(Washington, DC) – Hungary should deny entry to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or arrest him if he enters the country, Human Rights Watch said today. Netanyahu’s office announced that he is planning to travel to Hungary on April 2, 2025, following an invitation by Prime Minister Viktor Orban.
Netanyahu is subject to an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on November 21, 2024, when the court’s judges issued arrest warrants against him and Yoav Gallant, his then-defense minister, for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the Gaza Strip from at least October 8, 2023. These include starving civilians, intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population, murder, and persecution. Human Rights Watch has documented war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide committed by Israeli authorities in Gaza.
“Orban’s invitation to Netanyahu is an affront to victims of serious crimes,” said Liz Evenson, international justice director at Human Rights Watch. “Hungary should comply with its legal obligations as a party to the ICC and arrest Netanyahu if he sets foot in the country.”
As an ICC member country, Hungary is obligated to cooperate in securing the arrest and surrender of any suspects who enter its territory. Without its own police force, the ICC relies on states to assist in arrests.
Regrettably, officials from the governments of several European Union member states, including France, Poland, Italy, Romania, and Germany have recently explicitly said that they would not uphold their obligations or refused to commit to enforce the court’s warrant and arrest Netanyahu. Human rights activists and nongovernmental groups in Poland protested indications by the Polish government in January that Netanyahu would be welcome to visit the country without facing arrest.
All ICC members should uphold their obligations under the court’s treaty, Human Rights Watch said. The EU’s decision on the ICC commits the regional bloc to support cooperation with the ICC, including for arrests. The EU’s leadership and other EU member states, along with other ICC member countries, should publicly call on Hungary and all ICC member countries to cooperate with the ICC by arresting Netanyahu should he visit their territories.
In May 2024, the ICC prosecutor requested five arrest warrants in relation to the Palestine investigation – those against Netanyahu, Gallant, and also against three senior Hamas leaders. The Office of the Prosecutor later withdrew the application against two of the Hamas leaders after they were confirmed to have been killed. In November 2024, the ICC judges decided to issue an arrest warrant against the remaining Hamas official, Mohammed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri (“Mohammed Deif”), at the same time it handed down the warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant. In February, following confirmation of Deif’s killing, ICC judges terminated proceedings against him.
At the time the warrants were issued, Hungary’s Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó criticized the warrants as “shameful and absurd” and “unacceptable,” and Orban announced his intention to invite Netanyahu to Hungary. Vera Jourova, then-EU justice commissioner, reminded Hungary that that would be an “obvious breach” of Hungary’s obligations under the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding treaty, and damage Hungary’s reputation.
When US President Donald Trump issued an executive order in February that authorized the use of sanctions against ICC officials, in a bid in part to thwart the court’s case against Netanyahu, Orban announced his support for the US sanctions and called for a “review” of the country’s relations with the ICC.
Since his 2010 electoral win, Orban and his government have shown increasingly blatant disregard for the rule of law and human rights. In more than 14 years, it has curbed judicial independence, restricted and harassed civil society, and undermined media independence. Hungary’s worsening situation with democracy and rights led the EU to initiate a political enforcement process in 2018 under article 7 of the EU Treaty over the risk of Hungary’s actions breaching fundamental EU values. Orban traveled to Moscow in July 2024 to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, himself subject to an ICC warrant for serious crimes in Ukraine.
“Allowing Netanyahu’s visit in breach of Hungary's ICC obligations would be Orban's latest assault on the rule of law, adding to the country’s dismal record on rights,” Evenson said. “All ICC member countries need to make clear they expect Hungary to abide by its obligations to the court, and that they will do the same.”
Japan’s parliament, the Diet, voted this week to make public high school free for all children. Tuition fees had been abolished in 2010, but then reinstated in 2013.
The new measure, approved in the budget, will expand equal opportunity in education, and should increase education access and certainty for children of parents with unstable incomes or from immigrant and other marginalized backgrounds who sometimes struggle with the bureaucracy of tuition subsidies.
The initiative was pushed by the small opposition Japan Innovation Party, whose votes the minority government needed to pass the budget.
Currently, Japan subsidizes public high school tuition up to ¥118,800 (US$800) annually for students from households earning less than ¥9.1 million ($60,000). The new measure removes the income threshold, aiming to offer free public high school education to all.
International children’s rights law, enshrined in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, obligates countries to progressively make secondary education available and accessible to every child. The United Nations Human Rights Council is now considering efforts to draft an update to this treaty to guarantee all children the right to free public secondary education with the same urgency as the guarantee of free primary education, long ensconced in international law.
Until now, Japan was the wealthiest country in the world, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, without guaranteed free public secondary education for all. It also spends among the lowest GDP percentage on education among OECD countries. Moreover, access to free education had become increasingly inequitable across the country due to important initiatives by the Osaka prefecture and Tokyo Metropolitan governments to make secondary education free for children in their jurisdictions.
However, the new system maintains inequities in subsidy levels for children who attend public schools versus private schools, who in some circumstances receive greater financial support to cover the higher cost of private education.
Impressively, Japan has almost universal enrollment in schooling, although less so among recent immigrants. But the new measure is an important development in meeting Japan’s international obligations. It is important that the Diet pass an amendment to the Fundamental Law on Education to enshrine this expansion of free education so that these gains are secure from the whims of future governments.
Twelve years ago this April, the Rana Plaza factory building in Bangladesh collapsed, killing more than 1,100 garment workers and injuring more than 2,000 in one of the largest workplace disasters in modern history.
The Rana Plaza tragedy fueled a global movement calling for mandatory human rights rules for businesses, which ultimately led the European Union in 2024 to adopt the EU Due Diligence Directive, requiring large companies to adhere to human rights and environmental standards in their own operations and their global value chains.
However, Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, who are leading coalition talks to form the country’s next government, has vowed to “prevent” the law, portraying it as an “unnecessary burden” for companies. The CDU also wants to do away with other EU supply chain laws designed to tackle forced labor, deforestation, and the trade in minerals used to finance brutal wars.
Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), the other party in the coalition talks, should step up to preserve the EU Due Diligence Directive. Founded to protect workers’ rights, the SPD has long backed laws obliging companies to respect human rights in their supply chains, including the EU law.
As a powerhouse in the European Union, Germany could potentially destroy these protections, especially given the role of EU Commission President and CDU politician Ursula von der Leyen. Von der Leyen previously supported the laws but has recently made a U-turn, and now proposes to reduce the EU Due Diligence Directive to a meaningless shell. Many businesses are opposing this U-turn.
The Rana Plaza collapse tragically underscores the failure of voluntary industry initiatives to protect workers’ safety and rights. Disasters in the mining sector, as well as child labor, environmental harm, and other abuses have further highlighted the need for change.
The SPD should seek to ensure that any coalition agreement includes a commitment to uphold the EU’s laws on human rights in global supply chains. If that is not possible, an SPD veto would force the new German coalition government to abstain during an EU vote on proposals to gut or eliminate the EU Due Diligence Directive.
The SPD should stand up for human rights and oppose the CDU’s destructive path. Victims of corporate abuse need the EU’s legal protections more than ever.
(Bangkok) – Myanmar’s military junta should allow immediate unfettered access to humanitarian aid for earthquake survivors and lift restrictions that impede the emergency response, Human Rights Watch said today. Since the earthquake struck at 12:50 p.m. on March 28, 2025, the military has carried out airstrikes and limited internet access in severely affected areas, further complicating the humanitarian response.
The earthquake struck central Myanmar, toppling buildings and damaging roads and bridges. The epicenter was in Sagaing Region, close to Myanmar’s second-largest city, Mandalay, and the capital, Naypyidaw. The Myanmar military reported that more than 1,700 people had died, although estimates by the US Geological Survey suggest a possible death toll of 10,000 or higher.
“Myanmar’s military junta still invokes fear, even in the wake of a horrific natural disaster that killed and injured thousands,” said Bryony Lau, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The junta needs to break from its appalling past practice and ensure that humanitarian aid quickly reaches those whose lives are at risk in earthquake-affected areas.”
Days after the earthquake, people remain trapped in the rubble as family members and volunteer rescue workers desperately search for survivors with no machinery or safety equipment. In Sagaing, the regional capital, rescuers have run out of body bags and the city is filled with the odor of decaying corpses. “The bodies for volunteers to cremate are piling up,” said a rescue worker in a report shared with Human Rights Watch. “Even if they cremate a body every three minutes, they would have to work around the clock.”
Local journalists, humanitarian organizations, and social media report that many affected areas are without electricity and clean water. There are reported shortages of gasoline in both Mandalay and Sagaing cities. Food and other essential goods are in short supply because shops and markets have been closed. Across central Myanmar, people are sleeping outside and are in urgent need of shelter.
Within hours of the earthquake, the junta requested international assistance and declared an emergency in six states and regions. Large swathes of the country affected by the earthquake are under control of the anti-junta opposition or are contested. Information from these areas is limited due to military restrictions, including internet shutdowns, bans on VPNs, and popular social media platforms, including Facebook.
Several countries and international agencies have offered assistance, with foreign rescue teams reaching Mandalay and Naypyidaw within days. Although the junta indicated that all assistance was welcome, emergency workers from Taiwan were refused entry. A junta spokesperson also said that foreign media would not be allowed to report on the earthquake from inside the country.
In Sagaing, local media have reported restrictions imposed by local junta authorities, the military, and affiliated militia, requiring community members to seek authorization to respond to the earthquake by submitting lists of volunteers and items to be donated. The junta has not lifted curfews that have been in place since the Covid-19 pandemic, hindering rescue efforts.
Even prior to the earthquake, humanitarian needs had surged in central Myanmar where opposition groups have been fighting Myanmar security forces and allied militias since the February 2021 coup. In December 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated the number of people in need of assistance was 2.1 million in Mandalay Region and 2.7 million in Sagaing Region. Prior to the earthquake, nearly 1.35 million people had been displaced in the two regions according to the UN refugee agency (UNHCR).
A humanitarian worker told Human Rights Watch that people who had fled fighting and sought shelter in monasteries, convents, and other religious buildings have been displaced yet again due to earthquake damage to these structures. Earthquake survivors also face risks from dislodged landmines, which often shift during natural disasters.
Hospitals in central Myanmar are overwhelmed with those injured. The country’s healthcare system has deteriorated since the coup, with shortages of medical supplies and personnel. Local media reported that the junta had recently closed seven private hospitals in Mandalay because they had hired doctors and other medical staff from the civil disobedience movement.
In previous natural disasters, including Cyclone Mocha in 2023 and Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the Myanmar military has refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgently needed supplies from customs and warehouses, and relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance.
The junta is obligated under international human rights law to uphold the rights to life, health, and shelter. Under international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict areas, Myanmar’s military and opposition armed groups are obligated to facilitate rapid and unimpeded impartial humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need and cannot withhold consent for relief operations on arbitrary grounds.
Donors should rapidly support the earthquake response while seeking ways to channel aid through independent local groups, rather than only through junta authorities, given the military’s track record of corruption and misuse of disaster assistance funding and materiel. Effective aid delivery hinges on engaging local partners that have the networks and experience to navigate a difficult environment and reach those most in need, Human Rights Watch said.
“Myanmar’s junta cannot be trusted to respond to a disaster of this scale,” Lau said. “Concerned governments and international agencies need to press the junta to allow full and immediate access to survivors wherever they are.”
New allegations of ill-treatment and torture by Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, the wrongfully imprisoned Karakalpak blogger and lawyer, have emerged following a prison visit by his lawyer.
In a March 24 statement, Tazhimuratov’s attorney, Sergey Mayorov, detailed “mental and physical torture,” including beatings by other inmates at the behest of prison officials and filthy conditions in Tazhimuratov’s cell. Tazhimuratov said his personal writings have been stolen and prison officials have apparently delayed and cut short his telephone calls to his family.
This is not the first time Tazhimuratov has alleged ill-treatment and torture in detention. At his trial in 2022, he claimed that while in pretrial detention, police had beat him and stood on his head, causing him to lose consciousness. In 2023, he filed complaints about inadequate healthcare and food in prison.
In his statement, Mayorov also said that between March 4 and 7, the first four days of his client’s 10-day stint in solitary confinement after an altercation with another inmate, guards seized Tazhimuratov’s uneaten food before he could break his fast, which he was keeping during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Denying a prisoner food during religious fasting is a violation of the obligation to respect Tazhimuratov’s freedom of religion as well as his right to freedom from inhumane treatment.
Mayorov also said that he had met with a prison official regarding Tazhimuratov’s allegations, noting that his client told him he had repeatedly tried to file complaints “to protect his rights,” but that the appeals “do not leave the [facility].” Mayorov has asked the prosecutor and Ombudsman to investigate.
Inhuman treatment of detainees is strictly prohibited under customary international law, and Uzbekistan is a party to several international human rights treaties that include the prohibition on torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It’s important that obligations to prevent, investigate, and punish acts of prohibited treatment are met and that officials promptly investigate Tazhimuratov’s allegations and ensure he comes to no harm while in prison.
Yet as Tazhimuratov and other activists languish in prisons and forced psychiatric detention, Uzbekistan is gearing up host to a high-level European Union-Central Asia Summit later this week. As EU officials look to deepen bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan, they should stress the importance of upholding the rule of law and call for Tazhimuratov’s and other activists’ unconditional and immediate release.
The International Day for Mine Action on April 4 is a moment to highlight the work of the thousands of deminers around the world who clear and destroy landmines and explosive remnants of war. They risk their lives to help communities recover from armed conflict and its intergenerational impacts.
But due to devastating developments driven largely by two countries that have not banned antipersonnel landmines – the United States and Russia – this Mine Action Day does not feel like much of a celebration.
For over three decades, the US has been the world's largest contributor to humanitarian demining, mine risk education, and rehabilitation programs for landmine survivors. But the Trump administration’s deep cuts to foreign aid are now disrupting mine clearance operations. Thousands of deminers have been fired or put on administrative leave pending the completion of so-called reviews. It’s unclear if this crucial support will continue. The price of Trump administration cuts will be evident as casualties increase.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and uncertainty over Europe’s future security are also contributing to a challenging environment. Defense ministers from Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania announced in March their intention to withdraw from the 1997 treaty banning antipersonnel mines.
Russian forces have used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since 2022, causing civilian casualties and contaminating agricultural land. Ukraine has also used antipersonnel mines and has received them from the US, in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk sought to justify his government’s proposed withdrawal, telling parliament, “anything that can strengthen Poland’s defense will be implemented. We will use all available options.” Days later, Poland’s defense minister said the government intends to restart production of antipersonnel mines.
There’s nothing sophisticated about the antipersonnel mines used in today’s armed conflicts. They are indiscriminate weapons that predominately harm civilians, violate human rights, and have long-term societal impact. Embracing antipersonnel mines undermines international humanitarian law and long-standing civilian protections.
The proposed treaty withdrawals raise the question of what other humanitarian disarmament treaties are at risk: chemical weapons? cluster munitions? The military utility of any weapon must be weighed against the expected humanitarian damage.
To avoid further eroding humanitarian norms, Poland and the Baltic states should reject proposals to leave the Mine Ban Treaty. They should instead reaffirm their collective commitment to humanitarian norms aimed at safeguarding humanity in war.
Since 2020, the five richest men in the world have doubled their fortunes while almost five billion people have become poorer. A growing sense of economic injustice and insecurity is contributing to the rise of authoritarian movements around the world. Meanwhile, the world is set to blast past global heating targets. But this is not inevitable. What if, instead, economic decisions were made with people and the planet at the center?
This is the idea behind the concept of a human rights economy, which means putting rights at the heart of economic policymaking. The concept draws from the work of human rights scholars and organizations around the world, while supporting transformative economic approaches emerging from other movements, including climate justice, gender justice, and decolonization.
International human rights law guides how global resources should be used for everyone’s benefit while protecting the environment. It obligates governments to use the maximum of their available resources – individually and through international cooperation and assistance – to realize human rights. This includes economic, social, and cultural rights, such as to health, education, social security, housing, food, and water, as well as the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.
Yet governments have failed for decades to align their economies or international cooperation with these obligations. The exponential increase in resources has done too little to improve the lives of billions of people while devastating the planet. That needs to change.
Several human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, have collaborated on a working paper, available in English, French, and Arabic, which details how governments should set human rights as guideposts against which economic policies can be assessed, such as to progressively raise adequate revenues to fund universal public services and social security systems, as well as a just transition to sustainable energy.
At the same time, the paper recognizes that governments are often constrained by the global economic system within which they operate. Implementing human rights economies therefore means transforming the international financial architecture, including related to tax, debt, and the governance and operations of international financial institutions, to align with human rights. It also means moving beyond the longstanding fixation on GDP and growth as a measure of economic progress to metrics that reflect people’s lived reality and the environment.
Our current economic approach is putting people and the planet in crisis. Human rights offer a blueprint for a far better approach.
(The Hague) – Ongoing atrocities fueled by rampant impunity and an accountability gap across Sudan require comprehensive justice responses two decades after the United Nations Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, Human Rights Watch said today.
On March 31, 2005, the Security Council adopted resolution 1593, giving the ICC a mandate over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed in Darfur from July 2002 onward. ICC investigations led to the opening of several cases addressing crimes committed in the region from 2003-2013. But today, nearly two years after the current fighting began in April 2023, the ICC’s mandate remains limited to Darfur even as serious abuses are being committed across Sudan. The UN-backed Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan and the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights-mandated Joint Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, are international and regional mechanisms mandated to investigate, but not prosecute, current violations committed across Sudan.
“The warring parties have trapped the Sudanese people once again in an impunity-fueled cycle of violence, committing horrific atrocities and leading to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis,” said Liz Evenson, international justice director at Human Rights Watch. “Governments should commit publicly to explore all avenues to close the accountability gap in Sudan, so that victims of today’s crimes will not have to wait another two decades for justice.”
Since the fighting erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both warring parties have committed war crimes, such as executing detainees and mutilating their bodies, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, including in Khartoum, North Darfur, Gezira, and South and West Kordofan states, Human Rights Watch research has found.
The RSF has committed crimes against humanity, including in an ethnic cleansing campaign in West Darfur in 2023, and widespread acts of sexual violence in areas of Khartoum, the capital, since 2023. The RSF and allied militias also have raped scores of women and girls in the context of sexual slavery in South Kordofan since September 2023.
The ICC prosecutor, in January 2025, signaled that his office expects to request arrest warrants based on investigations into crimes committed since April 2023 in West Darfur. The 2005 Security Council referral limits the court’s jurisdiction to Darfur.
In its September and October 2024 reports, the UN fact-finding mission documented international crimes across the country and called for the Security Council to expand the jurisdiction of the ICC to cover all of Sudan. It also urged governments to use all available international justice options, including the establishment of an internationalized judicial mechanism for Sudan and universal jurisdiction prosecutions before domestic courts to complement the ICC’s work. The fact-finding mission also called on Sudan to cooperate with the ICC.
Other countries should use this anniversary to pledge publicly to work together to implement the fact-finding mission’s recommendations and ensure stepped-up justice responses for the country, Human Rights Watch said. Governments should make sure they speak at the highest level to the need for focused efforts on accountability at key upcoming meetings, including the European Union’s April 14, 2025, meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council and the April 15 London high-level conference on Sudan. Accountability efforts should center Sudanese voices and can draw from international experience with national and international efforts as in Ukraine and Syria.
States should also give their full support for evidence preservation and documentation of today’s crimes, to lay the groundwork for accountability. This should include support for the UN fact-finding mission and the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights-mandated Joint Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan. States should ensure that these bodies have the necessary political and financial resources to carry out their mandates, effective coordination and cooperation between them and with the ICC, and access to Sudan and neighboring countries.
Governments should also increase financial and technical support to civil society organizations to document human rights violations and campaign and strategize for justice through Sudanese civil society-led initiatives. This includes urgently filling the gap created by funding cuts by the United States government, and condemning the warring parties’ targeting of human rights defenders and lawyers because of their role in documenting human rights abuses.
A verdict is pending in an ICC trial of former Janjaweed militia leader, Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kosheib), on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur in 2003-04 and 2013. Twenty years after the Security Council referral, however, the Kosheib trial stands alone.
Following Omar al-Bashir’s ouster as Sudan’s leader in April 2019, the transitional government—a power-sharing agreement between civilian and military groups—had a window of opportunity to ensure accountability for past rights abuses. The transitional government took small steps on accountability. But it failed to prioritize accountability for serious rights abuses, and nascent legal reforms were cut short following the 2021 military takeover.
Al-Bashir and two former Sudanese leaders wanted by the ICC have yet to be handed over. The Sudanese authorities should immediately surrender al-Bashir and those wanted by the court, Human Rights Watch said.
ICC member countries should ensure that the court has the required resources to carry out its work. All UN member states should urge the Security Council to back the ICC’s mandate in Darfur, including by enforcing the court’s findings of noncooperation in arrests, Human Rights Watch said. States should also call on the government of Sudan to accept the ICC’s jurisdiction across the country.
The 20th anniversary of the Security Council’s referral is a reminder of the ICC’s essential role as a court of last resort and comes amid an open challenge to the court’s independence. On February 6, 2025, US President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order that authorizes asset freezes and entry bans on ICC officials and others supporting the court’s work in investigations the United States opposes, and applied these sanctions to the court’s prosecutor, Karim Khan. US sanctions are likely to have a wide impact on the court’s work, including in the Darfur situation. The United States is not a party to the ICC, but has supported the ICC’s work in Darfur.
ICC member countries should reaffirm their commitment to defend the court, its officials, and those cooperating with it from any political interference and pressure. The European Union should urgently impose its blocking statute to mitigate the effects of US sanctions, Human Rights Watch said.
“The Darfur referral 20 years ago showed what the international community could do to support justice as an essential element of international peace and security,” Evenson said. “Governments should draw on the experience of the intervening decades in pursuing creative pathways to justice at national and international levels to follow up on that 20-year-old promise.”
(Berlin, March 31, 2025) – The Uzbekistan government should immediately release and compensate the blogger and activist Valijon Kalonov who has been forcibly detained in a psychiatric hospital since December 2021, the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch said today.
On February 28, 2025, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) issued an opinion regarding the legality of Kalonov’s detention under international human rights law. It found that he had been “arbitrarily detained” and urged the government “to release him immediately and accord him an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations.”
“Valijon Kalonov’s forced psychiatric detention is nothing more than retaliation for his criticism of government policies,” said Umida Niyazova, director of the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights. “Kalonov did not call for violence, threaten violence, or say or do anything that posed a threat to anyone.”
Kalonov is a 55-year-old blogger from Jizzakh city, in Central Uzbekistan, who has criticized the government of Uzbekistan and in 2021 called for a boycott of the presidential elections. He had also spoken out against China’s discrimination against the Uyghurs.
In August 2021, the authorities placed him under arrest and charged him with “threatening public safety” and “insulting the president online” on the basis of statements he posted on social media. The authorities alleged the statements contained ideas of “religious fundamentalism,” as well as public insult and slander against Uzbekistan’s president.
Kalonov was placed in a psychiatric hospital in the Jizzakh region after a court, in December 2021, ruled that he could not be held criminally liable and should undergo compulsory psychiatric treatment. Those who know Kalonov say he does not have any mental health disability, which also would not be justifiable grounds on which to detain him.
In its 2021 ruling, the court cited a state-commissioned psychiatric assessment of Kalonov, which had concluded that “Kalonov Valijon suffers from a chronic mental illness in the form of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and a violation of logical thinking. At the time of the crime, he did not understand and was not fully aware of his actions. The crime committed by Kalonov, his mental state and illness can be dangerous for society.”
This is not the first time the Uzbek authorities have used bogus psychiatric assessments and forced psychiatric treatment to silence and discredit critics, the rights groups said. Kalonov’s detention follows a pattern of similar cases in which activists have been falsely diagnosed with mental illness based on state-ordered forensic examinations.
The veteran rights activist Elena Urlaeva was forcibly detained in a psychiatric hospital five times between 2001 and 2016. While she was in the hospital, officials tied her to her bed for hours and forcibly administered psychotropic drugs, which have had a lasting physical and emotional impact.
Michael Perlin, professor emeritus at New York Law School, is founding director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project. He was co-petitioner of the complaint filed to the UN working group and told the rights groups that “[f]orced psychiatric detention is a barbaric abuse of the medical profession that dates back to Soviet times. In circumstances such as those in this case, it is a violation of the prohibition on improper treatment and should be immediately prohibited.” He also underscored that “[b]ecause forced psychiatric treatment is often administered in institutions far from any third-party oversight, patients, whether they have a mental disability or not, are extremely vulnerable to abuse.”
In its February 28 opinion, the UN working group concluded that Kalonov was arbitrarily detained in violation of articles 2, 7, and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2, 19, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The working group urged the Government of Uzbekistan “to ensure a full and independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding Kalonov’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty” and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of his rights.
Uzbekistan’s international partners should urge Uzbekistan to immediately release Kalonov and provide reparations, in accordance with the working group’s decision. They should also call on Uzbekistan to implement fully another working group decision in February 2023 concerning the blogger Otabek Sattoriy. In that decision, the working group concluded that “the basis for the arrest and subsequent detention of Mr. Sattoriy was in fact his exercise of freedom of expression” and to release him immediately and provide reparations. In February 2024, Sattoriy was granted early release from prison, but he has not been given any reparations.
The government of Uzbekistan celebrated the recent election of its National Center for Human Rights director, Akmal Saidov, to the UN Human Rights Committee, as an expert in his individual capacity. Yet Uzbekistan has a demonstrably poor track record when it comes to implementing decisions of UN human rights bodies, including the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. The Uzbekistan government should respect all UN human rights bodies and experts and act in accordance with their decisions, the groups said.
“The government of Uzbekistan needs to release Kalonov immediately, but they also owe him reparations and should investigate how he ended up in psychiatric detention in the first place,” said Mihra Rittmann, senior Central Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Kalonov shouldn’t have to spend another day unlawfully and abusively locked up.”
(Beirut) – Iranian authorities are threatening to return the human rights defender and Nobel Peace Laureate Narges Mohammadi to prison to serve the remainder of her unjust sentence as a means to pressure her to cease her rights advocacy, Human Rights Watch said today. The authorities should immediately end their ongoing harassment and unconditionally release her and everyone else arbitrarily detained for their human rights activism.
Narges Mohammadi is serving a 13-year and nine-month sentence on charges that stem from her human rights work. She was released from Evin prison on December 4, 2024, after authorities suspended her prison sentence for 21 days. She is currently undergoing medical treatment for various health conditions and her temporary release came after months of denial of medical care. In November 2024, the authorities, contrary to medical advice, had returned Mohammadi to prison following surgery to remove a bone lesion from her leg that was suspected of being cancerous.
“Narges Mohammadi has used this brief respite from prison to continue her activism and shed light on the dire human rights situation in Iran. Iranian authorities’ threat to return her to prison is a stark reminder of their zero tolerance for dissent,” said Federico Borello, interim executive director at Human Rights Watch. “Iran’s authorities have a legal obligation to unconditionally release Nobel Laureate Narges Mohammadi and all others arbitrarily detained and to ensure that everyone in their custody has access to timely and adequate medical care.”
Earlier in March 2025, Mohammadi met virtually with Borello, interim executive director at Human Rights Watch, to discuss the human rights situation in Iran. She drew attention to the human rights crisis in the country, in particular the shocking escalation of authorities’ use of the death penalty and the continued repression of human rights defenders. She described the treatment of political prisoners, including the authorities’ practice of denying them medical care, and torture and ill-treatment, including prolonged solitary confinement to extract forced confessions. She highlighted the importance of maintaining international scrutiny on the authorities’ dismal rights record.
For months prior to her temporary release, Mohammadi had been suffering from various health conditions, including heart disease, acute back and knee pain, and a herniated spinal disk. The authorities denied her adequate medical care despite repeated calls.
Mohammadi refused to return to Evin prison on December 25, 2024, when the temporary suspension ended. On December 28, her lawyer submitted a request to the Legal Medicine Organization, under Iran’s judiciary, to extend the suspension, in line with medical advice. According to information received by Human Rights Watch, the Legal Medicine Organization has approved her request, but the authorities have nonetheless pressured her to return to prison. Mohammadi’s doctors have said she needs at least six months outside prison to ensure she has access to thorough and regular medical examinations and care.
The Iranian authorities have a long-standing policy of denying prisoners, in particular those arbitrarily detained on politically motivated national security charges, adequate and timely access to medical care, in an attempt to punish and silence them. Scores of political prisoners continue to be denied timely and adequate medical care, such as specialized treatment in hospitals. They include Zeynab Jalalian, a Kurdish political prisoner sentenced to life in prison; Fatemeh Sepehri, an outspoken critic of the supreme leader sentenced to 18 years in prison; Raheleh Rahemi-Pour, a 72-year-old civil rights activist; Warisha Moradi, a Kurdish activist sentenced to death; and Motaleb Ahmadian, a Kurdish political prisoner. Mahvash Sabet, a former member of the leadership of the Baha'i community in Iran, who is currently on medical leave, was long denied medical care and remains at risk of being returned to prison.
Under the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, sick prisoners who require specialist treatment should be transferred to specialized institutions or to civil hospitals. Denial of medical care to those detained may amount to torture and other ill-treatment, which is absolutely prohibited under international law. As documented by Amnesty International, in some cases, prisoners denied needed medical care have died in custody, which constitute arbitrary deprivation of life.
“Iranian authorities’ abhorrent policy of denying medical care to detainees and prisoners can have lethal consequences,” Borello said. “The international community needs to hold them to account for their blatant disregard not just for the right to liberty but also the right to life of people in their custody.”
March 31 marks the International Day of Transgender Visibility, a moment to celebrate the achievements and resilience of trans people around the world, while acknowledging the ongoing challenges they face in enjoying the full range of their human rights.
Today, Human Rights Watch is publishing a map that tracks some of these gains in Mexico, and highlights areas where there is still work to be done. The map shows that 22 out of Mexico’s 32 states have legislated to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition for trans people. This allows them to modify their identity documents to accurately reflect their gender identity.
The recognition of one’s gender identity is a human right. Without it, for many trans people, any request for documents is fraught with the potential for discrimination, violence, and humiliation. Human Rights Watch has documented such violations in schools, medical clinics, and the labor market in the Mexican states of Guanajuato and Tabasco.
In Mexico, the judiciary has played a crucial role in recognizing this right. In a landmark ruling in 2019, the Supreme Court laid out clear guidelines to states on legal gender recognition. The court extended this right to all children in 2022. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also found that states have an obligation to guarantee a simple and accessible procedure for trans people, including children, to have their gender legally recognized.
In Mexico, states have the authority to determine their laws in civil, family, and registration matters, which include implementing reforms for gender recognition. But in some states, political inaction has hindered progress. Eight states in Mexico have no procedure for gender recognition. Two others have procedures in practice, but not yet enshrined in law.
Even in states with gender recognition, more needs to be done. Only seven states extend legal gender recognition to children. Only three have explicitly recognized non-binary identities in their legislation.
Data: Gender Recognition in Mexico by State state_name summary law_1 link_1 law_2 link_2 Aguascalientes Aguascalientes has not reformed its legislation to create a legal gender recognition procedure for transgender people Baja California In 2022, the state’s congress enacted a <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://legislacion.scjn.gob.mx/Buscador/Paginas/AbrirDocReforma.aspx%3Fq%3DnLJHBX9G5HZ%2BppDlBlVGhMfLMpuaxgZP3d6aPdHvAyCP1opAlooJMDQIXqWtHsiFzQR4fO0L6XADTsT8Bgrb3rzJmz4tekLCOL51ey6aw78FAvzqS7TpFDn1dZztWeSs&ved=2ahUKEwjBnuLh4ZqMAxXNzwIHHYSHFmUQFnoECBgQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3x_ZKGJM_N7iVEC1KsXhcv"><u>reform</u></a> to the Civil Code, creating an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition for adults. In June 2023, Mexico’s Supreme Court <a href="https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=5714822"><u>ruled</u></a> that the law’s requirement of being “at least 18 years old” was invalid as it did not recognize the rights of transgender children and adolescents. As a result, in 2024, Baja California’s congress passed a new <a href="https://legislacion.scjn.gob.mx/Buscador/Paginas/AbrirDocReforma.aspx?q=nLJHBX9G5HZ+ppDlBlVGhMfLMpuaxgZP3d6aPdHvAyBgSKFLpFCGHm58KAb9W7PpkzXp+hLMOgA7K8QPmH9Z1VLQr8Z6ov9Gzjz2WiuTjvQeVe42EWMLbw3BAyMHf5pE"><u>reform</u></a>, establishing a procedure for individuals under 18 and expanding legal gender recognition to non-binary people. Reform of the Civil Code (pp. 9-11) https://www.congresobc.gob.mx/Documentos/ProcesoParlamentario/Decretos/XXIVDECRETO No. 75.pdf Baja California Sur In 2021, the state’s congress passed <a href="https://finanzas.bcs.gob.mx/wp-content/themes/voice/assets/images/boletines/2021/28bis.pdf"><u>a reform</u></a> modifying the Civil Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. In June 2023, Mexico’s Supreme Court <a href="https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5704191&fecha=06/10/2023#gsc.tab=0"><u>ruled</u></a> that it was unconstitutional to exclude children and adolescents from accessing this procedure<a href="https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5704191&fecha=06/10/2023#gsc.tab=0">.</a> In 2024, Baja California Sur’s congress passed <a href="https://finanzas.bcs.gob.mx/wp-content/themes/voice/assets/images/boletines/2024/48.pdf"><u>a reform</u></a> amending the Civil Code and expanding the right of legal gender recognition to include children and adolescents and non-binary people Reform of the Civil Code https://www.cbcs.gob.mx/SESIONES/PORDINARIO23XV/06-ABRIL-2021/XPUNTO.pdf Campeche In 2024, the state’s congress passed a <a href="http://periodicooficial.campeche.gob.mx/sipoec/public/periodicos/202408/PO2232QS16082024.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Civil Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Reform of the Civil Code Chiapas Chiapas has not reformed its legislation to create a legal gender recognition procedure for transgender people Chihuahua Although the state has not enacted any legislative reform around legal gender recognition as of March 2025, the Civil Registry has an <a href="https://www.oas.org/es/sap/dgpe/puica/docs/Compendio-de-practicas-de-reconocimiento-legal-de-la-Identidad-de-genero-en-las-entidades-federativas-de-Mexico.pdf"><u>administrative procedure</u></a> for legal gender recognition based on a 2019 Supreme Court <a href="https://sjf2.scjn.gob.mx/detalle/tesis/2020001"><u>ruling</u></a> finding that provisions of the state’s civil code violated the rights to equality and identity of transgender people by requiring a judicial process to secure legal gender recognition. That ruling established that an administrative procedure is the appropriate mechanism to guarantee these rights. Supreme Court ruling https://sjf2.scjn.gob.mx/detalle/ejecutoria/28693 Further Background https://laverdadjuarez.com/2019/11/25/sin-amparo-personas-trans-pueden-adecuar-su-acta-de-nacimiento-en-chihuahua/ Coahuila In 2018, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://periodico.segobcoahuila.gob.mx/ArchivosPO/95-PS-27-NOV-2018.PDF"><u>law</u></a> creating the Law on Civil Registry of the State of Coahuila, establishing an administrative procedure for the recognition of self-identified gender identity. Reform of the Civil Registry Law (arts. 124-128; pp. 20-21) http://periodico.sfpcoahuila.gob.mx/ArchivosPO/95-PS-27-NOV-2018.PDF Colima In 2019, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://periodicooficial.col.gob.mx/p/27022019/p9022701.pdf"><u>law</u></a> reforming the Civil Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Reform of the Civil Code https://periodicooficial.col.gob.mx/p/27022019/p9022701.pdf Durango Durango has not reformed its legislation to create a legal gender recognition procedure for transgender people Guanajuato In 2024, the state’s congress passed <a href="https://congreso-gto.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/dictamen/publicacion_archivo/6665/PER._OF._DEC.___50_51_52_53_54_55_56_Y_57.pdf"><u>a law</u></a> reforming the Civil Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Guerrero Guerrero has not reformed its legislation to create a legal gender recognition procedure for transgender people Hidalgo In 2019, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://periodico.hidalgo.gob.mx/?tribe_events=periodico-oficial-alcance-1-del-15-de-mayo-de-2019"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Family Law of the State of Hidalgo, creating an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition, available only to individuals over 18 years old. In 2022, it passed a <a href="https://periodico.hidalgo.gob.mx/?tribe_events=periodico-oficial-alcance-4-del-24-de-noviembre-de-2022"><u>law</u></a> recognizing non-binary identities. Reform of the Law for the Family (p. 12) https://periodico.hidalgo.gob.mx/?tribe_events=periodico-oficial-alcance-1-del-15-de-mayo-de-2019 Jalisco In 2020, the state governor issued a <a href="https://apiperiodico.jalisco.gob.mx/api/sites/periodicooficial.jalisco.gob.mx/files/10-29-20-ii.pdf"><u>decree</u></a> amending the Civil Registry Regulation, allowing all individuals, regardless of age, to access legal gender recognition. In 2022, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://apiperiodico.jalisco.gob.mx/newspaper/import/04-09-22-iv.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Civil Registry Law recognize this right, but limiting it to adults.<br /> In June 2023, Mexico’s Supreme Court <a href="https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5701395&fecha=11/09/2023#gsc.tab=0"><u>ruled</u></a> that it was unconstitutional for Jalisco to limit access to the right to adults. In March 2025, however, Jalisco’s, congress <a href="https://www.congresojal.gob.mx/boletines/rechazan-reforma-para-que-menores-puedan-cambiar-de-identidad-de-g-nero-en-actas-de"><u>voted against</u></a> a measure that would have extended this right to children in line with the Supreme Court ruling. Gubernatorial Decree, Reform of the Regulation for the Civil Registry (pp. 10-17) https://periodicooficial.jalisco.gob.mx/sites/periodicooficial.jalisco.gob.mx/files/10-29-20-ii.pdf 2022: Reform of the Civil Registry Law (Art. 23, p. 8) https://periodicooficial.jalisco.gob.mx/sites/periodicooficial.jalisco.gob.mx/files/04-09-22-iv.pdf Ciudad de México In 2014, Ciudad de México’s congress passed a <a href="https://data.consejeria.cdmx.gob.mx/portal_old/uploads/gacetas/7bb8a79364dfde1302011f559a62d207.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition applicable only to adults. In 2021, the Ciudad de México’s Head of Government issued a <a href="https://data.consejeria.cdmx.gob.mx/portal_old/uploads/gacetas/091771983997a7b58875142bd6d8d889.pdf"><u>decree</u></a> allowing adolescents as young as 12 years old to access this right. Reform of the Civil Code (arts. 135 Bis - 135 Quintus) https://data.consejeria.cdmx.gob.mx/portal_old/uploads/gacetas/7bb8a79364dfde1302011f559a62d207.pdf 2021: Guidelines to Guarantee Human Rights in the Administrative Procedure for Recognition of Gender Identity in Mexico City for Adolescents https://sidh.cdmx.gob.mx/storage/app/media/Docs/ComSocial/GacetaOficial_BIS_270821_LGBTTI.pdf Estado de México In 2021, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://legislacion.edomex.gob.mx/sites/legislacion.edomex.gob.mx/files/files/pdf/gct/2021/julio/jul222/jul222c.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Civil Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. In June 2023, Mexico’s Supreme Court <a href="https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=5741418"><u>declared</u></a> unconstitutional the fact that the law does not extend this right to people under 18 years old. As of March 2025, Estado de México’s congress has not reformed its legislation in line with that ruling. Reform of the Civil Code https://legislacion.edomex.gob.mx/sites/legislacion.edomex.gob.mx/files/files/pdf/gct/2021/julio/jul222/jul222c.pdf Michoacán In 2017, the state’s congress passed a <a href="http://congresomich.gob.mx/file/Decreto-390.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Family Code of Michoacán de Ocampo to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Reform of the Family Code https://periodicooficial.michoacan.gob.mx/download/2017/agosto/18 de Agosto del 2017/7a-9717.pdf Morelos In 2021, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://periodico.morelos.gob.mx/obtenerPDF/2021/5986.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Family Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. In November 2021, Morelos’ governor issued a <a href="https://database.ilga.org/api/downloader/download/1/MX%20-%20LEG%20-%20Morelos%20Decree%20to%20amend%20the%20Regulations%20of%20the%20Civil%20Registry%20(2021)%20-%20OR-OFF%20(es).pdf"><u>decree</u></a> amending the Civil Registry Regulation to expand this right to children between 12 and 17 years old. Reform of the Family Code (ejemplar 14.09.2021) https://periodico.morelos.gob.mx/ejemplares 2021: Reform of the Civil Registry Regulation (ejemplar 26.11.2021) https://periodico.morelos.gob.mx/ejemplares Nayarit In 2017, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://periodicooficial.nayarit.gob.mx/descargar_pdf.php?archivo=D%20270717%20(06).pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Civil Code of the State of Nayarit to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Reform of the Civil Code http://periodicooficial.nayarit.gob.mx:8080/periodico/resources/archivos/D 270717 (06).pdf Nuevo León Although the state’s legislative framework has not been reformed to guarantee an <a href="https://www.oas.org/es/sap/dgpe/puica/docs/Compendio-de-practicas-de-reconocimiento-legal-de-la-Identidad-de-genero-en-las-entidades-federativas-de-Mexico.pdf"><u>administrative procedure</u></a> for legal gender recognition, coordination between the Civil Registry and the local judiciary has enabled the implementation of procedures that, although formally judicial, have an administrative approach in practice. These procedures are carried out in accordance with the standards established in <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_24_eng.pdf"><u>Advisory Opinion OC-24/17</u></a> of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Trans children and adolescents can access this process through their parents or legal guardians. A formally judicial procedure, although materially administrative, managed almost entirely through the civil registry. https://www.sdpnoticias.com/diversidad/cambio-identidad-de-genero-en-nuevo-leon-tramite-personas-trans.html Oaxaca In 2019, the state’s congress passed a <a href="http://www.periodicooficial.oaxaca.gob.mx/listado.php?d=2019-10-5"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Civil Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. In 2021, Oaxaca enacted another <a href="http://www.periodicooficial.oaxaca.gob.mx/listado.php?d=2021-10-16"><u>reform</u></a> extending this right to children 12 years old and older. In June 2023, Mexico’s Supreme Court <a href="https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5730515&fecha=14/06/2024&print=true"><u>ruled</u></a> that it was unconstitutional for the law to exclude children under 12 years old; with that reform nullified, all children in the state can now access this right. Reform of the Civil Code (arts. 136-137 Quáter; pp. 2-3) http://www.periodicooficial.oaxaca.gob.mx/files/2019/10/SEC40-02DA-2019-10-05.pdf 2021: Reform of the Civil Code, allowing gender recognition for minors (arts. 137 Ter – 137 Quáter; pp. 4-5) http://www.periodicooficial.oaxaca.gob.mx/files/2021/10/SEC42-04TA-2021-10-16.pdf Puebla In 2021, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://periodicooficial.puebla.gob.mx/media/k2/attachments/T_E_V_26032021_C.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Civil Code to recognize the right to legal gender recognition. In 2021, congress issued a corresponding <a href="https://ojp.puebla.gob.mx/media/k2/attachments/Reglamento_del_Registro_Civil_de_las_Personas_T5_22062021.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> of the Civil Registry Regulation to recognize this right. One of the requirements established in the civil code law was that the applicant be at least 18 years old. In March 2022, the Supreme Court <a href="https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=5681822"><u>declared</u></a> this provision unconstitutional. Congress has not legislated to comply with the ruling. Reform of the Civil Code http://periodicooficial.puebla.gob.mx/media/k2/attachments/T_E_V_26032021_C.pdf Querétaro Querétaro has not reformed its legislation to create a legal gender recognition procedure for transgender people Quintana Roo In 2020, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://documentos.congresoqroo.gob.mx/decretos/EXVI-2020-11-17-61.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Civil Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Reform of the Civil Code http://documentos.congresoqroo.gob.mx/dictamenes/DI-XVI-2020-11-17_720_8.pdf Further Background https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2020/11/19/estados/reforman-codigo-civil-de-qroo-para-reconocer-a-personas-2018trans2019-4694 San Luis Potosí In 2019, the state’s congress passed a <a href="http://congresosanluis.gob.mx/sites/default/files/unpload/tl/gpar/2019/10/uno.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Law on Civil Registry to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Gubernatorial Decree, Reform of the Regulation for the Law of Civil Registry http://www.cegaipslp.org.mx/HV2019Tres.nsf/nombre_de_la_vista/0EB945AEA16E405486258488006CA7FD/$File/Inic1-.pdf Sinaloa In 2022, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://media.transparencia.sinaloa.gob.mx/uploads/files/2/POE-16-marzo-2022-033-I.PDF"><u>reform</u></a> amending the Family Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition, also covering children and adolescents. Reform of the Family Code (pp. 3-11) http://media.transparencia.sinaloa.gob.mx/uploads/files/2/POE-16-marzo-2022-033-I.PDF Sonora In 2021, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://cipes.gob.mx/resources/docs/boletin/Decreto_142.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> of the Civil Registry Law creating an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition for adults. In June 2023, Mexico’s Supreme Court <a href="https://diariooficial.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5706097&fecha=20/10/2023&print=true"><u>declared</u></a> the law’s limitation of the right to adults to be unconstitutional. As of March 2025, congress has not reformed its laws in line with the ruling. Reform of the Civil Registry Law http://www.boletinoficial.sonora.gob.mx/boletin/images/boletinesPdf/2021/02/2021CCVII9I.pdf Tabasco Tabasco has not reformed its legislation to create a legal gender recognition procedure for transgender people Tamaulipas Tamaulipas has not reformed its legislation to create a legal gender recognition procedure for transgender people Tlaxcala In 2019, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://publicaciones.tlaxcala.gob.mx/indices/Ex14102019.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> to the Civil Code to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Reform of the Civil Code https://congresodetlaxcala.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/D.-113.-SE-REFORMAN-Y-ADICIONAN-DIVERSAS-DISPOSICIONES-DEL-CÓDIGO-CIVIL-DEL-ESTADO-DE-TLAXCALA.-011019.pdf Veracruz Veracruz has not reformed its legislation to create a legal gender recognition procedure for transgender people Yucatán In 2024, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://www.yucatan.gob.mx/docs/diario_oficial/diarios/2024/2024-04-26_2.pdf"><u>reform</u></a> to the Civil Registry Law to create an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Zacatecas In 2022, the state’s congress passed a <a href="https://periodico.zacatecas.gob.mx/visualizar/f54730ab-c545-4b5a-b769-a5025a7fe4be;1.2"><u>reform</u></a> to amend the Family Code creating an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. In 2023, the director of the Civil Registry issued corresponding <a href="http://periodico.zacatecas.gob.mx/visualizar/1f058a50-e51c-4a4e-aef8-8a2eef072b1d;1.2"><u>guidelines</u></a> to implement the law. Reform of the Family Code https://www.congresozac.gob.mx/coz/images/uploads/20230126134044.pdf http://periodico.zacatecas.gob.mx/visualizar/1f058a50-e51c-4a4e-aef8-8a2eef072b1d;1.2Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) people are facing increasing threats to their rights worldwide, with governments enacting restrictive laws, political leaders amplifying hostile rhetoric, and cases of violence being far too common. Trans people remain an especially vulnerable group, including in Mexico.
Decision-makers in all remaining Mexican states should create legal gender recognition procedures so that trans people can enjoy their full human rights. Mexico has a real opportunity to serve as a model of progress and inclusion in this challenging landscape for the LGBT rights movement.
(Berlin, March 28, 2025) – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should place local people’s human rights at the center of the historic deal over their contested border, and provide justice to victims of war crimes during a 2022 border conflict, Human Rights Watch said today.
The agreement was signed on March 13, 2025 by Tajik president Emomali Rahmon and Kyrgyz president Sadyr Japarov during Rahmon’s first official visit to Kyrgyzstan since the September 2022 conflict. The agreement has since been ratified by parliaments in both countries and border crossings have been re-opened.
“Civilians living in the disputed areas between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have long borne the brunt of conflicts over the contested border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, so the draft border deal is an important step forward,” said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “But long-lasting peace will require rebuilding trust based on respect for human rights between border communities and reckoning with the injustices committed during past conflicts.”
The agreement includes a plan for land swaps of equal size and the shared management and use of water resources and facilities, as well as a commitment not to fly drones or station any heavy military equipment and auxiliary forces along the border. The agreement was ratified by the lower chamber of the Tajik parliament on March 18, and the Kyrgyzstan parliament on March 19.
On March 25, Kyrgyz president Japarov signed the law to ratify the agreement.
Tens of thousands of people living in the border region have been heavily affected by cross-border tensions and violence. The September 22 conflict was the deadliest, with forces of both countries engaging in four days of fighting. A Human Rights Watch investigation found that at least 37 civilians were killed and up to 121 injured in at least eight incidents.
The fighting included apparent war crimes by both sides. Kyrgyz forces caried out a drone strike on a town square in Tajikistan, attacked three ambulances carrying wounded Tajik civilians, and apparently indiscriminately shelled populated areas in Tajikistan. Tajik forces apparently deliberately killed civilians and caried out widespread deliberate destruction of homes and other civilian property.
In earlier clashes in April 2021, at least 41 people were killed, hundreds were injured, and civilian property was extensively damaged. There was also extensive damage to civilian property.
International humanitarian law, which applies to all parties to an international armed conflict, requires parties to distinguish between civilians and combatants at all times. It prohibits attacks that target civilians or that are indiscriminate or expected to cause harm to civilians and civilian objects that are disproportionate to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated. Warring parties must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize harming civilians.
Both governments have a responsibility to investigate potential violations or abuses by their forces and civilians in the areas they controlled and hold those responsible to account. Victims and their relatives living in the border areas deserve to know the truth about what happened and be compensated for it justly, Human Rights Watch said. But neither side has publicized any findings about violations committed by their forces during these conflicts. As part of the agreement, the village of Dostuk in Kyrgyzstan will be transferred to Tajikistan in exchange for territory of equal size. Residents of Dostuk requested and are to be granted additional land in the village they are to be relocated to, media reported. The two governments should ensure that the border agreement respects the rights of local populations, including property rights, and access to education, adequate housing, and water.
They should also promote initiatives designed to strengthen respect for human rights between local communities in border areas, for example programs to reduce hate speech. Both governments should endorse the international Safe Schools Declaration and the Political Declaration on the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s international partners should support steps by the two governments to rebuild trust based on respect for human rights between the border communities, including by supporting the investigation into serious violations of international humanitarian law in the September 2022 border conflict and ensuring accountability.
“The border agreement is an opportunity for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to look to the future” Williamson said. “For this to be meaningful, prioritizing the rights of local people and remedying past wrongs are essential steps.”
(New York) – India’s northeastern state of Manipur has faced renewed violence since its divisive chief minister resigned and the government imposed the president’s rule on February 13, 2025, Human Rights Watch said today.
At least five people have died and scores injured, including security force members, in recent clashes. On March 8, a man was killed and several were injured in Kangpokpi district when violence broke out after the authorities attempted to restore transportation connections across the state. On March 19, another man was killed following clashes between two tribal communities in the state’s Churachandpur district. The central government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi should act to end the violence, which has killed more than 260 people and displaced over 60,000 since May 2023, and ensure humanitarian aid reaches all affected. Armed militant groups, government-backed vigilantes, and state security forces should be held accountable for abuses.
“The resignation of Manipur’s divisive chief minister hasn’t ended the distrust among communities that fuels the violence,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “President’s rule should be seen as an opportunity to restore security, impartially prosecute those responsible for abuses, and end the violence in Manipur in a rights-respecting manner.”
From February to March 2025, Human Rights Watch interviewed 15 people, including human rights activists, lawyers, community organizers, healthcare workers, journalists, and academics from the Meitei and the Kuki-Zo communities affected by the violence in Manipur.
Ethnic violence between the predominant Meitei community, which is mostly Hindu, and the tribal Kuki-Zo communities, which are largely Christian, has wracked Manipur and its population of estimated 3.2 million for nearly two years. Armed militant groups on both sides, long dormant, have become active again.
The state government led by Chief Minister N. Biren Singh of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that was in power until February 9, 2025, demonstrated a pro-Meitei bias in its response to the violence. Singh’s administration, including the police, allegedly protected Meitei vigilante groups such as the Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun, which have looted weapons from state armories and engaged in mob attacks on the Kuki-Zo. Singh denied allegations of bias.
The state has effectively been split into two ethnic zones separated by buffer areas with police outposts and security force patrols. The valley, with the state capital, Imphal, administrative offices, healthcare centers, and the primary airport, is dominated by the majority Meitei community, while Kuki-Zo and other tribal communities are largely confined to the hills.
Several Kuki women have reported sexual violence including rape by Meitei men. Meitei mobs, including armed militants, have burned down, attacked, and vandalized homes, businesses, villages, and places of worship, mostly targeting the Kuki-Zo community. In September 2024, suspected Kuki militants attacked villages in West Imphal district and in Bishnupur district, killing three Meitei people. In November, suspected Kuki militants abducted and killed three Meitei women and three children in Jiribam district, while two men were burned to death.
The Modi administration has called for recovery of stolen weapons, and has embarked upon talks to reduce violence. Many Manipuris believe the central government should have acted sooner. “We had begged the prime minister to intervene, but he just didn’t care, while hundreds were killed and injured,” one activist said. “Now community ties have completely broken down.”
In August 2023, India’s Supreme Court expressed concerns over what it termed the “absolute breakdown of law and order” in Manipur. It noted that “there are serious allegations including witness statements indicating that the law-enforcing machinery has been inept in controlling the violence and, in certain situations, colluded with the perpetrators,” and called for an investigation into the allegations.
A 40-year-old Kuki farmer from Kangpokpi district has been living with his family in a community-run relief camp in Churachandpur district since a Meitei mob attack in May 2023. “There were more than 200 people along with about a dozen policemen and the mob had sophisticated weapons,” he said. “We had no means to defend ourselves, so we ran toward the jungle. We climbed up on the trees and we saw them burn the houses and the church with kerosene and petrol that they carried with them.”
The former state government’s support for Meitei militants and its complicity in the violence, has eroded trust in the rule of law and revived Kuki-Zo demands for a separate federally administered territory.
Indian authorities should demobilize and disarm vigilante groups, ensure prompt reparation for victims and survivors of abuses, and provide for impartial justice and accountability measures, Human Rights Watch said. All internally displaced people should be provided adequate food, shelter, clean water, appropriate clothing, essential medical services, sanitation, education for children, and other basic assistance and protection services in line with international human rights law, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, or citizenship status.
The authorities should ensure that people have the right to return when conditions are in place for a safe and voluntary process carried out in accordance with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, with full and meaningful participation of all affected communities, including the equal participation of women.
Security forces should abide by the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which require security forces to use the minimum necessary force at all times. In dispersing violent assemblies, firearms may only be used when other less harmful means are not practicable but to the minimum extent necessary. Law enforcement officers may only intentionally resort to lethal force when strictly unavoidable to protect life.
The Indian government has announced measures to disarm groups, restore free movement of vehicles, and dismantle community checkpoints to reverse the segregation of communities and restore normalcy in the state.
“The Indian government has taken necessary first steps but needs to make a genuine commitment to respect human rights, provide redress and rehabilitation for victims, and ensure impartial justice,” Pearson said. “The communities need to regain trust in each other but also in the government for this violence to end.”
Click to expand Image A destroyed house after clashes between Meiteis and Kukis along a highway in Torbung village in Churachandpur district, Manipur, May 3, 2023. © 2023 Biplov Bhuyan/SOPA Images/Sipa USA via AP PhotoHuman Rights Abuses in Manipur
State Bias, Complicity in Abuse
While chief minister, N. Biren Singh replicated many of the BJP’s divisive policies used nationally to promote Hindu majoritarianism in Manipur state. He claimed without any basis that the Kukis and other mostly Christian tribal groups were providing sanctuary to undocumented immigrants from Myanmar and engaging in drug trafficking and deforestation. Meitei community members echoed the accusations that the Kuki-Zo were cultivating poppies for the illegal drug trade, and unfairly benefiting from government quotas for tribal groups in jobs and education. The Kuki-Zo community alleged that the authorities were engaged in discriminatory practices such as escalating the eviction of villagers from forest areas. This led to rising tensions for months before the outbreak of violence in May 2023.
“If at all reconciliation has to happen, then the Indian state must be held accountable,” a Meitei academic said. “The state is an active party in this conflict.”
Singh denied allegations of bias, saying “I am chief minister of every community, be it Meiteis, Kukis or Nagas,” and that he “saved the state from illegal migration, illegal poppy cultivation.” His government told the Supreme Court in September 2023 that, “The Petitioners have made attempts to portray an incorrect position before this Hon’ble Court between two communities where only one community is portrayed as the victim and the other as the aggressor. The State and Union of India have always maintained a neutral stand on the issue and have specifically not sought to selectively highlight some incidents over others.”
Violence erupted on May 3, 2023, after tribal communities protested a Manipur High Court order granting the Meitei community certain benefits, including land ownership in protected areas and quotas in government jobs. In India, such affirmative action is usually reserved for tribal groups to correct historical and structural inequity and discrimination. The Manipur High Court revoked the contentious order in February 2024.
The role of then-Chief Minister Singh in fomenting violence became clear when activists submitted audio tapes to the Ministry of Home Affairs Commission of Inquiry and to the Supreme Court that allegedly contained recordings from a 2023 meeting in the chief minister’s official residence. An independent news website, the Wire, which obtained a copy of the recordings, said it had confirmed the date, subject, and contents. On audio, a voice, apparently Singh’s, describes colluding in the bombing of Kuki villages and shielding Meitei attackers. The then-chief minister and his government said the tapes were “doctored.”
Political Patronage for Civilian Militias
The Manipur state government provided political patronage to armed vigilante groups such as Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun that support the Meitei community. One BJP lawmaker is affiliated with Arambai Tenggol, while the founder of Meitei Leepun is a former member of an organization affiliated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, BJP’s ideological parent organization. The former chief minister had publicly expressed support for Arambai Tenggol.
Following the May 2023 violence, the media reported that mobs including members of Meitei vigilante groups looted more than 6,000 weapons from armories and police stations. About 2,500 have been recovered. The Kuki-Zo communities have alleged that these groups committed assaults, sexual violence, and murder. The Manipur authorities failed to investigate or take action against members of Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun who were implicated in the abuses.
The Meitei groups have also attacked people from their own community who have spoken out against them.
The Imphal-based human rights activist Babloo Loitongbam, a Meitei, faced threats and harassment from the two groups after he criticized their violent actions in a television news interview in May 2023. In October 2023, Meitei Leepun held a news conference, forbidding Loitongbam from appearing on public platforms. A group of about 30 men, allegedly belonging to Arambai Tenggol, vandalized his house. He was also forced to make a public apology for his earlier statement after the groups threatened to burn down his home. In September 2024, Meitei Leepun held another news conference, accusing him of collaborating with the Kuki community against Meitei interests.
In November, UN Human Rights experts wrote to the Indian government expressing concern over the smear campaign against Loitongbam: “We are further concerned that the authorities appear to have taken little to no action in addressing the threats which he and his family face.”
Jos Chongtham, 27, a documentary filmmaker who was investigating the chief minister’s policies on drugs, was abducted in September 2024, allegedly by about 50 members of Meitei Leepun. He told Human Rights Watch that he was held for about eight hours and mistreated. “They confiscated my phone and finally released me saying that I should appear before them whenever they call me,” he said. After Chongtham filed a police report about the kidnapping and assault and held a news conference, he says he “received constant death threats” on his phone and eventually fled Manipur.
Chongtham said this did not stop the attacks against his family. In October 2024, members of Arambai Tenggol went to his house, assaulted his father, confiscated the phones of his family members, and detained them for several hours. “They gave my family an ultimatum that they should produce me within three days, or else they would burn down my home, would try to locate and execute me,” he said.
The police, instead of investigating the attack against him and his family, put pressure on them to withdraw their complaint. “In March 2025,” he said, “the police went to my house to ask my family to rescind the FIR [First Information Report required to begin a police investigation] against Meitei Leepun and withdraw the complaint made to the National Human Rights Commission.”
In October 2023, members of Meitei militant groups attacked the house of a former police officer, Brinda Thounaojam, after she criticized Meitei Leepun and Arambai Tenggol. She was made to apologize. Her house was attacked again in December 2023 after she criticized then-Chief Minister Singh.
Police Failure to Protect
Kuki community members have alleged that the police were siding with the Meitei community, did not protect them, and at times even joined the mobs. The Manipur police have denied any bias.
The media have reported numerous cases of violence in which the police failed to act, leading the Supreme Court to intervene. On May 4, 2023, a large group of Meiteis attacked a village in Kangpokpi district, trapping two Kuki men and three women. The mob killed the men and sexually assaulted the women, gang-raping one of them. The Meitei mob also stripped and paraded two of the women. After a video of the attacks emerged in July 2023, the Supreme Court ordered the federal Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate it along with other cases of sexual assault in Manipur.
In October 2023, the investigation concluded that although two of the women and one male victim managed to get inside a police car, “the driver suddenly drove and stopped the vehicle near the violent mob of around 1,000 people,” and that after the crowd took the women, the police drove away “leaving the victims alone with the mob.” The authorities arrested six people in this case, but more than a year later, no charges have been filed against police officers or members of Meitei vigilante groups involved in this incident. The investigative authorities have made even less progress in incidents of sexual violence in other parts of the state that have not received the same level of public scrutiny.
In August 2023, the Supreme Court, accepting concerns over police complicity in abuses, created Special Investigation Teams overseen by senior police officers from outside Manipur, and appointed a former police commissioner from another state to monitor the overall investigation of cases as an added “layer of scrutiny.” The court also formed a committee of three former high court judges to oversee relief and rehabilitation.
The authorities have also failed to protect members of the Meitei community. In November 2024, about 35 armed Kuki militants attacked the camp of the Central Reserve Police Force, a paramilitary police, and the adjacent police station in Jiribam district, allegedly looking for “Meitei people.” They abducted and killed three women and three children including an 8-month-old infant from the Meitei community, and burned to death two older Meitei men. Security forces had provided shelter to several Meitei families since June 2023, after the violence extended to the area.
Delays and Failures of Access to Justice
In August 2023, the Supreme Court expressed “its dissatisfaction with the tardy pace of investigation.” It also noted the delays in recording witness statements, in making arrests even in cases involving “heinous offences,” and in ensuring medical examinations of victims.
As of December 2024, the 42 special investigation teams created by the Supreme Court had filed charges in only 6 percent of the 3,023 registered cases, including 126 murders, 9 cases of sexual crimes against women, and 2,888 cases of looting, arson, and other property crimes.
Growing Humanitarian Crisis
In government data submitted to the Supreme Court, 57,000 people are registered as living in 361 relief camps, displaced after the violence began. However, this does not account for people who found shelter with relatives, are staying in temporary housing, or have left the state due to the violence.
Meitei and Kuki community members and civil society groups have reported that most Meitei camps are being run with some government support, either sponsored by the local lawmaker or established in government buildings, such as colleges and sports complexes. In contrast, the Kuki camps are mostly housed in church compounds and are dependent on community contributions. “Government support has been sorely lacking,” said a journalist from the Kuki community. “People are surviving on kinship relations and the church.”
Displaced people from Kuki-Zo communities have limited access to proper healthcare, cramped living conditions, inadequate sanitation facilities, daily water shortages, a lack of nutritious food, and loss of livelihoods. A Kuki community organizer in Kangpokpi district said that the government was providing some food rations, “but not regularly or adequately. We need a lot of basic stuff that are being provided by the community.”
Healthcare access has emerged as one of the most pressing challenges for the Kuki Zo, because community members cannot go to Imphal, where the main hospitals are located. “The local hospital is so ill-equipped, we can’t take care of serious illnesses or injuries,” the community organizer in Kangpokpi said. “We have to transport the patients by road to another state, Assam or Nagaland.”
Click to expand Image A community-run relief camp inside a cemetery compound in Manipur’s Churachandpur district, for members of tribal Kuki-Zo communities displaced after the May 2023 clashes, March 2025. © 2025 Kamsanglian GuiteA government health worker who manages a community-run relief camp for 113 Kuki-Zo people in Churachandpur district said: “The government is providing very limited food so we are providing as much as we can and taking help from the church. Without the church we would not have been able to support these internally displaced people.” There is no drinking water in the camp, and people obtain it from a private school nearby, dependent on the school administration’s goodwill. There were two toilets, and an international humanitarian organization built three more. But none of them have piped water.
The 40-year-old Kuki farmer from Kangpokpi district who fled his home in May 2023 with his wife and three children, said: “We are suffering here so much. But I don’t think it is possible for Kukis and Meitei to live alongside each other anymore. We are very scared. We don’t think we will be safe if we return.”
Internet Shutdowns
The authorities shut down the internet in Manipur for over 200 days in 2023, from May to December, saying it was required to stop the spread of misinformation. Following a court order in July 2023, the state government restored broadband services with certain safeguards. But the mobile internet shutdown continued until December, denying access to a majority of the population since 96 percent of people access internet on their mobile phones.
In 2024, the authorities continued to shut down the internet in places affected by violence. “Internet shutdowns are frequent especially when there is escalation,” a professor in Churachandpur district said. “Whenever there is a problem, they blame the internet, not the issue.”
While misinformation played a significant role in instigating violence, including sexual violence, internet bans are not a solution to inadequate law enforcement. They violate multiple human rights, and only cause further harm by restricting access to credible information, with rumors encouraging retaliatory attacks.
A September 2023 fact-finding report from the Editors Guild of India said the internet shutdown had “a dramatic impact on reporting.” Since correspondents were not able to file stories from the hills, the Editors Guild said, the internet ban prevented an alternative perspective, instead vilifying the Kuki Zo:
The internet ban did not yield the expected peace dividends for the state government, as the law and order situation continued to spiral out of control. What was worse was that the narrative began to blame those who did not have a voice in this conflict.
Crackdown on Activists, Media
Following the issuance of the Editors Guild 2023 report, the Manipur police registered a criminal case against the group’s fact-finding team, which had visited Manipur for their research.
Manipur authorities also prosecuted other civil society activists and journalists for independent reporting on the violence.
In July 2023, a court in Manipur summoned an academic and two Kuki activists in cases filed by Meitei activists alleging that their media interviews had promoted enmity between communities. The same month, the Manipur Home Department asked the police to file a criminal case against members of the Zomi Students’ Federation Union, who published “The Inevitable Split: Documents on State sponsored ethnic cleansing in Manipur, 2023,” and to ban further publication of the book.
Manipur police also filed a criminal case against two feminist leaders and an independent advocate in July 2023 for their fact-finding mission, which found that the violence was “state-sponsored.” The charges included sedition, defamation, waging war against India, and promoting enmity between different groups, among others.
In December 2023, the Supreme Court stayed criminal proceedings against the journalist Makepeace Sitlhou after the Manipur police filed a case against her for defamation, criminal conspiracy, and promoting enmity between groups. Sitlhou was targeted for her critical remarks on social media against the Manipur government’s failure to control the violence in the state.
On Wednesday, in Japan’s Diet, the House of Representatives Committee on Judicial Affairs held a hearing on the country’s abusive “hostage justice” system. To pressure suspects to confess to crimes, prosecutors have long detained people prior to trial for prolonged and arbitrary periods: sometimes for several months or even years.
This was an extraordinary moment for human rights in Japan.
At the hearing, Junji Shimada described being held in pretrial detention for 332 days before prosecutors dropped the indictment. He emphasized the need to revise the custody rules in the Code of Criminal Procedure so that they conform with international standards on presumption of innocence.
Human Rights Watch and other organizations have for years called on the Japanese government to undertake wide-ranging reforms in the criminal justice system to uphold rights to due process and to a fair trial. The groups have supported victims of “hostage justice” by advocating that the Diet open an inquiry into the troubled system.
On March 4, 17 Diet members joined many others to hear directly from survivors at the second “hostage justice” survivor event at the Diet, hosted by the “End ‘Hostage Justice’ in Japan” project, run jointly by Innocence Project Japan and Human Rights Watch. One result was the official Diet inquiry.
Relatedly, on March 17, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office announced that beginning in April, it will expand the use of audio and video recordings for interrogations to include those of suspects who are not in custody. Currently, the law only mandates that the entire process be recorded in cases such as those of serious crimes like murder, which make up fewer than 3 percent of all criminal cases. In other cases, prosecutors generally record on a voluntary basis when a suspect is taken into custody, but it has not included interrogations prior to detention or cases not involving detention.
The prosecutor’s new measures will help prevent abusive interrogations: a key aspect of “hostage justice.” However, bolder reforms are needed. The Diet should listen to survivors like Junji Shimada and move quickly to prevent future abuses.
This week, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities issued a bleak assessment of Canada’s immigration detention system, calling for Canada to protect the legal capacity rights of people with disabilities in detention and urging an end to immigration detention altogether.
The committee’s findings, released after a review of Canada’s disability rights record, echo concerns that Human Rights Watch and our partners have raised for years.
The committee warned that asylum seekers and migrants with disabilities are disproportionately detained, often in correctional facilities where they may be placed in solitary confinement if they experience a mental health crisis.
The committee’s message is clear: Canada should “end the use of immigration detention by increasing community-based, independent alternatives that provide access to holistic supports, such as housing, healthcare, mental health services, legal representation, disability-related supports, and children’s services.” The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has also long called for the gradual abolition of immigration detention on human rights grounds.
The committee also condemned Canada’s use of substitute decision-making for people with disabilities in immigration detention. Under this practice, designated representatives—appointed without meaningful assessment or oversight—are empowered to make crucial decisions on behalf of detainees, often without detainees’ knowledge or consent. Human Rights Watch has documented how this system deprives people of their legal capacity, often with life-altering or even life-endangering consequences.
The committee urged Canada to replace this system with a supported decision-making model that upholds detainees’ will and preferences.
The committee’s findings directly reflect the evidence presented by Human Rights Watch, including the case of Prosper Niyonzima, a Rwandan genocide survivor who spent nearly five years in immigration detention. After a mental health crisis left him catatonic, the tribunal appointed a designated representative that Prosper never met and could not remove. For years, Prosper’s tribunal hearings proceeded with this stranger speaking for him.
Prosper’s experience is not unique. Human Rights Watch has extensively documented how Canada’s immigration detention system disproportionately harms people with disabilities. Advocacy efforts, including the #WelcomeToCanada campaign, led all ten provinces to commit to ending their immigration detention agreements with the Canada Border Services Agency, although Ontario has granted an extension until September 2025.
Despite this, the federal government is attempting to renegotiate the use of provincial jails for immigration detention and has expanded the system onto federal prison grounds.
The committee’s recommendations add international weight to the need for change. Canada should move towards abolishing immigration detention and align its legal capacity framework with human rights standards.
Guezouma Sanogo (L) and Boukari Ouoba.
(Nairobi) – Burkina Faso’s military junta arrested three journalists on March 24, 2025, for reporting on the government crackdown on the media, Human Rights Watch said today.
The authorities arrested Guezouma Sanogo and Boukari Ouoba, respectively president and vice president of the Burkina Faso’s Journalists Association (Association des journalists du Burkina), and Luc Pagbelguem, journalist at the private television station BF1, in the capital, Ouagadougou. The current location of the three men is not known, raising concerns about enforced disappearances.
“The arbitrary arrest and disappearance of the three journalists shows the Burkina Faso junta’s desperation with controlling the truth and ensuring that military authorities can commit abuses with impunity,” said Ilaria Allegrozzi, senior Sahel researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The military junta should take immediate action to locate and release the three journalists.”
Since taking power in a 2022 coup, the military junta of President Ibrahim Traoré has systematically cracked down on the media, the political opposition, and peaceful dissent. Amid a growing Islamist insurgency, the military junta has been using a sweeping emergency law to silence dissent and illegally conscript critics, journalists, civil society activists, and magistrates into the military.
On March 21, 2025, the Journalists Association held a news conference denouncing the military junta’s restrictions on freedom of expression and calling on the authorities to release arbitrarily detained journalists. On March 24, men in civilian clothes claiming to be policemen working for the Burkinabè intelligence services arrested Sanogo and Ouoba. Two members of the intelligence services arrested Pagbelguem for covering the Journalists Association’s news conference. The next day, the territorial administration minister dissolved the Journalists Association.
Colleagues of Sanogo and Ouoba said lawyers searched for them in various police and gendarmerie stations across the capital to no avail and that the authorities had failed to officially respond to their requests for information. On March 25, the intelligence services took both Sanogo and Ouoba to their homes to facilitate a police search, then took them away again to an unknown location, colleagues said.
BF1 said officials told them that “they only want to interrogate our colleague,” but the whereabouts of Pagbelguem remain unknown. The station formally apologized for reporting on the news conference.
In another recent arrest, on March 18, men claiming to be gendarmes arrested the well-known political activist and journalist Idrissa Barry in Ouagadougou. His whereabouts also remain unknown. Barry is a member of the political group Servir et Non se Servir (“To Serve and Not Serve Oneself,” or SENS), which four days before his arrest, issued a statement denouncing “deadly attacks” by government forces and allied militias against civilians around Solenzo, in western Burkina Faso, on March 11.
In June 2024, members of the security forces arrested the prominent journalist Serge Oulon, director of the investigative newspaper L’Événement (“the Event”), and television commentators Adama Bayala and Kalifara Séré. The authorities denied holding them until October 2024, when they acknowledged that they had been conscripted into military service. Their whereabouts also remain unknown.
In April 2024, Burkina Faso’s media regulator suspended the French news network TV5 and several other media outlets for two weeks after they reported on a Human Rights Watch report that found the military had committed crimes against humanity against civilians in the Yatenga province. The regulator also blocked the Human Rights Watch website in the country.
Dozens of journalists have been forced to flee Burkina Faso under threat of imprisonment, torture, enforced disappearance, and forced conscription because of their work.
“I left Ouagadougou, and I’m not planning to return,” a journalist told Human Rights Watch after the arrest of Idrissa Barry. “Free media is dead in this country – all you can hear is government propaganda.”
The latest crackdown on the independent media has coincided with escalating fighting throughout the country. In the past two weeks, the Al-Qaeda linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, or JNIM) has attacked army positions in several regions, killing soldiers and civilians. Local sources reported that on March 15, 2025, JNIM fighters attacked the military base in Séguénéga, northern region, and killed seven civilians as well as at least four soldiers fighting alongside local militias. Human Rights Watch verified a video showing JNIM fighters assaulting a fortified compound on a hill in the center of Séguénéga.
“Burkina Faso’s relentless descent into large-scale violence is not getting the scrutiny and media coverage it deserves domestically because independent media outlets have been silenced,” said a Burkinabè journalist in exile. “Unfolding events such as the deadly attack on civilians in Solenzo and elsewhere are never reported in the pro-government media or are reported in a biased way.”
International human rights law prohibits arbitrary restrictions on the rights to freedom of speech and expression, including by detaining or forcibly disappearing journalists. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, to which Burkina Faso is a party, defines enforced disappearances as the arrest or detention of a person by state officials or their agents followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or to reveal the person’s fate or whereabouts.
“The need for independent media in Burkina Faso has never been greater,” Allegrozzi said. “The authorities should change course and end their brutal crackdown against journalists, dissidents and political opponents.”
(Geneva) – The United Nations Human Rights Council should extend the mandate of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua for an additional two years, Human Rights Watch said today. This renewal is crucial as the government of co-Presidents Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo intensifies its repression.
The UN Human Rights Council established the group of experts in March 2022 with an initial one-year mandate to investigate human rights violations committed in Nicaragua since 2018. The mandate was extended for two additional years in April 2023. The group of experts has documented widespread human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and forced deportation. The experts have reported that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that these findings “constitute evidence of crimes against humanity.”
“Sustained international scrutiny of Nicaragua, one of the region’s most oppressive regimes, remains crucial,” said Juanita Goebertus, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. “As the government denies any accountability for rights violations within Nicaragua, the Group of Human Rights Experts serves as an essential mechanism to document violations and facilitate other avenues for accountability.”
In its latest report, published in February 2025, the group of experts found new evidence that the Nicaraguan army participated in a violent 2018 crackdown on protesters in coordination with the police and pro-government armed groups. That violent suppression of protesters left 355 people dead and hundreds injured.
The group of experts also urged other countries to pursue accountability measures at the International Court of Justice for violations by Nicaragua of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and to expand sanctions against individuals, institutions, and entities identified in the experts’ reports.
Fifty-two political prisoners remain behind bars in Nicaragua, according to the Mechanism for the Recognition of Political Prisoners, a coalition of Nicaraguan human rights organizations documenting arbitrary arrests. Nicaraguan authorities have also stripped the citizenship of 546 people, leaving many stateless.
The government has also closed over 5,600 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), approximately 80 percent of all NGOs that operated in Nicaragua in 2018. According to the Nicaraguan Platform of NGO Networks, the government has also reportedly shut down at least 29 universities and 58 media outlets.
In January 2025, the National Assembly approved a constitutional overhaul that places the legislature, judiciary, and electoral bodies under the “coordination” of the co-presidency of Ortega and Murillo.
The overhaul is set to provide even more domestic legal cover to the government’s systematic human rights violations, including by allowing authorities to strip alleged “traitors” of their Nicaraguan nationality.
In February, the Nicaraguan government announced its decision to disengage from the UN Human Rights Council, and withdraw from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This decision came shortly after the group of experts released its latest report and just as the ILO was set to establish a Commission of Inquiry—the organization’s highest-level investigative mechanism—to examine alleged violations of the rights of workers in Nicaragua.
“As the Nicaraguan government seeks to avoid international scrutiny, the Human Rights Council should reinforce its mandate to put a spotlight on violations in the country,” Goebertus said.
(Brussels, March 27, 2025) – The European Union should put human rights at the center of its intensifying engagement with Central Asian countries at the inaugural EU-Central Asia summit on April 3 and 4, 2025 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch said today.
The EU is deepening bilateral agreements and connections to the countries in the region. Rights protections and the rule of law are essential to secure its interests in any partnership.
“It is good news that the EU is engaging at a high level with Central Asia, but to be effective, the talks need to address the very serious human rights concerns across the region” said Iskra Kirova, Europe and Central Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Jailing critics and activists and restrictions on civil society and independent media are hardly conducive to the progress the EU is seeking.”
The failure of Central Asian governments to uphold human rights, including freedoms of expression and assembly, has been at the core of instability in the region in recent years. This includes the violently suppressed unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022 as well as the deadly crackdowns on protests in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan in November 2021 and May 2022 and in the Republic of Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan in July 2022. There has been little or no accountability for police brutality in these protests.
Media freedom is another concern. Human Rights Watch has documented significant media restrictions across Central Asia, with tight government control and suppression of independent journalism.
Turkmenistan exerts total control over access to information, prohibits content deemed offensive to the government, blocks websites, including those of foreign news organizations and independent media, and limits internet access.
Kazakhstan’s June 2024 mass media law requires online publications to register and set up a physical presence in the country and grants the government expansive powers to deny accreditation to foreign media representatives. Kazakhstan’s courts have imprisoned independent journalists on dubious criminal charges. Duman Mukhammedkarim was sentenced to seven years in prison on August 2, 2024, on alleged “extremism” charges. On October 18, Daniyar Adilbekov was sentenced to four-and-a-half years in prison for allegedly disseminating false information.
Uzbekistan has harassed and imprisoned bloggers and jailed others for “insulting the president online.” Valijon Kalonov, a blogger and government critic, has been held in forced psychiatric detention since late December 2021. On January 31, 2023, the Karakalpak blogger and lawyer Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, was sentenced to 16 years in prison for his alleged role in the July 2022 protests in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan. The authorities have ignored his allegations of ill-treatment and torture.
Kyrgyzstan’s once vibrant media reached a new low in 2024. In January 2024, police arrested 11 journalists with the independent outlet Temirov Live on charges of “inciting mass unrest.” In October 2024, a Bishkek court sentenced two to prison terms and put two on probation. Courts have also ordered the closure of an award-winning investigative outlet, Kloop Media, alleging it failed to register as a media outlet and made “public calls for the violent seizure of power.” In January 2025, Kyrgyz authorities also recriminalized libel and insult on the internet and media.
Tajikistan has targeted journalists reporting on the crackdown in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, with seven journalists currently behind bars, including Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, who was sentenced to 21 years. In February 2025, the Tajik Supreme Court sentenced another journalist, Ruhshona Khakimova, to 8 years following a closed trial on classified charges.
Central Asian countries have also enacted restrictive legislation targeting nongovernmental organizations and have targeted independent activists for simply exercising their freedom of expression or association.
In Kyrgyzstan, a 2024 law requires foreign-funded groups to register as “foreign representatives” and submit to enhanced government oversight. The legislation mirrors Russia's foreign agents law and has had a stifling effect on civil society, with many organizations self-liquidating or ceasing activities.
Turkmenistan has virtually no independent civil society. The state continues to groundlessly and arbitrarily bar actual and perceived critics and activists and their relatives from foreign travel. Since January 2024, authorities arbitrarily barred at least three activists from traveling abroad, Soltan Achilova, Nurgeldy Khalykov, and Pygambergeldy Allaberdyev. Turkmenistan routinely represses dissidents abroad and their families inside the country.
The authorities refuse to renew or reissue passports through consulates abroad, requiring citizens to return to Turkmenistan, where they risk arrest and persecution. This requirement violates the right to freedom of movement and is a hallmark of transnational repression.
Uzbekistan has targeted independent rights activists with unfounded criminal charges and denies registration to independent rights groups. On July 18, 2024, a Kashkadarya court sentenced the activists Dildora Khakimova and Nargiza Keldiyorova to more than six years in prison on dubious extortion charges after they criticized corruption in the education system in Kashkadarya.
Kazakhstan uses vaguely-worded extremism laws to target activists with lengthy prison sentences. On November 30, 2023, the head of the unregistered opposition party Alga, Kazakhstan! (Forward, Kazakhstan!), Marat Zhylanbaev, was sentenced to 7 years on unfounded extremism charges. Legislators are also considering foreign-agent style legislation.
In February 2025, Tajikistan’s Supreme Court found a number of prominent figures, human rights lawyers, and politicians guilty of high treason, with sentences of between 18 and 27 years in prison. A human rights lawyer, Manuchekhr Kholiqnazarov, was sentenced to 16 years for his alleged role in the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region protests.
The EU should urge Central Asian governments to release rights defenders and journalists imprisoned for their legitimate activities and to repeal repressive legislation, Human Rights Watch said.
The EU’s new generation of Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements being negotiated with Central Asian countries set clear expectations, in addition to offering trade and investment opportunities. Mutual respect and cooperation to protect human rights and the rule of law is an “essential element” of the agreement. The EU should use these agreements to seek and achieve specific advances for human rights, Human Rights Watch said.
The EU also offers preferential market access to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in exchange for implementing international conventions on labor and human rights, environmental protection, and good governance. Yet, Human Rights Watch reporting and the European Commission’s own assessment show both countries to be in serious violation of most core international human rights treaties. EU leaders should demand that partners fulfil their human rights obligations or lose trade benefits.
“The first EU-Central Asia summit is an important milestone,” Kirova said. “The EU should use this moment to shape a well-rounded and sustainable partnership with Central Asian states that requires human rights to be a central part of the agenda.”
(Beirut) – A Casablanca Court on March 3, 2025, sentenced a prominent activist, Fouad Abdelmoumni, to six months in prison and fines over a Facebook post, Human Rights Watch and Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) said today. Moroccan authorities should urgently end their intensifying repression of activists, journalists, and human rights defenders solely for exercising their right to free speech and overturn his conviction.
Abdelmoumni, who was travelling outside the country, was sentenced in absentia to six months in prison and a fine of 2,000 dirhams (about US$208), over a Facebook post during French President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit. Abdelmoumni, a member of the Human Rights Watch Middle East and North Africa Advisory Committee, said he would appeal the conviction.
“Dragging yet another Moroccan activist into court and sentencing him to prison merely for expressing an opinion about relations between Morocco and another country shows just how outrageous this crackdown on free speech is,” said Balkees Jarrah, acting Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Macron should press the King of Morocco, his ally, to end these repressive tactics and release all those detained for peaceful speech.”
Moroccan police arrestedAbdelmoumni on October 30, 2024, in Temara, near the capital of Rabat. A prosecutor at the Ain Sebaa Criminal Court charged Abdelmoumni on November 1 with “insulting public authorities, spreading false allegations, and reporting a fictitious crime he knew did not occur.” The charges were in reference to an October 28 Facebook post criticizing Moroccan-French relations and alleging that the government is using spyware to target dissidents. He was provisionally released on November 1.
The Casablanca public prosecutor said on October 31 that allegations of Moroccan authorities’ “involvement in human trafficking, organizing illegal immigration, and spying using Pegasus software” lacked evidence and were false.
A petition signed by nearly 300 activists and human rights advocates called on Moroccan authorities to annul Abdelmoumni’s sentence and to “release all political prisoners held in Morocco and other Maghreb countries.”
Abdelmoumni is the coordinator of the Moroccan Association in Support of Political Prisoners and an outspoken critic of Morocco’s political system. Authorities have targeted him for years, including through digital surveillance, invading his privacy, and repeated harassment by media linked to Moroccan security services, he told Human Rights Watch. He was a political prisoner in 1977 and in 1982, during which he said he was subjected to torture and enforced disappearance.
Abdelmoumni learned in 2019 that his phone was infected with Pegasus spyware developed and sold by the Israel-based company NSO Group. The software gains complete access to a phone’s camera, microphone, voice calls, media, email, text messages, and other functions, enabling extensive surveillance of the targeted person and their contacts. Investigations by Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories found that Moroccan authorities were behind the hacking of the smartphones of several journalists and rights defenders, alongside possibly thousands of other individuals, using Pegasus, between 2019 and 2021.
In December 2020, Abdelmoumni and other spyware victims lodged an investigation request with the Moroccan National Commission for the Control of Personal Data Protection. The commission did not act on the complaint, contending that it “had no jurisdiction over those types of matters,” he said. Moroccan authorities have repeatedly denied using Pegasus to spy on dissidents.
In 2020, an anonymous WhatsApp account sent six videos to a few dozen people, including friends, activists, and close relatives, of Abdelmoumni and his partner, showing them in intimate situations before they were married. Abdelmoumni believes cameras were secretly planted inside his apartment.
Morocco’s criminal code punishes consensual sexual relationships between unmarried adults with up to one year in prison. Publicizing such relationships can expose women in particular to lasting stigma. Abdelmoumni said circulation of the videos prompted him to temporarily adopt a lower public profile to protect his partner and his security and privacy.
But after he resumed criticizing the authorities, Chouf TV in October 2020 publicly named Abdelmoumni’s partner, outing and shaming her.
In recent years, Moroccan authorities have stepped up repressive tactics against dozens of journalists and social media activists, convicting them for libel; publishing “false news,” “insulting” or “defaming” local officials, state bodies, or foreign heads of state; and “undermining” state security or the institution of the monarchy.
In a major escalation, the National Brigade of the Judicial Police of Casablanca on March 1, 2025, arrested four family members of Canada-based Moroccan content creator Hicham Jerando, seemingly in retaliation for his outspoken YouTube videos denouncing alleged corruption by public figures and senior Moroccan officials. The four, Jerando’s sister, her husband, his nephew, and his 13-year-old niece, are awaiting trial for alleged complicity in “disseminating false facts after invading the privacy of people” and for their alleged participation in threats.
Ismail Lghazaoui, an activist, was summoned for questioning in November 2024 over calls to protest Morocco’s facilitation of US weapons transfers to Israel and was charged with incitement to commit offenses. A Casablanca court sentenced him to one year in prison and a fine of 5,000 dirhams (about $520) on December 10. On February 5, 2025, the Casablanca Court of Appeals reduced the prison sentence to four months, including two months suspended, and ordered his release.
The Rabat Court of First Instance on November 11, 2024, sentenced Hamid Elmahdaoui, editor-in-chief of the website Badil and a frequent government critic, to 18 months in prison and a fine of 1.5 million Dirhams (about $156,600) for allegedly “broadcasting and distributing false allegations and facts in order to defame people, slander, and public insult,” after he mentioned a minister in a video. He had been previously sentenced to multiple prison terms for peaceful speech.
Morocco’s parliament should repeal all provisions criminalizing nonviolent speech offenses, including insults to public officials and state institutions, which can be punished with prison terms under the Penal Code.
Morocco’s constitution guarantees the protection of private life as well as thought, opinion, and expression. Morocco is also a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the rights to freedom of expression and to privacy.
“The Moroccan monarchy’s effort to present itself as progressive stands in stark contrast to the country’s repressive security forces,” Jarrah said. “The only way to align these outlooks is to end repression of critics and ensure people can express their peaceful views.”
The United Kingdom government has advanced accountability in Sri Lanka by imposing sanctions on four men implicated in atrocities during the country’s civil war.
The 1983-2009 conflict between the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government involved widespread human rights abuses and war crimes by both sides, but successive Sri Lankan governments have sought to cover up violations and protect those responsible.
On Monday, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy said, “The UK government is committed to human rights in Sri Lanka, including seeking accountability for human rights violations, … which continue to have an impact on communities today.” The measures include UK travel bans and asset freezes.
Those sanctioned include retired Gen. Shavendra Silva, who commanded the 58th Division of Sri Lanka’s Army at the end of the war and is implicated in enforced disappearances and killing Tamil civilians. He retired as chief of defense staff on January 1, 2025.
Also sanctioned is former navy Cmdr. Wasantha Karannagoda, who is implicated in the abduction for ransom and alleged torture and killing of 11 people by naval intelligence officers in 2008-2009. In 2021, the Sri Lankan government dropped charges against him and appointed him governor of North Western province. Both Silva and Karannagoda have been sanctioned by the United States.
Former army Chief and retired Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya commanded Joseph Camp, a military detention center where people were subjected to torture, sexual violence, and enforced disappearances.
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, also known as Colonel Karuna, is a former LTTE commander who switched sides to form a pro-government paramilitary group in 2004. He allegedly recruited child soldiers and committed summary executions for both sides. After the war he became a government minister.
On Wednesday, the Sri Lankan government responded to the UK sanctions, saying accountability should be pursued through domestic mechanisms, which it claimed to be strengthening.
The UK is among a core group of states at the United Nations Human Rights Council that have successfully proposed a series of resolutions to gather evidence and seek accountability for international crimes committed in Sri Lanka. So long as Sri Lanka makes no effort to attain accountability, international measures to seek justice are essential. Foreign governments should continue to impose targeted sanctions and use evidence that the UN has gathered to prosecute Sri Lankan war crimes suspects.