections on February 15, 2024. The article provides that all political parties and candidates need to avoid using threats, intimidation, or violence against citizens, other political parties, or candidates. The law prohibits parties and candidates from inciting their supporters or voters to commit abuses, threats, violence, or intimidation against individuals or other political parties.
But the law also broadly and problematically bans direct or indirect verbal remarks or written statements by parties and candidates that are immoral and insult any candidates, their supporters, or anyone else.
With respect to the concerns raised by the opposition councilors to Human Rights Watch, the law prohibits all political parties, candidates, or supporters from threatening, intimidating, or enticing anyone to pledge their vote for any political party. In addition, political parties, candidates, or representatives must not make donations in cash or through any kind of incentives to institutions, organizations, or any person to buy votes.
International Human Rights Standards
Cambodia has been a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 1992. Article 25(b) of the ICCPR guarantees “the right to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections … guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, an international expert body that monitors state compliance with the ICCPR, has stated in General Comment No. 25 related to article 25, that “[p]ersons entitled to vote must be free to vote for any candidate for election… without undue influence or coercion of any kind which may distort or inhibit the free expression of the elector’s will.”
Colombia, Panama Fail to Protect Migrants in Darién Gap
Click to expand Image Migrants sit under a sign marking the Panama-Colombia border during their trek across the Darién Gap, May 9, 2023. Hundreds of people making the journey through the jungle have experienced robbery and serious abuse, including sexual violence. © 2023 AP Photo/Ivan Valencia, File Colombia and Panama are failing to effectively protect and assist hundreds of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers in the Darién Gap and to investigate abuses there. Over half a million people, including 113,000 children, crossed the Darién Gap in 2023. Panamanian authorities estimate that the number of people crossing is likely to be even higher in 2024. Over 1,500 have reported sexual violence since 2021. Colombian and Panamanian authorities should prevent exploitation by criminal groups and bandits, conduct criminal investigations, and ensure access to food, water, and basic healthcare services.
(Bogota, April 3, 2024) – Colombia and Panama are failing to effectively protect and assist hundreds of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers transiting through the Darién Gap, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.
The 110-page report, “Neglected in the Jungle: Inadequate Protection and Assistance for Migrants and Asylum Seekers Crossing the Darién Gap,” is the second in a series of Human Rights Watch reports on migration via the Darién Gap. Human Rights Watch identified specific shortcomings in Colombia’s and Panamana’s efforts to protect and assist people – including those at higher risk, such as unaccompanied children – as well as to investigate abuses against them.
“Whatever the reason for their journey, migrants and asylum seekers crossing the Darién Gap are entitled to basic safety and respect for their human rights along the way,” said Juanita Goebertus, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. “Colombian and Panamanian authorities can and should do more to ensure the rights of migrants and asylum seekers crossing their countries, as well as of local communities that have experienced years of neglect.”
Human Rights Watch visited the Darién Gap four times between April 2022 and June 2023 and interviewed almost 300 people, including migrants and asylum seekers, victims of serious abuses, aid workers, and Colombian and Panamanian authorities. Between January 2022 and March 2024, researchers also conducted phone and virtual interviews. Human Rights Watch also reviewed data and reports by the Colombian, Panamanian, and United States governments; United Nations agencies; international, regional, and local human rights and humanitarian organizations; and local legal clinics, and repeatedly sent information requests to Colombian and Panamanian authorities, who in most cases responded.
Human Rights Watch found that on both sides of the border, the authorities are failing to effectively protect the right to life and physical integrity of transiting migrants and asylum seekers, and to investigate violations effectively, promptly, and thoroughly. Efforts to guarantee access to food, water, and essential healthcare services have proven inadequate, affecting the basic rights of both migrants and local communities that have experienced longstanding marginalization, high poverty rates, and a lack of opportunities.
Crimes against migrants and asylum seekers in the Darién Gap, including pervasive cases of sexual violence, go largely uninvestigated and unpunished on both sides of the border. Accountability for these abuses is rare due to a combination of limited resources and personnel, a lack of a criminal investigation strategy for these cases, and poor coordination between Colombian and Panamanian authorities.
On March 4, 2024, the Panamanian government suspended the work of Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders or MSF) in the country, saying that its agreement with the humanitarian group had ended in December. MSF says that they have been seeking a renewal since October. The organization played a leading role in assisting migrants and asylum seekers, including hundreds of survivors of sexual violence.
“Restricting MSF’s work is exactly the opposite of what is needed to address the situation in the Darién Gap,” Goebertus said. “Panamanian authorities should urgently review this decision to ensure the rights of migrants and asylum seekers, including victims of sexual violence.”
Over half a million people crossed the Darién Gap in 2023, including 113,000 children. Based on the large number of people who crossed in January and February, Panamanian authorities estimate that the number of people crossing is likely to be even higher in 2024.
Click to expand ImageDuring their journey through this difficult terrain, Venezuelans, Haitians, and Ecuadorians, as well as people from Asia and Africa, have experienced serious abuses, including sexual violence. Since 2021, over 1,500 people have reported sexual violence to MSF, but the numbers are likely to be higher. However, between January 2021 and December 2023 the Attorney General’s Office in Panama reported only 285 victims of sexual abuse.
Dozens, if not hundreds, have lost their lives trying to cross or are missing. While the International Organization for Migration reported that 245 have disappeared between 2021 and March 2023, the real figure is likely to be much higher.
In one case documented by Human Rights Watch, in October 2022, a Venezuelan couple embarked on the journey with their 6-year-old son and two other children through the Darién jungle. Amid the arduous trek, a stranger offered to carry their son to expedite the journey, but that group soon outpaced them, the parents said. As they caught up with the group the next morning, the man told them that their child had drowned while crossing the river. It took the authorities eight days to begin a search, and Interpol issued a notice to help locate the child over a month later. He remains missing.
Researchers found that in Colombia, the government lacks a clear strategy to safeguard the rights of migrants and asylum seekers crossing the Darién Gap. The limited government presence in the region effectively leaves them unprotected from the Gulf Clan, an armed group involved in drug trafficking that controls the flow of migrants and asylum seekers and profits from their desperation and vulnerability.
The Panamanian government implements a strategy of “controlled flow” or “humanitarian flow.” The policy appears focused on restricting the free movement of migrants and asylum seekers within Panama and seeking their swift exit to Costa Rica, rather than on addressing their needs or ensuring that they can exercise their right to seek asylum, Human Rights Watch found.
Both Colombia and Panama should appoint a special adviser or senior official to coordinate their response to the increased migration flow across the Darién Gap and bolster cooperation among the two governments and with the UN and other humanitarian agencies.
Both governments should work with humanitarian organizations and local communities to establish a joint system to rescue people reported missing in the Darién Gap and to identify and recover bodies. They should also strengthen efforts to prevent, investigate, and punish sexual violence against migrants and asylum seekers. They should increase forensic capacity in the region, prioritize investigations into these cases, and address obstacles that make it harder for victims to report crimes. Working with humanitarian organizations, governments should bolster medical, including psychological, assistance for victims.
Addressing the situation in the Darién Gap will require broader efforts across the region. Latin American governments and the US should reverse measures that are preventing access to asylum and forcing people into dangerous crossings like the Darién Gap. They should honor the 40th anniversary of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, a landmark international instrument on refugees’ rights in Latin America, by adopting rights-respecting policies.
“Colombia and Panama should not be left alone to respond to the challenges in the Darién Gap,” Goebertus said. “Foreign governments should support meaningful efforts to assist and protect migrants and asylum seekers – and all governments should provide options to ensure that people are not forced to risk their lives in the jungle.”
Rwanda: Genocide Archives Released
(Nairobi) – Human Rights Watch announced today that it is releasing a series of archives highlighting the extraordinary efforts of human rights defenders in Rwanda and abroad, to warn about the planned 1994 genocide and attempt to stop the killings. The documents painfully illustrate leading international actors’ refusal to acknowledge the slaughter of more than half a million people and act to end it.
A significant number of individuals responsible for the genocide, including former high-level government officials and other key figures behind the massacres, have since been brought to justice, and more than a dozen prosecutions of genocide suspects are being conducted in domestic courts across Europe under the principle of universal jurisdiction. And yet, in recent years, several high-level alleged genocide masterminds have died, or, in the case of one alleged planner, been declared unfit to stand trial, highlighting the urgent need to continue the quest to deliver justice.
“The genocide in Rwanda remains a stain on our collective conscience and, 30 years later, lessons can still be drawn from the actions – or lack thereof – of world leaders in the face of ongoing atrocities,” said Tirana Hassan, executive director at Human Rights Watch. “There is an urgent need to expedite the pursuit of justice to ensure that the remaining architects of the genocide are held to account before it is too late.”
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down over the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The crash marked the beginning of three months of ethnic killings across Rwanda on an unprecedented scale.
Hutu political and military extremists orchestrated the killing of approximately three quarters of Rwanda’s Tutsi population, leaving more than half a million people dead. Many Hutu who attempted to hide or protect Tutsi, as well as those who opposed the genocide, were also killed.
In mid-July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a predominantly Tutsi rebel group based in Uganda that had been fighting to overthrow the Rwandan government since 1990, took over the country and ended the genocide. Its troops killed thousands of predominantly Hutu civilians, though the scale and nature of these killings were not comparable to the genocide.
Human Rights Watch documented the genocide and the RPF’s 1994 crimes in detail. Alison Des Forges, senior adviser to the Africa division at Human Rights Watch for almost two decades, published the authoritative account of the Rwandan genocide, “Leave None to Tell the Story,” and documented the international community’s indifference and failure to act.
Despite repeated warnings by Rwandan and international human rights organizations, diplomats, United Nations staff, and others that a genocide was being planned in the period leading up to April 1994, governments and intergovernmental bodies, including the UN and the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), failed to act to prevent the genocide as it unfolded. The UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda withdrew most of its troops at the height of the massacres, leaving the Rwandan civilian population defenseless.
Thirty years later, Human Rights Watch is releasing part of its archives from March 1993 to December 1994. The documents and a chronology of actions during this period illustrate the organization and its allies’ extensive advocacy efforts, led by Alison Des Forges, first to try to prevent, and then to stop, the killings. The chronology does not purport to be a comprehensive compilation of all actions undertaken by civil society organizations and others in 1993 and 1994. The contents are rather some of what remained in Human Rights Watch’s possession from a pre-internet period after the unexpected death of Des Forges in 2009 in a plane crash in the US, and which the organization considers to be of public interest.
Stopping the leaders and the killers in Rwanda would have required military force, but in the early stages, a relatively small one. A rapid and efficient international intervention could have succeeded in halting the genocide and preventing some of the worst killings. The archives illustrate how international leaders not only rejected this course, but also declined for weeks to use their political and moral authority to challenge the legitimacy of the genocidal government. Strategy documents, statements, and letters show that international leaders at the time refused to declare that a government that was exterminating its citizens would never receive international assistance and did nothing to silence radio programs that incited Rwandans to slaughter. Such simple measures could have sapped the strength of the authorities bent on mass murder and encouraged Rwandan resistance to the extermination campaign.
On May 10, 1994, Des Forges wrote a letter to then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights José Ayala Lasso, informing him that the regime committing genocide was cognizant of how it was perceived internationally and that, the day before his planned visit to Rwanda, “the national committee of the Interahamwe militia […] broadcast a communique calling on their members to stop killing Tutsi and members of the political opposition. They also asked them to help stop killings by those who were not members of their groups.”
The documents shed light on the vital role played by human rights defenders in preventing atrocities. From the outset, Human Rights Watch and several others expressed alarm at the targeting of human rights activists in Rwanda.
In the months and years that followed, as the horror of the genocide sank in, “never again” became a common refrain. A number of world leaders acknowledged, and some apologized for, their failure to halt the genocide. It was also one of the triggers of the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, which governments adopted in 2005 to protect people facing mass atrocities.
Overwhelming guilt at their individual and collective failure to stop the genocide has been a defining factor in many governments’ foreign policy toward Rwanda since that time. It continues to color international perceptions of and reactions to events in Rwanda and in the Great Lakes region, especially in relation to Rwanda’s human rights record in the 30 years since the genocide and its repeated incursions into the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwanda has supported Congolese armed groups responsible for killings of civilians, rape, and other grave human rights violations.
The majority of genocide related prosecutions have taken place in Rwandan courts. Others have occurred before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or domestic courts across Europe and North America.
Rwanda's community-based gacaca courts completed their work in 2012; the ICTR formally closed in 2015, handing over a number of functions to a residual mechanism. After years of delays, since 2001, scores of genocide suspects have been investigated, arrested, or prosecuted under the principle of universal jurisdiction in France, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other European and North American countries.
The 30th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide provides an opportune and urgent moment to take stock of progress, both at national and international levels, in holding to account suspects who planned, ordered, and carried out these horrific crimes. It is all the more urgent to do so, and to accelerate efforts to prosecute remaining genocide suspects, as several high-profile planners and masterminds of the genocide have already died and one – Félicien Kabuga – was declared unfit to stand trial.
“An enduring lesson from the genocide is the international community’s failure to take heed of the clear signs that preparations for mass atrocities were underway – including warnings from human rights defenders who put their lives on the line to sound the alarm,” Hassan said. “Despite the passage of time, victims deserve to see those responsible for genocide and other crimes arrested and prosecuted in fair and credible trials.”
For an update on justice efforts after the genocide since 2019, please see below.
Justice Since the Genocide
The genocide in Rwanda, together with the wars in the Balkans, marked a turning point in international commitment to including accountability and criminal trials as part of responses to grave crimes under international law. The creation of the ICTR in 1994, and of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) the year before, paved the way for international justice. One important legacy of the genocide in Rwanda is the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998.
The ICC is the first permanent international criminal court whose mandate is not limited to a specific situation, but that has a potential global reach, with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The ICC currently has 124 states parties, and has opened 17 investigations into grave international crimes, spanning all regions of the world. It acts as a court of last resort, stepping in only when national authorities do not carry out genuine investigations and, as appropriate, prosecutions. The court anchors a broader system of justice for serious international crimes rooted in the national courts of its member countries.
International Justice for the Rwandan Genocide (2019-2024)
The United Nations Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994 in response to the genocide. The tribunal indicted 93 people, convicted and sentenced 62, and acquitted 14. The remaining defendants had their cases transferred to national jurisdictions, while other suspects died before being presented before a judge or remain fugitives. The tribunal made significant contributions to establishing the truth about the organization of the genocide and providing justice to victims. Des Forges appeared as an expert witness in 11 genocide trials at the tribunal.
However, the ICTR ultimately prosecuted only a limited number of cases and was unwilling to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The tribunal formally closed on December 31, 2015.
As it wound down its work between 2011 and 2015, the ICTR transferred several genocide cases to Rwandan courts. To provide for the transfer of those cases, as well as extraditions of genocide suspects from other countries, the Rwandan government undertook reforms to the justice system aimed at meeting international fair trial standards. But the technical and formal improvements in laws and administrative structure have not been matched by gains in judicial independence and respect for the right to a fair trial.
Several people convicted by the ICTR have since died or served their sentences. On September 25, 2021, Malian officials announced the death of Théoneste Bagosora, a former Rwandan army colonel convicted of masterminding killings during the 1994 genocide. Bagosora, 80, was serving a 35-year sentence in Mali after the tribunal found him guilty of crimes against humanity.
When the ICTR closed, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), created in 2010, was tasked with arresting and prosecuting the nine remaining tribunal-indicted fugitives. It retained jurisdiction over Augustin Bizimana, Félicien Kabuga, and Protais Mpiranya, while referring the six remaining cases to Rwandan authorities (Fulgence Kayishema, Charles Sikubwabo, Aloys Ndimbati, Charles Ryandikayo, Phénéas Munyarugarama, and Ladislas Ntaganzwa).
In May 2023, Kayishema was arrested in South Africa, after evading justice since 2001. He is alleged to have planned the killings of more than 2,000 men, women, and children on April 15, 1994, at a church in western Rwanda.
Kabuga, an alleged mastermind behind the genocide, was arrested in France in May 2020. His trial started in September 2022 before the IRMCT, but was suspended in March 2023 while judges considered whether he was mentally fit to stand trial. In August 2023, IRMCT Appeals Chamber’s judges ordered the trial indefinitely suspended, confirming in part a June trial chamber decision finding Kabuga unfit to stand trial.
Just days after Kabuga’s arrest in 2020, the Residual Mechanism announced that the remains of Bizimana – the defense minister at the time of the genocide – had been identified in a grave in the Republic of Congo. In May 2022, Mpiranya – the commander of the army’s presidential guard at the time of the genocide – was confirmed dead. Des Forges had documented Mpiranya’s involvement in leading militia members and civilians in carrying out the killings. In May 2022, the IRMCT prosecutor also confirmed the death of another fugitive, Munyarugarama, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in 2002.
As a result of these deaths, survivors have been robbed of their chance to see some of those allegedly responsible for the genocide face the accusations against them in a court of law.
Rwanda’s Public Prosecution Authority was quoted in media reports saying that Kayishema is expected to be transferred first to the Residual Mechanism in Arusha, Tanzania, and then to Rwanda for trial. Kayishema is challenging his transfer to Rwanda in the South African court system, South African judicial authorities told Human Rights Watch.
The prosecution of international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity in the country where they were committed, close to the victims and the affected population, can have a number of advantages over prosecutions in international courts, provided fair trials can be guaranteed. However, in Rwanda, the justice system lacks independence, and the government can influence the outcome of trials, especially in politically sensitive cases. This risks undermining the rights of the accused, as well as those of the victims to receive meaningful justice.
Ntaganzwa, whose case was also transferred to the Rwandan authorities, was arrested in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2015 and, in March 2016, was extradited to Rwanda where he faced trial. He was convicted in May 2020 and his conviction and life sentence were upheld on appeal in March 2023. However, fair trial concerns have been raised, including about the length of the trial.
In its monitoring report for November 2018, the IRMCT reported that Ntaganzwa had told the court he was held in solitary confinement for 25 days, and that prison authorities had harassed him, and threatened to beat him up. In a meeting with monitors in December, he said that his defense lawyers had not been allowed to see him during his time in solitary confinement, that the authorities had confiscated his laptop for a day, and that he was concerned that they had gone through his defense documents.
In March 2019, one of Ntaganzwa’s defense lawyers expressed concern that sharing the defense witness list early in the proceedings could lead to witness tampering. Ntaganzwa repeated his concerns regarding the prison authorities’ attempts to monitor his communications and laptop on several occasions.
Trials Under Universal Jurisdiction
Much of the information below draws on TRIAL International’s database on universal jurisdiction, which provides an overview of major criminal cases related to universal jurisdiction worldwide.
Typically, national authorities are only able to investigate a crime if there is a link between their country and the crime. However, under the principle of “universal jurisdiction,” national judicial systems can investigate and prosecute certain of the most serious crimes under international law no matter where they were committed, and regardless of the nationality of the suspects or their victims. Cases brought under this principle are an increasingly important part of international efforts to hold those responsible for atrocities accountable, provide justice to victims who have nowhere else to turn, deter future crimes, and help ensure that countries do not become safe havens for human rights abusers.
Some countries have created specialized war crimes units within their law enforcement and prosecution services focused on addressing grave international crimes committed abroad, including genocide.
In some of these countries, many years elapsed before trials of Rwandan suspects began. But, since 2001, several countries have tried Rwandan genocide suspects, including Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. For some, these were the first cases of genocide tried in their domestic courts. Criminal investigations are still ongoing against other Rwandan genocide suspects in several countries, including France and Belgium.
France
In France, a country to which a number of known genocide suspects had fled after the genocide, judicial authorities have finally redoubled efforts to secure the delivery of justice for the genocide after decades of delays and lengthy judicial processes. It was not until 20 years after the genocide, in February 2014, that France’s newly created war crimes unit tried the first suspect, Pascal Simbikangwa, a former intelligence chief under the Habyarimana government. It was a significant moment, as France had backed the former government of Rwanda and supported and trained some of the forces that carried out the genocide. On March 14, 2014, a Paris court found Simbikangwa guilty of genocide and complicity in crimes against humanity, and sentenced him to 25 years in prison. His conviction was upheld on appeal in May 2018.
In 2021, after decades of tense relations between France and Rwanda, a commission established by President Emmanuel Macron to investigate France’s role in the 1994 genocide published a 1,200-page report concluding that France has responsibilities it characterized as “serious and overwhelming,” including for being blind to the preparation of the genocide and being slow to withdraw support from the government orchestrating it.
During a visit to Rwanda in May 2021, Macron committed to ensuring that nobody suspected of crimes of genocide escapes justice. Since then, the French and Rwandan governments have increased cooperation and efforts to arrest and try genocide suspects in France.
Laurent Bucyibaruta, the Gikongoro prefect at the time of the genocide, fled to France in 1997. He was indicted by the ICTR on June 16, 2005, for incitement to genocide, genocide, and complicity in genocide, as well as crimes against humanity including extermination, murder, and rape. The ICTR referred the case to the French authorities, and he was arrested on September 5, 2007, and placed under judicial surveillance. Over 10 years later, on December 24, 2018, investigative judges referred the case to the Paris Criminal Court for complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity.
On January 21, 2021, the Court of Appeals confirmed the referral and changed the charges from complicity to direct perpetration of genocide for certain criminal facts and added charges that the judge had previously rejected. During his trial, which took place from May 9 to July 1, 2022, Bucyibaruta was acquitted of the charge of directly perpetrating genocide and crimes against humanity, but he was found guilty of complicity in those crimes for abetting several massacres. He was sentenced to 20 years and imprisoned at the end of the trial. Bucyibaruta died on December 6, 2023.
Sosthene Munyemana, a well-known doctor in Butare, was indicted in Paris for genocide and crimes against humanity on December 14, 2011, and placed under judicial supervision. Twelve years later, in December 2023, he was found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity, and participation in a group formed for the purpose of preparing for complicity in these crimes, though he was acquitted of complicity, and sentenced to 24 years in prison. He was accused of inciting Hutu to exterminate the Tutsi community of Tumba in a public speech on April 17, 1994; of taking part in several massacres of Tutsi in and around Tumba; of distributing ammunition; of compiling lists of Tutsis to be eliminated; of leading night patrols; and of giving directions for abductions. His defense team announced Munyemana would appeal.
Eugene Rwamucyo, a doctor and the head of the Center of Public Health of the University of Butare at the time of the genocide, was indicted and placed under judicial surveillance in 2013. In April 2020, the prosecution asked to try him on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. In October 2020, the case was referred to the Paris Criminal Court. Rwamucyo appealed and, in September 2022, the Paris Court of Appeals confirmed the referral to the Assize Court. In January 2023, the Court of Cassation rejected his appeal and confirmed the referral of his case for the last time. He is detained and awaiting trial.
Philippe Hategekimana, a former gendarme, was convicted by a French court and sentenced to life in prison in June 2023 for genocide and crimes against humanity. He was found guilty of all charges against him for his participation in mass murders in Nyanza, and the murder of a nun and a mayor. Hategekimana fled to France in 1999, where he obtained refugee status, and later became a French citizen in 2005. After an investigation was opened in France, following a complaint filed by the Collective of Civil Parties for Rwanda (Collectif des parties civiles pour le Rwanda, CPCR), Hategekimana fled to Cameroon in 2017. In 2019, he was extradited to France, indicted, and his trial started on May 10, 2023. He has appealed the conviction.
In February 2014, French authorities rejected an extradition request from Rwandan authorities for Claude Muhayimana, who obtained French citizenship in 2010, but arrested him two months later following a 2013 complaint by the CPCR. In November 2017, a judge referred his case to the Paris Criminal Court for complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity. The trial took place between November and December 2021. Muhayimana was found guilty of complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity for transporting militiamen to killing sites during the genocide and was sentenced to 14 years in prison. On December 21, 2022, the Court of Appeals released Muhayimana pending his appeal.
Other cases are ongoing. Marcel Hitayezu, a former priest in Mubuga parish, is under judicial surveillance in France, charged with genocide and complicity in crimes against humanity in April 2021. Isaac Kamali, a former official of the Ministry of Public Works and Energy, was indicted in September 2021 and placed under judicial surveillance for his alleged involvement in genocide and crimes against humanity, according to TRIAL International. He was first arrested in Paris in June 2007. French authorities denied an extradition request by Rwanda in 2008.
Laurent Serubuga was a high-ranking officer in the Rwandan army, the deputy chief of staff until 1992, and allegedly associated with the Akazu, an informal organization of Hutu extremists. A memo issued by the French intelligence services from September 1994 and leaked to the media in 2019, describes him as one of the key suspects in the April 6, 1994 attack on Habyarimana’s plane. Several nongovernmental groups filed a complaint against him before the investigating judges of the Paris High Court and, in 2002, an investigation was opened against him for genocide and complicity in crimes against humanity. Rwanda issued an arrest warrant and extradition order to France in 2013, and while he was arrested that same year, France denied the extradition request and he was released. In 2017, the investigation was completed. The prosecutor’s office has yet to issue its final submissions stating its position on next steps, according to TRIAL International.
Pierre Kayondo, a former prefect of Kibuye and reportedly a shareholder of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), which had broadcast incitements to genocide before April 6 and communicated the orders for implementing the killings after that date, was arrested in September 2023, and charged with complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity. The French judiciary had opened an investigation in October 2021 against Kayondo for his involvement in massacres, following a complaint from the CPCR.
Belgium
In Belgium, Pierre Basabose, a retired member of the Rwandan army and shareholder of RTLM, and Seraphin Twahirwa, a relative of Habyarimana accused of leading the Interahamwe, were put on trial for genocide and war crimes in October 2023. Both were first arrested in September 2020 but later released under investigation. In December 2023, Twahirwa was found guilty of participating in or overseeing atrocities; while Basabose was found guilty of funding the militia, but was not sentenced to a prison term due to health reasons. The court also established that Twahirwa had raped or overseen the rape of multiple women, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Both have appealed their conviction, according to TRIAL International.
Ernest Gakwaya and Emmanuel Nkunduwimye were arrested in March 2011 in Brussels. Gakwaya is facing charges for murdering and raping Tutsi and moderate Hutu, and Nkunduwimye allegedly committed murder, attempted murder, and rape. Both are alleged former Interahamwe members. In October 2019, the Belgian judiciary separated their cases from a case against Fabien Neretse. The scheduled hearings were postponed because of the Covid-19 pandemic and no date has yet been set for the opening of their trial, according to TRIAL International.
After Belgian and French authorities issued arrest warrants against him, in 2011, Neretse was arrested in France and eventually handed over to Belgium, where his trial for genocide and the war crime of murder took place in 2019. The Brussels Criminal Court found him guilty of genocide and war crimes, and sentenced him to 25 years in prison. The court based Neretse’s conviction on his role as a founder of an Interahamwe militia, providing them with weapons and money; and on his role planning massacres. He was also found guilty of several murders, including of a Belgian national, Claire Beckers, her Rwandan Tutsi husband, Isaïe Bucyana, and their daughter.
Christophe Ndangali, the Ministry of Education’s chief of staff at the time of the genocide, was charged with genocide and war crimes, and arrested in September 2020 in Belgium for allegedly participating in the exclusion of Tutsi from the school system and calling for their extermination. The investigation is ongoing.
Several other cases are ongoing in Belgium, although trials have been slow to materialize. Across Europe, investigations and prosecutions have continued with a new sense of urgency.
Other Cases in Europe
Pierre-Claver Karangwa, a former Rwandan military official suspected of having played a key role in the genocide, was arrested in the Netherlands in October 2023. His arrest came after the Dutch Supreme Court ruled in June 2023 that he could not be extradited to Rwanda because of the risk of an unfair trial. The Netherlands has extradited several other genocide suspects in the past.
In December 2015, a United Kingdom district judge, after assessing the trials of previously extradited suspects and the updated legal framework in Rwanda, rejected an extradition request for five Rwandan genocide suspects due to risks they would not get a fair trial in Rwanda. Vincent Brown, also known as Vincent Bajinya; Charles Munyaneza; Emmanuel Nteziryayo; Célestin Ugirashebuja; and Célestin Mutabaruka were held in the UK in 2013 after an extradition request from the Rwandan government. The investigation was reopened in 2018 at the request of Rwandan prosecutors, and British police confirmed investigations are ongoing in April 2019.
In January 2024, a 69-year-old Rwandan man was arrested in Gateshead, in the north of England, by police investigating genocide and crimes against humanity. He was released on bail.
In 2017, Theodore Tabaro was charged in Sweden with murder, attempted murder, rape, kidnapping, and of having organized, recruited, incited, and executed killings against Tutsi. In 2018, he was sentenced to life in prison for genocide through murder, attempted murder, and abduction, but was acquitted of rape charges. The Appeals Chamber upheld the verdict and sentence in April 2019.
In Norway, Jean Chrysostome Budengeri was arrested by the National Criminal Investigation Service (known as “Kripos”) in June 2018 on suspicion of participating in killings during the genocide. His defense lawyer requested an independent review of Kripos’ investigation by the attorney-general in May 2019, citing discrepancies in witness interviews and their translations. The attorney-general rejected his request. Budengeri was released from pretrial detention in September 2019 but ordered to report to the police twice a week.
Trials in Rwanda
In Rwanda, the task of delivering justice was made more difficult by the fact that many judges, lawyers, and other judicial staff were killed during the genocide, and much of the country’s infrastructure was destroyed. Despite these challenges, the Rwandan government embarked on an ambitious and unprecedented approach to delivering justice, using both conventional domestic courts and community-based gacaca courts.
The gacaca left a mixed legacy. Its positive achievements included the courts’ swift work in processing a huge number of cases; the participation of local communities; and the opportunity for some genocide survivors to learn what had happened to their relatives. Gacaca might also have helped some survivors find a way of living peacefully alongside perpetrators. However, many gacaca hearings resulted in unfair trials. There were limitations on the ability of the accused to effectively defend themselves; numerous instances of intimidation and corruption of defence witnesses, judges, and other parties; and flawed decision-making due to inadequate training for lay judges who were expected to handle complex cases.
In March 2024, human rights defender François-Xavier Byuma was released from prison after serving a 17-year sentence following a gacaca trial marred by grave procedural errors. The trial judge was known to have a prior conflict with Byuma but had refused to recuse himself, as law required and Byuma requested. Byuma, who was then the head of an association for the defense of childrens' rights, had previously investigated allegations that the judge had raped a minor. The judge also failed to accord Byuma the right to defend himself fully.
Compared with most other countries emerging from mass violence, Rwanda's determination to see justice done and its progress in trying so many alleged perpetrators has been impressive. But the lack of safeguards against abusive prosecutions in a weak judicial system heightened the risk of unfair trials.
Extraditions to Rwanda
Until the first ICTR transfer decision, most countries denied Rwanda’s extradition requests. Under international human rights law, the sending country could be held responsible for foreseeable human rights violations of the suspects in Rwanda.
A European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruling in October 2011 that the extradition of Sylvere Ahorugeze, a Rwandan genocide suspect arrested in Sweden, would not violate Sweden’s obligations to protect against torture or inhuman treatment, or to avoid complicity in fair trial violations, emboldened governments seeking to extradite suspects to face trial in Rwanda. Prosecutors and judges in extradition cases in various countries cited the ICTR and ECHR decisions as precedents when arguing for extradition. Although many countries have extradited genocide suspects to face trial in Rwanda, some still refuse to do so.
The Rwandan authorities have improved several aspects of the delivery of justice in the last 30 years, a noteworthy achievement given the challenges faced after the genocide. There have also been significant improvements in the functioning of the justice system and in prison conditions. But while the laws have changed considerably, the underlying politicization of the judiciary remains, hindering the full realization of the reforms, and there is still no guarantee of a fair trial in Rwandan courts, especially in politically-sensitive cases.
Rwanda has passed a number of laws that may have been intended to prevent and punish hate speech of the kind that led to the 1994 genocide, but they have led to serious violations of freedom of expression by imposing strict limits on how people can talk about the genocide and other events in and after 1994. Accusations and charges of genocide ideology have been used to silence prominent critics of the government. The government has also manipulated genocide accusations to discredit and target critics and dissidents.
Some countries have extradited suspects to Rwanda despite these concerns. Since the ICTR first transferred a case to Rwanda in 2011, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States all have extradited suspects.
Leopold Munyakazi was deported from the US to Rwanda in 2016 on the basis of an international arrest warrant charging him with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and genocide denial. Yet, a leaked 2015 Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) report stated that the investigation was “almost certainly” compromised by a Rwandan intelligence agent and cast doubt on the allegations against Munyakazi. A lower court in Rwanda convicted him for direct involvement in the genocide and sentenced him to life in prison in 2017.
Rwanda’s Chamber for International Crimes overturned Munyakazi’s life sentence in July 2018, but upheld a nine-year sentence for genocide denial. On February 18, 2021, the Nyanza High Court Chamber of International and Cross-Border Crimes convicted Munyakazi of new charges of genocide denial, and added another five years to his sentence. The conviction is based on statements he made ahead of the genocide commemorations in April 2017, in Muhanga prison. According to the verdict, Munyakazi said that the genocide was a consequence of the RPF’s attempted invasion of Rwanda in October 1990, and that if President Habyarimana’s plane had not crashed, there would not have been a genocide.
In January 2024, Wenceslas Twagirayezu, a Rwandan with Danish citizenship who was extradited to Rwanda in December 2018, was acquitted of genocide and crimes against humanity during the 1994 genocide. The charges were linked to his suspected role in attacks on Tutsi in the former Gisenyi prefecture in the north. The acquittal of Twagirayezu followed contradictory witness statements and evidence demonstrating he was not in Rwanda at the time of the events he was accused of having been involved in. The prosecution has appealed the acquittal.
In April 2021, Beatrice Munyenyezi was deported to Rwanda by the US after serving a prison term for lying on her naturalization application, and arrested upon arrival in Rwanda. She faces seven charges related to the 1994 genocide, including rape. Her trial is ongoing.
Mexico: Guanajuato Should Legally Recognize Trans Identities
(Mexico City) – Trans people in the Mexican state of Guanajuato suffer economic, medical, and labor discrimination, as well as other onerous legal impediments, because the state has no process for issuing identity documents consistent with their gender, Human Rights Watch said in a documentary released today. Guanajuato’s authorities should urgently create an administrative procedure to allow trans people to reflect their self-declared gender identity on official documents.
The Keys to My Freedom, produced in collaboration with Amicus DH, is released on the heels of International Transgender Day of Visibility. It follows the stories of two transgender women, Ivanna Tovar and Kassandra Mendoza, who have fought to have their gender and names legally recognized in Guanajuato. Eight additional trans people from the state also share brief experiences of discrimination and messages of hope.
“The documentary powerfully shows how trans people in Guanajuato are disadvantaged in work and education and weighed down with legal proceedings due to authorities’ undue delay in recognizing their gender identity,” said Cristian González Cabrera, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The governor and state congress should urgently establish a legal gender recognition procedure that will contribute to reducing discrimination.”
Each of Mexico’s 32 states has the authority to determine its laws and policies in civil, family, and registration matters in accordance with the constitution. It is up to the state legislature or state governor to pass a law or issue an administrative decree that enables legal gender recognition through a simple administrative procedure at a state-level civil registry. Twenty-one Mexican states already have such a procedure. Guanajuato does not.
“It has been difficult to find a job,” says Kassandra Mendoza in the documentary regarding her lack of documents reflecting her gender identity. “[Employers] see my documents, then they see me and say, ‘This doesn’t add up.’ I’ve been made fun of, I’ve even been insulted.”
Ivanna Tovar says in the documentary: “Without a gender identity reform, we [trans people] cannot work in a dignified manner because we are violated, because we are not called by the [legal] names that appear in our documents, and [dealing with that] is the state’s responsibility.” She described gender recognition as her “keys to [her] freedom.”
In October 2021, a state lawmaker, Dessire Ángel Rocha, introduced a legal gender recognition bill, but the bill has not advanced in the current legislature. Previous gender recognition bills presented in February 2019, October 2019, and April 2021 also did not advance.
Until last month, the state congress was unwilling to consider bills relating to the rights of LGBT people. In February 2024, the state passed the Law for Persons of Sexual and Gender Diversity. It aims to establish coordination mechanisms between various authorities, as well as guiding principles, “to promote, protect and progressively guarantee” the rights of LGBT people. However, this reform did not address gender recognition for trans people.
Human Rights Watch and Amicus DH, together with the Trans Youth Network and Colmena 41, interviewed 31 trans people from Guanajuato state in April 2022 in the cities of León, Irapuato, and Guanajuato city, as well as remotely, to understand and document the harm related to a lack of legal gender recognition in the state. They found that the absence of a legal gender recognition procedure in Guanajuato leads to serious economic, legal, health, and other ramifications for trans people.
In states like Guanajuato without procedures for legal gender recognition, transgender people have to initiate an onerous legal proceeding to enjoin the state to recognize their gender identity on the basis of the Supreme Court rulings and international law. Federal judges generally grant the injunction, but it can be a lengthy and expensive process which requires hiring an experienced lawyer.
In a successful case, the judge orders the civil registry to permanently seal a trans person’s original birth certificate, meaning it is no longer readily accessible in its information systems, and to issue a corrected certificate. This new state birth certificate is necessary to request new nationally valid identification documents like a voter registration card, a tax number, or a passport.
In 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an advisory opinion saying that states must establish simple and efficient legal gender recognition procedures based on self-identification, without invasive and pathologizing requirements. The ruling is an authoritative interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights, which Mexico has ratified.
In 2019, the Mexican Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling with clear guidelines on legal gender recognition. The court said that this must be an administrative process that “meets the standards of privacy, simplicity, expeditiousness, and adequate protection of gender identity” set by the Inter-American Court.
The Supreme Court ruling binds all lower federal courts. The court said that in order to comply with the constitution, state authorities should ensure that trans people can update their legal documents through an administrative process. In 2022, the court expanded the right to legal gender recognition to include adolescents and other children.
“The trans people who shared their stories in the documentary are just a few of the many trans people who are suffering under the state’s inaction on gender recognition,” González said. “Guanajuato should heed activists’ calls and Mexican law and join the majority of Mexican states that uphold the rights of their gender minorities by creating an administrative gender recognition procedure.”
Iran: Persecution of Baha’is
(Beirut) – Iranian authorities’ decades-long systematic repression of Baha’is amounts to the crime against humanity of persecution, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.
The 49-page report, “‘The Boot on My Neck’: Iranian Authorities’ Crime of Persecution Against Baha’is in Iran,” documents Iranian authorities’ systematic violation of the fundamental rights of members of the Baha’i community through discriminatory laws and policies that target them. Human Rights Watch found that Baha’is face a spectrum of abuses. Government agencies arrest and imprison Baha’is arbitrarily, confiscate their property, restrict their education and employment opportunities, and even deny them dignified burial.
“Iranian authorities deprive Baha’is of their fundamental rights in every aspect of their lives, not due to their actions, but simply for belonging to a faith group,” said Michael Page, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “It is critically important to increase international pressure on Iran to end this crime against humanity.”
The report draws on extensive documentation by Human Rights Watch and Iranian human rights groups regarding violations against Baha’is in Iran. Researchers reviewed government policies, court documents, and communications with Baha’is. Information was accessed through the Archive of the Persecution of Baha’is in Iran and documents from the Human Rights Activists News Agency. Human Rights Watch also conducted interviews with 14 Baha’is remotely in Persian, both within Iran and abroad place between May 2022 and March 2023.
Baha’is are the largest unrecognized religious minority in Iran. They have been the target of harsh, state-backed repression since their religion was established in the 19th century. After the 1979 revolution, Iranian authorities executed or forcibly disappeared hundreds of Baha’is, including their community leaders. Thousands more have lost their jobs and pensions or were forced to leave their homes or country.
Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has codified its repression of Baha’is into law and official government policy, vigorously enforced by security forces and judicial authorities. Judicial authorities interpret vague national security laws to label Baha’is an outlawed religious minority, branding them as a threat to national security. Human Rights Watch believes that this sustained systematic repression deliberately deprives Baha’is of their basic rights, constituting the crime against humanity of persecution.
The Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court, defines persecution as the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of “the identity of the group or collectivity,” including on national, religious, or ethnic grounds. Under international law, crimes against humanity are some of the most serious crimes “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”
Court documents demonstrate authorities' characterization of the Baha’i faith as a “deviant cult” and its adherents as members of an “illegal group.” Official state policies outlined in documents reviewed by Human Rights Watch explicitly bar them from employment and education opportunities, deny them pensions, and seize their property.
Baha’is who spoke to Human Rights Watch described their persecution as a series of violations that begin with their first encounters with the Iranian state and affect every aspect of their lives, including education, employment, and marriage.
“[When I left Iran to continue my education], I did not intend to emigrate,” said Negar Sabet, 38-year-old daughter of Mahvash Sabet Shahriari, a prominent member of the Baha’i community currently imprisoned in Iran. She said:
But my experience at the university outside of the country was very different, as if for the first time a burden was lifted off my shoulders and the boot on my neck had disappeared … There [abroad] I experienced a strange freedom, and for the first time I was equal with other people, and no one was pulling themselves away from me.
Iranian authorities’ 1991 Iranian Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council memorandum outlines state policies systematically discriminating against Baha’is, restricting their access to jobs, education, and economic opportunities. Iranian authorities also use legal provisions to deny Baha’is employment, pensions, and benefits, alongside targeting Baha’i-owned businesses, economically strangling the community by confiscating hundreds of members’ properties.
United Nations member states should support accountability measures, including investigation and prosecution at the national level under the principle of universal jurisdiction, and renew the UN Fact-Finding Mission's mandate, Human Rights Watch said. The UN Human Rights Council established the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran on November 24, 2022, to investigate alleged human rights violations related to the protests that began on September 16, 2022, after the death of a 22-year-old Iranian-Kurdish woman in the custody of the country’s abusive morality police especially with respect to women and children.
“The Iranian government's systematic oppression of Baha'is casts a shadow over every aspect of their lives and is a distressing testament to its discriminatory treatment of religious and ethnic minorities, leaving no aspect of their lives untouched by injustice,” Page said.