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Children's Rights Should Guide Japan's Online Safety Policy
In June, a working group at Japan's Internal Affairs Ministry declined to endorse a blanket age-based social media ban for children, saying it was "not desirable." Although the group’s report is not yet final, its rejection of a blanket ban suggests a willingness to consider alternative approaches to protecting children online.
As Human Rights Watch said in our response, online safety measures should respect children's rights and, consistent with international human rights law, any restrictions on those rights should be lawful, necessary, and proportionate. A blanket ban fails that test.
The draft report proposes several safeguards, including requiring platform operators to conduct and publish risk assessments and protection measures, establishing an external mechanism to review those measures, and implementing default-on protections.
However, the report frames its recommendations as risk management measures rather than measures to protect children’s rights. A children’s rights approach starts by recognizing that children are entitled to a full range of rights guaranteed under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Japan ratified in 1994. The working group should ground its recommendations on the convention and Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 25 on the digital environment.
The government should also be more ambitious in addressing gaps in protecting children's data. Rather than relying solely on technical solutions that may be outdated as digital technologies evolve, policymakers should propose future-proof solutions.
Human Rights Watch research on educational technology products—including applications recommended by Japan’s Education Ministry —found that the vast majority of these products secretly surveilled children and sent their data to third parties for behavioral advertising.
The government should either amend the Act on the Protection of Personal Information to include comprehensive protections for children’s data or enact a new child data protection law with effective implementation, enforcement mechanisms, and adequate resources.
Such legislation should require companies to apply the most protective privacy and safety settings by default. Such settings should also include disabling recommendation algorithms, infinite scroll, and push notifications. Strong data protection safeguards could also help mitigate the privacy and human rights risk associated with collecting and processing children’s data for age verification purposes.
By placing children's rights and data protection at the center of this policy process, Japan has an opportunity to create a stronger model for protecting children online.
Five Years On, Hundreds of Cuban Protesters Still Behind Bars
Five years ago, on July 11, 2021, Cuba experienced its largest nationwide demonstrations since the 1959 Revolution, as thousands took to the streets amid severe shortages and calls for greater rights and freedoms. The government responded with a wave of repression, deepening decades of restrictions on dissent. Rights groups Justicia 11J and Prisoners Defenders estimate that about 800 political prisoners remain behind bars, nearly half in connection with those demonstrations.
Human Rights Watch found that Cuban courts convicted many of them of crimes for engaging in what should be lawful acts of free expression and association. Others were accused of violent crimes, such as throwing stones, based on unreliable or uncorroborated evidence, and sentenced to disproportionate prison terms. Human Rights Watch also spoke to former detainees who described serious abuses in prison, including beatings, solitary confinement, and lack of medical care.
Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, an artist and activist arrested as he was heading to the demonstrations, was sentenced to five years in prison. He should have been released on July 9. Instead, Cuban authorities transferred him to an undisclosed location where, according to his friend, activist and curator Anamely Ramos, he remains in custody while awaiting admission to the United States under the Significant Public Benefit Parole program. She said the authorities' actions suggest that they are making his release contingent on him leaving the country. Ramos, who spoke with Otero by phone on July 9, said he was unable to tell her where he was being held.
Juan Enrique Pérez Sánchez joined the 2021 protests and is serving eight years for “contempt, public disorder, and sabotage.” Cuban prosecutors accused him of throwing rocks, based on “odor traces” allegedly found on the rocks. Forensic experts from the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims told Human Rights Watch that such traces “should not be considered as scientifically based evidence.”
Cuban human rights groups say that guards beat Ibrahim Domínguez Aguilar after he requested medical attention in 2024 and Duannis Dabel León Taboada after he protested the lack of medical care for other inmates that same year. The rights group Cubalex said that the authorities continue to deny Lizandra Góngora Espinosa treatment for sickle cell anemia and a uterine fibroid causing her pain and bleeding. All three remain in prison.
Five years on, protests in Cuba continue, even if at a smaller scale. The repressive system hasn’t changed. The Cuban government should immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and end its systematic repression of dissent.
European Parliament Resolution on Sudan Should Spark Action
The European Parliament adopted a milestone resolution on July 8 that addresses the armed conflict in Sudan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacks in El Obeid, capital of North Kordofan.
Civilians in El Obeid continue to suffer from unlawful attacks. “Drones strikes are daily,” one resident said. “They’re targeting infrastructure like water, fuel and the electricity station [that] we need for our survival.” Fifteen drone strikes killed at least 45 civilians in El Obeid and the surrounding area over three weeks in June.
The resolution is significant because for the first time it explicitly names the UAE as participating in and fueling the war in Sudan and calls for actions to end this support.
Since the outbreak of the conflict in 2023, diplomats and policymakers have steadfastly opposed naming the UAE. Delaying this step kept the European Parliament from denouncing the UAE’s support to the abusive RSF.
Nor had growing attention to the Sudan crisis in recent weeks resulted in greater focus on the UAE’s role. The United Nations Human Rights Council, which had previously denounced external support sustaining the conflict, did so again without naming the UAE.
Human Rights Watch research found that Colombian private military contractors, hired by a UAE-based company, transited through UAE military bases before being deployed to Sudan to support the RSF. We also found that Colombian fighters were present when the RSF captured El Fasher in 2025. This is further evidence that the UAE is assisting or otherwise substantially contributing to the RSF’s capacity to commit war crimes. They have also provided them with weapons and ammunition, some made in Europe, in violation of the UN arms embargo on Darfur.
With RSF’s abuses under the spotlight, the European Union should roll out targeted sanctions against entities, including the Abu Dhabi-based company Global Security Services Group and its chief executive officer, Mohamed Hamdan al-Zaabi, for apparently hiring the Colombian fighters, and other companies, such as airlines and airport operators, involved in the UAE air bridge to the RSF. They should suspend their military and defense cooperation with the UAE and ensure any further cooperation is contingent on the UAE government ending its support of the RSF.
Proposed Law in France Threatens Civic Space
The French government is expected at any moment to unveil troubling draft legislation to address so-called entryism: the idea that certain groups seek to infiltrate state institutions to influence and promote an ideological agenda. If adopted, the bill would further erode the country’s already shrinking civic space.
The entryism bill would aim to strengthen the 2021 Law Reinforcing Respect for the Principles of the Republic, often referred to as the “separatism law,” which grants the government broad powers to shut down nongovernmental groups by ministerial decree. It also forces organizations to sign a “Contract of Republican Engagement” conditioning the receipt of public funds on vague requirements, including refraining “from any action that undermines public order.” These tools have created an environment of intense pressure and self-censorship among civil society.
The French Senate passed on May 5 the first reading of a separate, highly restrictive bill initiated by conservative Senator Bruno Retailleau specifically targeting “Islamist entryism.” While Retailleau’s bill is unlikely to secure enough support for the next phase of the legislative process, it serves as a blueprint for what the government intends to incorporate into its own legislation.
Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez has said that the government bill will closely align with Retailleau’s proposal. The Council of State is currently reviewing the government’s entryism bill which will then be discussed by the Council of Ministers; if approved, the draft will be presented to the Parliament.
Although the final draft is not public, Nuñez has outlined several key provisions raising serious human rights concerns. They would grant the Ministry of Interior and local state-appointed governors unprecedented powers, broadening grounds for dissolution of nongovernmental groups. It would also allow the government to freeze nongovernmental groups’ assets and will expand state powers to enforce compliance with the Contract of Republican Engagement.
CIVICUS Monitor, a global alliance tracking civic freedoms across the globe, downgraded France’s civic space status from “restricted” to “obstructed” in December 2025. The government’s proposed law would compound the problem.
The French government should halt this dangerous downward spiral, scrap the bill, and take steps to protect civic space. As the European Commission prepares to publish its annual Rule of Law Report, it should issue clear, enforceable recommendations that directly address respect for rights to freedom of thought, expression and assembly and democratic backsliding in France.
UNRWA is Irreplaceable in Gaza
Governments should disregard the statement from the US President Donald Trump-chaired Board of Peace that “UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza,” the latest salvo in the US and Israeli government’s long-running campaign to destroy the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.
Even before October 2023, UNRWA provided lifesaving humanitarian aid and services to Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank, and elsewhere. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) made clear in a 2025 advisory opinion that Israel is legally obligated to enable UNRWA to operate to ensure the unhindered provision of humanitarian relief to civilians in Gaza.
UNRWA remains the backbone of humanitarian aid in Gaza. Humanitarian aid organizations active in the region have said that UNRWA is irreplaceable and undermining its role will create a dangerous—and potentially catastrophic—vacuum.
UNRWA delivers food and medical assistance to people in Gaza, provides education to hundreds of thousands of children who have been largely deprived of their right to education for over two years, provides psychosocial support to 730,000 displaced people, and potable water to 860,000 people daily. States deliberately obstructing such humanitarian aid is a violation of international law.
UNRWA has maintained this critical support even though nearly 400 UNRWA staff have been killed in Gaza since October 2023, many of its facilities have been damaged or destroyed, and funding suspensions have brought it to the brink of collapse.
The Board of Peace does not have the power to decide whether UNRWA has a role in Gaza: the Agency’s mandate can only be amended or terminated by the UN General Assembly, and states voted overwhelmingly to renew its mandate in December 2025. Human Rights Watch has previously warned of the danger of the Board of Peace undermining the UN and its agencies.
Israeli authorities should comply with international obligations and stop ongoing attacks on UNRWA and other humanitarian organizations. States should continue to fund and support UNRWA and protect its mandate. Rather than vilifying UNRWA, it would be far more productive for the US and Board of Peace to press Israel to respect its obligations under international law and to stop impeding entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, which remains woefully insufficient.
Latest ICE Killing Demands Independent Investigation
A US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent fatally shot Lorenzo Salgado Araujo in Houston, Texas on July 7. This is the latest in a string of shooting incidents involving federal immigration agents over the past two years.
Salgado, who had reportedly lived in the United States for nearly 35 years, leaves behind a wife and three children. One of his sons, Ronaldo, spoke at a press conference on July 8, describing his father’s dedication to their family and sharing that he and his older brother had graduated from university thanks to their father’s “hard work and inspiration.”
While video footage of Salgado’s killing has yet to publicly surface, past ICE conduct gives rise to immediate concerns about both the incident itself and the prospects for a truly credible investigation.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) said ICE was conducting “a targeted enforcement operation” when Salgado “weaponized his vehicle in an attempt to run over an ICE law enforcement officer” before an ICE officer fatally shot him.
The language evokes the claims DHS advanced in other cases where agents shot drivers, including the January 7 fatal shooting of US citizen Renee Good in Minneapolis. In that case, DHS stated that Good “weaponized her vehicle in an attempt to kill [ICE officers],” a false claim contradicted by video evidence.
In September 2025, an ICE officer shot Silverio Villegas González near Chicago, claiming he “drove his car at law enforcement officers.” But CCTV footage called that account into question.
Authorities should immediately carry out a comprehensive, transparent investigation into Salgado’s killing and whether ICE officers complied with use-of-force policies. Given federal authorities’ repeated failures to credibly investigate similar incidents, including Good’s killing, local Houston authorities should investigate the killing as well, and federal authorities should share evidence with them.
Congress, meanwhile, should step up its oversight of DHS. Instead of expansively resourcing ICE while ignoring its deadly human rights abuses, Congress should hold oversight hearings, including on killings by federal immigration agents. They should also pass legislation imposing sweeping DHS reforms, such as robust investigation and reporting requirements and meaningful consequences for violations, including effective remedies for victims of abuse.
FIFA Should Tackle Racism and Discrimination On and Off the Pitch
Following France’s July 4 victory over Paraguay, Paraguayan Senator Celeste Amarilla attacked French player Kylian Mbappé with dehumanizing remarks. The Dutch and German national teams’ elimination from the round of 32 prompted racist posts online. An Argentina fan was reportedly caught on video on July 7 making racist gestures at American YouTuber IShowSpeed (Darren Watkins Jr.).
FIFA released analysis on July 1 finding that, based on the World Cup so far, “racial abuse is growing and has become a persistent threat to the wellbeing of players.” FIFA has identified more than 89,000 abusive online posts during the tournament, with 11 percent containing specifically racial abuse.
A United Nations human rights spokesperson called Amarilla’s remarks “despicable and, regrettably, not isolated,” and said governments and sports organizations “must actively work to prevent acts of racism and any other form of discrimination.”
But while FIFA has condemned racist incidents at the World Cup, it can certainly do more to combat discrimination off the field. The majority of World Cup matches are held in the United States, where President Donald Trump’s abusive and discriminatory immigration crackdown— primarily focused on Black and Brown communities—has put fans, workers, and communities at risk.
Prior to the World Cup, Human Rights Watch urged FIFA to use its leverage with the Trump administration to challenge these actions, noting they “would fundamentally undermine the inclusive spirit of the World Cup and the non-discrimination policies under FIFA’s Statutes.” We also called for FIFA to push for an “ICE Truce” to protect soccer fans, workers, and communities from abusive immigration operations.
Instead, FIFA awarded Trump the newly-concocted FIFA Peace Prize, citing his “unwavering commitment to advancing peace and unity throughout the world.” Host city human rights action plans developed with FIFA also largely failed to address the risk to fans and workers from the US government’s immigration operations.
Soccer’s popularity means FIFA has a global platform. As well as condemning racist attacks against athletes and fans, FIFA should use its leverage to tackle the impact of the US government’s discriminatory policies on fans, players, and other affected people as the World Cup unfolds.
UNRWA is Irreplaceable in Gaza
Governments should disregard the statement from the US President Donald Trump-chaired Board of Peace that “UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza,” the latest salvo in the US and Israeli government’s long-running campaign to destroy the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.
Even before October 2023, UNRWA provided lifesaving humanitarian aid and services to Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank, and elsewhere. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) made clear in a 2025 advisory opinion that Israel is legally obligated to enable UNRWA to operate to ensure the unhindered provision of humanitarian relief to civilians in Gaza.
UNRWA remains the backbone of humanitarian aid in Gaza. Humanitarian aid organizations active in the region have said that UNRWA is irreplaceable and undermining its role will create a dangerous—and potentially catastrophic—vacuum.
UNRWA delivers food and medical assistance to people in Gaza, provides education to hundreds of thousands of children who have been largely deprived of their right to education for over two years, provides psychosocial support to 730,000 displaced people, and potable water to 860,000 people daily. States deliberately obstructing such humanitarian aid is a violation of international law.
UNRWA has maintained this critical support even though nearly 400 UNRWA staff have been killed in Gaza since October 2023, many of its facilities have been damaged or destroyed, and funding suspensions have brought it to the brink of collapse.
The Board of Peace does not have the power to decide whether UNRWA has a role in Gaza: the Agency’s mandate can only be amended or terminated by the UN General Assembly, and states voted overwhelmingly to renew its mandate in December 2025. Human Rights Watch has previously warned of the danger of the Board of Peace undermining the UN and its agencies.
Israeli authorities should comply with international obligations and stop ongoing attacks on UNRWA and other humanitarian organizations. States should continue to fund and support UNRWA and protect its mandate. Rather than vilifying UNRWA, it would be far more productive for the US and Board of Peace to press Israel to respect its obligations under international law and to stop impeding entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, which remains woefully insufficient.
Ukraine: Civilians Trapped in Occupied Khersonska Region
(Berlin, July 9, 2026) – Civilians trapped in front-line areas of the Russian-occupied Khersonska region in southern Ukraine face dire humanitarian conditions and have no safe way to leave, Human Rights Watch said today. Civilians who wish to evacuate should be allowed to do so safely.
Residents who escaped the city of Oleshky, on the east bank of the Dnipro River, described severe shortages of food and medical care, and the collapse of basic services. They experienced unpredictable procedures at Russian checkpoints and the risk of death or serious injury from ongoing hostilities and landmines while moving around or attempting to leave. Antipersonnel mines, which both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used during the conflict, pose a particularly grave and lasting danger to civilians.
“Civilians trapped in parts of the occupied Khersonska region are surviving in hellish conditions,” said Yulia Gorbunova, associate director for Ukraine at Human Rights Watch. “Many have managed to escape, but among those who remain are more who want to flee, if evacuation were not such a life-threatening gamble.”
Oleshky has been under Russian occupation since February 2022 and is currently on the front line between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have been conducting attacks in the area, and Oleshky has been subjected to sustained attacks by Ukrainian forces.
Human Rights Watch interviewed six residents who escaped Oleshky between October 2025 and May 2026, some of whom remained in contact with people still in the city, as well as a Kherson-based journalist, and reviewed media reports and official statements.
Other occupied parts of Khersonska region where conditions have been reported as dire for civilians include Hola Prystan, Stara Zburivka, and Nova Zburivka.
According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, civilian security in Oleshky and Hola Prystan deteriorated significantly in 2025 and 2026. In 2026 alone, the mission recorded reports of at least 29 civilians killed and 54 injured across both cities.
Oleshky had about 24,000 residents before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine but now has an estimated population of about 2,000, according to the Ukrainian government. Those remaining include older people, people unable to leave, and an estimated 200 children. To Human Rights Watch’s knowledge, neither Russian occupation authorities, international humanitarian organizations, nor other intermediaries currently operate an organized evacuation system for older people, people with disabilities, wounded or sick civilians, or others at heightened risk.
Former Oleshky residents described the near-total collapse of public utilities. They said there was no electricity or gas, and that many people were forced to rely on wood-burning stoves with trees for firewood. Those with diesel generators faced increasingly expensive and scarce fuel. Some had installed solar panels to pump water and keep refrigerators running.
Residents said that since the beginning of 2026, commercial deliveries of basic goods to some occupied areas had become rare and unpredictable. When sellers reached Oleshky, residents said, crowds quickly took what was available. The daughter of an 84-year-old woman who fled Oleshky in May said older residents “are unable to compete with the crowd.” “When I saw my mother, she was so thin,” the daughter said. “There was nothing out there; people were starving.”
Another woman, who hid in her home for four months before escaping in May, said: “In my neighborhood, everything is scorched, burned out. We were afraid to venture outside just to get water.”
Residents said local medical care was barely functioning. The Oleshky District Hospital operates on emergency generator power, with limited capacity. One man said he witnessed the death of a 65-year-old neighbor who stepped on a mine: “It severed his artery,” he said. “While we were trying to tie a tourniquet around his leg, Russian [soldiers] gave him a painkiller. The ambulance couldn’t reach us. We had nowhere to carry him…. Drones were [hovering overhead]. Two hours later, he died from blood loss.”
Human Rights Watch could not determine whether humanitarian organizations had regular access to Oleshky or surrounding villages. Both warring parties are obligated under international humanitarian law to facilitate access for humanitarian assistance to civilians.
Russia, as the occupying power, has an obligation to ensure that civilians in occupied territory have access to food, medical care, and other goods and services essential for survival.
All former Oleshky residents interviewed described intensifying danger from attacks and landmines. They said drones were “constantly hovering” overhead and that mines were scattered throughout the city and along roads.
Human Rights Watch has not determined responsibility for specific drone attacks or for the emplacement of particular mines in and around Oleshky. Human Rights Watch found credible indications that Ukrainian forces may have used drones and mines on roads in and around Oleshky, but has not determined the scale, the precise circumstances of the incidents, or responsibility for specific attacks or particular mines. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used drones and mines in the broader area during the war. Landmines, including antipersonnel mines, pose a grave and lasting threat to civilians and can make evacuation routes deadly.
Former residents said there was no organized, safe evacuation route for civilians. Those who left since March said that leaving Oleshky required passing through Russian military checkpoints, including in Hola Prystan and Hladkivka, where passage was subject to the discretion of Russian forces.
“Everything is at your own risk, you just take your life in your hands [if you want to flee],” said a resident who escaped in March.
Warring parties are obligated under international humanitarian law to take all feasible steps to allow the civilian population to evacuate safely, if they choose.
Fear, damaged telecommunications, and lack of electricity make it difficult for residents to get information, including about possible evacuation routes. Many are also afraid to use mobile phones because Russian soldiers routinely check them at checkpoints.
Leaving occupied areas often requires residents to travel through Belarus before crossing into government-controlled Ukraine. Ukrainian civilians holding Russian internal passports can enter Belarus but reportedly need Russian international travel passports to leave Belarus and continue to government-controlled Ukraine. All residents interviewed said that they had to conceal their Ukrainian passports when traveling.
Men face additional risks because obtaining Russian documents may expose them to forced conscription into Russian forces. Compelling civilians in occupied territory to serve in the forces of a hostile power violates international humanitarian law and is a war crime.
One resident who fled Oleshky in March described applying for a Russian passport as a trap: “They immediately send you to the military enlistment office. And then you risk mobilization [into the Russian army].”
Some residents said relatives and neighbors remained because they lacked the money to travel, feared they would have nowhere to go, or believed Ukrainian state support for internally displaced people would be insufficient.
Russia and Ukraine have been in discussions over a potential pause in hostilities to enable civilians to evacuate. Both parties should abide by their obligations under international law and provide safe and voluntary passage for civilians who want to leave areas affected by hostilities. Russian occupation authorities should not arbitrarily prevent civilians from leaving, nor condition their departure on acquiring a Russian passport or other documents, or put Ukrainians at risk of forced conscription.
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces should immediately cease using antipersonnel mines and other victim-activated explosive devices and take all feasible measures to protect civilians from mines and explosive remnants of war, including by issuing effective warnings, sharing information about contaminated areas, and providing mine-risk education.
“Civilians in the occupied Khersonska region should be allowed to leave safely if they wish to do so,” Gorbunova said. “Those who remain should have access to humanitarian assistance, including the food, medicine, and basic services they need to survive.”
DR Congo: Crackdown on Protesters
(Kinshasa) – Security forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo used excessive force against protesters demonstrating against a proposed law that could extend President Félix Tshisekedi’s term on June 12, 2026, Human Rights Watch said today.
The security forces used tear gas and batons in the capital, Kinshasa, to prevent a group of protesters created to defend the existing constitution from attending a sit-in in front of the parliament building. They also failed to protect members of the group from assault by a group linked to the main ruling party.
“Congolese security forces used unnecessary force against people who tried to exercise their right to criticize proposed changes to the constitution,” said Ashwanee Budoo-Scholtz, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Instead of protecting the demonstrators, security forces instigated violence and left protesters vulnerable to assault by a pro-ruling party group.”
Between June 12-22, Human Rights Watch interviewed 38 people, including 15 from Article 64 Coalition for the defense of the constitutional order (Coalition Article 64, or C64) who were injured on June 12 and 7 from Force of Progress (Force du Progrès), a group linked to the main ruling party, Union for Democracy and Social Progress (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social, or UDPS).
On June 11, the Kinshasa governor rejected an application from C64 to hold a sit-in in front of the parliament building, the Palace of the People (Palais du Peuple), and provided an alternative venue. The C64 members rejected this proposal. While the Constitution guarantees the right to peaceful assembly, the law on demonstrations empowers the authorities to prevent or disperse a meeting if it is a threat to public order and security.
Those interviewed said that on June 12, at about 10 a.m., Force of Progress members attacked the offices of several opposition political parties within the C64.
Human Rights Watch verified and geolocated videos showing members of Action for Democracy and Development in Congo (Action pour la Démocratie et le Développement au Congo) defending their headquarters against Force of Progress members. Images also show debris, broken glass on the building’s floor, and a visibly injured woman in the office of the Alliance for Change (Alliance pour le Changement), and damage to the headquarters of the Innovative Forces for Unity and Solidarity (Forces Novatrices pour l’Union et la Solidarité).
Seven Force of Progress members interviewed said that main ruling party members told them to mobilize their supporters to prevent the sit-in. “We held the last meeting on the afternoon of Wednesday before the demonstration date [June 10] in Limete [10th Rue, Kinshasa] during which two of our party leaders clearly instructed us to target opposition leaders and their parties,” one said.
“They [party members] promised to give us money if we disrupted the demonstration,” said a Force of Progress member. “Many young people join the group because of the opportunities for informal jobs,” another one said.
At around noon, C64 members gathered at the headquarters of the opposition party Commitment for Citizenship and Development Party (Engagement pour la Citoyenneté et le Développement, or ECiDé) on Triomphal Boulevard, then headed toward the parliament building.
Protesters said that the police set up three barricades close to the “Robot roundabout” in front of the building. As protesters approached the second barricade, the police threw tear-gas canisters and fired tear gas at them. Members of a task force comprising a special unit of the Congolese army, the Republican Guard, and the intelligence services were also present, protesters said.
Click to expand Image Graphic © 2026 Human Rights WatchProtesters said that their march was peaceful until they reached the police barricades. “We raised our hands in the air as a sign of non-violence,” one said.
“While walking along Triomphal, I heard a loud noise, felt my leg go heavy, and fell, and discovered that my foot was bleeding profusely,” said a protester who was struck by a tear-gas canister.
Protesters said that Force of Progress members joined the security forces and threw stones and bottles at them, some filled with urine. They said they could identify the assailants as Force of Progress because they openly expressed their affiliation during the attacks. Two people said they recognized specific Force of Progress members because they had worked with them previously. Human Rights Watch also verified a video showing two men in civilian clothing expressing support for the Force of Progress alongside other men throwing stones and police throwing tear-gas canisters.
Witnesses said that some protesters retaliated by throwing stones at the security forces and Force of Progress members.
Many C64 members said they managed to seek safety at the ECiDé headquarters, but security forces and Force of Progress members followed them there and continued attacking them.
Both witness accounts and video evidence confirm a security forces and Force of Progress assault against the ECiDé headquarters while politicians and injured protesters were trapped inside. In a video verified by Human Rights Watch, police officers stand by as Force of Progress members throw projectiles toward the headquarters and try to force open its main gate. The video also shows a security force member throwing an apparent tear-gas canister over the headquarters’ wall.
A video Human Rights Watch verified and geolocated shows a security force member firing a tear-gas canister at short range against the building.
Human Rights Watch documented injuries to more than a dozen protesters, including opposition leaders Martin Fayulu, Delly Sesanga, Jean-Marc Kabund, and Ados Ndombasi.
Security forces also arrested and detained several dozen protesters, according to the National Human Rights Commission.
Congolese authorities denounced the violence, with the justice minister and the National Human Rights Commission interviewing C64 members to establish the facts. On June 19, the Prosecutor General’s Office at the Court of Cassation (the final court of appeal in Congo) announced that it had opened an investigation into the incident.
On June 22, UDPS filed a complaint with the Court of Cassation seeking the initiation of legal proceedings against individuals for using the party’s name, particularly those it accused of posing as Force of Progress, to commit abuses.
On July 3, the party’s secretary general, Augustin Kabuya, told Human Rights Watch that the party had never sent anyone to commit violence, and that a fake Force of Progress is tarnishing the party’s name.
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials state that security forces shall “apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force.” In the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but nonviolent, law enforcement officials avoid the use of force or “restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.”
“The Congolese government’s investigation into the June 12 crackdown is a positive step, but it needs to be independent and impartial to ensure accountability,” Budoo-Scholtz said. “Those responsible should be held to account irrespective of political party affiliation to show that justice can prevail over politics.”
Georgia: New Laws Devastate Independent Civic Groups
(Berlin, July 9, 2026) – Georgian authorities’ use of increasingly repressive laws and politically motivated criminal investigations is decimating independent civil society and silencing critical voices, Human Rights Watch said today.
Since 2024, Georgia’s ruling party has adopted laws that impose stigmatizing registration requirements, invasive state oversight, funding restrictions, and criminal penalties on nongovernmental organizations, individuals, and media outlets receiving foreign funding. The authorities have also launched investigations into activists and rights defenders for providing information to international organizations and foreign media and frozen the bank accounts of prominent civic groups under a dubious criminal investigation following protests in 2024.
“The Georgian government’s goal has been to suppress critical voices and dismantle the country’s vibrant independent civil society, and it is making frightening progress,” said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The authorities are creating a system in which independent groups cannot operate safely, sustain funding, or support the communities that need and have relied on them.”
Human Rights Watch interviewed 15 Georgian activists, lawyers, and leaders of nongovernmental groups, who described how the deeply hostile environment has created a severe chilling effect leading, among other things, to self-censorship, staff departures, financial collapse, and a growing reluctance among some communities to seek assistance from such groups. Human Rights Watch also analyzed new laws and related legal documents and wrote to officials requesting information about their implementation. We received partial information from the State Audit Office and several data points from the Government of Georgia.
The Transparency of Foreign Influence Law, adopted in 2024, requires nongovernmental groups and media receiving more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as organizations “serving the interests of a foreign power.” It grants sweeping powers to the Justice Ministry to demand extensive information, including sensitive data about an organization’s employees, its beneficiaries, and others.
In April 2025, parliament adopted a separate Foreign Agents Registration Act, which could cover virtually any organization cooperating with international donors or sharing even the most routine information with foreign partners. Its vague and overly broad definitions give the authorities wide discretion to apply the law arbitrarily against independent groups and individuals. Those deemed foreign agents must register, submit detailed reports on their activities, finances, and beneficiaries, and mark all their materials with the “foreign agent” label. The law imposes criminal liability for even minor violations of its requirements, with penalties of up to five years in prison.
Amendments to the Law on Grants place foreign funding under direct government control, require foreign donors to obtain prior government approval before issuing grants, and make it a criminal offense to receive foreign funding without authorization. Penalties include up to six years in prison. A government decree requires foreign grants to align with government policies, effectively excluding projects that do not conform to government-defined priorities or challenge government plans in any way. These requirements apply retroactively and cover consultancy contracts with foreign entities involving activities that could influence Georgia’s domestic or foreign policy, as well as organizations registered abroad whose work substantially relates to Georgia.
Human Rights Watch is aware of several cases in which authorities rejected proposed foreign grants, including a UK Embassy-funded project to support four Georgian organizations monitoring the 2025 municipal elections and a donor request to fund an LGBT rights organization’s healthcare and harm reduction services for marginalized communities.
The authorities have also used criminal investigations to target independent groups. In March 2025, they opened a sweeping criminal investigation alleging that protests that began in late 2024 against the foreign influence law involved efforts to “sabotage” the state. The investigation also concerns alleged assistance to foreign actors engaged in “hostile activities,” including spreading “false information” about Georgia to trigger sanctions and “weaken the country’s international standing.”
As part of the investigation, in 2025 authorities froze the bank accounts of 12 independent groups, paralyzing their work. One prominent group said that, among the repressive measures adopted since 2024, “the asset freezing was the most severe for us.” The group had secured sufficient funding to operate until the end of 2026 but could not access those funds.
A late-2025 unpublished study by the Social Justice Center, based on interviews with 100 civil society representatives, found that 96 percent of surveyed organizations reported acute financial difficulties, and 94 percent had reduced their activities, with many scaling back to core functions or ceasing operations altogether.
The new restrictions forced the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), one of the country’s leading legal defense organizations, to suspend free legal aid. Regional organizations have been especially hard hit. Of 114 community organizations active in 2024, only 37 remained operational in 2025, with many nearing closure.
The new laws have also raised serious privacy concerns. A disability rights activist said his group considered registering under the foreign influence law but stopped after seeing that the Justice Ministry required personal and medical data concerning beneficiaries. “We had no legal right to disclose such information,” the representative said.
Organizations also reported growing self-censorship, especially among groups working on the rights of LGBT people. The director of the queer feminist media platform Grlz Wave said the organization had “shift[ed] to a regime of self-censorship,” particularly on queer issues.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have concluded that the laws impose unjustified restrictions on fundamental freedoms, are incompatible with human rights standards, and risk stigmatizing and harassing civil society organizations.
Georgia’s international partners should further increase the costs to the Georgian authorities of continuing these repressive measures. Any diplomatic engagement with the government should make the full repeal of repressive laws a central criterion for progress. The EU and its member states should also advance accountability for serious human rights violations by reaching the unanimity required to impose EU-level targeted sanctions, including against officials responsible for proposing and implementing repressive laws. Georgia’s international partners should also urgently expand flexible, emergency, and long-term support to independent civil society and human rights groups, including those operating under restrictive conditions or from exile, Human Rights Watch said.
“The Georgian authorities should stop treating independent civic work as a threat,” Williamson said. “They should repeal these repressive laws, end politically motivated investigations against independent groups, unfreeze organizations’ assets, and restore conditions necessary for civil society to operate freely and safely.”
For additional details, please see below.
Restrictive Legislation
Transparency of Foreign Influence Law
The ruling party first introduced the draft Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence in parliament in March 2023 but withdrew it following widespread protests and international criticism. The government reintroduced and adopted the law in spring 2024.
The law defines a “foreign power” to include foreign governments, foreign citizens, and any organization not established under Georgian law. It requires nongovernmental organizations and media outlets receiving more than 20 percent of their annual income from a “foreign power” to register as “serving the interests of a foreign power” and to submit detailed annual reports about their income, expenditures, and funding sources. The law designates independent groups as acting in foreign interests solely due to foreign funding.
Organizations that fail to register or file the annual financial declaration face annual fines of GEL 25,000 (approximately US$9,330), with additional fines for failing to provide requested information in full. The Justice Ministry may demand access to an organization’s records, including sensitive personal data. It may also unilaterally register organizations as serving the interests of a foreign power.
According to Georgia’s National Statistics Office, as of January 1, 2026, 3,987 noncommercial organizations were active in Georgia, of which 385 had registered as “serving the interests of a foreign power.” According to a report by an expert appointed by the OSCE, as of February 20, 2026, the authorities had not fined any organizations refusing to register.
Representatives of independent civil society organizations who spoke with Human Rights Watch said they refused to register because they considered the label unfair, degrading, and stigmatizing. One representative of an organization that ultimately registered described the decision as “emotionally devastating.”
The Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional and legal matters, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights concluded that the law imposes unjustified restrictions on fundamental freedoms, is incompatible with human rights standards, and risks stigmatizing and harassing civil society organizations. The Venice Commission also found that the restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, association, and privacy fail to satisfy “the requirements of legality, legitimacy, necessity in a democratic society and proportionality....”
Foreign Agents Registration Act
In April 2025, Georgia’s parliament adopted the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The bill’s explanatory note stated that the earlier foreign influence law had failed because most groups with foreign funding refused to register, implying that stronger sanctions were therefore needed. Both laws remain in force. The foreign agents law imposes broader restrictions and significantly harsher sanctions. An individual or legal entity can be designated as a “foreign principal’s agent” if they act under the direction, request, control, or financing of a foreign principal, and engage in activities deemed to advance that principal’s interests in Georgia.
The law defines such activities broadly enough to include efforts to influence government institutions or public opinion on domestic or foreign policy, as well as sharing information with international partners about developments in Georgia related to democracy, human rights, or the rule of law.
Individuals or organizations meeting these criteria must register as foreign agents and submit detailed reports about their activities, finances, and beneficiaries, with updates every six months or more frequently if requested. They are also required to label all informational materials as produced by a foreign agent.
The law granted sweeping powers to the Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate organizations and individuals and demand extensive information concerning compliance with the law, regardless of whether they have been designated as “foreign agents.” Noncompliance can result in court orders to cease activities and criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up to five years. It authorized the bureau to unilaterally register individuals and organizations as foreign agents.
The Anti-Corruption Bureau was also tasked with implementing the Law on Grants. On March 2, 2026, the authorities transferred both mandates to the State Audit Office.
Georgia’s civil society groups and international partners widely condemned the law. The Venice Commission and the OSCE expert report noted that the legislation relies on vague and overly broad definitions, stigmatizes civil society, and poses serious risks to democratic freedoms, civic space, and the rule of law, and called for its repeal.
Amendments to the Law on Grants
Amendments adopted in April 2025 required foreign donors to obtain government approval before awarding grants, and penalized organizations that accept a foreign grant without authorization with fines equivalent to double the amount received. A subsequent government decree made approval conditional on foreign grants aligning with “the government’s program, key strategic documents, and the state’s interests.”
Further amendments adopted in June 2025 expanded the definition of a “grant” to include various forms of technical and expert assistance.
The law authorized the Anti-Corruption Bureau to demand financial, project-related, and personal information from civil society organizations, third parties, and public institutions, and to compel individuals to appear for questioning before a magistrate judge. Organizations receiving foreign grants without government approval could face fines and asset freezes.
Further amendments adopted in March 2026 sharply tightened these restrictions and introduced criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up to six years. They also expanded the definition of foreign donors to include foreign individuals and barred employees of organizations deemed to “pursue the interests of foreign powers” from membership in political parties for eight years. Notably, the amendments apply retroactively.
Human Rights Watch is aware of several instances in which the authorities did not approve foreign grants. One involved a project funded by the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Georgia to support four Georgian groups to monitor the 2025 municipal elections. In June 2025, the parliamentary chair, Shalva Papuashvili, publicly criticized the project, claiming the embassy was “funding extremism, hatred, and propaganda in Georgia.”
The government also denied approval for a grant supporting an LGBT rights organization’s healthcare and harm reduction project for marginalized communities. The group’s director told Human Rights Watch that the authorities provided no explanation for the rejection.
Current regulations do not require the authorities to provide detailed reasons for refusing to approve grants, increasing the risk that they will use the approval mechanism selectively against organizations and projects they consider undesirable.
Georgia’s prime minister informed the OSCE expert that the government approves grants that have no “political content.” In a June 22, 2026 letter to Human Rights Watch, the Georgian government reported that, between April 2025 and June 2026, it had received 222 grant applications with a combined value of approximately GEL 109 million. Of these, 177 applications, worth more than GEL 60 million, had been approved; 10 had been rejected; and 35, worth more than GEL 44.2 million, remained under review.
The government did not respond to Human Rights Watch’s questions about the types of projects approved or rejected, or the grounds for individual rejections. It said applications were assessed individually for their alignment with national interests, the government’s main strategic documents, the proposed use of funds, and expected results. However, it did not explain in greater detail how these broad criteria are applied in practice.
Enforcement of the Anti-NGO Laws
In June 2025, eight prominent civil society organizations received almost identical court orders granting the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s motions and requiring the organizations to submit to the Bureau extensive legal, financial, technical, and personal information. The bureau’s head stated that these inspections sought to assess the “purpose” of these groups’ activities, alleging that “wealthy NGOs, hiding behind good deeds, avoid transparency and engage in undeclared political activity.”
Later that summer, at least seven organizations received letters from the Anti-Corruption Bureau demanding an explanation for not registering as foreign agents and warning them they risked incurring criminal liability. Representatives of five of these organizations said they responded with detailed legal arguments explaining why the law did not apply to their activities. They received no response.
From September 2025 onward, the Anti-Corruption Bureau initiated monitoring and issued information requests to approximately 100 organizations under the grants law. The bureau demanded extensive information covering an 18-month period in 2024 and 2025, including personal data about beneficiaries and third parties. Dozens of organizations unsuccessfully challenged the requests in court.
As of December 2025, the “foreign agents” registry listed 12 “foreign principals,” and 12 “foreign agents.” Civil society representatives interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they had refused to register because they considered the label degrading and rejected the premise that they operated under the control of foreign donors. They emphasized that their organizations acted independently and set their own priorities, strategies, and principles.
After responsibility for enforcing the grants law was transferred from the Anti-Corruption Bureau to the State Audit Office, the latter opened monitoring proceedings against one organization. The State Audit Office informed Human Rights Watch that the proceedings remained pending as of June 1.
Instrumentalization of Criminal Justice against Civil Society
Investigation into Alleged Sabotage
Georgian authorities have also used a wide-ranging criminal investigation alleging that protests involved sabotage against the state, as a pretext to target prominent civil society organizations, freeze their bank accounts, and paralyze their operations.
The investigation, opened in February 2025, concerns the ongoing demonstrations that began in 2024 against the foreign influence law. The authorities alleged that protesters damaged police infrastructure, injured law enforcement officers, and disrupted parliament, and characterized these acts as sabotage.
The investigation also concerns alleged assistance to foreign actors engaged in supposedly “hostile activities,” including deliberately spreading false information about Georgia to trigger foreign sanctions and damage the country’s international standing. No civil society organization or its representative has been charged in connection with the investigation.
In March 2025, as part of this investigation, the authorities froze the bank accounts of five independent groups: Human Rights House Tbilisi, Shame Movement, Nanuka’s Fund, Prosperity Georgia, and Fund for Each. The authorities alleged that legal and financial assistance these groups provided to protesters, including, in some cases, paying protest-related fines, constituted unlawful activity.
The groups began providing this assistance after the authorities sharply increased penalties for assembly-related offenses and began arbitrarily imposing harsher sanctions on demonstrators. The then-leader of the parliamentary majority publicly claimed that paying protesters’ fines amounted to “encouraging and facilitating violence” and undermining the state.
In August 2025, authorities froze the accounts of seven more organizations: International Society of Fair Elections and Democracy, Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, Georgian Democracy Initiative, Union Sapari, Social Justice Center, Civil Society Foundation, and Democracy Defenders. Officials claimed the groups had used project funds to support demonstrators who committed “violent acts” against police.
A representative of one of the affected organizations said that a judge justified freezing funds on the grounds that the group had purchased “30 gas masks and protective goggles, as well as several flags.” The representative said the items were intended to protect staff members who were monitoring or peacefully attending protests.
The authorities also initiated legal action against individuals for sharing information concerning alleged human rights violations with foreign media outlets and international organizations.
Additional Investigation into ‘Hostile Activities’
In December 2025, the State Security Service started an investigation related to BBC reporting that the police used toxic agents during demonstrations. On suspicion of facilitating the hostile activities of a foreign power, the authorities summoned for questioning human rights defenders and others featured in the report who had described the alleged incidents.
In April 2026, the State Security Service questioned Ucha Nanuashvili, Georgia’s former public defender and current head of Democracy Research Center, a civil society organization, solely for providing information about Georgia’s human rights situation to the OSCE expert. Nanuashvili said that the questioning primarily focused on his human rights work. Law enforcement authorities also required him to sign a non-disclosure agreement preventing him from publicly discussing details of the interrogation.
Risk of False Money Laundering Charges
Another criminal investigation, opened in 2024, illustrates how authorities could use financial crime allegations to target independent groups and researchers critical of the government. In October 2024, police raided the homes of Sopo Gelava and Eto Buziashvili, researchers with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.
The researchers’ work included analysis of Russia’s online influence operations targeting Georgia and other countries. The searches were part of an investigation into alleged fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion. During the raids, officers seized computers and other electronic devices, and a court froze the researchers’ bank accounts. Both women subsequently relocated abroad.
In January 2026, Georgia’s parliament amended the criminal code’s money laundering provision to introduce an aggravating circumstance for laundering funds connected to political activity, punishable by 9 to 12 years in prison. Since the authorities can treat foreign funding received without government approval as illicit income, organizations attempting to circumvent restrictions imposed by the grants law risk prosecution for money laundering.
Excluding and Discrediting Civic Groups
Legislative amendments adopted in April 2025 excluded civil society organizations from policy-making and other public processes in which they had long participated. The amendments abolished certain governmental mechanisms requiring consultation with nongovernmental organizations. The bill’s explanatory note claimed civic groups’ involvement “in public decision-making hinders the effective functioning of the state.”
Some organizations reported that efforts to discredit and marginalize independent groups intensified in 2023, after they publicly opposed the government’s initial attempts to introduce the foreign influence law. Government agencies reduced or abandoned cooperation with nongovernmental organizations on activities previously carried out jointly. Regional organizations said that local authorities discouraged community members from attending trainings and meetings organized by independent groups, and that defamatory narratives about their staff increasingly circulated locally.
Organizations working nationwide, particularly on elections, judicial reform, corruption, and other politically sensitive issues, said hostile rhetoric against civil society has gradually become normalized. Government officials and pro-government media frequently portray nongovernmental organizations as politically biased and controlled by foreign interests.
Although such rhetoric had existed for years, it intensified significantly in spring 2024, with coordinated smear campaigns on social media and public spaces, including posters labeling civil society leaders “foreign agents” and “enemies of the church.” Several organizations also reported vandalism targeting their offices, and attacks on the homes and vehicles of civil society leaders. Law enforcement responses were largely ineffective.
Pro-government media portrayed these incidents as spontaneous expressions of public anger toward civic groups. A ruling party member publicly described the vandalism as a “response” to the organizations’ activities and published footage showing the vandalism of several offices.
The authorities have also used homophobic rhetoric to delegitimize independent organizations by portraying them as promoters of “LGBT propaganda” and opponents of traditional values. The September 2024 law banning so-called LGBT propaganda further marginalized LGBT rights issues from public discourse and restricted access to essential healthcare services for transgender people.
Impact on Civil Society Organizations
The new laws and other measures have made it practically impossible for independent groups to operate sustainably, secure funding, and assist beneficiaries with the assurance that their personal data will not be disclosed.
Funding Restrictions
According to the GYLA, of the 136 organizations that jointly lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights concerning the foreign influence law, only 3 registered under the law. Most either suspended their activities altogether or significantly scaled them down. Of these, 109 reported difficulty securing funding or an inability to do so; 97 said they had reduced staff or that all staff had left; and 62 said they had been targeted by propaganda and disinformation campaigns. An unpublished study by the Social Justice Center documented similarly severe effects.
The restrictions also affected donor decisions. According to the OSCE expert’s report, after the adoption of the grants law, numerous donors halted direct financial support for Georgian groups, reducing both the scope and capacity of their work.
Organizations interviewed by Human Rights Watch described the concrete impact of these restrictions. To avoid drawing unwanted government attention, Knowledge Café, which runs a multifunctional community space and promotes civic awareness, said they felt compelled to refuse donor funding for cultural diversity activities, and also rejected equipment from a foreign donor for workshops on computer programming and robotics.
After the 2026 amendments to the grants law, GYLA had to suspend free legal aid, as it was forced to significantly reduce staff and redirect its remaining resources to strategic litigation.
The reduction of certain work by larger organizations significantly affects smaller community-based groups. Aslan Chanidze, head of the House of Free Journalists in Adjara, said that closing GYLA’s Batumi office left smaller groups more exposed, especially without the organization’s consistent legal support. Disability rights organizations expressed similar concerns. A disability rights activist, Koba Nadiradze, said that, even if community groups manage to survive, their effectiveness will be severely limited without strong legal and human rights expertise.
Financial pressures have been especially acute for regional organizations, which often have a narrower focus and depend heavily on specific donors or cooperation with local authorities. The Centre for Strategic Research and Development of Georgia, a nongovernmental organization, found that of 114 community organizations active in 2024, only 37 remained operational in 2025, with many nearing closure.
Organizations have also had to spend dwindling resources for legal and other services to cope with the new laws. The director of an organization that made what they described as “probably [our] … most difficult and nightmarish decision” to register under the foreign influence law, said they paid a law firm US$400 per month for compliance assistance.
The Grlz Wave director said the organization paid a lawyer $2,000 to respond to the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s demand for information, even as it declined new funding and returned money to several donors to avoid falling within the scope of the foreign agents law.
Privacy Concerns
The new laws’ disclosure obligations have raised serious privacy concerns among organizations, staff, and beneficiaries. The OSCE expert’s report said that “a significant number” of employees and collaborators resigned from organizations that could fall under the new laws because of the risk that their private information might be disclosed.
Several people described their concerns about government access to sensitive personal data. One disability rights activist said his organization decided not to register under the foreign influence law because the Justice Ministry required personal and medical data concerning beneficiaries. “We had no legal right to disclose such information,” the activist said.
Another disability rights activist said that organizations can no longer “guarantee potential beneficiaries that their medical or other personal data will not become a matter of governmental interest,” causing some people to avoid seeking support.
Self-Censorship and Silencing
Organizations reported increasing self-censorship and fear of criminal prosecution against their leaders and staff. Groups working on LGBT rights described the pressure as especially acute.
The Grlz Wave director said, “We had to shift to a regime of self-censorship,” particularly on queer issues. “It is now extremely difficult to find respondents willing to appear in videos on LGBT topics. Even openly out individuals refuse visibility.”
Organizations have also curtailed broader programmatic work. The director of a group providing social and healthcare services to vulnerable communities said that “self-censorship was one of the most severe effects.” The organization suspended all cooperation with the government and halted its advocacy work, including a planned 2025 public awareness campaign on sex education, because of the risk that authorities could invoke the “LGBT propaganda” law or the foreign agents law.
Chilling Effect and Exclusion
Several group leaders noted that the government’s hostile rhetoric and restrictive laws have chilled public engagement with civil society organizations and reduced access to services.
Iza Bekauri, executive director of the Kakheti Regional Development Foundation, said that after the organization publicly criticized the “foreign agents” law, the municipality refused to renew its lease for state-owned premises housing the group’s educational centers. In February 2026, the organization was forced to vacate the premises, effectively halting programs that had served about 1,000 people annually, including vocational education for women and refugees, support for writing grant applications, and providing social and economic support to women.
Bekauri also said beneficiaries had become increasingly reluctant to engage with the organization, and that teachers feared their participation in training programs would become publicly known.
The director of Knowledge Café said teachers who had previously participated actively in the organization’s programs now avoided them, while fake social media accounts urged parents not to send their children to its programs, describing the space as “demonic.”
Other organizations described the collapse or hollowing out of long-standing cooperation with state agencies. “In previous years we were actively involved in expert revision of school textbooks and cooperated with the Health Ministry in combating various diseases,” one respondent said. “Today these forms of cooperation are practically abolished.”
Pressure on/from Family Members
The repressive legislation affected not only civil society activists personally, but also their families. A majority of those interviewed said that during the 2024 smear campaigns, their relatives, including parents and young children, received threatening calls from unknown people. The callers urged family members to ensure that their politically active relatives stopped participating in protests or criticizing the government, ostensibly for their own safety.
A representative of Grlz Wave said that even in the absence of direct threats from third parties, pressure from concerned family members had become a significant source of stress. “Parents constantly fear that we will encounter problems and urge us to stop and to protect ourselves,” she said. “Often, more than the risks directed at me personally, I fear how my loved ones will experience these events.”
Georgia: New Laws Devastate Independent Civic Groups
(Berlin, July 9, 2026) – Georgian authorities’ use of increasingly repressive laws and politically motivated criminal investigations is decimating independent civil society and silencing critical voices, Human Rights Watch said today.
Since 2024, Georgia’s ruling party has adopted laws that impose stigmatizing registration requirements, invasive state oversight, funding restrictions, and criminal penalties on nongovernmental organizations, individuals, and media outlets receiving foreign funding. The authorities have also launched investigations into activists and rights defenders for providing information to international organizations and foreign media and frozen the bank accounts of prominent civic groups under a dubious criminal investigation following protests in 2024.
“The Georgian government’s goal has been to suppress critical voices and dismantle the country’s vibrant independent civil society, and it is making frightening progress,” said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The authorities are creating a system in which independent groups cannot operate safely, sustain funding, or support the communities that need and have relied on them.”
Human Rights Watch interviewed 15 Georgian activists, lawyers, and leaders of nongovernmental groups, who described how the deeply hostile environment has created a severe chilling effect leading, among other things, to self-censorship, staff departures, financial collapse, and a growing reluctance among some communities to seek assistance from such groups. Human Rights Watch also analyzed new laws and related legal documents and wrote to officials requesting information about their implementation. We received partial information from the State Audit Office and several data points from the Government of Georgia.
The Transparency of Foreign Influence Law, adopted in 2024, requires nongovernmental groups and media receiving more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as organizations “serving the interests of a foreign power.” It grants sweeping powers to the Justice Ministry to demand extensive information, including sensitive data about an organization’s employees, its beneficiaries, and others.
In April 2025, parliament adopted a separate Foreign Agents Registration Act, which could cover virtually any organization cooperating with international donors or sharing even the most routine information with foreign partners. Its vague and overly broad definitions give the authorities wide discretion to apply the law arbitrarily against independent groups and individuals. Those deemed foreign agents must register, submit detailed reports on their activities, finances, and beneficiaries, and mark all their materials with the “foreign agent” label. The law imposes criminal liability for even minor violations of its requirements, with penalties of up to five years in prison.
Amendments to the Law on Grants place foreign funding under direct government control, require foreign donors to obtain prior government approval before issuing grants, and make it a criminal offense to receive foreign funding without authorization. Penalties include up to six years in prison. A government decree requires foreign grants to align with government policies, effectively excluding projects that do not conform to government-defined priorities or challenge government plans in any way. These requirements apply retroactively and cover consultancy contracts with foreign entities involving activities that could influence Georgia’s domestic or foreign policy, as well as organizations registered abroad whose work substantially relates to Georgia.
Human Rights Watch is aware of several cases in which authorities rejected proposed foreign grants, including a UK Embassy-funded project to support four Georgian organizations monitoring the 2025 municipal elections and a donor request to fund an LGBT rights organization’s healthcare and harm reduction services for marginalized communities.
The authorities have also used criminal investigations to target independent groups. In March 2025, they opened a sweeping criminal investigation alleging that protests that began in late 2024 against the foreign influence law involved efforts to “sabotage” the state. The investigation also concerns alleged assistance to foreign actors engaged in “hostile activities,” including spreading “false information” about Georgia to trigger sanctions and “weaken the country’s international standing.”
As part of the investigation, in 2025 authorities froze the bank accounts of 12 independent groups, paralyzing their work. One prominent group said that, among the repressive measures adopted since 2024, “the asset freezing was the most severe for us.” The group had secured sufficient funding to operate until the end of 2026 but could not access those funds.
A late-2025 unpublished study by the Social Justice Center, based on interviews with 100 civil society representatives, found that 96 percent of surveyed organizations reported acute financial difficulties, and 94 percent had reduced their activities, with many scaling back to core functions or ceasing operations altogether.
The new restrictions forced the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), one of the country’s leading legal defense organizations, to suspend free legal aid. Regional organizations have been especially hard hit. Of 114 community organizations active in 2024, only 37 remained operational in 2025, with many nearing closure.
The new laws have also raised serious privacy concerns. A disability rights activist said his group considered registering under the foreign influence law but stopped after seeing that the Justice Ministry required personal and medical data concerning beneficiaries. “We had no legal right to disclose such information,” the representative said.
Organizations also reported growing self-censorship, especially among groups working on the rights of LGBT people. The director of the queer feminist media platform Grlz Wave said the organization had “shift[ed] to a regime of self-censorship,” particularly on queer issues.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have concluded that the laws impose unjustified restrictions on fundamental freedoms, are incompatible with human rights standards, and risk stigmatizing and harassing civil society organizations.
Georgia’s international partners should further increase the costs to the Georgian authorities of continuing these repressive measures. Any diplomatic engagement with the government should make the full repeal of repressive laws a central criterion for progress. The EU and its member states should also advance accountability for serious human rights violations by reaching the unanimity required to impose EU-level targeted sanctions, including against officials responsible for proposing and implementing repressive laws. Georgia’s international partners should also urgently expand flexible, emergency, and long-term support to independent civil society and human rights groups, including those operating under restrictive conditions or from exile, Human Rights Watch said.
“The Georgian authorities should stop treating independent civic work as a threat,” Williamson said. “They should repeal these repressive laws, end politically motivated investigations against independent groups, unfreeze organizations’ assets, and restore conditions necessary for civil society to operate freely and safely.”
For additional details, please see below.
Restrictive Legislation
Transparency of Foreign Influence Law
The ruling party first introduced the draft Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence in parliament in March 2023 but withdrew it following widespread protests and international criticism. The government reintroduced and adopted the law in spring 2024.
The law defines a “foreign power” to include foreign governments, foreign citizens, and any organization not established under Georgian law. It requires nongovernmental organizations and media outlets receiving more than 20 percent of their annual income from a “foreign power” to register as “serving the interests of a foreign power” and to submit detailed annual reports about their income, expenditures, and funding sources. The law designates independent groups as acting in foreign interests solely due to foreign funding.
Organizations that fail to register or file the annual financial declaration face annual fines of GEL 25,000 (approximately US$9,330), with additional fines for failing to provide requested information in full. The Justice Ministry may demand access to an organization’s records, including sensitive personal data. It may also unilaterally register organizations as serving the interests of a foreign power.
According to Georgia’s National Statistics Office, as of January 1, 2026, 3,987 noncommercial organizations were active in Georgia, of which 385 had registered as “serving the interests of a foreign power.” According to a report by an expert appointed by the OSCE, as of February 20, 2026, the authorities had not fined any organizations refusing to register.
Representatives of independent civil society organizations who spoke with Human Rights Watch said they refused to register because they considered the label unfair, degrading, and stigmatizing. One representative of an organization that ultimately registered described the decision as “emotionally devastating.”
The Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional and legal matters, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights concluded that the law imposes unjustified restrictions on fundamental freedoms, is incompatible with human rights standards, and risks stigmatizing and harassing civil society organizations. The Venice Commission also found that the restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, association, and privacy fail to satisfy “the requirements of legality, legitimacy, necessity in a democratic society and proportionality....”
Foreign Agents Registration Act
In April 2025, Georgia’s parliament adopted the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The bill’s explanatory note stated that the earlier foreign influence law had failed because most groups with foreign funding refused to register, implying that stronger sanctions were therefore needed. Both laws remain in force. The foreign agents law imposes broader restrictions and significantly harsher sanctions. An individual or legal entity can be designated as a “foreign principal’s agent” if they act under the direction, request, control, or financing of a foreign principal, and engage in activities deemed to advance that principal’s interests in Georgia.
The law defines such activities broadly enough to include efforts to influence government institutions or public opinion on domestic or foreign policy, as well as sharing information with international partners about developments in Georgia related to democracy, human rights, or the rule of law.
Individuals or organizations meeting these criteria must register as foreign agents and submit detailed reports about their activities, finances, and beneficiaries, with updates every six months or more frequently if requested. They are also required to label all informational materials as produced by a foreign agent.
The law granted sweeping powers to the Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate organizations and individuals and demand extensive information concerning compliance with the law, regardless of whether they have been designated as “foreign agents.” Noncompliance can result in court orders to cease activities and criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up to five years. It authorized the bureau to unilaterally register individuals and organizations as foreign agents.
The Anti-Corruption Bureau was also tasked with implementing the Law on Grants. On March 2, 2026, the authorities transferred both mandates to the State Audit Office.
Georgia’s civil society groups and international partners widely condemned the law. The Venice Commission and the OSCE expert report noted that the legislation relies on vague and overly broad definitions, stigmatizes civil society, and poses serious risks to democratic freedoms, civic space, and the rule of law, and called for its repeal.
Amendments to the Law on Grants
Amendments adopted in April 2025 required foreign donors to obtain government approval before awarding grants, and penalized organizations that accept a foreign grant without authorization with fines equivalent to double the amount received. A subsequent government decree made approval conditional on foreign grants aligning with “the government’s program, key strategic documents, and the state’s interests.”
Further amendments adopted in June 2025 expanded the definition of a “grant” to include various forms of technical and expert assistance.
The law authorized the Anti-Corruption Bureau to demand financial, project-related, and personal information from civil society organizations, third parties, and public institutions, and to compel individuals to appear for questioning before a magistrate judge. Organizations receiving foreign grants without government approval could face fines and asset freezes.
Further amendments adopted in March 2026 sharply tightened these restrictions and introduced criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up to six years. They also expanded the definition of foreign donors to include foreign individuals and barred employees of organizations deemed to “pursue the interests of foreign powers” from membership in political parties for eight years. Notably, the amendments apply retroactively.
Human Rights Watch is aware of several instances in which the authorities did not approve foreign grants. One involved a project funded by the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Georgia to support four Georgian groups to monitor the 2025 municipal elections. In June 2025, the parliamentary chair, Shalva Papuashvili, publicly criticized the project, claiming the embassy was “funding extremism, hatred, and propaganda in Georgia.”
The government also denied approval for a grant supporting an LGBTQ rights organization’s healthcare and harm reduction project for marginalized communities. The group’s director told Human Rights Watch that the authorities provided no explanation for the rejection.
Current regulations do not require the authorities to provide detailed reasons for refusing to approve grants, increasing the risk that they will use the approval mechanism selectively against organizations and projects they consider undesirable.
Georgia’s prime minister informed the OSCE expert that the government approves grants that have no “political content.” In a June 22, 2026 letter to Human Rights Watch, the Georgian government reported that, between April 2025 and June 2026, it had received 222 grant applications with a combined value of approximately GEL 109 million. Of these, 177 applications, worth more than GEL 60 million, had been approved; 10 had been rejected; and 35, worth more than GEL 44.2 million, remained under review.
The government did not respond to Human Rights Watch’s questions about the types of projects approved or rejected, or the grounds for individual rejections. It said applications were assessed individually for their alignment with national interests, the government’s main strategic documents, the proposed use of funds, and expected results. However, it did not explain in greater detail how these broad criteria are applied in practice.
Enforcement of the Anti-NGO Laws
In June 2025, eight prominent civil society organizations received almost identical court orders granting the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s motions and requiring the organizations to submit to the Bureau extensive legal, financial, technical, and personal information. The bureau’s head stated that these inspections sought to assess the “purpose” of these groups’ activities, alleging that “wealthy NGOs, hiding behind good deeds, avoid transparency and engage in undeclared political activity.”
Later that summer, at least seven organizations received letters from the Anti-Corruption Bureau demanding an explanation for not registering as foreign agents and warning them they risked incurring criminal liability. Representatives of five of these organizations said they responded with detailed legal arguments explaining why the law did not apply to their activities. They received no response.
From September 2025 onward, the Anti-Corruption Bureau initiated monitoring and issued information requests to approximately 100 organizations under the grants law. The bureau demanded extensive information covering an 18-month period in 2024 and 2025, including personal data about beneficiaries and third parties. Dozens of organizations unsuccessfully challenged the requests in court.
As of December 2025, the “foreign agents” registry listed 12 “foreign principals,” and 12 “foreign agents.” Civil society representatives interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they had refused to register because they considered the label degrading and rejected the premise that they operated under the control of foreign donors. They emphasized that their organizations acted independently and set their own priorities, strategies, and principles.
After responsibility for enforcing the grants law was transferred from the Anti-Corruption Bureau to the State Audit Office, the latter opened monitoring proceedings against one organization. The State Audit Office informed Human Rights Watch that the proceedings remained pending as of June 1.
Instrumentalization of Criminal Justice against Civil Society
Investigation into Alleged Sabotage
Georgian authorities have also used a wide-ranging criminal investigation alleging that protests involved sabotage against the state, as a pretext to target prominent civil society organizations, freeze their bank accounts, and paralyze their operations.
The investigation, opened in February 2025, concerns the ongoing demonstrations that began in 2024 against the foreign influence law. The authorities alleged that protesters damaged police infrastructure, injured law enforcement officers, and disrupted parliament, and characterized these acts as sabotage.
The investigation also concerns alleged assistance to foreign actors engaged in supposedly “hostile activities,” including deliberately spreading false information about Georgia to trigger foreign sanctions and damage the country’s international standing. No civil society organization or its representative has been charged in connection with the investigation.
In March 2025, as part of this investigation, the authorities froze the bank accounts of five independent groups: Human Rights House Tbilisi, Shame Movement, Nanuka’s Fund, Prosperity Georgia, and Fund for Each. The authorities alleged that legal and financial assistance these groups provided to protesters, including, in some cases, paying protest-related fines, constituted unlawful activity.
The groups began providing this assistance after the authorities sharply increased penalties for assembly-related offenses and began arbitrarily imposing harsher sanctions on demonstrators. The then-leader of the parliamentary majority publicly claimed that paying protesters’ fines amounted to “encouraging and facilitating violence” and undermining the state.
In August 2025, authorities froze the accounts of seven more organizations: International Society of Fair Elections and Democracy, Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, Georgian Democracy Initiative, Union Sapari, Social Justice Center, Civil Society Foundation, and Democracy Defenders. Officials claimed the groups had used project funds to support demonstrators who committed “violent acts” against police.
A representative of one of the affected organizations said that a judge justified freezing funds on the grounds that the group had purchased “30 gas masks and protective goggles, as well as several flags.” The representative said the items were intended to protect staff members who were monitoring or peacefully attending protests.
The authorities also initiated legal action against individuals for sharing information concerning alleged human rights violations with foreign media outlets and international organizations.
Additional Investigation into ‘Hostile Activities’
In December 2025, the State Security Service started an investigation related to BBC reporting that the police used toxic agents during demonstrations. On suspicion of facilitating the hostile activities of a foreign power, the authorities summoned for questioning human rights defenders and others featured in the report who had described the alleged incidents.
In April 2026, the State Security Service questioned Ucha Nanuashvili, Georgia’s former public defender and current head of Democracy Research Center, a civil society organization, solely for providing information about Georgia’s human rights situation to the OSCE expert. Nanuashvili said that the questioning primarily focused on his human rights work. Law enforcement authorities also required him to sign a non-disclosure agreement preventing him from publicly discussing details of the interrogation.
Risk of False Money Laundering Charges
Another criminal investigation, opened in 2024, illustrates how authorities could use financial crime allegations to target independent groups and researchers critical of the government. In October 2024, police raided the homes of Sopo Gelava and Eto Buziashvili, researchers with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.
The researchers’ work included analysis of Russia’s online influence operations targeting Georgia and other countries. The searches were part of an investigation into alleged fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion. During the raids, officers seized computers and other electronic devices, and a court froze the researchers’ bank accounts. Both women subsequently relocated abroad.
In January 2026, Georgia’s parliament amended the criminal code’s money laundering provision to introduce an aggravating circumstance for laundering funds connected to political activity, punishable by 9 to 12 years in prison. Since the authorities can treat foreign funding received without government approval as illicit income, organizations attempting to circumvent restrictions imposed by the grants law risk prosecution for money laundering.
Excluding and Discrediting Civic Groups
Legislative amendments adopted in April 2025 excluded civil society organizations from policy-making and other public processes in which they had long participated. The amendments abolished certain governmental mechanisms requiring consultation with nongovernmental organizations. The bill’s explanatory note claimed civic groups’ involvement “in public decision-making hinders the effective functioning of the state.”
Some organizations reported that efforts to discredit and marginalize independent groups intensified in 2023, after they publicly opposed the government’s initial attempts to introduce the foreign influence law. Government agencies reduced or abandoned cooperation with nongovernmental organizations on activities previously carried out jointly. Regional organizations said that local authorities discouraged community members from attending trainings and meetings organized by independent groups, and that defamatory narratives about their staff increasingly circulated locally.
Organizations working nationwide, particularly on elections, judicial reform, corruption, and other politically sensitive issues, said hostile rhetoric against civil society has gradually become normalized. Government officials and pro-government media frequently portray nongovernmental organizations as politically biased and controlled by foreign interests.
Although such rhetoric had existed for years, it intensified significantly in spring 2024, with coordinated smear campaigns on social media and public spaces, including posters labeling civil society leaders “foreign agents” and “enemies of the church.” Several organizations also reported vandalism targeting their offices, and attacks on the homes and vehicles of civil society leaders. Law enforcement responses were largely ineffective.
Pro-government media portrayed these incidents as spontaneous expressions of public anger toward civic groups. A ruling party member publicly described the vandalism as a “response” to the organizations’ activities and published footage showing the vandalism of several offices.
The authorities have also used homophobic rhetoric to delegitimize independent organizations by portraying them as promoters of “LGBT propaganda” and opponents of traditional values. The September 2024 law banning so-called LGBT propaganda further marginalized LGBT rights issues from public discourse and restricted access to essential healthcare services for transgender people.
Impact on Civil Society Organizations
The new laws and other measures have made it practically impossible for independent groups to operate sustainably, secure funding, and assist beneficiaries with the assurance that their personal data will not be disclosed.
Funding Restrictions
According to the GYLA, of the 136 organizations that jointly lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights concerning the foreign influence law, only 3 registered under the law. Most either suspended their activities altogether or significantly scaled them down. Of these, 109 reported difficulty securing funding or an inability to do so; 97 said they had reduced staff or that all staff had left; and 62 said they had been targeted by propaganda and disinformation campaigns. An unpublished study by the Social Justice Center documented similarly severe effects.
The restrictions also affected donor decisions. According to the OSCE expert’s report, after the adoption of the grants law, numerous donors halted direct financial support for Georgian groups, reducing both the scope and capacity of their work.
Organizations interviewed by Human Rights Watch described the concrete impact of these restrictions. To avoid drawing unwanted government attention, Knowledge Café, which runs a multifunctional community space and promotes civic awareness, said they felt compelled to refuse donor funding for cultural diversity activities, and also rejected equipment from a foreign donor for workshops on computer programming and robotics.
After the 2026 amendments to the grants law, GYLA had to suspend free legal aid, as it was forced to significantly reduce staff and redirect its remaining resources to strategic litigation.
The reduction of certain work by larger organizations significantly affects smaller community-based groups. Aslan Chanidze, head of the House of Free Journalists in Adjara, said that closing GYLA’s Batumi office left smaller groups more exposed, especially without the organization’s consistent legal support. Disability rights organizations expressed similar concerns. A disability rights activist, Koba Nadiradze, said that, even if community groups manage to survive, their effectiveness will be severely limited without strong legal and human rights expertise.
Financial pressures have been especially acute for regional organizations, which often have a narrower focus and depend heavily on specific donors or cooperation with local authorities. The Centre for Strategic Research and Development of Georgia, a nongovernmental organization, found that of 114 community organizations active in 2024, only 37 remained operational in 2025, with many nearing closure.
Organizations have also had to spend dwindling resources for legal and other services to cope with the new laws. The director of an organization that made what they described as “probably [our] … most difficult and nightmarish decision” to register under the foreign influence law, said they paid a law firm US$400 per month for compliance assistance.
The Grlz Wave director said the organization paid a lawyer $2,000 to respond to the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s demand for information, even as it declined new funding and returned money to several donors to avoid falling within the scope of the foreign agents law.
Privacy Concerns
The new laws’ disclosure obligations have raised serious privacy concerns among organizations, staff, and beneficiaries. The OSCE expert’s report said that “a significant number” of employees and collaborators resigned from organizations that could fall under the new laws because of the risk that their private information might be disclosed.
Several people described their concerns about government access to sensitive personal data. One disability rights activist said his organization decided not to register under the foreign influence law because the Justice Ministry required personal and medical data concerning beneficiaries. “We had no legal right to disclose such information,” the activist said.
Another disability rights activist said that organizations can no longer “guarantee potential beneficiaries that their medical or other personal data will not become a matter of governmental interest,” causing some people to avoid seeking support.
Self-Censorship and Silencing
Organizations reported increasing self-censorship and fear of criminal prosecution against their leaders and staff. Groups working on LGBT rights described the pressure as especially acute.
The Grlz Wave director said, “We had to shift to a regime of self-censorship,” particularly on queer issues. “It is now extremely difficult to find respondents willing to appear in videos on LGBT topics. Even openly out individuals refuse visibility.”
Organizations have also curtailed broader programmatic work. The director of a group providing social and healthcare services to vulnerable communities said that “self-censorship was one of the most severe effects.” The organization suspended all cooperation with the government and halted its advocacy work, including a planned 2025 public awareness campaign on sex education, because of the risk that authorities could invoke the “LGBT propaganda” law or the foreign agents law.
Chilling Effect and Exclusion
Several group leaders noted that the government’s hostile rhetoric and restrictive laws have chilled public engagement with civil society organizations and reduced access to services.
Iza Bekauri, executive director of the Kakheti Regional Development Foundation, said that after the organization publicly criticized the “foreign agents” law, the municipality refused to renew its lease for state-owned premises housing the group’s educational centers. In February 2026, the organization was forced to vacate the premises, effectively halting programs that had served about 1,000 people annually, including vocational education for women and refugees, support for writing grant applications, and providing social and economic support to women.
Bekauri also said beneficiaries had become increasingly reluctant to engage with the organization, and that teachers feared their participation in training programs would become publicly known.
The director of Knowledge Café said teachers who had previously participated actively in the organization’s programs now avoided them, while fake social media accounts urged parents not to send their children to its programs, describing the space as “demonic.”
Other organizations described the collapse or hollowing out of long-standing cooperation with state agencies. “In previous years we were actively involved in expert revision of school textbooks and cooperated with the Health Ministry in combating various diseases,” one respondent said. “Today these forms of cooperation are practically abolished.”
Pressure on/from Family Members
The repressive legislation affected not only civil society activists personally, but also their families. A majority of those interviewed said that during the 2024 smear campaigns, their relatives, including parents and young children, received threatening calls from unknown people. The callers urged family members to ensure that their politically active relatives stopped participating in protests or criticizing the government, ostensibly for their own safety.
A representative of Grlz Wave said that even in the absence of direct threats from third parties, pressure from concerned family members had become a significant source of stress. “Parents constantly fear that we will encounter problems and urge us to stop and to protect ourselves,” she said. “Often, more than the risks directed at me personally, I fear how my loved ones will experience these events.”
Zimbabwe Constitution Amended to Extend President’s Term
Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa signed a law on July 7 amending the constitution to extend presidential terms from five to seven years. The amendment, approved by parliament last month, also abolishes the election of the president by popular vote and establishes a parliamentary method for selecting the president.
Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution limited the term of a president to a maximum of two five-year terms, which would require President Mnangagwa to step down in 2028. The new law effectively keeps him in office for an additional two years and postpones the 2028 elections until 2030.
The constitutional amendment followed a resolution in October 2025 by the ruling ZANU PF party. The party said an extension of Mnangagwa’s rule was necessary “to ensure continuity, stability and the sustained transformation of the nation.”
Human Rights Watch documented attacks and arbitrary arrests against civil society groups, opposition political parties, student leaders, and activists opposed to the proposed constitutional amendment.
After assuming power in a military coup in 2017, Mnangagwa was elected president in 2018 and reelected in 2023. He had previously stated that he was a “constitutionalist” who would “abide by the provisions of [the] constitution to the letter.”
Civil society groups raised concerns that the Constitutional Amendment Bill was an attack on the country’s democracy. The Constitutional Defenders Forum mobilized against the bill because it altered protected constitutional structures. Lovemore Madhuku, a prominent lawyer and leader of the National Constitutional Assembly, filed a case at the Constitutional Court to halt the constitutional amendment process. The court dismissed the case on procedural grounds.
The authorities responded to this opposition by intensifying their crackdown on government critics. Police and unidentified armed men have been reported threatening, harassing, and beating up opposition politicians and civil society leaders, including during public consultation meetings about the proposed amendment. The violence at the public hearings effectively denied people their free expression rights and tainted the constitutional amendment process.
International human rights law, as stated in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, does not mandate the length or number of presidential terms, but it does require citizens to be able to vote for their leaders in genuine periodic elections that reflect the will of the voters. The Mnangagwa administration’s intensified repression of human rights, including during the constitutional amendment process, and the failure to impartially investigate rights violations and ensure accountability for abuses, raises grave concerns about the future of democracy and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.
Sounding the Alarm over Tunisia’s Crackdown
At the 62nd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, which closed on July 8, UN experts and civil society expressed deep concern about Tunisia’s intensifying human rights crises. But the continued silence from UN member states all but signalled a free pass for Tunisian authorities to continue escalating their crackdown on civic space.
Five years after Tunisian President Kais Saied seized extraordinary executive powers, the country’s human rights situation has deteriorated dramatically. The resurgent authoritarianism has translated into systematic repression of civil society, journalists, political opponents, independent lawyers, and migrants, and erosion of the rule of law.
In May, UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk called on the Tunisian government to end its repression of “civil society organisations, journalists, human rights defenders, opposition figures, activists and members of the judiciary, through the imposition of criminal proceedings and administrative impediments.” He mentioned Tunisia in his global update to the Council, highlighting how journalists are prosecuted under vague charges. The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, in her presentation to the Council, denounced reprisals against judges “for defending judicial independence through professional associations,” including the conviction of Tunisian Judge Anas Hmedi.
UN independent experts have similarly condemned the prosecution, sentencing, and conviction of judges, lawyers, and human rights defenders. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination raised the dangerous situation for sub-Saharan migrants collectively expelled to the Algerian and Libyan borders in life-threatening conditions, resulting in deaths and injuries.
Human Rights Watch and other groups have documented ongoing human rights violations in Tunisia, including the dire situation for migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, attacks on judicial independence, freedom of expression, and the press, and the crackdown on civil society, including the recent sentencing of former truth commission president Sihem Bensedrine to 25 years in prison and a heavy fine.
At the Council session, Tunisian civil society organizations also highlighted the ongoing abuses despite fear of reprisal. But instead of engaging, the government delegation responded aggressively, dismissing their legitimate concerns.
The alarm has been sounded. Now the Human Rights Council and UN member states should set political expediency aside, break their silence, and publicly condemn the Tunisian government’s repression.
Sweden: Deportation Decisions Ignore Women’s Rights Risks
(Stockholm) – Sweden is deporting young women to countries where they could face severe gender-based rights violations, Human Rights Watch said today. Media reported that in 2025, at least 92 young adults were set to be deported alone, many of them women who grew up in Sweden and have immediate family there.
Sweden has been deporting an increasing number of young adults who spent years on temporary residence permits tied to a family member, but lost their right to remain in the country when delays and policy changes left them without permanent residency by the time they turned 18. Deporting young women is especially alarming when they are forced back to countries where gender-based violations and entrenched patriarchal norms severely restrict their rights and autonomy.
“The Swedish government is sending young women to situations where they may have to give up their rights and autonomy just to survive,” said Susanne Bergsten, research assistant at Human Rights Watch. “These deportations disregard well-documented risks of severe gender discrimination, including gender persecution and the daily risks faced by young women living alone in societies with grave social, legal, and financial barriers to women’s independence.”
These deportations separate families, undermining Sweden’s international and European human rights obligations, and expel young people from the place they call home just as they begin adult life. Sweden should halt these deportations and review all decisions to ensure young adults will be protected from gender-based harm and prioritize solutions that prevent families from being split.
Human Rights Watch interviewed two people whose residency has been denied, and two legal experts.
Recent cases illustrate the consequences. Sisters Darya Javid Gonbadi, 24, and Donya Javid Gonbadi, 20, were deported to Iran in October 2025 after seven years in Sweden, while their father, a permanent resident, and younger siblings, Swedish citizens, remained. Ayla Rostamil, 21, also faces deportation to Iran without her family after six years in Sweden. Her case is temporarily on hold due to the ongoing conflict.
In Iran, women face severe discrimination and violence, including on the basis of laws that deny them equal rights in marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. A UN Fact Finding Mission, established in 2022, found that authorities commit the crime against humanity of gender persecution, denying women and girls fundamental rights, including to bodily autonomy, expression, education, and to employment through compulsory hijab laws. Those who defy or protest face grave consequences, including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and other ill-treatment, and unlawful killings.
Nardine Rael Awad, 21, was deported to Egypt on May 16, 2026. She came to Sweden at age 17 with her mother, who is married to a Swede and was not deported. In an interview after her deportation, she said she feared for her safety as a Christian woman who does not wear a hijab, living alone in Egypt. She said she has five locks on her door and is afraid to leave her apartment. “Egypt is a much more male-dominated society, and my life is very restricted” she said.
Human Rights Watch found in a 2023 report that social norms in Egypt discourage women from living alone, while male guardianship policies restrict women’s travel and mobility. Sexual harassment and violence remain widespread, and Egypt lacks comprehensive domestic violence laws. The country’s Personal status law also creates a disadvantage for women in divorce, inheritance, and child custody. Egyptian authorities have in recent years arrested women who posted online videos, bringing vague charges for violating “public morals,” and “undermining family values.”
Sisters Diya Hassan, 21, and Kani Hassan, 20, came to Sweden with their family eight years ago. Both graduated from high school and started working. Four years after they arrived, they applied for permanent residency with their parents and younger brother, but their cases were not processed for more than two and a half years. They were both over the age of 18 when they finally received their decisions. “When our parents received their permanent residence permits, we received rejection and deportation decisions on the same day” Diya said. “We didn’t know whether to be happy for them, or sad for us.”
The sisters face deportation to Iraq, where they have no family or support network. When they raised this concern with the court, the judge said their father in Sweden could support them financially. “It won’t be the same as in Sweden where women can be independent; here both Diya and I work” Kani said. Women’s rights in Iraq are increasingly under threat, with weak legal protections for women. There is no federal domestic violence law, and article 41(1) of the penal code permits a husband to “punish” his wife. The law reduces sentences for crimes committed for so-called honorable motives.
“You think of Sweden as a country that stands up for women’s rights: I never would have believed that they would send young women back alone to places like Iraq and Iran,” Diya said.
Sweden once prided itself on its feminist foreign policy. Although the government abandoned it after 2022, the foreign minister says gender equality is a “core value.” Yet current migration decisions seem to disregard the gender-specific harm of deportation, despite guidance from the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women requiring states to consider gender-specific risks throughout the migration process, including return decisions.
On March 6, the Swedish government said it would pause issuing new “teenage deportation” orders but would carry out the deportations of those who already have decisions. On June 1, the government announced a pathway where young adults can apply for resident permits tied to their parents up to age 21 rather than 18, and those with deportation decisions will be able to reapply.
While this offers some temporary relief, it only defers the substantive issue until young adults turn 21, and fails to address the core problem that young women will be deported to countries where they will face a real risk of gender-based rights violations, Human Rights Watch said.
These decisions also raise questions about how the strict prohibition in international law on returning individuals to countries where they face serious risk of inhuman and degrading treatment or torture is being taken into account. The prohibition is reflected in several of Sweden’s treaty obligations including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The UN Human Rights Committee interpreted article 7 of the Covenant to include a ban on deportations to the risk of severe gender-based violence or persecution. In addition, separating these young adults from their parents and siblings and social networks raises serious questions under article 8 of the European Convention with respect to the right to family and private life.
Swedish authorities should immediately halt these deportations and ensure that all return decisions are in line with its international human rights obligations, Human Rights Watch said. This includes respecting the absolute prohibition of returning individuals to countries where they face a real risk of persecution, gender-based violence, or inhuman and degrading treatment or torture, as well as protecting families from being torn apart.
“Sweden has clear obligations to ensure that no one is returned to a real risk of serious harm,” Bergsten said. “By deporting young women to countries where gender-based persecution and severe restrictions on their rights are well documented, Sweden risks exposing them to exactly the kinds of abuses it is bound to prevent.”
Egypt: Prisoner with Apparent Brain Tumor Denied Care
(Beirut) – Egyptian authorities are denying medical care to a death row prisoner with an apparent brain tumor, following a forced disappearance and an unfair trial, Human Rights Watch said today.
The Egyptian authorities detained the prisoner, Ahmed al-Waleed al-Shal, in 2014 shortly after he graduated from medical school at age 24. He was convicted in a mass trial for alleged involvement in a violent attack, and sentenced to death following confessions he told prosecutors and his family were obtained through torture, including rape. For over a decade, his family said, he has been held in abysmal conditions and denied appropriate medical care for an apparent mass in his brain. In recent months, his symptoms have drastically worsened.
“The Egyptian authorities have inflicted immense suffering on Ahmed al-Waleed al-Shal and his family by failing to provide him necessary medical care despite an apparent brain tumor,” said Amr Magdi, senior Middle East and North Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Allowing al-Shal immediate surgery and freeing or transferring him on medical grounds, given the years of failure to provide adequate medical care, would be a long-overdue act of justice.”
Al-Shal was convicted in the February 28, 2014, murder of Abdullah al-Metwally, a guard of one of the judges who tried former president Mohammed Morsy after he was removed from office in 2013. The National Security Agency responded with mass arrests, detaining nearly two dozen alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that to which Morsy belonged. Al-Shal’s mother, Nouseila Haroun, told Human Rights Watch that authorities arrested him on March 6, 2014, outside his university and forcibly disappeared him, ignoring inquiries about his whereabouts.
On March 12, the Interior Ministry published a statement regarding eleven men arrested in this case, and a video showing three of them, including al-Shal, confessing to crimes. A prosecutor’s office only informed the family of al-Shal’s whereabouts weeks later, his mother said.
The authorities brought terrorism-related charges against 23 men, including al-Shal, and a 17-year-old child, for allegedly shooting and killing al-Metwally in al-Mansoura city. On September 7, 2015, a criminal court convicted and sentenced nine men, including al-Shal, to death following a flawed mass trial. In June 2017, the Cassation Court upheld the death sentences against six of them, including al-Shal. Based on court documents Human Rights Watch reviewed, four of the twenty-four were eventually acquitted.
Haroun said that when the family finally visited al-Shal in the infamous Scorpion Prison several weeks after his initial arrest, he had wounds consistent with cigarette burns “arranged in geometrical shapes” on his neck. She said he told her and other family members that, while he was disappeared, officers at two National Security Agency sites, in al-Mansoura and Cairo, severely tortured him, including with electric shocks, cigarette burns, suspension by his legs, and inserting a wooden stick in his anus, to force confessions.
She said that officers told him they would arrest and rape her if he refused to sign confessions and threatened more torture if he changed his account before prosecutors. Despite his apparent marks of torture, prosecutors ignored al-Shal’s request for a forensic examination, based on court records Human Rights Watch reviewed. A defense memo Human Rights Watch reviewed cited a doctor who examined al-Shal upon arrival to the prison as stating that, “nothing negates the possibility that his wounds could have been caused according to the way he described to prosecutors.”
Al-Shal’s family contend that he was targeted because of his peaceful activism. Haroun said he participated in anti-government protests following the 2013 military coup while holding posters of his brother, Khaled, a veterinarian killed by police during the violent dispersal of the mass Rabaa sit-in in August 2013.
Haroun said al-Shal experienced several years in abysmal prison conditions in Wadi al-Natroun Prison in a 1.5 by 2.5 square meter cell with three other prisoners, taking turns sleeping on the floor. The guards let them use a toilet outside the cell once a day, she said.
Haroun said that between 2002 and 2005, he had surgery twice to remove a benign brain tumor. Human Rights Watch reviewed supporting medical documents. While he was in prison, she said, his health deteriorated, with balance difficulties, right hand motor disorder, headaches, dizziness, and double vision. Haroun said that prison doctors for years did not offer him appropriate medical care.
After multiple complaints, she said, he was taken to a public hospital in 2023, where, after an MRI, a neurosurgeon informed him of a mass in his brain, saying he needed surgery urgently. Officers instead took al-Shal back to prison, Haroun said.
After several other complaints to the cabinet, public prosecutor’s office, and the Interior Ministry, Haroun said, the administration transferred al-Shal to the medical central in Wadi al-Natroon Prison Complex in 2023, where he has been ever since. After his condition worsened, she said, the prison hospital conducted another brain image in 2026, but a doctor refused to tell him the results and told him he had “nothing,” and that his symptoms were “psychological.”
However, Haroun said, an informed source in the prison told the family the imaging showed the brain mass had doubled in size. The prison administration never allowed the family access to his medical records, and a prison guard told the family informally that only “National Security” could let him undergo surgery, his mother said.
The authorities should provide al-Shal with immediate adequate medical care, including releasing him from detention on humanitarian medical grounds, or transferring him to an equipped medical facility qualified to provide adequate care, Human Rights Watch said. The authorities should also ensure him a fair retrial.
The Committee for Justice, an independent group, said in a report that prosecution documents and defendants’ accounts showed that at least seven other defendants in the case were disappeared for periods of up to three months. It said that the documents also show that all those sentenced to death retracted their confessions in court and told prosecutors they had been severely tortured. Prosecutors referred only some for forensic examination, with significant delays.
Human rights groups reported that many defendants had no lawyers present during interrogation. A Human Rights Watch review of prosecution documents found no record of inspection of any of the places named as secret detention sites or officers identified in alleged torture. Court documents showed that judges based their decisions mainly on an unsubstantiated, even contradictory, National Security Agency account despite a lack of corroborating evidence.
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN independent mechanisms, and the African Commission for Human and Peoples Rights have repeatedly condemned unlawful mass death sentences in Egypt. Several UN experts and working groups expressed “serious concern” over the death sentences against al-Shal and his codefendants over due process and fair trial concerns and said that if they were executed, it would amount to “arbitrary executions.”
The authorities should uphold Egypt’s obligations, including under the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and investigate the alleged torture and ill-treatment of al-Shal and his codefendants. Human Rights Watch opposes capital punishment in all countries and under all circumstance as unique in its cruelty and finality, and is inevitably and universally plagued with arbitrariness, prejudice, and error.
“Executing a man following torture-tainted confessions and years of denied medical care would be grossly unjust,” Magdi said. “Granting al-Shal a medical pardon and his fellow defendants a fair retrial would be a positive step in Egypt’s long road to fixing its broken justice system.”
Germany: Government Curbing Freedom of Information Act
(Berlin, July 8, 2026) – The German government should abandon its plans to gut Germany’s Freedom of Information Act, Human Rights Watch said today. The proposed amendments will threaten core human rights essential to transparency and public participation in a democracy based on the rule of law.
On July 2, 2026, the coalition committee of the German government, comprised of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), decided to significantly amend Germany’s Freedom of Information Act. The changes will severely restrict the ability of the public, including civil society and journalists, to obtain public records that relate to the actions of the government and authorities.
“The German government seems to perceive transparency and freedom of information as threats and an administrative burden instead of essential safeguards in a democracy,” said Almaz Teffera, senior Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Restricting access to public records denies everyone basic information, makes it harder to hold the government and authorities to account, and risks increasing public distrust in their actions.”
The government seeks to adopt five key amendments to Germany’s Freedom of Information Act:
People will have to prove a “legitimate interest” to obtain official information, giving authorities broad discretion to reject information requests and deter people from seeking information of public concern. The government provided no further details on what would constitute a “legitimate interest.”Non-EU citizens who do not live in Germany would not be able to obtain public records, regardless of whether they may be able to prove a legitimate interest. Only individuals would have access to public records, preventing civil society organizations like Human Rights Watch or media organizations from making requests.The government would remove the cap, currently at €500, on fees for information requests, which risks creating financially prohibitive barriers, deterring and excluding people from access.The government would allow routine redactions of names of public officials, which would obscure individual responsibility for government actions.FragDenStaat, a German civil society platform for freedom of information, called the government’s plans “the most serious attack on state transparency in the history of the Federal Republic [of Germany].” They suggest that removing the cap could result in fees of thousands of euros.
Reporters Without Borders and German journalist networks have criticized the government’s plans as barriers to information for journalists and attempts to limit the media’s oversight, since they would make it significantly more difficult for journalists to do their jobs of monitoring the actions of politicians and the authorities.
The government’s plans also drew criticism from state-level independent watchdogs like Berlin's commissioner for freedom of information, Meike Kamp, who said that “Now more than ever, the state and its authorities should have an interest in ensuring that their actions can be reviewed and understood by the public” to create trust and strengthen democracy.
Currently, anyone can request access to government documents and thus monitor the actions of authorities and the government. Civil society and media investigations using information requests based on the act have exposed numerous political and corruption scandals in the past, including some that involve allegations linked to officials of the current government who are now pushing for the amendments.
In its coalition agreement adopted last year, the government set out a commitment to reform the Freedom of Information Act to provide “added value for citizens and the administration.” However, the government’s plans to limit freedom of information in Germany would breach not just its own commitment but also international and European human rights law, Human Rights Watch said.
Germany is bound by international and regional human rights standards that protect the right to seek and receive information as part of the right to freedom of expression, including the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that access to information is especially important for journalists, civil society organizations, and other public watchdogs, whose ability to inform public debate depends on obtaining relevant public records. Restrictions on access must be lawful, necessary, and proportionate to a legitimate aim. Blanket exclusions, redactions of government officials’ names, and arbitrary eligibility rules are inconsistent with a transparent government and risk chilling journalism and civic participation, key pillars of a functioning democracy.
“Political transparency and public scrutiny do not have an off switch when it gets uncomfortable for the government,” Teffera said. “The German government should reverse course on this dangerous pursuit to gut Germany’s Freedom of Information Act and preserve meaningful access to official records for individuals and organizations alike.”
Japan Shouldn’t Ignore India’s Authoritarian Turn
On July 2, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, on her first visit to India since taking office, met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Under their shared "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" vision, an effort to counter China, they agreed to deepen cooperation on security, energy, and investment, unveiling about 120 business agreements worth 2 trillion yen (US$12 billion).
Japan has long called India a partner sharing universal values. When then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Modi elevated ties to a "Special Strategic and Global Partnership," both pledged to uphold "democracy, human rights, and the rule of law."
There is no indication that human rights or the rule of law were discussed, notwithstanding the Modi administration’s long-running slide into authoritarianism. His Hindu nationalist government has tightened its crackdown on civil society groups and the media, imposing internet shutdowns and prosecuting activists, journalists, and peaceful protesters on fabricated charges.
The administration has stifled rights groups through foreign funding regulations and adopted discriminatory laws and policies targeting religious minorities, especially Muslims but also Christians. Police complicity has emboldened Hindu nationalist groups to attack minorities with impunity.
Japan should not repeat the mistakes of its China policy. After the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, Japan led the way in re-engaging a shunned Chinese government. The West, too, bet on engagement without human rights conditions, expecting economic growth in China would bring political liberalization and, ultimately, respect for human rights. The policy failed: the Chinese government under Xi Jinping has become increasingly repressive at home and abroad. The Japanese government itself, in its National Security Strategy, identifies China’s military activities and other activities as “a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community” and “unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge.”
Beijing dismisses concerns over its rights abuses, marshals countries at the United Nations in its defense, and targets government critics, even in Japan. India has begun to do the same, pushing back against international criticism with allegations of hypocrisy and double standards instead of undertaking reforms.
But it’s not too late. Many in India are still bravely fighting to preserve democratic values. That is precisely why Japan, with Europe and other like-minded partners, should build a relationship in which friends speak frankly about human rights and the rule of law. If those values hollow out, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision loses its force against authoritarian rule. Japan should learn the lesson of its China policy: speak up before it’s too late—for a trustworthy partnership and Japan's long-term interests.
EU Shouldn’t Cut a Migration Deal With the Taliban
The European Union hosted a delegation of Taliban officials in Brussels on June 22 for the first time since the group returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. The European Commission described the meeting as “technical” and focused on returns, while a Taliban spokesperson described it as a “historic visit” and a step toward regularizing consular relations with EU countries.
The negotiations took place despite EU awareness and frequent criticism of the Taliban’s horrific human rights record. The Taliban spokesman said discussions included securing a deal for “a dignified return process”—that is, sending Afghans back to Afghanistan.
International law prohibits governments from engaging in refoulement, the forced return to a place where someone would face a genuine risk of persecution, torture or other ill-treatment, or a threat to their life.
Afghanistan is not a safe country for any forced returns. There is compelling evidence that Taliban security forces have detained and tortured people who have been forced to return to Afghanistan. The Taliban have curtailed media freedom and arbitrarily detained critics and human rights defenders.
The Taliban have banned women and girls from secondary and higher education and have imposed severe restrictions on women’s employment and movement. Several EU countries, including Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands, grant Afghan women refugee status automatically, based on their nationality and gender.
The problems faced by people who return to Afghanistan are not limited to persecution and ill-treatment. Returnees from mass evictions in Pakistan and Iran often arrive with few resources, no housing, and limited access to basic services. They struggle to survive in a country facing economic collapse, foreign aid cutbacks, unemployment, drought, and broad repression.
There is a profound contradiction in condemning Taliban abuses while cooperating with them to deport people to danger. If the EU and its member states want their Afghanistan policy to be credible, they should halt all forced returns to Afghanistan and use engagement to press for rights and accountability, not to normalize forced returns to persecution and abuse.
UN Takes Key Step to Ease Financial Crisis Fueled by US, China
United Nations member countries took an important step last week to protect the world body from financial ruin.
The UN has faced a liquidity crisis for years, mostly due to the United States withholding billions of dollars in obligatory contributions and China paying very late. This has forced the UN to cut back on peacekeeping operations and lifesaving humanitarian and human rights work.
Earlier this year, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned governments that the UN was approaching “imminent financial collapse.” He urged member countries to cancel a rule effectively requiring the UN to refund money it never received from member countries, since complying with it now could risk bankrupting the organization.
The General Assembly decided last week to halt the rule, passing a resolution that introduces a four-year trial period amending the practice so it only applies to funds the UN receives but doesn’t use, not money member states never paid.
The UN administrative budget and peacekeeping operations are funded with obligatory contributions from member states, assessed according to the size of countries’ economies and expected to be paid early each new year. But dozens of countries pay late or not at all. The liquidity crisis, which has had a disproportionate impact on the UN’s already underfunded and understaffed human rights operations, will continue as long as the US and China, the two largest contributors, do not pay their share in full and on time.
Last week the General Assembly’s budget committee also adopted multiple resolutions related to the 2026-2027 peacekeeping budget. Once again, China, backed by Russia, sought to cut numerous posts dedicated to human rights. European delegations and some from Latin America, Asia, Africa and elsewhere resisted and salvaged most of them, including a crucial post at the UN Support Office in Haiti.
The General Assembly’s budget adoption is good news, but it won’t solve the underlying problem. All UN member states should honor their funding obligations so the UN is not forced to curtail critical human rights, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.