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China: Cybercrime Bill Entrenches Censorship, Surveillance
(New York) – The Chinese government’s proposed law to combat cybercrime extends far beyond addressing legitimate legal concerns and contains sweeping provisions that pose a significant threat to human rights, Human Rights Watch said today.
China’s Ministry of Public Security on January 31, 2026, published a 68-article Draft Law on Cybercrime Prevention and Control. If enacted, the bill would bring together rules that govern China’s telecommunication, internet, and banking systems under a single framework, strengthening authorities’ ability to trace user activity across platforms. The bill also expands police and other authorities’ ability to suspend access to financial accounts and communication services and bar people from leaving the country in cybercrime-related cases without meaningful oversight or redress provisions. Notably, the draft law has problematic extraterritorial reach.
“The draft cybercrime law reflects President Xi Jinping’s broad efforts to restrict digital and physical spaces by allowing state security to expand and tighten social controls, including beyond borders,” said Yalkun Uluyol, China researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The law would further undermine online anonymity, chill free speech, and restrict access to information.”
Many of the bill’s restrictive regulatory practices already exist under Chinese law, such as the Cybersecurity Law of 2016 and Data Security Law of 2021. However, the draft law consolidates and further formalizes them. The provisions address legitimate law enforcement concerns such as criminal activities online, including fraud, child pornography, and illicit financial transactions. However, they also threaten internationally protected rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and access to information.
The vague and overbroad nature of many of the offenses—such as “disrupting online order,” harming “national security” and “public interest,” “disrupting the real-name management system,” and “disseminating false information”—allows the government to punish legitimate speech and activities. Although such vague terminology is not new under Chinese law, its use in the draft cybercrimes law poses a significant threat to basic freedoms.
The draft law consolidates and reinforces existing mandatory real‑name registration across telecommunication, internet, and banking systems services (articles 11 to 13). While such requirements already exist in Chinese law, the bill requires ongoing or “dynamic” reverification of identity when these platforms are handling accounts in high crime areas or during high crime periods, or when they notice “abnormal operations” of the accounts, suggesting automated or algorithmic-based identity checks (动态身份核验, article 16). China’s real-name registration requirement allows the authorities to identify online commentators or tie mobile use to specific individuals, limiting anonymous expression, infringing on privacy rights, and chilling free speech.
Articles 19 to 33 list conduct prohibited under the “governance of the cybercrime ecosystem,” which include vague terms such as “publishing information that goes against social order and good custom for the generation of … advertising revenue” (article 28(4)). These articles also contain undue restrictions on legitimate cybersecurity research (articles 24 and 25). Such provisions risk criminalizing legitimate activities, such as those carried out by journalists, human rights defenders, and security researchers.
Article 62 also allows the police and other administrative authorities to “record in the credit files of individuals” who violate the draft law. And article 57 allows the police to “blacklist” people from using basic services such as opening a sim card without a clear removal mechanism, transparency, or redress mechanisms, practices that may be used to punish dissidents.
Articles 34 to 51 list provisions outlining extensive obligations of telecommunication, internet, and banking service providers in China to constantly monitor user behavior, and report broadly problematic behaviors such as artificial intelligence-generated “rumors” (article 40(10)) to public security organs and other relevant authorities. Article 51 also requires these service providers to provide technical assistance and decryption to the police for broad purposes to “safeguard national security” and “investigate terrorist activities.”
The 2018 report of the United Nations special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression states that governments should not impose “laws or arrangements that would require the ‘proactive’ monitoring or filtering of content, which is both inconsistent with the right to privacy and likely to amount to prepublication censorship.” Compelled decryption without safeguards also raises mass surveillance risks. The authorities may “block illegal information that originates outside the territory of the PRC [People’s Republic of China]” and network operators should promptly block them and report them to public security organs (article 44).
The draft law also prohibits tools and services that enable people to obtain or spread such information. While China already blocks foreign information through practice such as with the “Great Firewall” and bans the unapproved provision of virtual private networks to circumvent such restrictions, the bill embeds such prohibitions into the cybercrime law framework.
Such provisions contravene the right to seek, receive, and impart information “regardless of frontiers” under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose provisions are considered reflective of customary international law, and article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed but not yet ratified.
The draft law not only extends this abusive cybercrime regime to citizens abroad (article 2) but also to “overseas individuals and organizations providing internet service … to users in the PRC” (article 53). The law would also allow relevant authorities to punish these foreign entities for producing or disseminating information that “harms the interests” of the Chinese government by freezing their funds and investments in China and barring them from entering China (article 55).
The draft law provisions allow for up to 5,000,000 Chinese yuan (US$725,000) fines and 15 days in detention for “serious” violations related to cybercrimes. The authorities may also restrict “Chinese citizens … from leaving the country for six months to three years after their punishment is completed” (article 56), which violates their right to freedom of movement, protected under international human rights law. China’s Criminal Law already punishes cybercrimes under articles 285, 286, and 287, which includes detention, imprisonment, and fines; it also includes extensive punishments for peaceful speech and activities.
The draft law on cybercrime is inconsistent with China’s international human rights law obligations and violates the rights of internet users in China and abroad, Human Rights Watch said.
“The draft cybercrimes law is part of the Chinese government’s ‘digital authoritarianism,’ through which the authorities are weaving a set of laws to restrict the remaining pockets of freedom that people once enjoyed in cyberspace,” Uluyol said. “Concerned governments should press the Chinese government to scrap the proposed law.”
US Lifts Sanctions on Wagner-Linked Officials in Mali
The United States government recently lifted sanctions on three senior Malian officials linked to Russia’s abusive Wagner Group who could be implicated in serious human rights violations. The decision signals disturbing disregard for atrocities in Mali’s armed conflict with Islamist armed groups.
The three officials, Defense Minister Sadio Camara, and Chief of Staff Alou Boï Diarra and Deputy Chief of Staff Adama Bagayoko of the Malian Air Force, were sanctioned in 2023 for facilitating the Wagner Group’s activities in Mali. According to the US Treasury Department at the time, the officials exposed Malians to “the Wagner Group’s human rights abuses” and helped facilitate “the exploitation of their country’s sovereign resources.”
Since 2012, Islamist armed groups have waged an insurgency against successive Malian governments, attacking security forces and killing and displacing tens of thousands of civilians. In response, Malian armed forces have conducted abusive counterterrorism operations, including airstrikes that have targeted civilians. Fighters from the Wagner Group, which operates under the Russian Defense Ministry and was rebranded as Africa Corps in 2025, have also been implicated in widespread abuses against civilians during joint operations with Malian forces.
Despite the scale of abuses, accountability in Mali remains limited and avenues for justice at the international level are at risk. The US sanctioning authority can be a powerful tool to hold rights abusers to account. But lifting sanctions without clear accountability sends the wrong signal when impunity for serious abuses remains widespread.
Removing these sanctions comes as Washington appears to be seeking closer security cooperation with governments in Africa’s Sahel region, including Mali. In February, Nicholas Checker, a senior State Department official, met with Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop in Bamako, Mali’s capital. The US is also reportedly nearing a deal with the Malian government to resume intelligence operations in the country that were curtailed after the military coups in 2020 and 2021.
Since taking power in 2020, Mali’s military junta has tightened its grip on power, delaying return to civilian democratic rule, banning political parties, and targeting political opponents, journalists, and civil society activists.
If the US engages with Mali on counterterrorism, it needs to abide by US law and practice restricting security assistance to coup governments. It should also ensure it does not contribute to further abuses against Malian civilians and that any steps taken are conditioned on meaningful accountability and redress for victims.
Iran: Unlawful Strikes Across Gulf Endanger Civilians
(Beirut) – Civilians in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are at grave risk from ongoing Iranian strikes in response to US and Israeli military attacks on Iran, Human Rights Watch said today. Many of the Iranian attacks have struck civilian residential buildings, hotels, civilian airports, and embassies, and have unlawfully targeted civilian objects such as financial centers.
Since February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States have carried out thousands of attacks across Iran. Iranian forces responded with waves of drone and missile attacks against Gulf states, striking in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Since February 28, Iran has launched thousands of drones and missiles against GCC countries, with the largest number striking the UAE.
As of March 16, the attacks resulted in at least 11 civilian deaths and at least 268 injuries, with the majority of victims migrant workers, according to GCC government sources. Of those killed, at least 10 are foreign nationals. Some deaths were caused by falling debris.
“Civilians, particularly migrant workers, across Gulf states are being threatened, killed, and injured by Iranian drones and missiles,” said Joey Shea, senior Saudi Arabia and UAE researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Rather than pretending to apologize, Iran’s authorities should immediately take all possible measures to protect civilians across the Gulf.”
Human Rights Watch investigated an Iranian attack on Fairmont The Palm Hotel and Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) in the UAE and reviewed information related to attacks on Zayed International Airport, Dubai International Airport, Kuwait International Airport, residential buildings and Crowne Plaza Hotel in Bahrain, the US consulate in Dubai, and the US Embassy in Riyadh. Researchers also reviewed information related to attacks on other civilian areas in the UAE. Researchers were unable to confirm whether there were military targets present in any of the attacks.
The Iranian government has alleged that it is targeting sites where US personnel have relocated from nearby bases. However, Ebrahim Jabbari, a general with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), suggested that Iran will target civilian objects, saying that Iran “will hit all economic centers in the region,” AFPreported.
On March 8, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized for Iran’s attacks on Gulf states, saying “there will be no further attacks or missile launches toward neighboring countries.” But attacks continued. A spokesman from Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters said on March 8 that “every point that serves as the origin of aggression against Iran is a legitimate target.” On March 14, a media outlet affiliated with the IRGC stated that American “companies will be the legitimate targets for Iran’s Armed Forces,” listing a number of US management consulting and investment firms.
Human Rights Watch verified videos posted to social media taken during and in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Some were initially geolocated by GeoConfirmed, a volunteer-driven visual verification platform. These videos show attacks on and damage to residential buildings, hotels, airports, embassies, ports, and energy facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Human Rights Watch spoke with 16 people including witnesses, journalists, tourists, and residents of the cities attacked, and family members of three migrant workers killed in Bahrain and the UAE.
Human Rights Watch wrote to authorities in Iran, as well as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, on March 10, 2026. Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had not responded at the time of publication. Authorities in Oman acknowledged receipt but requested additional time. Iranian authorities responded, writing that, “While the Islamic Republic of Iran firmly rejects the unfounded claims of certain regional countries that Iran has attacked them… Iran once again emphasizes that its defensive operations—targeting United States military bases and facilities in the region—are in no way directed against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of any regional country.”
Iranian attacks have hit densely populated civilian areas such as popular tourist sites, particularly in the UAE. On February 28, an Iranian Shahed-238 one-way attack drone struck the forecourt area in front of Fairmont The Palm hotel in the luxury Palm Jumeirah area of Dubai. Local authorities said four people were injured. The Shahed-238 drones reportedly have multiple variants, all of which are guided, either by global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), radar homing, or electro-optical sensors, and are known to be equipped with features to allow them to overcome jamming to improve accuracy. While the exact accuracy of the Shahed-238 is not known, nor is the extent or efficacy of any countermeasures deployed by the UAE, its targeting systems allow it to be reliably directed at large objects and infrastructure.
People interviewed said that US military personnel are not known to stay at the Fairmont The Palm. Human Rights Watch could not confirm that there were no military personnel staying at the hotel at the time of the attack on February 28, but was able to confirm the civilian nature of the 391-room luxury hotel.
A guest said he was sitting down for dinner in a hotel restaurant when he “heard what sounded like a jet engine approaching… It was very quick and very loud. The explosion was utterly terrifying.”
Another witness saw the drone “go straight past us and hit the Fairmont.” The woman was leaving a nearby beach with friends when she heard a whistling sound from the drone before it hit the building. “You obviously think you’re a goner,” she said. After running to the beach, they “looked back and saw the Fairmont was up in smoke.”
Two videos geolocated by Human Rights Watch capture the moment of the strike. In the first, a person on a roof of a nearby building films in the direction of the hotel. The drone can be seen for a few frames descending rapidly at a near perpendicular angle before detonating. A second video, filmed northwest of the hotel, follows the drone as it makes impact and a large ball of flames engulfs the courtyard.
A third video filmed from inside the hotel in the immediate aftermath shows at least four vehicles on fire. Two other videos filmed from inside the hotel after the strike show damage to the northern side of the parking lot and burned vehicles, consistent with the detonation of high explosives.
Iranian drone attacks have also targetedfinancial districts in the UAE, particularly Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and surrounding areas, in at least three separate incidents since March 12. On March 14, the IRGC said, “we warn the American regime to evacuate all American industries in the region.” A media outlet affiliated with the IRGC stated that “these companies will be the legitimate targets for Iran’s Armed Forces” and shared a graphic identifying US companies in the region. The graphic lists a number of US firms and their regional addresses, including KKR, a US private equity and investment company, Boston Consulting Group, a US management and consulting firm, and Bain & Company, a US management consulting firm. The graphic lists the firms’ Dubai office addresses, all of which are located within the DIFC district. DIFC is one of Dubai’s special economic zones and is an important financial hub for companies operating in the Middle East. The district is a densely populated civilian area of Dubai.
On March 14, an Iranian drone apparently struck ICD Brookfield Place, a luxury office and retail building in DIFC, containing restaurants, gyms, salons, and grocery stores. Researchers geolocated a video uploaded to Telegram the same night showing smoke emitting from the ICD Brookfield Place building. On March 13, AFP reported that “explosions rattled buildings in Dubai and a large cloud of smoke hung over a central area of the financial hub.”
Iranian forces, using drones, also appeared to strike residential buildings throughout Dubai. In the early hours of March 12, an Iranian drone struck a residential building in the Creek Harbour neighborhood, causing a fire, according to Dubai authorities and local and internationalmedia.One video geolocated by Human Rights Watch and uploaded to X on March 12 shows smoke billowing from an upper floor. A photograph published by the Dubai Media Office shows damage to the same floor.
In a March 3 media briefing, the UAE’s defense ministry said UAE authorities had intercepted hundreds of Iranian Shahed-136 one-way attack drones, as well as dozens of Shahed-107 and Shahed-238 drones. UAE authorities have intercepted the overwhelming majority of attacks, with an interception rate of more than 90 percent, according to government figures.
Iranian forces have also apparently attacked several large residential buildings and hotels in Bahrain, including Era View residential building on February 28, Crowne Plaza Hotel on March 1, and Millennium Tower on March 10, based on researchers’ verification of videos and review of information published online, and interviews with four people.
The attack on Millenium Tower killed a 29-year-old Bahraini woman and injured eight people, according to Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior. A Bahrain-based newspaper, Gulf Digital News, wrote that the woman was killed by falling debris from the attack, which a person with second-hand information who spoke to Human Rights Watch also said.
Human Rights Watch verified two videos uploaded to Telegram showing an Iranian Shahed-136 one-way attack drone striking the Era View residential building as well as videos that show the aftermath of the attacks and damage to the two other buildings. Similar to the Shahed-238, the Shahed-136 drone is a guided weapon system, primarily through the use of GNSS.
The US State Department said that two US Defense Department employees had been injured in the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, the Washington Post reported. People interviewed said that US government and military personnel often stayed in some of the attacked buildings in Bahrain, including the Crowne Plaza, but that the US military placed limits on how many military personnel could stay in any building at a given time. Researchers could not confirm whether there may have been military targets in the hotel or in two residential buildings hit in Bahrain, but confirmed civilian use of the buildings. All are in densely populated civilian areas of Manama.
Iranian attacks have struck at least three international airports in the GCC. Abu Dhabi airport authorities reported that a drone struck Zayed International Airport on February 28, resulting in the death of Diwas Shrestha, a Nepali security guard, and seven people injured. Iranian authorities have repeatedly struck Dubai International Airport. On February 28, the Dubai airport authority reported that a concourse at Dubai International Airport had been damaged in an apparent Iranian drone attack. Four staff members were injured, Dubai authorities said. Researchers geolocated a video uploaded to X on March 7 capturing the moment a drone struck in the immediate vicinity of the airport, causing a temporary suspension of flights. Another drone attack on Dubai International Airport on March 16 caused Dubai’s Civil Aviation Authority to temporarily suspend flights. Dubai authorities said a drone damaged one of the fuel tanks in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport causing a fire that was later extinguished. Two videos geolocated by researchers show a large plume of smoke rising from the direction of the airport’s fuel storage tanks. An Iranian drone strike struck the Kuwait International Airport on February 28, resulting in injuries to four Bangladeshis.
Human Rights Watch could not confirm whether these three airports, which are used for civilian purposes, were also being used for any military purposes or if there were military targets in the airport at the time of the attack.
The Kuwait airport has previously been used by the US military, but Human Rights Watch is not aware of any publicly available evidence indicating that Dubai International Airport and Zayed International Airport have been used for any recent transport of arms or troops. The cost to civilians of damage and disruption to these airports is high: Dubai International Airport is the world’s busiest airport, according to OAG, a leading provider of airport data, and has been a key site of repatriation flights for civilians fleeing the conflict.
Iranian attacks have also repeatedly targeted what appear to be US diplomatic premises throughout the Gulf. On March 3, an Iranian drone attack struck the US consulate in Dubai, causing a fire. One video uploaded to X, filmed from across the street, captures the sound of a drone moments before a loud explosion. The camera then pans toward the consulate, where smoke and fire are visible.
Also on March 3, two Iranian drones struck the US embassy in Riyadh, causing a fire and minor damage, said Saudi Arabia’s Defense Ministry. A video shared with Human Rights Watch of the aftermath of the attack shows a fire billowing from the direction of the embassy complex. On March 2, drones struck the US embassy in Kuwait, Agence France-Presse reported. On March 5, the US State Department announced the suspension of operations at the US Embassy Kuwait City.
Migrant workers have been significantly affected by the attacks and the falling debris from air defense systems. On February 28, an Iranian attack killed a Bangladeshi national, Saleh Ahmed, in Ajman in the UAE. Ahmed was collecting water for delivery in the Al Talla neighborhood when apparent debris from an attack struck his water tank truck, piercing the cab and damaging the rear, hitting Ahmed and two others, a Bangladeshi and a Pakistani person, said Ahmed’s son, Mohammad Abdul Haq. Ahmed died and the others were injured.
Iranian forces have also attacked or struck states beyond the GCC, including Azerbaijan, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey since the conflict began.
International humanitarian law requires all parties to the conflict to distinguish between military objectives and civilians and civilian objects and to target only military objectives. Military objectives are limited to “objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”
International humanitarian law also requires parties to a conflict to “take all feasible precautions” to avoid or minimize the incidental loss of civilian life. All attacks must respect the principle of proportionality in attack, including considering the likely impact on civilians and civilian objects. Attacks are prohibited if their primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population. Serious violations of the laws of war committed with criminal intent, that is deliberately or recklessly, are war crimes.
In contrast to what Iranian authorities have stated, companies having US ownership or ties would not in and of itself make them legitimate military objects.
“Iran's response appears to be striking civilians and civilian objects and devastating lives and livelihoods across the Gulf,” Shea said.
UN: Global Tax System Undermines Rights, Development
(New York) – UN member countries should work to align the emerging United Nations tax convention with international human rights law to achieve its objective of advancing sustainable development, seven human rights groups said today in a submission to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee. The submission proposes edits to the draft text to incorporate these standards and guidance into the draft convention.
The groups are Amnesty International, the Center for Economic and Social Rights, Dejusticia, the Global Initiative for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Human Rights Watch, the Initiative for Human Rights in Fiscal Policy, and the Tax Justice Network.
“The current outdated and patchwork global tax system is driving an extreme concentration of wealth that is depriving most governments of money that could fund rights like health, education, and social security,” said Sarah Saadoun, senior advisor on economic inequality at Human Rights Watch said. “Aligning the tax convention with human rights is the best way to provide a strong foundation for a fairer global tax system that could let governments improve people’s lives.”
Negotiations for a first UN tax treaty began in 2025, with a draft to be submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2027. The United States withdrew during the first round of negotiations in February 2025, but dozens of other governments, including European Union members and other major economies, have been actively engaging in negotiations.
The countries agreed to make sustainable development the explicit objective of the new UN tax convention. Human rights can provide standards and guidance to help ensure that the convention achieves this objective. International human rights law requires governments to take steps, “to the maximum of [their] available resources,” to progressively deliver the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights—such as education, health care, and social security—both individually and through international cooperation and assistance. Practically speaking, the effective protection of other human rights depends on having adequate government resources as well.
Numerous UN human rights mechanisms have underscored that a fair international tax system is critical to any hopes of enabling governments to mobilize adequate domestic resources to fulfill human rights.
The debates at the heart of the treaty negotiations have enormous implications for rights. Governments lose about US $500 billion globally each year to tax abuse, according to the Tax Justice Network. The UN Tax Convention could help generate significant income for governments by, for example, curbing tax evasion and avoidance, preventing companies from shifting profits to tax havens, and giving governments the right to tax companies whose profits are unjustifiably put out of reach under current rules.
“Tax is one of the most powerful tools governments have to realise human rights”, said Sergio Chaparro, international policy and advocacy lead at the Tax Justice Network. “Global tax rules have restricted the ability of countries to serve broader aims such as the fulfillment of human rights. The UN tax convention offers a historic opportunity to change course.”
Governments would be able to mobilize significant new revenue under a fairer global tax system, which would vastly improve their ability to fund public services and social security systems, while reducing their reliance on taxes that disproportionately harm people with lower incomes, the groups said.
“Many of the same governments that claim to support human rights are fighting the hardest to maintain a tax system that deprives governments of the revenues they need to fulfill rights,” said Camila Barretto Maia, executive director of the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Research in countries such as Sri Lanka has shown that the global tax system undermines governments’ ability to fund human rights. Nearly half the world’s population—3.6 billion people—live in poverty, defined as less that $6.85 per day, and around the same number have no access to any social security benefits. More than half—4.6 billion people—still lack access to essential health services. Fixing the current tax system is critical to ensure universal support for these rights, the groups said.
“Human rights and fair tax cooperation must go hand in hand. Embedding human rights in the convention can strengthen the negotiations and help a global tax architecture that currently enables abuse and deprives governments of the resources needed to realise economic, social and cultural rights,” said Maria Ron Balsera, Executive Director of at the Center for Economic and Social Rights.
It is also essential to the realisation of civil and political rights. Anger over economic inequality and elite capture is fueling the rise of authoritarianism in some countries, and motivating protesters to go into the streets to demand change in others.
“At a time when international cooperation and assistance is needed more than ever,” said Riva Jalipa, researcher and advisor with Amnesty International, “The UN tax convention provides an historic opportunity for more transparency, accountability and the participation of states on an equal footing to rewrite a more equal global tax system.”
The Great Unrooting: A Special Season of Rights & Wrongs
(New York) – A new five-episode narrative podcast will explore what it means to lose home and what it takes to start again, Human Rights Watch said today. Anchored in the story of Maung, a Rohingya refugee now living in New York, the series traces his journey of flight, survival, and rebuilding and explores displacement at a moment when more people are forcibly displaced than at any point since World War II.
The series, “The Great Unrooting,” is hosted by Ngofeen Mputubwele , a journalist, attorney, and audio producer whose work includes podcasts for The New Yorker and the critically acclaimed series “Fela Kuti: Fear No Man.” The series combines intimate storytelling with Human Rights Watch research and investigations around the world. It examines the fragility—and the human cost—of the lines that divide communities, determine who belongs, and shape the routes people take in search of safety.
“Record numbers of people are being forced from their homes, even as borders harden and safe pathways shrink,” said Bill Frelick, refugee and migrant rights director at Human Rights Watch. “The Great Unrooting brings listeners inside the choices people face when the world they know becomes unlivable — and the long road that follows.”
Across five episodes, the series follows the “hidden geography” of displacement and looks at what borders really do in human lives; not as abstract lines, but as lived systems that reshape families, futures, and belonging.
“Borders look like neat lines on a map, but in real life, they’re lived as detours, documents, checkpoints, and the moment you realize you can’t go back home,” Mputubwele said. “Home isn’t just where you’re from – it’s where you’re known, where you’re wanted. The Great Unrooting is about what happens when that breaks, and what it takes to find your way again.”
About “The Great Unrooting”
“The Great Unrooting” follows Maung’s story from the early warning signs of exclusion to the moment his family is forced to flee and then into the grueling logistics of survival on the move. Subsequent episodes explore life in limbo, the systems that govern who can move and who cannot, and what it means to rebuild in a new place while still longing for home.
Episode Guide:
Episode 1: “The Unrooting”—The moment “home” begins to fall away (now available).Episode 2: “Flight”—The logistics of getting from here to there (available March 30, 2026).Episode 3: “The Shadow City”—Life in the world’s largest refugee camp (available April 13, 2026).Episode 4: “The Toll it Takes”—The consequences of displacement on mental health (available April 27, 2026). Episode 5: “Arrival”—Building a new life after displacement (available May 11, 2026)Yemen: Apparent Excessive Force Against Protesters
(Beirut) – Yemeni government-aligned forces appeared to have used excessive force against protesters, as well as arbitrarily detained some protestors in February, Human Rights Watch said today.
Throughout February 2026, there were several protests in support of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Human Rights Watch investigated protests that took place in three governorates of Yemen: Aden, Shabwa, and Hadramout. Government forces reportedly killed at least six people and injured dozens in these clashes with protesters in Aden and Shabwa, and detained dozens of people in Hadramout. Human Rights Watch found that government forces used excessive force against protestors and arbitrarily detained protestors in Aden.
“The Yemeni government has long purported to stand up for free expression, and yet their actions don’t match their words,” said Niku Jafarnia, Yemen and Bahrain researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The government should be ensuring that Yemenis’ rights are respected during this period, rather than violating their right to free expression.”
On December 30, 2025, Rashad al-Alimi, the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, announced a 90-day nationwide state of emergency following the STC’s takeover of the governorate of Hadramout. One week later, Saudi-led coalition forces and government forces pushed the STC out of territories where it had gained control in December.
Throughout February 2026, people took to streets throughout southern Yemen to show support for the STC, which had recently announced its dissolution.
Human Rights Watch interviewed 13 people between February 10 and March 6, including protestors who had been arrested, witnesses to government forces’ use of force, and representatives of the STC. Researchers also verified photographs and videos posted online from the protests showing the use of force, as well as injured protesters, including two children. Human Rights Watch wrote to the Yemeni government on March 12 to request its response to Human Rights Watch’s findings but has received no response.
In the capital of Hadramout governorate, Seiyun, on February 6, government forces fired on demonstrators at Seiyun airport, where they had demanded the removal of the Yemeni national flag and a picture of the Saudi king. The STC has publicly supported southern Yemen’s independence movement and used the flag of South Yemen, which was a state between 1967 and 1990 before unifying with northern Yemen. Nobody was killed or injured as far as Human Rights Watch could ascertain.
Government forces detained dozens of protestors, and two STC leaders at their homes the following day. The STC leaders were charged with inciting people to protest, while the four protestors interviewed said they had not been charged and were released after several days.
On February 11, protesters in Shabwa’s governate capital, Ataq, attempted to storm a government building—some of them armed—to take down the Yemeni flag and replace it with the STC flag. Both at the start of the protest, which appeared to have been peaceful based on information researchers received and a livestream video analyzed by researchers, and at the government building, government forces fired at protesters.
Some protesters also fired on government forces, though Human Rights Watch was unable to determine who fired first. Five people were killed and 39 injured, according to Al Jazeera, citing a statement from the deputy head of the Shabwah General Hospital Authority, Rami Lamas.
Pro-STC protesters in Aden on February 19 attempted to storm the presidential palace. Government security forces fired on them, killing one person and injuring at least 25, the STC said in a statement to Human Rights Watch. A human rights activist following the cases told Human Rights Watch that government forces also detained 28 people.
According to the activist, as well as Human Rights Watch’s documentation, those detained were not provided with due process, and were held for over two weeks without being taken before a judge or charged with a criminal offense, making the detentions arbitrary.
Human Rights Watch believes, based on evidence it reviewed, that government forces in Aden used excessive force against peaceful protesters.
The protests were directed at least in part by the STC. The STC in Hadramout; Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the leader of the STC; and the STC in Aden made statements on February 4, 10, and 19, respectively, calling on STC supporters to protest. Several STC leaders participated in the protests, including the leader of the STC in Shabwa, Shiekh Lahmer Ali Laswad.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Yemen is a party, protects the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Under the covenant, law enforcement personnel are obliged to respect fundamental rights. The Yemeni constitution also provides for the right to free speech and political participation under article 42.
The ICCPR allows only for limited restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly that are “necessary in a democratic society” to protect a narrow range of important interests including public order, public safety, and the rights of others.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, an international expert body that monitors compliance with the ICCPR, has stated that restrictions justified on grounds of public safety require authorities to demonstrate “a real and significant risk to the safety of persons (to life and security of person) or a similar risk of serious damage to property.”
The Yemeni government should ensure a speedy and effective investigation into all instances of security forces firing on protestors and hold accountable anyone responsible for any unlawful use of force.
Throughout Yemen’s 11-year conflict, all warring parties, including both the Yemeni government and the STC, have suppressed free speech and violated protesters’ rights.
“As power changes hands in southern Yemen, the warring parties need to end the cycle of violations,” Jafarnia said. “The Yemeni government needs to provide accountability and justice for the STC’s violations in areas previously under its control and not repeat the same violations that it previously condemned.”
Aden, February 19On February 19, 2026, Southern Transitional Council (STC) supporters attempted to storm the presidential palace in Aden. In response, government security forces fired on the supporters, killing one person and injuring at least 25, according to an STC representative’s statement sent to Human Rights Watch.
A video compiling several clips from unknown sources, posted by the Indian news channel Mirror Now and geolocated by Human Rights Watch, shows hundreds of people peacefully protesting outside a barrier two kilometers from the presidential palace. Another clip shows dozens of protesters breaching the barrier and throwing debris towards the nearby security forces.
Two armored vehicles face the barrier as well as dozens of armed security force members. Gunshots can be heard throughout, and researchers identified at least three incidents of security forces firing upward, including shots from a machine gun mounted on an armored vehicle. In another video posted to social media, one of the armored vehicles initially backs away from the protesters, but then speeds directly toward them, stopping just before it reaches them.
Al Jazeera said it had “obtained [footage] purporting to show several wounded individuals at the site.” Human Rights Watch has not reviewed this footage. Human Rights Watch reviewed a South24 video said to be taken at the Aboud hospital in Aden that showed 12 injured protesters, including two older men and a child.
The government-run Saba News Agency said that a senior official in the Presidential Leadership Council described the protests as “acts of incitement” and “armed mobilization,” and said that government forces had “exercised maximum restraint” in responding. Aden’s security committee stated that the protesters’ actions “compelled security authorities to perform their duty in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, ensuring the protection of sovereign institutions and the preservation of security and stability.”
Security forces also arrested many protesters. An activist based in Aden provided a list of 28 detained protesters to Human Rights Watch; 17 of them were transferred to al-Mansora Prison.
The father of one of the detainees told Human Rights Watch that authorities had not allowed his 19-year-old son to call his family to tell them when he was detained: “My son didn’t get back home [the night of the protest], and we thought he went to stay over at one of his relatives’ homes. The next day when he wasn’t back and we saw the pictures of the protest and people said that there are detainees, so we started looking for him, and that was when we learned he was detained in Ma’ashiq Palace.”
The father said that as of March 2, his son had yet to be released despite several promises by authorities. “The security forces in Ma’ashiq kept telling us that they would release [the detained protesters] tomorrow or the day after, but they didn’t and transferred them to the central prison in al-Mansora on February 26.” He was released on March 8.
The brother of another detainee said his brother had also not been released after two weeks, that authorities had not allowed his brother to call his family, and that they were only able to visit him once, after he was transferred from Ma’ashiq to Al Mansoura Prison after being held for nine days in the palace. His brother was also released on March 8.
Both were not aware that any charges had been brought against their relatives.
The security forces in Aden said in a February 20 statement that “Armed elements … attempted to infiltrate to carry out acts of sabotage. Despite the security forces’ utmost restraint, these elements’ insistence on crossing red lines by targeting security forces and attempting to storm the outer gate of the Ma’ashiq Palace constituted a premeditated and organized attack.”
Human Rights Watch was unable to verify the security forces’ claims that protesters were targeting security forces, though videos showed protesters trying to storm the barrier two kilometers from the palace.
On March 8, Rashad al-Alimi, head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, ordered the immediate release of the detained protesters according to al-Mashhad news website. On March 9, Human Rights Watch confirmed that the detainees had been released by a presidential directive.
Hadramout, February 6On February 6, protestors supporting the STC marched in Seiyun and some later held a sit-in at the local airport. Government-aligned National Shield Forces fired on protestors at the airport and arrested an estimated 35 people either at the protest or the next day.
Researchers interviewed five people, including Amgad Sabeeh, the head of the STC’s department of media and culture in Hadramout, and four people who were arrested at the protests.
Sabeeh and one of those arrested said that protesters marched peacefully through the city. The protester said that some demonstrators climbed the walls of a literacy center and the government palace and tore down the Yemeni national flag and the picture of Saudi Arabia’s king at both sites.
He said that after protesters read a concluding statement, some continued on to Seiyun airport, sitting in front of the gate, demanding that the Yemeni flag be removed. He said that after about 45 minutes, “an unknown force intervened and opened fire directly from the direction of the palm farms [east of the airport], toward the protesters [and the airport security forces].”
In response, he said, the National Shield Forces began to “fire hysterically” at both the unknown force and the protesters, though nobody was killed. The National Shield Forces also arrested some protesters.
He said that since the person in the palm farms was firing toward the protesters, he took cover behind a car. At that point, he said a soldier from the National Shield Forces, which he recognized by his uniform, found him, fired in the air “to intimidate [him],” and subsequently arrested him. He said that while he was detained, an investigator told him there was a third party who fired at the security forces, so they had to respond.
Three others said government forces arrested them either during the airport protest or as they were trying to leave. Two said that they and other protesters were accused of “assaulting the airport,” though they said that the protest was peaceful and there was no intention of storming the airport.
One said that when his brother came to the airport to seek his brother’s release, the brother was also arrested. He was released the next day.
All four people interviewed said that during the investigation, they were accused of assaulting the airport, which they denied. Authorities held them at the airport, an unofficial detention site, for several days, without bringing charges against them. When they were released, authorities conditioned their release on signing a pledge stating that they wouldn’t participate in “unlicensed” protests anymore.
Two of the detainees said about 50 protestors were held at the airport with them and one said they were forced to sleep on the floor. One said they spent a night “without water and were forbidden from using the restroom until the following morning.”
Sabeeh said forces went to his house to arrest him and when they couldn’t find him, they waited outside for several hours before leaving. He told Human Rights Watch he had fled to a safe area. He said that security forces accused him and several other STC leaders with, “inciting people to protest.”
He said that those who tore down the pictures and the Yemeni flags “didn’t belong to the STC,” and were “infiltrators.” Human Rights Watch was unable to verify this statement. However, the STC’s Hadramout leadership had made a statement on February 4 calling on supporters to march on February 6, in with “steadfastness and resilience.”
Shabwa, February 11STC supporters led a march through Ataq the day after Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the head of the STC, called on supporters on X “to press on with your struggles across the various arenas and fronts of the revolution.” Government forces fired on the protesters, killing at least 5 people and injuring 39, according to the statement from Rami Lamas, the deputy head of the Shabwah General Hospital Authority, to Al Jazeera.
Human Rights Watch spoke to five people who attended the protest: a journalist; an STC leader; Nasser al-Khalife, the head of the Yemeni civil society organization Dameer Association for Rights and Freedoms; and two other human rights activists.
The night before the protest, the protest site was destroyed along with microphones, speakers, and southern Yemini flags that had been set up there. The STC leader said that people standing near the platform said that armored military vehicles and troops belonging to the Shabwa Defense Forces and Special Forces under the authority of the governor of Shabwa—who had recently shifted his allegiance away from the STC—had approached the platform. The STC leader said that those he spoke with saw these forces destroy the platform and confiscate southern flags. The journalist corroborated this account.
Both the STC leader and the journalist said that around 9:00 a.m. on February 11, protesters assembled at Mohammed Bin Zayed hospital, to march to the nearby square. They said that government-aligned special forces and security personnel tried to prevent them from reaching the square and started firing at protesters. Human Rights Watch could not verify this information.
The journalist and STC leader said that at around 9:30 a.m., Laswad, the head of the STC in Shabwa, arrived and led the march to the protest square though security forces continued firing toward protesters. Eventually, the forces withdrew, and the protest continued peacefully.
Afterward, some protesters marched on toward the city center, which includes Shabwa’s main government building—a typical location for protests—people interviewed said. They said that as protesters approached the government building, different government-aligned forces began firing upon protesters from multiple directions.
An STC leader who was documenting the protest said:
I was photographing what was happening and another person next to me was photographing as well and he was shot and [I] later learned that he was injured. When that happened, I returned to my car and continued photographing from my car. While I was doing so, an armored vehicle moved next to me and fired at me, injuring me.
Al-Khalife told researchers that there were “masked gunmen carrying assault rifles in the middle of the protesters who were shooting towards the military forces.” He said that one also threw a sound bomb at the gate of the government building. Two people interviewed confirmed al-Khalife’s account and added that the armed men were soldiers with the STC-aligned Second Shabwa Defense Forces Brigade. Human Rights Watch was unable to verify these claims. Abdul Galil Shaif, a the STC’s representative in Geneva, told Human Rights Watch the armed men were not officially affiliated with the STC.
Human Rights Watch reviewed footage from a recording of a Facebook livestream, which a journalist started at 9:10 a.m. on February 11. The livestream shows hundreds of peaceful protesters waving flags and chanting as they walk down Ataq’s main street. Forty-three minutes into the livestream, several unmasked people, all wearing either camouflage pants or jackets, come into view among the protestors armed with Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles, including a group of men in a pick-up truck.
Shortly afterward, gunfire is heard, and the protesters run down the street. It is unclear who is shooting. A few minutes later the protesters reach the governorate building and are met with armored vehicles, and more gunfire is heard, including from automatic rifles and heavy machine guns.
In a statement published on February 11, the government-aligned Security Committee in Shabwa stated that “infiltrating elements armed with various types of weapons” had “launched a blatant assault against members of the security and military units and their vehicles, targeting them with live ammunition while attempting to storm the Shabwah Governorate building,” and that “This resulted in a number of casualties and injuries.” They did not say who caused the casualties and injuries, or whether any of their own forces had been injured or killed.
On March 6, Human Rights Watch learned that the Yemeni government’s Interior Ministry had issued an arrest warrant for Laswad, accusing him of inciting people to attack civilian institutions.
Human Rights Watch verified a video posted to social media showing STC supporters in front of the government building, with at least one projectile being fired from the grounds of the government building toward the protestors.
Human Rights Watch also reviewed two photographs and a video of two injured protesters, reportedly injured in the clashes. Both appeared to be children. Both had images of STC leaders attached to their shirts, and one had an STC flag wrapped around his head.
UN Committee Should Promote, Not Oppose, Civil Society
The United Nations will hold elections in April for the 19 members of the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, which controls UN accreditation for nongovernmental groups. The election to the UN’s gatekeeper for civil society comes at a difficult time for human rights and civil society groups around the world, with governments defunding these groups, blocking foreign grants, and suppressing and often criminalizing their work.
The candidates for this year’s largely uncompetitive election are mostly countries whose governments are hostile to civil society.
Only the Central and Eastern Europe Group has any competition so far. Belarus, which has effectively outlawed civil society and prosecutes human rights defenders, is vying with Estonia and Ukraine for two spots and should be rejected.
Abusive governments that restrict civil society at home have long held a majority on the panel, turning into a de facto anti-NGO committee. Instead of vetting applications responsibly so that organizations can interact with UN bodies and officials, the committee has largely blocked their applications, particularly of human rights groups.
All four candidates for the Asia-Pacific Group have a track record of abusive practices with civil society. Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates, and India silence activist and human rights groups, including arbitrarily arresting their members under counterterrorism laws. China has not only prevented human rights groups from functioning inside the country, but has for years retaliated against Chinese activists seeking to participate in UN forums.
In the Western group, Israel, Türkiye, and the United States under the Trump administration have demonstrated open hostility to civil society groups. The United Kingdom has said it is “committed to championing civil society participation” though it has adopted multiple laws restricting protest, criminalized those supporting Palestinian rights and action on climate change, and used counterterrorism laws to ban a pro-Palestine direct action group.
Running for the Latin America and Caribbean seat are Cuba, which suppresses criticism and detains critics, Nicaragua, which has closed down thousands of groups, and Peru, which recently approved a law suppressing civil society. The African Group has yet to declare any candidates.
The UK has called for reforming the NGO committee. Meaningful reform should start with its membership so that governments that support civil society engagement outnumber governments hostile to them. Doing so will require better candidates and competitive elections to keep out countries like Belarus and others unfit for membership.
Bangladesh: New Government Should Prioritize Human Rights
(London) – Bangladesh’s recently elected prime minister, Tarique Rahman, and his Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government face many urgent challenges but can use this opportunity to bring lasting protections of human rights, nine rights groups wrote in a letter to Rahman published today.
Prime Minister Rahman came to office following a landslide election victory in February 2026. The election was conducted by an interim government that had replaced the increasingly abusive 15-year rule of the former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, who was toppled by mass protests in 2024. While the widespread rights violations including enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings under Hasina’s rule ended, the interim government continued to arbitrarily detain political opponents, and was unable to end mob violence against journalists, religious minorities, and cultural centers.
“Tarique Rahman has been given a wide mandate to bring change, including by many Bangladeshis who risked their lives to overthrow an autocratic government,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Success will require meaningful reform to ensure that independent institutions are capable of delivering accountability and upholding the rule of law, and real commitment to upholding rights such as freedom of religion and expression.”
Among the priorities highlighted in the letter are ending arbitrary detention, holding those responsible for past violations accountable, abolishing the abusive Rapid Action Battalion, and protecting ethnic and religious minorities. The groups also said that the government should protect the rights of over a million Rohingya refugees currently in Bangladesh and establish a strong and independent National Human Rights Commission. The groups made specific recommendations in their letter for policy measures and legislative steps.
During the election campaign, the BNP made numerous commitments to safeguard rights, including economic rights, by increasing the resources available for health, education, environmental protections, and social security.
Ecuador: Government Defies Court-Ordered Oil Ban
(Quito) – Ecuador is failing to comply with key provisions of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling to protect the Tagaeri and Taromenane Indigenous peoples, Human Rights Watch said today. The groups live in voluntary isolation near oil facilities inside Yasuní National Park.
On March 14, 2025, the court ordered Ecuador to take measures to protect the Indigenous groups, including by immediately stopping oil operations in an area of Yasuní National Park called Block 43. Ecuador’s government was already obliged to stop oil production in Block 43 based on a 2023 national referendum. Despite a court-ordered deadline of March 2026 to improve protective measures and monitoring, the government has produced few results.
“Ecuador continues to allow extraction from Block 43, putting oil production above the rights of Indigenous communities,” said José Rodríguez Orúe, Kenneth Roth practitioner-in-residence at Human Rights Watch. “Ecuador should take immediate steps to suspend oil extraction in Block 43 and fully comply with the court’s ruling to respect the rights of Indigenous peoples in the national park.”
Despite the court order, during 2025 the government allowed oil production from Block 43 to continue and has not provided information on nearby environmental conditions. The government has also failed to meet a September 2025 deadline to establish a court-ordered technical commission to monitor the movements of people living in the area to determine whether a protected zone inside Yasuní National Park should be expanded to protect Tagaeri and Taromenane territory.
In November and December 2025, Human Rights Watch interviewed 13 leaders and community members of the Waorani Indigenous people and a leader from a Kichwa community situated within Block 43. Human Rights Watch also interviewed eight representatives of civil society organizations, journalists, academics, and economists. Researchers reviewed a range of external sources, including academic studies, news reports, legal documents, satellite imagery, oil industry publications, and publications by the Waorani Nationality of Ecuador (NAWE). The semi-nomadic Tagaeri and Taromenane live in the Ecuadorian Amazon, including a section of Yasuní National Park. In 1999, Ecuador established the “Tagaeri Taromenane Intangible Zone,” a core area of the national park where all extractive activity is forbidden. A ten-kilometer buffer zone separates oil facilities and the no-go zone.
Oil operations continued in other park areas, including an adjacent area to the north, oil Block 43. A 2024 government report that explained the challenges of complying with the referendum noted “signs of presence” of the Tagaeri and Taromenane peoples to the south of Block 43 and acknowledged that oil operations “posed a threat” to their survival.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that oil extraction in Block 43—which overlaps with ancestral Indigenous territory—generated environmental pollution and increased the risks of forced contact with the Tagaeri and Taromenane, potentially exposing them to diseases, displacement, food shortage, and conflicts over resources. The court also noted the result of the national referendum on August 20, 2023, ordering the facility’s closure within one year.
It ordered the government to take “all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that this [referendum] is effectively implemented and that oil exploitation in Block 43 is prohibited.” Environmental defenders filed a compliance case against the government in November 2025 for failing to close Block 43.
Data from the state oil company, Petroecuador, showed that, except for a period in July 2025 when national oil production dropped due to damaged pipelines following a landslide, Block 43’s crude output remained constant throughout 2025, with an average of 1.2 million barrels of oil extracted each month.
The authorities have failed to provide public access to information about the required environmental monitoring since April 2024. Under Ecuadorian law, the Ministry of Environment, Water and Ecological Transition must submit these reports to the National Assembly every six months. An August 2025 ministerial letter on file with Human Rights Watch confirmed the submission of the October 2023-April 2024 monitoring report, yet the ministry has not disclosed the two subsequent reports that were legally due by that date.
The Tagaeri and Taromenane are part of the broader Waorani Indigenous people. Oil extraction near their territory increases the risk of unwanted encounters with outsiders and may expose them to pollution, severe health risks, and conditions that could make return to isolation virtually impossible.
The interviews with Waorani community members—who share the same language and culture and live in nearby areas affected by the oil operations—provide insights into how the Tagaeri and Taromenane might experience the impacts of oil operations in Block 43.
The Waorani community members said they believed that oil activity in and around Block 43 negatively affected the water quality of rivers—the primary source of drinking water—as well as the health and well-being of their communities. “Our rivers are being polluted, the animals are dying, rashes cover our skin after we bathe, we have no drinking water,” said Isabel Baihua, leader of the Waorani Women’s Association of Orellana.
The American Convention on Human Rights and the Escazú Agreement, to which Ecuador is a party, require the government to ensure people can access information needed to protect the rights to health and to a healthy environment. But Waorani community members said the authorities do not provide the information they need to make informed decisions to protect their health from the environmental impacts of oil extraction in Block 43.
The government has also not established the commission the court ordered to monitor the movements of the Indigenous groups to recommend expanding the no-go zone’s boundaries.
Ecuador’s ability to protect the Tagaeri and Taromenane Indigenous peoples has been further weakened by changes that have undermined key ministries. President Daniel Noboa downgraded the previous Ministry of Environment, Water and Ecological Transition into a vice-ministry within a new Ministry of Environment and Energy. The Ministry of Women and Human Rights was also downgraded to a vice-ministry under the Government Ministry. In its judgment, the court had flagged concerns that institutional changes and budget cuts had led to the state’s failure to prevent incursions of loggers and other third parties into Tagaeri and Taromenane territory.
The government of Ecuador should work with the Waorani people and communities affected by oil extraction in Block 43 to ensure its suspension and progressive closure.
“The Ecuadorian government’s refusal to close Block 43 undermines the democratically expressed will of its people, and its refusal to comply with the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s orders erodes its commitments to the regional human rights system,” Rodríguez Orúe said. “The government needs to respect the rule of law, and ultimately, the will of the Ecuadorian people.”
Oil-Related Threats to Indigenous Peoples in Yasuní National Park
Click to expand Image Map of the Block 43 Infrastructure in Yasuni National Park, Ecuador. Graphics © 2026 Human Rights Watch. Data sources: Oil Concessions: Ecuador Ministry of Non-Renewable Natural Resources. Global Forest Watch. Protected areas: Ministry of Environment, Water and Ecological Transition (MAATE). EcoCiencia. Oil extraction infrastructure: PetroEcuador, 2024.Yasuní National Park is one of the most culturally diverse and biodiverse areas on Earth. The national park was established by law in 1979 and was designated a UNESCO biosphere reserve in 1989. It overlaps with the ancestral territories of the Kichwa and Waorani Indigenous peoples. The Waorani were the last Indigenous group in Ecuador to be contacted by the outside world, in the 1950s. After contact, the Waorani fragmented into several clans and communities, with the Tagaeri and Taromenane deciding to remain in isolation.
Dr. Patricio Trujillo, an Ecuadorian anthropologist who researches the Tagaeri and Taromenane, said that these groups follow semi-nomadic cyclical mobility patterns on ancestral hunting trails and rivers.
In 2013, Ecuador’s National Assembly declared oil exploitation in Blocks 31 and 43 inside Yasuní National Park to be “of national interest,” overriding prohibitions on extraction in national parks. Block 43—with the highest oil production in Yasuní—contains 247 wells across three fields. Ishpingo, the field furthest south, is the newest and most productive field, and the one closest to the Indigenous groups’ buffer zone.
In 1999, Ecuador established the Tagaeri Taromenane Intangible Zone, a core area of the park with the greatest environmental protection, to protect the “lands of habitation and development” of the groups. While all extractive activity, including oil operations, is banned in the zone, a 2024 government report identified the area south of Block 43 as suitable for hunting and seasonal mobility of the Tagaeri and Taromenane, acknowledging that “competition for subsistence resources in these areas may lead to situations of ... forced contact with Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation.” Maps produced by the citizen-led Critical Geography Collective that were used by the Inter-American Court, show that the impacts of oil extraction in the Ishpingo field already extend to the buffer zone.
Waorani community members interviewed by Human Rights Watch affirmed that the Tagaeri and Taromenane still appear to use territory near Block 43 infrastructure. They said they hear war cries as they cross ancestral hunting paths and find pottery and animal carcasses left behind by their relatives living in isolation.
According to official spills reports disclosed by Petroecuador, 29 spills occurred in Block 43 between 2016 and 2024, the most recent period for which data is available. However, in the company’s 2024 statement on the feasibility of closing the oil block, it said that “no spills have been recorded,” classifying the 29 incidents as “operational events” that, it said, “had no environmental impact” and were properly contained.
By contrast, in an official document on file with Human Rights Watch, the Ministry of Environment, Water and Ecological Transition said that the last publicly reported incident in Block 43, a June 2024 diesel spill, reached the Salado River that flows through the Tambococha field, affecting a Kichwa community dependent on fishing.
Block 43 Spills 2016 - 2024(crude, hydraulic oil, diesel, and chemicals) Show Spill Clusters Map of spills inside Block 43, Yasuni National Park, Ecuador.
Note: This map omits a March 31, 2023, chemical leak at the Ishpingo field caused by a tank plug failure; irregular coordinates in the official record prevented its precise mapping.
Graphics © 2026 Human Rights Watch. Data source: EP Petroecuador; Official spill registry submitted to the Citizen Oversight Committee in 2024 and 2025.
Human Rights Watch has documented that, around the world, communities most exposed to the extraction, manufacturing, use of, and disposal of fossil fuel products often face ongoing rights violations or other harmful human rights impacts tied to toxic air, unsafe water, and polluted ecosystems.
Many Waorani communities live close to Yasuní oil facilities, and people interviewed said they believe they are exposed to harmful water pollution. They said that children and older people have become ill after bathing or drinking river water and that fish deaths have reduced the availability of staple food.
“When the oil spills, animals, fish, trees, and people die,” one said. A Waorani elder leader born in what is now Block 43 said that two older people from her community had fallen ill after bathing in the rivers: “their whole body was red, blisters covered their skin … now we avoid the big river and seek nearby streams. Before oil extraction began in Block 43, my family and I were free to bathe and fish in the river. Now we can’t bathe in it; the fish are not healthy; they’re covered in oil.”
Ministry of the environment monitoring reports to the National Assembly from 2016 to 2024 repeatedly show “very polluted” and “moderately polluted water” in Block 43 under the Biological Monitoring Working Party Index, which assesses river water quality but doesn’t determine whether pollutants related to oil production are causing that pollution.
In its last publicly disclosed monitoring report issued in April 2024, the ministry noted that Petroecuador had not presented its biotic monitoring data since 2022, as required under Ecuadorian law, and that it failed to “submit biotic monitoring data for the exploitation phase of Block 43 from October 2023 to April 2024 for review and comment.” The ministry started an administrative proceeding against the company in May 2024.
Spills in Block 43 are part of a broader pattern of chronic oil pollution in Ecuador. Between 2020 and 2022, the ministry recorded an average of 22.5 oil spills each month. In the Amazon, the impacts have historically fallen heavily on Indigenous peoples and communities that depend on rivers for water, bathing, and fishing. Oil contamination in Ecuador’s Amazon has long been associated with skin irritation and dermatitis and newer research continues to document the wider pollution of rivers and fish, on which Amazonian communities depend.
Waorani community members also described poor air quality, which they attributed to gas flaring from nearby oil operations in Block 43. A Waorani leader from the Nampaweno community inside Yasuní said, “When it rains, pollutants fall to the ground harming our cassava and plantain crops. Communities that have no flaring have healthy crops.”
Scientific literature shows that gas flaring can produce acid rain that damages staple crops such as cassava, with effects strongest in closest proximity to flare sites. Throughout 2025, satellite imagery analysis and remote sensing carried out by Human Rights Watch detected intermittent flaring from the Central de Procesos Tiputini, an oil and gas processing facility to the north of Block 43.
Waorani community members also reported that sound and light pollution from oil operations in Block 43 have driven animals away from traditional hunting areas, affecting their ability to hunt wild games, another staple food source.
“It’s like having a helicopter outside of your home every hour, every day,” said Sofía Torres Caiza, president of the Citizen Oversight Committee, which was intended to oversee compliance with Block 43’s closure between 2023 and 2025.
One Kichwa leader living in the area said: “Before Block 43 we lived without noise, now it’s 24 hours of nonstop noise. When the animals hear that noise, they start to move away. They used to stay within our territory, and we rely on hunting to feed our families, but now there isn’t as much wildlife anymore.”
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Ruling
In March 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights formally communicated to Ecuador a ruling it had finalized in September 2024. The court found that Ecuador violated the rights of the Tagaeri and Taromenane Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation by, among other things, authorizing oil operations that surround the area where oil extraction is forbidden without proper environmental and human rights risk assessments and failing to stop illegal loggers from operating inside the zone. This exposes the Indigenous groups to a serious risk of human rights violations associated with forced contact, pollution, and conflicts over limited resources, the court said.
The court held that, given the close relationship between territory, natural resources, and the survival of Indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation, Ecuador should have applied the precautionary principle when determining and implementing measures to protect their territory. Under that principle, a government may be required to implement mandatory preventive measures to head off the risk of irreversible harm, even where there is no scientific certainty about the environmental or health impacts at issue.
The court concluded that, with the expansion of extractive activities in Yasuní, oil fields surrounding the no-go zone and its buffer have impacts that encroach upon those areas. The court underscored that oil blocks adjacent to the no-go zone, including Block 43, pollute that area, and that roads enabling access to oil facilities have enabled illegal logging, fishing, and hunting to proliferate inside Indigenous territory, increasing risks of forced contact, disease transmission, and conflicts, jeopardizing the survival of the Indigenous groups.
The court underscored that while authorities knew local groups lived and moved near Block 43, the government failed to demonstrate how the risks posed by oil operations were “taken into account when analyzing the granting of permits and concessions.”
The court found that oil extraction in Block 43 violated several rights enshrined under the American Convention on Human Rights, including the rights to health, territory, a healthy environment, self-determination, and to live with dignity. It acknowledged that “there is a risk that an oil spill affects waterways and, therefore, ends up affecting the territory” of the Indigenous groups.
In 2023, Ecuadorians voted in a referendum to halt oil extraction in Block 43. Protecting Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation from the impacts of oil production was a core component of the underlying 10-year campaign that sought to keep oil in Block 43 “indefinitely underground.”
Ecuador’s Constitutional Court ordered that the government should implement the result at the latest by August 2024, progressively halt extraction, protect the Tagaeri and Taromenane, revoke permits, and restore the environment. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights considered that compliance with the referendum would help minimize the harmful impacts that oil extraction on the rights of the Indigenous groups and ordered Ecuador to adopt “all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that this [referendum] is effectively implemented and that oil exploitation in Block 43 is prohibited.” The government has not complied.
The court also ordered Ecuador to identify additional measures to fix serious gaps in producing reliable information about environmental conditions in the no-go zone, including potential contamination of water, air, and the broader ecosystem, and noise from nearby extractive activity. The court also ordered Ecuador to take steps to improve monitoring of the movements of peoples in isolation in areas surrounding the no-go zone.
Non-Compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Ruling
Ongoing Oil Production
In a letter to a National Assembly member dated August 1, 2025, on file with Human Rights Watch, the ministry of the environment acknowledged that there was no final plan for phasing out oil production in Block 43, despite the referendum and the court order. The ministry also acknowledged that environmental licenses had not been revoked, and withdrawal of infrastructure remained stalled. As of March 2026, Ecuador has shut down a handful of wells in Block 43.
Oil production in Block 43 remained stable throughout 2025, according to Petroecuador’s yearly production reports, with an average of 1,245,225 oil barrels extracted each month. Ecuador was still extracting over 44,000 barrels of oil per day from Block 43, based on Petroecuador data, 9.4 percent of the country’s total crude output in 2025.
Despite President Noboa’s initial promise to comply with the 2023 referendum, his government has continued extracting oil from Block 43, alleging that an immediate compliance would harm the country’s economy and therefore postponed the closure until 2029. However, experts, environmental human rights defenders, Indigenous leaders, and academics interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that Block 43’s closure presents a critical opportunity to start a transition away from fossil fuels, on which Ecuador depends for about 12 percent of its GDP.
In February 2026, Human Rights Watch wrote to Petroecuador requesting comments on our finding that oil operations in Block 43 continued after the Inter-American Court's Ruling. At the time of publication, Petroecuador had not replied.
Reduced Access to Information
The ministry of the environment is required to present environmental monitoring information to the National Assembly every six months by law, but currently there are no publicly available monitoring reports. Pedro Bermeo from the citizen collective Yasunídos said, “These reports are rarely uploaded online; we always struggle to find them.”
As a result, interested parties are forced to seek information through freedom of information requests—which are often denied or ignored—said Indigenous leaders, oversight bodies, civil society organizations, and legislators.
Waorani leaders and community members also reported that the authorities provide little information about the potential health impacts of oil activities in Block 43. They said that the government does not warn them about potential pollutants and health hazards in the rivers from which they draw water, including when an oil spill or other associated polluting incidents occur. When coupled with the skin irritation and blisters that some community members have experienced, and the dead fish observed in surrounding areas, this lack of information leaves community members to consider their water unsafe for drinking or bathing.
“Information about the environmental conditions in Block 43 is kept secret, the government has never given it to us, even though we’re the affected people – it puts our lives at risk,” said Nemo Andy Guiquita, a Waorani leader from the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador.
In September 2025, the Citizen Oversight Committee established by the Council for Citizen Participation and Social Control—the public entity charged with promoting public participation to monitor implementation of the 2023 referendum—reported repeated refusals by state institutions to provide information regarding environmental impacts of oil extraction in Block 43 and measures to protect the Tagaeri and Taromenane peoples.
In April 2024, in a response to a freedom of information request filed by the Citizen Oversight Committee, the ministry of the environment provided information on the environmental conditions inside Block 43 in a Google Drive folder with data up to October 2023. Human Rights Watch reviewed the folder and concluded that monitoring reports showed no cumulative risk assessments to determine the environmental impacts of continued oil extraction over the Tagaeri and Taromenane peoples. Much of the information from the ministry was from monitoring data by the state oil company.
Mariana Yumbay, a member of the National Assembly, filed a freedom of information request in 2025 asking the ministry of the environment to provide information on the closure of Block 43 and the environmental impacts of oil operations in the area. In its August 2025 reply, the ministry provided an additional environmental monitoring report for the October 2023-April 2024 period, but by that time authorities had been legally required to have produced two additional reports.
“[The ministry] takes far too long to provide us with incomplete information, and from what little they have given us, it is evident that the government is not complying with the orders to shut down Block 43,” Yumbay said.
Government Inaction on Protection Measures
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordered Ecuador to act with the utmost diligence within defined timelines to correct failures in monitoring and protection of the Tagaeri and Taromenane Indigenous peoples.
The court acknowledged that Ecuador had established a protective framework for the Tagaeri and Taromenane peoples but found the implementation of these measures insufficient to stop illegal logging, fishing, and hunting in their territory.
The court ordered Ecuador to create a Technical Evaluation Commission to map the presence of isolated peoples outside the no-go zone every two years and recommend expanding the protected zone if needed in light of those findings. The commission was to include Waorani and civil society representatives and operate under the supervision of the court. Ecuador had until September 2025 to establish it.
The Waorani Nationality of Ecuador and counsel for plaintiffs before the court confirmed that the government had not yet established the commission. “The government does not have the will to dialogue with the Waorani people … we don’t want to just participate, we deserve the right to speak and decide on how the closure and reparation of Block 43 happens,” said Juan Bay, president of NAWE.
The court found that Ecuador had failed to establish the required commission and criticized its existing protection measures as inadequate due to their lack of implementation. Human Rights Watch analyzed information presented by the Women and Human Rights Ministry to the Oversight Committee in June 2025 regarding the measures it was taking to ensure the protection of the Indigenous peoples. Although the ministry reported that it had carried out three patrols in the no-go zone to look for signs of Tagaeri and Taromenane presence and had also provided routine training to oil workers on how to avoid contact with Indigenous peoples living in isolation, it did not provide any information regarding third party incursions into the region or any measures it has taken to prevent such incursions.
The now downgraded Vice-Ministry of Women and Human Rights is responsible for conducting patrols to look for signs of Tagaeri and Taromenane presence and to monitor any threats to their rights, including by third-party incursions. However, the Citizen Oversight Committee noted in September 2025 that the entity lacked a protection plan or targets to carry out these functions.
In its final 2025 report concluding that the government had not complied with the 2023 referendum, the Citizen Oversight Committee emphasized that, “Although the ministry acknowledges the existence of protocols, patrols, and training, the reported actions are merely formal and do not constitute concrete measures for redress or effective protection … the absence of an operational and funding plan confirms the lack of actual implementation.” The committee noted that the ministry failed “to demonstrate cumulative risk assessments for ongoing operations in Block 43 (such as traffic, noise, gas flares, and construction), nor did it include safety measures to prevent exposure.”
Reimagining Albinism Rights Advocacy
It is a hot afternoon in a rural district in Malawi. People gather around a tent set up at the Local Trading Center, eager to witness a community outreach program that aims to combat rising violence against people with albinism.
The organizers passionately encourage greater understanding of albinism and the protection of the rights of people with albinism. They ask questions to ensure the listeners have comprehended what has been discussed. At the appointed time, the advocates depart, pleased with the community’s feedback during this short session. “This outreach has been a success,” they say.
While these sessions raise awareness, they often do not actively engage participants in challenging the underlying stigma. They’re mostly passive, so attendees may remember the information briefly, but there’s little follow-up or practical engagement to transform attitudes or behaviors in the long term. Tracking lasting change or impact is difficult.
As a disability rights advocate, I have seen how unsustainable this approach can be. Also, as a theater practitioner, I aim to combine what I learned in class with my advocacy work. In my efforts to help the community understand albinism, I have utilized an applied theater technique called forum theater.
I create short plays based on real-life injustices faced by people with albinism, illustrating how these barriers deprive both individuals and their communities of their full participation. I offer the audience a glimpse into our lived experiences and let them feel what we feel.
Applied theater approaches usually include follow-up or visits to address any emerging issues and reinforce learning. This makes applied theater more effective for sustaining behavioral or attitudinal change.
Forum theater also invites community members to literally step into the shoes of the characters during the play to suggest and enact their own solutions. This co-creation of ideas empowers the community to address injustices and actively support people with albinism.
Furthermore, this approach enables me to record the community’s proposed solutions and turn them into tangible commitments. These then serve as a foundation for tracking progress to ensure that the rights of people with albinism are actively protected through the very actions the community itself suggests.
I believe that, to be fully effective and sustainable, advocacy needs to move beyond just performance. It has to become a shared act of critical reflection, one that is sustainable and bears fruit long after the advocacy activities have ended.
Corruption-Linked Arrests in South Sudan Raise Questions
In a wave of arrests that began on February 24, South Sudanese authorities have detained at least six current and former officials linked to the country’s oil and financial sectors.
While authorities have yet to publicly clarify if charges have been brought, Minister for Information Ateny Wek Ateny told media that the arrests were not political and that a committee was investigating “financial malpractices.”
However, previous high-profile detentions give reason to scrutinize such claims.
Those detained in the recent wave of arrests include former Finance Ministers Dr. Bak Barnaba Chol and Dr. Marial Dongrin Ater; former Governor of the Bank of South Sudan Moses Makur Deng Manguak; former Director of Security at the Ministry of Petroleum Maj. Gen. Mannasseh Machar Bol; former Petroleum Undersecretary Deng Lual Wol and former Commissioner General of the South Sudan Revenue Authority Simon Akue. Authorities also detained businessman Bol [Abuk] Kuanyin Bol.
Six are being held at the National Security Services headquarters in Juba, which has a reputation as a place of detainee abuse, and one is under house arrest, a local source told Human Rights Watch.
The same source said that the arrests were carried out by National Security Service and the presidential guard, Tiger Division, however officials from the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and the Ministry of Interior are the ones leading a joint investigative committee. The roles in the investigation of the Office of the Auditor General and the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission, both constitutionally mandated to ensure oversight and accountability in public spending and both plagued by a lack of independence and chronic underfunding, are unclear.
All action taken in pursuit of the investigation, detentions—be it under house arrest or on remand in a detention center—asset freezes, or confiscations requires a clear legal basis, including where appropriate prior judicial authorization, and be subject to judicial review.
Government corruption in South Sudan is endemic and has direct human rights consequences. For example, diversion of oil revenues and public funds has undermined delivery of essential public services, including health care and education, as well as payment of civil servant salaries.
However, for anti-corruption efforts, though badly needed, to be credible, authorities need to address the systemic nature of the corruption that permeates most institutions in South Sudan, as well as ensuring transparency and respecting fundamental rights of all involved.
Governments Should Support Vanuatu’s UN Climate Resolution
The world’s highest court has spoken: tackling climate change is not a choice: it’s a legal obligation. Now it’s up to the United Nations General Assembly to speak up and urge its 193 member countries to take action.
Millions of people around the world have already lost their homes, livelihoods, and lives, due to climate change. It is vital states take action.
In July 2025, the International Court of Justice delivered a unanimous landmark Advisory Opinion on states’ obligations under international law to address climate change. The Court ruled that states are legally required to protect the climate system, prevent transboundary harm, and regulate activities driving greenhouse gas emissions. The court also made clear that failing to act on climate change can violate human rights, including the rights to life, health, food, water, housing, and culture.
Human Rights Watch has documented how fossil fuel production harms communities around the world, particularly those living near its infrastructure. The court’s opinion makes explicit that governments have existing legal duties to address those harms.
Vanuatu, alongside a cross-regional group of countries, has circulated a draft UN General Assembly resolution to motivate member countries to transform the court’s findings into action. In practice, this means urging states to adopt stronger national climate plans, phaseout fossil fuels, and better protect communities displaced by climate change. It also proposes mechanisms to document and track the losses communities are already suffering.
The General Assembly has a history of translating advisory opinions into resolutions that demand action by governments. The US, backed by oil-producing states in the Gulf amongst others, has urged Vanuatu to withdraw the resolution. But the Pacific island state, which is itself threatened by rising sea levels, has refused. Vanuatu and its partners have worked hard to accommodate a range of concerns by different countries, including from the European Union which has pushed back on a more expansive interpretation of the advisory opinion.
Human Rights Watch and its partners are urging governments to engage constructively in the ongoing consultations and vote in favor of the resolution. It’s imperative they resist efforts to water down its core elements, especially those protecting human rights, international law, and advancing international cooperation on climate change.
US/El Salvador: Deportees Forcibly Disappeared
(Washington) – El Salvador is forcibly disappearing and arbitrarily detaining Salvadorans deported from the United States, Human Rights Watch said today, one year after some of the men were sent to El Salvador.
The detained people are among more than 9,000 Salvadorans deported by the United States since the start of 2025. Some of them were deported on March 15, 2025, alongside the Venezuelans who were tortured and, in some cases, sexually abused in the Center for Terrorism Confinement (Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo, CECOT) mega prison.
“Whatever the criminal history of these Salvadoran men, they have a right to due process, to be taken before a judge, and their relatives are entitled to know where they are being held and why,” said Juanita Goebertus, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. “Deportation cannot mean enforced disappearance.”
Human Rights Watch interviewed 20 relatives and lawyers of 11 Salvadorans who were deported from the United States between mid-March and mid-October 2025 and then immediately detained in El Salvador. Like most detainees in El Salvador, these men have not been allowed to communicate with their relatives or lawyers.
None of the relatives or lawyers have had any indication from the authorities that the men have been brought before a judge since their arrival. Some have not been informed of where their loved ones are held, or why. In five cases, relatives learned about deportees’ whereabouts only though litigation at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
The Trump administration has alleged that several of the Salvadorans are members of the MS-13 gang. The United States disclosed that one of them is César Humberto López Larios (“El Greñas”), a known MS-13 gang leader. Neither US nor Salvadoran authorities have provided evidence or information to substantiate the claim that any of the others are gang members.
Human Rights Watch analysis of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) data indicates that, of the at least 9,000 Salvadorans deported to El Salvador since January 2025, only 10.5 percent had a conviction in the United States for a violent or potentially violent crime. Relatives of ten of those detained said that they had served sentences in the United States: some for possession of drugs and two for violent crimes, including one for homicide and one for sexual assault.
Some of the people interviewed said their relatives had fled domestic or criminal violence, including recruitment-related threats and extortion by gangs in El Salvador. Some had apparently been living in the United States for several years.
On March 15, 2025, US authorities deported 23 Salvadorans to El Salvador, including Kilmar Ábrego García, whom the Trump administration said was deported due to an “administrative error.” On June 6, he was returned to the United States, following an order by a federal judge. Ábrego’s lawyers told US courts that he was physically abused in Salvadoran prisons. On December 11, a U.S. District Court in Maryland ordered his release from ICE custody.
On April 14, 2025, the White House published the names of 12 more deported Salvadorans, without specifying when they were removed. On July 17, 404 Media published a leaked list of Venezuelan and Salvadoran nationals deported to El Salvador. However, neither the US nor the Salvadoran government has confirmed the list’s authenticity.
Most relatives interviewed said they tried to locate their relatives through ICE’s Online Detainee Locator System but found no results. They said US officials then told them that their relatives had been deported to El Salvador.
All of the relatives Human Rights Watch interviewed said they had asked Salvadoran authorities about their loved ones’ whereabouts. Authorities refused to provide information, claiming they “lacked a legal mandate” or that they had no record of them.
Relatives of five deportees submitted a request to the IACHR. In October and December 2025, El Salvador informed the commission that four of them were being held at the Santa Ana prison, and one other at CECOT. The commission said that El Salvador should disclose the detainees’ legal status, end their incommunicado detention, and take steps to protect them.
In two additional cases, relatives believe their loved ones are being held at CECOT. In one other case, family members believe their relative is detained at Santa Ana prison because they identified him in photos and videos posted by El Salvador President Nayib Bukele. In the remaining three cases documented by Human Rights Watch, relatives have no indication of their family members’ whereabouts.
Salvadoran courts have also refused to provide information. Relatives and lawyers of five of the deportees said they filed habeas corpus petitions before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, in May, August and October 2025. The court rejected one petition, claiming the facts presented were not sufficiently “precise.” It has not responded to the others.
Under international law, an enforced disappearance occurs when authorities deprive a person of their liberty and then refuse to disclose that person’s fate or whereabouts, placing them outside the protection of the law.
Salvadoran authorities have not clarified the legal basis for the deportees’ detention or whether they will be brought before a judge. In some cases, the Salvadoran government told the IACHR that it had asked the United States for information and that the men remain in the Salvadoran prison system “pending the decision of the sending State regarding their migratory and legal status.”
The sister of one of the deportees said that her 32-year-old brother migrated to the United States in 2022 because of police abuse. US authorities deported him on March 15, 2025. “I kept calling the migrant shelter in El Salvador, but they never gave me any information, so I filed a complaint with the Human Rights Ombudsperson’s Office,” she said. “An official told me that my brother was deported on March 15 [but] because of the state of emergency they would not provide any information.”
The mother of another deportee, who had lived in the United States for 11 years beginning at the age of 17, said that the last time she spoke with her son was on March 13, 2025, when he said he would shortly be deported to El Salvador. On March 15, when she tried to locate him using ICE’s online locator system, no results appeared.
“That same day I started looking for lawyers in El Salvador, but several told me they could not take those cases because they feared government reprisals,” she said. “I called several institutions, the Attorney General’s Office, the Ombudsperson’s Office, a migrant shelter, and government ministries in El Salvador, but they gave me no information. At the Ombudsperson’s Office, they told me that due to the state of emergency, they were not obligated to provide me with information. I feel abandoned.”
El Salvador’s state of emergency has been in place since March 2022, The government has used it to suspend, among others, the rights to be informed promptly of the grounds for arrest, to remain silent, to legal representation, and the requirement to present any detainee before a judge within 72 hours of arrest. Human Rights Watch has documented widespread human rights violations during the state of emergency.
“The desperation of families to find disappeared loved ones evokes the darkest days of dictatorships in Latin America,” Goebertus said. “The United States should stop casting people into the black hole of El Salvador’s prison system.”
European Parliament Urges Niger to Free Detained Ex-President
Over two-and-a-half years after Niger’s military coup, the country’s ousted president, Mohamed Bazoum, and his wife remain detained without legal basis.
On March 11, the European Parliament unanimously adopted an urgent resolution condemning their arbitrary detention, as well as that of “other individuals detained in the coup,” and calling for their immediate release.
Niger’s Foreign Affairs Ministry reacted sharply, summoning the European Union’s representative in the capital, Niamey, and accusing the EU of interfering in Niger’s internal affairs.
International bodies have previously denounced Bazoum’s detention as illegal and called for his release. In February 2025, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, an independent expert body that investigates cases of deprivation of liberty, found that detaining Bazoum and his wife was arbitrary in violation of international human rights law and called for their immediate release. In December 2023, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice ruled that Bazoum and members of his family were being held unlawfully and ordered their release.
Instead, Niger’s junta moved to prosecute Bazoum. In April 2024, military authorities initiated proceedings to strip him of his presidential immunity so he could face charges related to alleged crimes during his time in office. In June 2024, a court lifted his immunity during proceedings that fell short of basic due process rights. The authorities have since said they intend to prosecute him for high treason.
Bazoum’s case reflects a broader crackdown on the political opposition, media, and activist groups engaging in peaceful dissent. The military authorities have tightened their control over political life by restricting opposition activity, delaying a return to civilian democratic rule, and targeting critics in the media and civil society.
At least 30 officials from the former government have been detained without due process. A prominent human rights activist and critic of the junta, Moussa Tiangari, arbitrarily arrested in December 2024, remains in detention on fabricated terrorism-related charges. Six journalists, arrested in October 2025, also remain detained under a draconian cybercrime law.
Rather than dismissing international criticism, Niger’s military authorities should heed the growing calls from regional and global bodies and immediately release Bazoum, his wife, and others detained on politically motivated grounds.
New OSCE Report Finds Sharp Democratic Backsliding in Georgia
A new report prepared under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) documents a significant deterioration in human rights and democratic standards in Georgia and calls for urgent reforms to protect fundamental freedoms.
Published on March 12, the report was prepared by an OSCE fact-finding mission after 23 participating states invoked the rarely used “Moscow Mechanism” to investigate concerns about democratic backsliding and repression of dissent in the country.
The report details a pattern of violence and other abuses against protesters, journalists, political opposition figures, and government critics, combined with what it describes as “near-total impunity for perpetrators.” The findings echo concerns Human Rights Watch and other groups have previously raised about Georgia's growing human rights crisis.
Among the most serious concerns are violations of the right to peaceful assembly. The report documents excessive and disproportionate use of force by police, noting that in some instances the treatment of protesters may amount to torture or other forms of prohibited treatment. It also finds that authorities have failed to conduct effective investigations into these abuses.
The report also examines legislative changes since 2024 that significantly restrict fundamental freedoms, concluding that these laws are aimed at marginalizing independent groups and media outlets. Additional changes affecting broadcasting regulation, protest rules, and so-called family values legislation further narrow civic space and public participation.
The report raises concerns about the misuse of criminal and administrative proceedings against political opponents and other critics. It highlights cases in which individuals appear to be serving prison sentences following unfair convictions and highlights broader concerns regarding judicial independence and fair trial guarantees, including misuse of administrative detention and over-reliance on police testimonies to imprison protest participants.
The report also analyses the 2024 parliamentary elections, noting concerns raised by observers about pressure on voters, misuse of administrative resources, and an uneven playing field. It warns that attempts to ban opposition parties threaten political pluralism.
The report recommends Georgian authorities repeal restrictive legislation, release individuals detained on political grounds, ensure accountability for abuses by security forces, and implement reforms to safeguard judicial independence and electoral integrity.
Georgian authorities should urgently heed the report’s recommendations. OSCE participating states should ensure the report’s findings inform the work of other international bodies, including the United Nations and the Council of Europe. They should closely monitor the situation and support efforts to protect human rights and the country’s democratic institutions.
Landmark Court Ruling in Ukraine a Step Toward Equality
A ruling this week by Ukraine’s Supreme Court recognizing a same-sex couple as a de facto family marks a significant victory for equality.
The case involves Zorian Kis, a Ukrainian diplomat, and his partner Tymur Levchuk. After years of legal struggle, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision recognizing that the couple constitutes a family under Ukrainian law.
While the ruling sets an important precedent for lower courts, legislation that would allow same-sex partners to register a civil union has remained stalled in parliament for three years.
Without formal legal recognition, same-sex couples in Ukraine are not considered immediate family members, blocking access to spousal hospital visits, medical decisions, inheritance, and other rights.
Public opinion in Ukraine on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights has shifted in recent years, particularly since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. The service of LGBT soldiers in Ukraine’s armed forces has reshaped public debate. A 2024 survey found that over 70 percent of Ukrainians support equal rights, a figure that remains high today.
In June 2023, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Ukraine violated prohibitions against discrimination and the right to respect for private and family life by failing to provide legal recognition for same-sex couples. The court rejected the government’s claim that protecting “traditional families” justifies excluding same-sex couples and highlighted that Ukraine offers two forms of legal recognition for different-sex couples.
A new draft civil code defines “de facto family unions” as different-sex partnerships, explicitly excluding same-sex families. If adopted, Ukraine could run afoul of obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and complicate its path toward European Union membership, which requires compliance with nondiscrimination standards.
The Supreme Court has made a clear determination: same-sex couples are families and the law must respect their rights. It is beyond time for the law on the books to catch up.
For LGBT Ukrainians, including many serving on the front lines and their loved ones, the continued legislative delay leaves them in a legal vacuum.
Ukraine is fighting for a future based on human rights and rule of law, but its democratic credentials are damaged if it continues to treat some citizens as second class. Parliament should adopt the civil partnerships bill without further delay.
Doing so is not just a matter of law, but of dignity.
In the Shadow of War, Settler Violence against Palestinians Intensifies
While many Israelis are taking shelter from missile and drone attacks, armed settlers in the West Bank are taking advantage of the fog of war to seize land and advance Israel’s ongoing dispossession and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.
On a daily basis, settlers are invading Palestinian communities, firing live ammunition, setting homes and cars on fire, and attacking families in their homes. Over the past 11 days, armed settlers—three in uniform—have reportedly shot and killed five Palestinians in the West Bank; a sixth reportedly died from cardiac arrest after inhaling tear gas fired by the Israeli army. These events put 2026 on track to surpass 2025, a year that saw Israeli settler violence reaching a two-decade high with armed settlers killing nine Palestinians.
The Israeli military said the recent incidents were under investigation.
At the end of 2025, Israeli NGO Yesh Din said that of the hundreds of settler violence cases it documented since October 2023, only three percent resulted in convictions. By providing settlers with weapons and failing to hold them accountable for criminal acts, the Israeli government abets and enables settler violence.
The Israeli government also emboldens settlers by approving and funding the growth of illegal settlements. Last August, Israel formalized plans to develop the illegal E1 settlement project, long declared a “red line” by the international community, and published a tender for 3,401 housing units last December. If completed, the project will fully separate the southern part of the West Bank from its northern part. Construction tenders will be awarded to bidders on March 16.
The International Court of Justice in July 2024 ruled that Israel’s 59-year occupation of Palestinian territory is unlawful and that Israeli authorities are responsible for apartheid. The court ordered Israel to evacuate all settlers in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, allow displaced Palestinians to return to their homes and provide compensation for Palestinians. But in the shadow of war, the opposite is underway.
States should act to prevent further atrocities across the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including by imposing targeted sanctions on those implicated in ongoing grave abuses, suspending arms transfers to Israel, banning trade with illegal settlements, suspending preferential trade agreements with Israel, and supporting the International Criminal Court and its ongoing investigations, including by executing its arrest warrants. Failing to act now will have grave consequences for Palestinians’ future.
Formula One: Put Human Rights in the Driver’s Seat
(Paris) – Formula One (F1) and its governing federation, the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), should address the risk of governments using upcoming 2026 Grand Prix events to whitewash human rights abuses, Human Rights Watch said today. The Formula 1 Grand Prix season in 2026 includes races in 24 countries, including in Bahrain, China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.
Human Rights Watch and other groups have documented serious human rights violations in countries where authorities might use the scheduled 2026 Grand Prix races to launder their rights record on the world stage, known as “sportswashing.” Without strong policies, the FIA and F1 risk falling short of their stated mission to “leave a legacy of positive change wherever [they] race” and tarnishing motor sport’s integrity by providing a platform for abusive authorities to conceal their abuses.
“Abusive governments around the world relish the Grand Prix because it offers them a dazzling distraction from their human rights records,” said Minky Worden, director of global initiatives at Human Rights Watch. “Formula One and its governing federation should roll out comprehensive due diligence to identify and remedy any adverse human rights impacts of their activities and use their influence with governments to urge rights reforms.”
On February 24, 2026, Human Rights Watch wrote to the FIA and F1 asking whether any policies would be adopted to address human rights risks arising from their activities, but received no response.
In China, where the second 2026 Grand Prix will be held, the authorities systematically deny the rights to freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and religion; persecute critics of the government; and have, since 2016, committed various crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang region. The Chinese authorities have long sought to use international sporting competitions to distract from the government’s appalling rights record, while targeting athletes.
A Grand Prix event is scheduled for April in Bahrain, where detainees face brutal treatment, including torture and denial of medical care. Although the government recently pardoned scores of inmates, the authorities still wrongfully imprison prominent human rights defenders and political leaders, some of whom have urgent unaddressed medical needs. Human Rights Watch previously documented the Bahraini authorities’ crackdown on protesters and critics of the race. Domestic and international organizations have also raised concerns about arrests before or during F1-related activities.
Later in April, a Grand Prix event is scheduled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government’s abysmal human rights record was compounded by the recent surge in executions in 2025, including at least 356 as of December. The authorities continued to arbitrarily detain and imprison many for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, association, and belief, while migrant workers continue to face widespread labor abuse.
Ongoing developments since the United States and Israel began carrying out strikes on Iran on February 28 and Iran’s retaliatory strikes in the Gulf region may affect the race agenda. However, this should not prevent FIA and F1 from carrying out needed human rights due diligence.
The sixth Grand Prix circuit event will be held in October and November in the US, where President Donald Trump’s second term has been characterized by a slide toward authoritarianism, including the repeated domestic deployment of national guard forces and retaliatory acts against perceived political enemies and former officials. The Trump administration has imposed broad anti-immigrant policies, arresting and summarily deporting primarily Black and Brown immigrants, while security forces committed abuses, at times deadly, in the context of raids and other law enforcement operations.
The Trump administration has sought to use the upcoming 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup, which the US is cohosting with Canada and Mexico, to burnish its international reputation, exemplified by Trump’s receipt of FIFA’s newly created “Peace Prize.”
Human Rights Watch has reported on abuses in other countries hosting a 2026 Grand Prix event, including Azerbaijan and Japan, as well as in countries reportedly bidding to host future races. All prospective host countries should be subject to human rights scrutiny, Human Rights Watch said.
Human Rights Watch underscored the risk of the FIA sportswashing abuses in Uzbekistan, which is reportedly bidding to host a Grand Prix. FIA held its 2025 General Assemblies in Tashkent, the capital. Upcoming FIA assemblies reportedly will be held in China.
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights set out how businesses should put in place policies and conduct due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for how they address their impacts on human rights. Since the UN Guiding Principles were adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, they have increasingly been adopted by sport governing bodies, including FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, in recognition of their applicability to effectively address human rights risks associated with their activities.
Formula One’s Statement of Commitment to Respect for Human Rights affirms that the organization is committed to “respecting internationally recognised human rights in its operations globally” and commits F1 to “take proportionate steps” to conduct human rights due diligence. The FIA statutes require the FIA to “promote the protection of human rights and human dignity” while its Code of Ethics affirms it “bears a special responsibility to safeguard the integrity and reputation of motor sport.”
The FIA and F1 should formally endorse the UN Guiding Principles and make public the steps they are taking to implement human rights due diligence measures to address the human rights impacts of their operations. This should include human rights strategies tailored for each Grand Prix based on meaningful consultations with a diverse range of stakeholders, including national and local human rights groups, trade unions, fan groups, and workers.
The FIA and F1 should also apply clear, objective human rights criteria to all countries vying to host a motor sport event, and establish a fair and transparent bidding procedure. They should also use their leverage with host governments to promote the protection of internationally recognized human rights.
“While many nations wish to host Grand Prix, F1 and the FIA carry a responsibility to safeguard against adverse human rights impacts arising from these events,” Worden said. “If F1 and the FIA are serious about their ambition to drive positive change wherever they race, they need to do much more to protect human rights.”
Iranian Footballers Gain Asylum in Australia
The Australian government’s decision to grant asylum to five members of the Iranian women’s national football team and one official shows the importance of protecting courageous athletes who stand up for what they believe.
The six Iranians sought protection in Australia after their final match of the Asian Women's Cup on March 8. In their opening match against South Korea on March 2, the players had, in protest, refrained from singing the national anthem of the Islamic Republic, prompting Iran’s state television to call the squad “wartime traitors.”
The women’s team’s silent protest echoed that of the Iranian men's team at the 2022 Qatar World Cup, following Iranian authorities’ repression of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising after the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini. Australia has in the past offered a safe haven to members of Afghanistan’s women’s national football team after the Taliban banned all sport for women and girls.
Since arriving in Australia, days before the conflict in Iran started on February 28 and the Iranian authorities’ ongoing internet shutdown, players on the team have reported being followed by Iranian security and handlers. Iranian athletes have previously told Human Rights Watch how government political “minders” travel with the national team to monitor them.
FIFPRO, the global players’ union, has said the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) should have foreseen the risk and have done too little to protect the players. By permitting political officials who restrict women’s rights to travel with delegations, the AFC and FIFA do not merely tolerate abuse, they provide it a platform beyond its country of origin.
The implications extend beyond Australia. The 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup, to be held in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, comes amid a rights crisis in the US that includes a widespread immigration crackdown, threats to freedom of expression, and a wider slide towards authoritarianism.
Before the World Cup begins in June, FIFA needs to put in place safeguarding protocols including a grievance mechanism, confidential referral pathways, and prohibitions on political minders in football federations who actually restrict the rights of the athletes they are accompanying. This will protect athletes who choose to exercise their right to protest human rights abuses.
Central African Militia Leader Dies in Custody
Earlier this week the Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic (CAR) announced that Maturin Kombo, who was in the court’s custody charged with crimes committed in 2014, died in hospital in Bangui.
Twelve years ago, as CAR was in the throes of a civil war, I arrived in the village of Guen, in the southwest of the country, to conduct research. While there, we confirmed that in early February 2014, anti-balaka forces had attacked Muslim civilians, killing at least 72 men and boys, some as young as nine.
I will never forget a conversation I had with the father of 10-year-old Oumarou Bouba. “As we were running away, he was shot,” he told me. “He fell down, but they finished him off with a machete.”
Anti-balaka militias rose up across CAR to fight the Seleka, a predominantly Muslim coalition that took control of the country in 2013. They began to target Muslim civilians, particularly in the west, equating them with Seleka or their sympathizers.
At the time, we met with Maturin Kombo an anti-balaka leader who was in charge in Guen. He denied the massacre occurred but was open about his disgust towards Muslims. He was a brazen and proud leader who thought he could evade justice.
Then the transitional government created the Special Criminal Court (SCC) to help curb widespread impunity. The court is mandated to investigate and prosecute grave crimes committed during the country’s armed conflicts since 2003 and is staffed by both international and national judges and prosecutors. It began its work in 2018 and Kombo was arrested in 2022.
The trial against him and six other co-defendants, including fellow anti-balaka leader Edmond Beïna, for the atrocities in Guen is ongoing.
The fact that Kombo will not see the end of the trial is a loss for survivors and relatives of victims of the massacres. But his death also highlights the continued need for justice, for the crimes committed in Guen and elsewhere in the country, and the key role the SCC plays in delivering it. The Central African government and the court’s international partners should step up efforts to ensure the court has the resources it needs to continue its essential work and can deliver on its crucial mandate.
Kombo may have died before the end of his trial, but the ongoing proceedings against his co-defendants provide hope that justice, no matter how long it takes, will be served.