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Human Rights Watch
Gaza: Latest Israeli Plan Inches Closer to Extermination
(Beirut) – The Israeli government’s plan to demolish what remains of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure and concentrate the Palestinian population into a tiny area would amount to an abhorrent escalation of its ongoing crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and acts of genocide, Human Rights Watch said today.
Israeli authorities, who have blocked the entry of aid, food, fuel, and medical supplies into Gaza for 75 days, have reportedly decided on a plan that would include “flatten[ing]” buildings and displacing Gaza’s entire population into a single “humanitarian area” if no “deal” with Hamas is reached by mid-May 2025. The dire humanitarian situation stemming from the unlawful blockade and plans to escalate forced displacement and widespread destruction demand a more robust response from other governments and institutions, especially the United States, France, Germany, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. Human Rights Watch called on all parties to the Genocide Convention to do more to prevent further atrocities, including ending weapons sales, military assistance, and diplomatic support to Israel, imposing targeted sanctions on Israeli officials, and reviewing and considering suspending bilateral agreements.
“Hearing Israeli officials flaunt plans to squeeze Gaza’s 2 million people into an even tinier area while making the rest of the land uninhabitable should be treated like a five-alarm fire in London, Brussels, Paris, and Washington,” said Federico Borello, interim executive director of Human Rights Watch. “Israel’s blockade has transcended military tactics to become a tool of extermination.”
The United Nations has warned that Gaza is facing its worst humanitarian crisis since the beginning of hostilities. The world’s foremost experts on food insecurity, the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC), said on May 12 that there is a “high risk” that famine will occur in Gaza in the coming weeks, with one in five people likely to face starvation. The World Health Organization said on May 11 that Gaza is experiencing “one of the world’s worst hunger crises, unfolding in real time,” citing a Gaza Ministry of Health report that at least 57 children have died from malnutrition in Gaza since the blockade began. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated in mid-April that Israel’s “policy is clear: no humanitarian aid will enter Gaza.” National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir said at the time: “As long as our hostages are dying in tunnels, there is absolutely no reason to allow even a gram of food or aid.”
According to the Israeli government, 58 Israeli hostages are still believed to be held in Gaza, of whom 23 are believed alive. Palestinian armed groups should immediately and safely release all civilians they detain, just as Israeli authorities should immediately and safely release all unlawfully held Palestinians.
In early May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s security cabinet approved a plan dubbed “Gideon’s Chariots,” which it says could start as soon as US President Donald Trump’s visit to the region concludes on May 16. The plan involves forcibly displacing much of the Palestinian population of Gaza while seizing and occupying the territory. “There will be no in-and-out,” Netanyahu announced on May 5. Israel is “finally going to conquer the Gaza Strip,” said Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also serves as a minister in the Defense Ministry and sits on the security cabinet. Smotrich, who has said that Gaza will be “completely destroyed” and its Palestinian population will “leave in great numbers to third countries,” also suggests these plans should not be adjusted, even if hostages are released.
When coupled with the systematic destruction of homes, apartment buildings, orchards and fields, schools, hospitals, and water and sanitation facilities, as well as the use of starvation as a weapon of war—acts that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity including extermination, and acts of genocide—these plans trigger the “duty to prevent” under the Genocide Convention. For the 153 states that are parties to it, the duty to prevent genocide arises as soon as a state learns, or should normally have learned, of a serious risk that genocide may be committed. A definitive determination that genocide is already underway is not required, as Human Rights Watch set out in an April 2025 intervention in a case currently before the UK courts challenging the UK government’s decision to continue to license military equipment used by Israeli forces in Gaza.
Israel and the United States are advancing a new plan to use private military contractors to provide aid only to certain parts of Gaza. In a May 4 joint statement, the UN and aid groups operating in Gaza warned that the plan won’t reach the most vulnerable, “appears designed to reinforce control over life-sustaining items as a pressure tactic,” and “will further entrench forced displacement.” The IPC said the plan is “highly insufficient to meet the population’s essential needs.”
Virtually all of Gaza’s population has already been displaced, while Israeli authorities have pursued forced displacement as state policy, rendering the strip largely uninhabitable. Israeli officials have confirmed that going forward, areas “cleared” by their military would follow the “Rafah model,” a euphemism for the destruction of civilian infrastructure.
The Genocide Convention obligates states parties to “employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible.” States that are party to the 1948 Genocide Convention, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, risk legal liability for failing to act to prevent genocide in Gaza, Human Rights Watch said. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2007 found that the obligation applied extraterritorially “to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate to meeting the obligation.” The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which have strong ties with or influence over the Israeli government, have a heightened responsibility to act.
Aid agencies have 171,000 metric tons of pre-positioned food in the region, which would be enough to sustain 2 million people in Gaza for three to four months, but they have not been allowed to enter since March 2, 2025. Bakeries, community kitchens, and relief organizations, including the World Food Programme and World Central Kitchen, have been forced to stop operations because their food stocks ran out. People now spend hours waiting for a few gallons of water or rotten flour. According to the International Water Association, 90 percent of households were struggling with water scarcity in the first half of April, often forced to choose between showering, cleaning, and cooking. That percentage has likely risen because fuel to run desalination plants and water pumps for wells has not entered Gaza since March 2.
Israeli authorities have made it impossible to effectively deliver assistance. Increasing use of evacuation orders has also trapped civilians in enclaves without food or water. According to a survey by Relief Web, 95 percent of the aid organizations operating in Gaza had to suspend or dramatically cut services since the escalation of hostilities on March 18 because of widespread Israeli bombing or onerous Israeli restrictions.
The ICJ has issued three rounds of provisional measures in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. Israeli authorities have flouted them all.
Continued weapons sales, military assistance, and diplomatic support to the Israeli government despite overwhelming evidence of atrocity crimes also expose governments and officials to the risk of complicity. Governments should halt arms transfers immediately. They should also support international accountability efforts, including by enforcing the arrest warrants of the International Criminal Court, Human Rights Watch said.
Governments should also immediately review bilateral agreements with Israel, including the EU-Israel Association agreement, which identifies “respect for human rights and democratic principles” as an “essential element” of the agreement. Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, and Sweden support such a review.
Both the UK-Israel Trade Partnership Agreement and the UK’s 2030 roadmap for UK-Israel bilateral relations should be revised, including removing provisions that shield or attempt to shield Israel from accountability, Human Rights Watch said.
“States that are party to the Genocide Convention committed themselves not just to punish genocide, but also to prevent it from taking place,” Borello said. “Failing to act to stop Israeli authorities from starving civilians in Gaza and further rendering it unlivable flies in the face of the very purpose of the convention.”
The US Should Protect Exiled Cuban Dissidents
Last week, a group of 14 exiled Cuban dissidents living in the United States sent a letter to the US government and several members of Congress, urging officials to help them obtain legal status in the country. Some of them said they feared deportation.
Among the dissidents is rap singer Eliexer Márquez Duany. Known as El Funky, Márquez is one of the authors of “Patria y Vida,” a song that became an anthem for many protesters in Cuba who took to the streets in landmark July 2021 demonstrations that Cuba’s government severely repressed.
The song, which repurposes the Cuban government’s slogan “Patria o Muerte,” earned global recognition and fierce reprisal in Cuba. While Márquez managed to leave Cuba, two of the song’s other authors, Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Maykel Castillo Pérez, are respectively serving five and nine-year sentences in Cuba, following prosecutions that violated their rights to freedom of expression and association.
In April 2025, Márquez said US authorities denied his permanent residency and ordered that he leave the country within 33 days. He told Human Rights Watch that returning to Cuba would be “suicidal.”
Other dissidents who signed the letter include journalist Lázaro Yuri Valle Roca and human rights advocate Eralidis Frómeta. The pair were given 26 days to leave the United States following the Trump administration’s termination of a humanitarian parole program for nationals of Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Haiti.
Valle Roca was jailed in Cuba in 2021 after posting a video of pro-democracy leaflets thrown from a building in the capital. He says he was beaten and put in solitary confinement.
Many other Cuban dissidents, including journalists, artists, and academics, say they remain stuck in lengthy US immigration proceedings and face the risk of being deported or arrested because of their legal status.
The US government should give Cubans and all others fearing persecution in their home country a fair chance to seek asylum in the United States. They should not be deported to countries like Cuba if they risk abuse there.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, should know that well.
Mali’s Junta Further Shutters Political Space
This week, Mali’s National Transition Council adopted a bill that effectively abolishes multiparty politics across the country. The new law officially bans opposition political meetings, speeches, and organizations. The action unfortunately came as no surprise given the ruling military junta’s recent attacks on the political opposition.
The law formalizes a political atmosphere in Mali in which freedom of expression is increasingly restricted. Days earlier, the country’s media regulatory body, Haute Autorité de la Communication (HAC), suspended TV5, an international French-language television network, because the authorities deemed its reporting of the May 3, 2025, anti-junta protests in the capital, Bamako, to be “biased” and “unbalanced.” The HAC also accused TV5 of “defamation of the armed and security forces.”
The new law coincides with the junta’s recent jailing and enforced disappearance of several political opponents, activists, and dissidents.
On May 8, two political opposition leaders, Abba Alhassane and El Bachir Thiam, went missing, sparking fears they may have been forcibly disappeared. Neither have been located, raising concerns for their safety.
Three days later, Abdoul Karim Traoré, the youth president of the opposition party Convergence pour le développement du Mali (CODEM), went missing in Bamako. Like Alhassane and Thiam, Traoré took part in the May 3 protests. He was a witness to and publicly denounced Alhassane’s abduction. International media has reported that Traoré is being held by state security officers.
A day before Traoré disappeared, unidentified men in Bamako assaulted democracy activist Cheick Oumar Doumbia, who also took part in the protests. Pro-junta activists have increasingly called for violence against democracy activists and those who participated in the protest.
And on Monday, Abdrahamane Diarra, the communication secretary for the opposition party l'Union pour la République et la Démocratie (URD), was detained and interrogated by security forces in Bamako. Diarra, a vocal opponent of the dissolution of Mali’s political parties, was later released, but the authorities’ message has become undoubtedly clear: the space for voicing dissent is closing.
These past few weeks have marked dark days in Mali as the military authorities again raise the stakes for activists advocating a return to democratic civilian rule. The junta should instead release those unjustly held and uphold the right to free expression.
Russian Court Convicts Rights Defender on Bogus Charges
A Moscow court on Wednesday sentenced prominent Russian rights defender and election monitor Grigory Melkonyants to five years in prison on charges of involvement with a foreign “undesirable organization.” It’s yet another hideous result of Russia’s perversion of the justice system to punish independent civic activism.
Melkonyants, who has been in pretrial custody since August 2023, is a co-founder of Golos, Russia’s leading independent election monitoring group. In 2013, Golos was one of the first Russian civil society organizations that authorities designated a “foreign agent,” a smearing label that imposes absurd restrictions and penalties, incompatible with international law. Although the government eventually stripped Golos of its registration, that did not stop the group from continuing to monitor elections nationwide.
The charges against Melkonyants stem from Golos’s former membership in the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations, which Russian authorities banned as “undesirable” in September 2021. Golos was no longer a member at that time, but when it comes to punishing civic activists, the authorities, as usual, have not let facts get in the way.
The Council of Russian Human Rights Organizations, an informal association of the country’s leading groups, condemned the verdict and draconian sentence against Melkonyants, calling them “politically motivated, arbitrary, and lawless.”
In his final statement before the verdict, Melkonyants urged his colleagues and supporters to continue and rejoice in their work: “Monitor [elections], participate … raise the level of honesty and common sense… one step after another, one day after another.”
The list of political prisoners in Russia maintained by Memorial, a leading Russian human rights organization, currently includes over 950 people. The number of politically motivated criminal cases against government critics escalated sharply after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and new war censorship laws in 2022. Melkonyants is one of the few prominent rights defenders to be handed a prison sentence. Another, Oleg Orlov, co-chair of Memorial, had been sentenced to two-and-a-half years’ imprisonment in February 2024 for repeatedly speaking out against Russia's war on Ukraine and was released as part of a historic prisoner swap between Russia, the United States, and Germany in August.
Melkonyants’s prison sentence sends another chilling signal to all Russian human rights defenders who continue their work despite great personal risks. The government should free him immediately and unconditionally put an end to politically motivated repression.
UN Security Council Should Commit to People with Disabilities
As the United Nations Security Council prepares for Protection of Civilians Week 2025 on May 19-23, when many stakeholders gather to advance ways to protect civilians in armed conflict, UN member states should ensure that people with disabilities are included in efforts to strengthen protection and uphold international humanitarian law and human rights law.
Human Rights Watch’s investigations over the past decade into the impact of armed conflict on people with disabilities have shown that they face disproportionate risks during fighting, and are more likely to experience forced displacement, starvation, and lack of access to aid. During the hostilities in Gaza and elsewhere, children with disabilities have faced particular harms due to both their age and disability, including higher risk of death and injury.
On December 6, 2024, the Security Council organized its first informal meeting in five years on the protection of people with disabilities in armed conflict. Member states and civil society groups acknowledged the lack of progress on implementing Security Council Resolution 2475, which urges warring parties to take measures to protect people with disabilities and ensure they have access to justice, basic services, and humanitarian assistance. Member states overwhelmingly recommitted to implement the resolution and to mainstream disability across the council’s work.
The Security Council now has an opportunity to turn those commitments into action. It should permanently include the situation of people with disabilities in armed conflicts and humanitarian emergencies on its agenda. It should invite people with disabilities to serve as briefers and consult regularly with them. Resolution 2475 urged member states to provide people with disabilities a seat at the table.
I have spent 19 months documenting the harms faced by children and adults with disabilities in Gaza, including from the Israeli government’s use of starvation as a weapon of war and its denial of access to health care through its sustained assault on medical facilities. I have seen firsthand the devastating consequences of failing to include people with disabilities in humanitarian responses. Similar harms have been documented in other recent armed conflicts, including Syria, where people with disabilities have been routinely overlooked in protection efforts and denied access to aid and essential services.
Ensuring that people with disabilities are a central focus of the Security Council would demonstrate the council’s genuine commitment, not only to Resolution 2475 and the rights of people with disabilities, but to the protection of all civilians in armed conflict.
Australia: Display Human Rights Leadership in Asia, Beyond
(Sydney) – Australia’s recently re-elected Labor government should use its second term as an opportunity to amplify human rights in its foreign policy, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to Foreign Minister Penny Wong. An annex to the letter sets out 17 actions that the Australian government should take in key foreign policy areas during its first 100 days.
From the start, the government should commit to supporting multilateralism and new human rights standards, amplifying human rights in diplomacy, protecting marginalized peoples and groups, and supporting accountability for international crimes.
“Labor’s re-election provides Foreign Minister Penny Wong a chance to reshape Australia’s global reputation as a human rights leader,” said Daniela Gavshon, Australia director at Human Rights Watch. “The Australian government should see promoting human rights overseas as fundamental to acting in Australia’s national interest.”
Specifically, the Australian government should impose targeted sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs and for the destruction of democratic freedoms in Hong Kong. It should also press the Israeli government to lift its unlawful blockade on the entry of desperately needed water, food, medical aid, and fuel to Gaza and impose targeted sanctions on Israeli officials responsible for ongoing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide in Gaza.
Australia should be a champion of multilateralism and the development of international legal norms. It can do this by supporting proposed treaties on free pre-primary and secondary education, crimes against humanity that include gender apartheid, and autonomous weapons systems.
In response to the United States’ foreign aid cuts and their impact on marginalized people and groups, the Australian government should provide increased financial and other support to humanitarian, human rights, and independent media groups in the Asia-Pacific region. These groups and leaders are crucial for protecting and promoting human rights in the face of abusive governments, Human Rights Watch said.
“With world affairs in a state of turmoil and intractable conflicts racked by atrocities and mass flight, the Australian government should prioritize the rule of law, accountability, and global leadership,” Gavshon said. “The government can do this by promptly acting to protect and promote human rights in the region and beyond.”
Egypt: Apparent Extrajudicial Killings
(Beirut) – Egyptian Ministry of Interior officers on April 10, 2025, apparently killed two men in northwest Egypt hours after their arrest, which would amount to extrajudicial executions, Human Rights Watch said today.
The ministry claimed that the two men, Youssef El-Sarhani and Faraj Al-Fazary, were killed in a shootout in Marsa Matrouh governorate, but there is credible evidence that the men had turned themselves in to the police hours before they were killed and were in police custody when they died.
“The killings in Marsa Matrouh are only the latest in a long line of abuses carried out for years with near-absolute impunity by Egyptian security forces” said Amr Magdi, senior Middle East and North Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Egyptian authorities should promptly create an independent judicial committee to investigate the killings in Marsa Matrouh and refrain from putting any pressure on families to give up their right to justice.”
On April 9, three noncommissioned police officers in Marsa Matrouh were killed in a security raid to arrest a fugitive charged in drug trafficking cases, pro-government newspapers reported, citing official sources.
A journalist speaking to Human Rights Watch, numerous witness accounts published on Facebook, news sites, and several Egyptian human rights organizations said that police forces then raided houses and detained between 20 and 24 women and girls, reportedly to force relatives who might have been involved to turn themselves in. The Interior Ministry denied these arrests.
Community leaders intervened and reportedly reached an agreement with the police to release the women, on the condition that the leaders help apprehend those wanted in the police killings. Community leaders convinced El-Sarhani and Al-Fazary, both between 19 and 20 years old and reportedly related to those wanted for the police killings, to turn themselves in as witnesses. They reportedly did so in the presence of community leaders who mediated the process on the evening of April 10 at the 30 kilometer point on Al-Salloum highway.
National Security Agency officers reportedly took El-Sarhani and Al-Fazary to a nearby road and shot and killed them. Several witnesses including residents and community leaders in Matrouh made public statements and presented credible evidence to the authorities that Interior Ministry officers had killed the two men.
A local resident involved in mediating the handover said in a video statement that he called the National Security Agency officer involved when he learned of the killings. He said that the officer told him that he had turned the men over to [Interior] Ministry officers, “and it’s out of my hands.”
The ministry claimed in a brief statement on April 11 that its forces in Marsa Matrouh “identified the location of two extremely dangerous criminal elements” and that they targeted them, killing both men in “a shootout” and seized two assault rifles. The statement did not identify the slain men or provide the location of the alleged shootout. It did not provide evidence of threats that would justify the use of lethal force.
The killings caused an uproar in Matrouh and nationwide on social media. In response, Matrouh’s Council of Sheikhs and Omada, a local council appointed by the government, announced it was “ending cooperation with the police agencies” until investigations are completed, a rare confrontation with the government. The Lawyers’ Syndicate in Matrouh held an emergency general assembly and voted to appoint lawyers to represent the families of the deceased men.
Public prosecutors in Matrouh initiated an investigation into the killings following pressure from families and local community officials. However, according to media reports and a journalist Human Rights Watch interviewed, the main officers involved have not been summoned for interrogation. A senior lawyer representing the families said they are still pushing prosecutors to interrogate the National Security Agency officer involved.
Lawyers for the families also said that they have been unable to obtain the forensic report on the killings. The families of the two slain men are facing pressure from “intermediaries” to accept “reconciliation” and financial compensation to drop their complaints, the journalist said.
Human Rights Watch has previously documented how Egypt’s Interior Ministry police and National Security Agency officers have, under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s government, apparently killed dozens of alleged suspects across the country in unlawful extrajudicial executions they contend are “shootouts.” For example, Human Rights Watch found that the ministry announced the killing of at least 755 people in 143 alleged shootouts between January 2015 and December 2020, with only one suspect arrested in these incidents.
The right to life is an inherent, core, and non-derogable human right, regardless of the circumstances. The United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions says that the duty to investigate is “triggered” not only in a clear case of an unlawful death, but also where there are “reasonable allegations of a potentially unlawful death,” even without a formal complaint.
In all cases involving use of firearms by law enforcement officials, persons affected (in case of death, families of the deceased) “shall have access to an independent process, including a judicial process.” Families should have the right to participate in the investigation process. To meet international standards, investigations must be prompt, transparent, effective, independent, and impartial.
The authorities should suspend all allegedly involved officials and those who could interfere with an investigation, protect families and witnesses from intimidation, and form an independent judicial committee to investigate and prosecute those responsible.
“The apparent Mafia-style killing of two young men in Marsa Matrouh should serve as yet another alarm bell to Egypt’s international partners who support police agencies with weapons, training, and other assistance despite an ever-growing record of abuse and the lack of accountability,” Magdi said. “Egypt’s international partners should make clear that authorities have an obligation to investigate and ensure accountability for alleged abuses.”
Saudi Arabia: Migrant Workers Electrocuted, Decapitated, and Falling to Death at Workplaces
(Beirut) – Scores of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia die in gruesome yet avoidable workplace-related accidents, including falling from buildings, electrocution, and even decapitation, Human Rights Watch said today. Saudi authorities have failed to adequately protect workers from preventable deaths, investigate workplace safety incidents, and ensure timely and adequate compensation for families, including through mandatory life insurance policies and survivors’ benefits. A separate, independent investigation by Fairsquare, also released today, highlights a serious lack of effective Saudi government policies and processes to determine the cause of migrant worker deaths.
The risks of occupational deaths and injuries are further increasing as the Saudi government ramps up construction work for the 2034 World Cup as well as other “giga-projects.” Families said that Saudi-based employers and authorities have given their families very little information on the circumstances of their relatives’ deaths, some employers refused to cover repatriation costs, and some even pressed families to bury their relatives in Saudi Arabia, offering financial incentives to do so. Companies also often sought to withhold returning deceased migrant workers’ belongings and the outstanding pay owed to them.
“The gruesome workplace accidents killing migrant workers in Saudi Arabia should be a huge red flag for businesses, football fans, and sports associations seeking to partner with FIFA on the 2034 Men’s World Cup and other Saudi ‘giga-projects’,” said Michael Page, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Given that Saudi authorities are failing to adequately ensure basic safety protections and social security for migrant workers, local and international companies face a larger responsibility to ensure that serious rights violations are not occurring throughout their business operations in Saudi Arabia.”
Human Rights Watch interviewed families of 31 deceased migrant workers from Bangladesh, India, and Nepal who died between the ages of 23 and 52 in Saudi Arabia, 2 social workers based in origin countries who provided repatriation support to the families, and 3 current migrant workers who were witnesses to their colleagues’ deaths. Researchers also reviewed, where available, deceased workers’ “No Objection Certificates,” a mandatory document issued by origin country embassies before allowing repatriation of a migrant worker’s body, death certificates, and other relevant official documents.
In line with a body of research on how many migrant worker deaths in Saudi Arabia are erroneously classified as “natural” and neither investigated nor compensated, Human Rights Watch found that even work-related death cases categorized as such in a migrant worker’s death certificate are sometimes not compensated as they should be according to Saudi law and international labor standards. In migrant death cases that are compensated, the process is long and burdensome.
The construction sector is most prone to work-related accidents, according to official records of Saudi Arabia’s General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI). The figures show that the top three workplace injuries are from “inanimate mechanical forces,” falls, and traffic accidents, with migrant workers disproportionately affected.
Saudi laws require employers with 50 or more workers to implement a health and safety policy, conduct training, assess workplace risks, and provide necessary protective gear and first aid. The National Council of Occupational Safety and Health has said that the Human Resources and Social Development Ministry conducts regular inspections, compliance checks, and investigations of workplace incidents in coordination with stakeholders, and that violations are to be addressed through legal action or penalties as specified by labor regulations.
But Human Rights Watch found that workers across employment sectors and geographic regions in Saudi Arabia continue to face widespread labor abuses and occupational dangers at their work sites. While “diseases caused by exposure to extreme temperatures” are included in its approved list of occupational diseases, heat-related protections and related investigations, including of extreme heat-related deaths, remain grossly inadequate.
FIFA, the international football organization, has awarded the 2034 World Cup to Saudi Arabia without proper human rights due diligence, guarantees of effective worker protection requirements, including from extreme heat, or ensuring social security to workers, including survivor’s benefits and other compensation, such as mandatory life insurance. FIFA is knowingly risking yet another tournament that will unnecessarily come at a grave human cost, Human Rights Watch said.
Saudi authorities, FIFA, and other employers should ensure that all migrant worker deaths, regardless of perceived cause, time, and place are properly investigated and that families of deceased workers are treated with dignity and receive fair and timely compensation, Human Rights Watch said.
FIFA wrote in its response to Human Rights Watch that it plans to establish a workers’ welfare system dedicated to mandatory standards and enforcement mechanisms for World Cup-related construction and service delivery in Saudi Arabia, without providing details on concrete measures to prevent, investigate, and compensate migrant worker deaths such as risk-based heat protection measures or life insurance. Saudi authorities did not respond to a March 25 Human Rights Watch letter on questions regarding migrant worker protections. Human Rights Watch has previously documented that Qatar, which hosted the 2022 FIFA World Cup, had encouraged its contractors to purchase private life insurance for their employees since 2019. But in 2022, Human Rights Watch found that only 23 contractors had purchased life insurance policies for their workers. One contractor said that it cost them less than US$14 per worker per year for a benefit of $20,599 for family members when deaths were not classified as work-related and thus did not qualify for compensation.
“FIFA, which claims to be an impetus for positive labor reforms in World Cup host countries, should learn from the human rights disasters of past tournaments and urgently demand effective prevention, investigation, and compensation mechanisms for migrant worker deaths and injuries,” Page said.
For detailed findings, please see below.
Researchers collected information about migrant workers’ deaths from Indian, Bangladeshi, and Nepali government sources. Across nationalities the large majority of deaths of workers were attributed to “natural causes,” which accounted for 74 percent of 1,420 Indian migrant worker deaths recorded just at the Indian embassy in Riyadh in 2023; 80 percent of 887 Bangladeshi deaths during the first 6 months of 2024, and 68 percent of 870 Nepali migrant worker deaths from 2019 to 2022.
Five of the nine cases Human Rights Watch documented of deaths that official documents classify as nonwork related, including by “natural causes,” involved workers who collapsed at their workplace and later died, their families said. Witnesses to two worker deaths told families that their coworkers died from workplace accidents; one was an electrocution and the second was an elevator accident. Witnesses also shared with two families of deceased workers that two migrant workers died in their sleep. These findings raise concerns that workplace accidents in Saudi Arabia are under-recorded, misclassified, and/or inadequately investigated.
Moreover, the “No Objection Certificate” for the death of a Bangladeshi worker due to “electrocution” marked the possibility of compensation as “no,” with the reason as “not available,” while for two other cases of formally certified work accidents, the possibility of receiving compensation was marked as “depends on police report.”
Employers also violated or sought to evade their obligation under Saudi law that requires employers to bear the costs of repatriation of the remains unless covered by GOSI. The family members of nine deceased Bangladeshi workers said employers had proposed to bury them in Saudi Arabia, offering lump sum payments or coverage of monthly expenses like children’s education. Despite their dire economic conditions, eight families said they had refused these offers while six paid the repatriation costs themselves. In one case, the wife of a Nepali worker said that her husband was buried in Saudi Arabia without the family’s consent. None of them have yet received compensation.
The son of a Bangladeshi man who died of electric shock said that his father’s employer conditioned compensation on local burial. The family rejected this and had to pay more than 500,000 Bangladeshi Taka (approximately US$4,134) to repatriate the body, which they financed through loans. The family received TK335,000 (US$2,770) in compensation from the Bangladeshi government. “We had more debt than compensation,” the son said.
Eligible migrant worker families struggle to navigate accessing their Saudi government social security benefits, even with the help of their embassy or consulate. Origin country embassy websites say that getting compensation is extremely lengthy, cumbersome, and can take years. The widow of a deceased worker said it took 10 years to get what was owed to her: “My sons are 11 and 13 years old. When my husband died, they were 11 months and 2 years old. If we had received compensation right after his death, it would have provided so much relief.”
In another case, it took almost 15 years for the family of a deceased migrant to access their GOSI benefits. His brother told Human Rights Watch: “The compensation should have come sooner. It would have offered some consolation to my grieving parents and eased the pressure of loans. They passed away six years after my brother’s death.”
The failure to acknowledge workplace deaths and ensure timely social security for surviving family members can further entrench or lead to poverty and multi-generational harm, including pressure to take children out of school and send them to work. A widow of a Bangladeshi migrant worker said, “To make ends meet, I have put my 14-year-old son to work, and the little money he earns is used for our daily expenses.”
Some witnesses said that employers required them to resume work after witnessing coworkers’ deaths in work-related accidents. A worker described the dizziness he felt when he removed his friend’s corpse after being killed in a machinery accident. He resumed work the next day with no access to bereavement time off or social and mental health support.
Another said that supervisors questioned why he and his colleagues had paused their work after witnessing their friend’s death. They were forced to resume working the same day. “It is difficult in a foreign land,” he said. “We did not dare to speak up about this issue and stayed silent in fear.”
Workplace Deaths and Egregious Workplace Safety FailuresDeaths from Falls, Falling Construction MaterialsA widow of a 48-year-old Bangladeshi man who worked in construction in Saudi Arabia for over two decades said:
He died after falling from the fifth floor of a building that was under construction. His colleagues present at the site informed me that the place where he fell was the elevator landing area, where garbage and iron pieces had been dumped. At that time, he was doing shuttering work when his safety belt came off, causing him to fall.… As there were many heavy and hard objects there, he got injured in various parts of his head and body. He lost consciousness but was alive. The Saudi police arrived very quickly and rescued him from the accident site and took him to a nearby hospital. After first aid, he was admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) and died two hours later. I used to talk to him several times a day. Like every day, on the day he died, he called me after lunch, and that was our last conversation.
The widow of a 36-year-old Bangladeshi migrant worker who worked in construction in Saudi Arabia for over eight years said:
A relative also worked and lived with him at the same company. On the day of the accident, he was present at the worksite and informed us about my husband’s passing. He told me, “We carry heavy blocks at work, and a large quantity of blocks were amassed in the construction site. When brother [my husband] was passing by that place, a bulk of blocks suddenly fell on him. As there were quite a few blocks, we could not rescue him with our bare hands. A crane was brought to remove those blocks from the body, but it was too late. Brother [my husband] had already stopped breathing. His body was smashed by the weight of the heavy blocks.”
The widow of a 33-year-old Bangladeshi migrant worker who had been in Saudi Arabia for just seven months said:
A few of my relatives live in Saudi Arabia for work. They heard that my husband fell from the third floor of a construction building’s window which was about to be demolished for reconstruction.... My husband was on the third floor hammering the wall to break it when he fell. He did not die on the spot. But no one stepped forward to help him as they feared getting into legal trouble as this was an accident case.
Electrocution DeathsThe widow of a 25-year-old Nepali man who worked in Saudi Arabia for two years said:
After my husband got electrocuted at work, he collapsed and was taken to the hospital. A few months later, we were relieved to hear that he had regained consciousness, but then we were again suddenly informed about his death. Despite the death due to work-related causes, the death is officially classified as natural death. Furthermore, we did not receive the dead body of my husband, but were instead informed that his last rites were already done in Saudi Arabia itself without our permission. This has put us in further pain. We believe all this was an elaborate plan to deprive us of compensation. There are so many questions unanswered.… Who gave them permission to bury [my husband] instead of repatriating [his] body? Witnesses say that the death was caused by electrocution.…
The widow of a 27-year-old Bangladeshi who worked in Saudi Arabia for four and a half years said:
Several colleagues were present when he [my husband] was electrocuted. They described how he was working near electrical wiring when a sudden electric shock caused him to collapse. Despite attempts to revive him, he was declared dead at the scene.
DecapitationThe widow of a 46-year-old Bangladeshi man who worked in construction in Saudi Arabia for two years said:
According to his colleagues and the foreman, he noticed a mechanical issue with the machine he was operating. He turned off the machine to fix it and was trying to remove a stone that was stuck inside when someone accidentally turned the machine back on. His head got caught inside, and he died on the spot. When his body arrived in Bangladesh, we saw that his head was separated from his body. The description provided by his colleagues matched the condition of his body, so I had no choice but to believe the incident. However, I cannot say whether the investigation into the accident was thorough or not. When we received his body, I wanted to hold him one last time, but it wasn’t possible. Seeing him in that state, I lost consciousness.
The widow of a 43-year-old Bangladeshi man who cut concrete blocks in Saudi Arabia for two years said:
He had no prior experience operating this type of giant machine. Maybe the blade got jammed but he did not notice that the blade was running in the upper side. He put his head inside the machine when the blade suddenly started running. At that point his head got cut by that blade and became detached from the body. He died on the spot. The Police came and took the body. I only know what happened through words. It was not possible for me to fact check the cause of death from Bangladesh.
Employer Pressure to Bury Bodies of Deceased Migrant Workers in Saudi ArabiaMultiple families of migrant workers told Human Rights Watch that they faced active hurdles from their deceased family member’s employer to repatriate their bodies.
The widow of a 48-year-old Bangladeshi man who worked in construction in Saudi Arabia for over two decades said:
Initially, the people from the company proposed to bury my husband’s body in Saudi Arabia and assured us of various company facilities in return. But when we wanted to bring my husband's body to Bangladesh and bury him here, the company said that we will have to bear all the expenses of bringing the body.… All these expenses were borne by our family.
The widow of a 46-year-old Bangladeshi man who worked in construction in Saudi Arabia for two years said:
The Saudi Kafil [sponsor] wanted to bury my husband in Saudi Arabia, but I did not give consent. I wanted to bring him back to see him one last time. The Kafil did not provide any financial assistance. It helped that my relatives were in Saudi Arabia as they put their heart and soul to ensure my husband’s dead body was repatriated. To do so, my relatives contributed 1,000 Saudi rials (US$265) and also an additional SAR4,000 ($1065) from my husband’s colleagues.… The Kafil [sponsor] did not provide any compensation or insurance.
The widow of a 44-year-old Bangladeshi who worked in Saudi Arabia as a plumber for over two decades said:
During the time of death, the company kept calling me and offered various financial assistance in exchange of burying my husband in Saudi Arabia itself. They insisted that I not take the body back. They promised to send me 800,000 Bangladeshi Taka (US$6584), my husbands’ outstanding salary, and a monthly allowance for my children's education, but I insisted on bringing his body to Bangladesh.
The widow of a 32-year-old Bangladeshi laborer who died due to electric shocks said:
My husband’s body arrived in Bangladesh about three months after his death. The company's foreman kept trying to convince me in various ways that if I did not get the body repatriated, I would get many benefits from the company. He said the company would even help us with our monthly expenses, children’s education fees etc. When we did not agree to bury the body in Saudi Arabia, the foreman himself contacted the company and brought the body to Bangladesh.
Refusal to Compensate Migrant Worker Deaths, Including Work-Related AccidentsSaudi Arabia’s GOSI covers injuries or deaths that are attributed to work-related accidents. This mandatory insurance is based on a 2 percent salary contribution, and surviving family members of deceased get 84 months of salary with a maximum of 330,000 Saudi rials (US$88,000).
Most deaths in Saudi Arabia are attributed to non-work-related reasons including “natural causes” without proper investigation, which deprives surviving members of compensation. However, Human Rights Watch research shows that even when migrant workers die in work-related accidents that are certified as such in the death certificates, families often face significant challenges and delays in accessing compensation.
The last resort for many returning migrant workers and their families are welfare programs set up by their own governments especially for abuses resulting in death and injury. Contributory Migrant Welfare Funds, which are largely funded by contributions from migrants, are commonly used in many countries of origin to fund such welfare programs. However, such support is often conditioned on valid labor permits, which not all migrant workers possess. Moreover, origin countries’ level and comprehensiveness of support to migrant workers varies significantly.
Compensation from Both Saudi Arabia and Origin CountriesThe widow of a 28-year-old Nepali road construction worker who died after being hit by a heavy vehicle said:
I received 700,000 Indian rupees (US$8,065) from the Nepal Government as compensation and 1,400,000 Indian rupees ($16,130) from the [Nepali] insurance company. I faced many hurdles to receive the compensation from Saudi Arabia. My brother-in-law took the lead. It took two years to process, and I had to visit multiple offices. The paperwork was burdensome.… It was clear that I could not manage the compensation process on my own. My brother-in-law then appealed to social workers who put pressure on the Nepali embassy in Saudi Arabia. It is only after their frequent follow-up that we finally received compensation in my son’s and my bank accounts separately.… Without [compensation], we would not have been able to manage our expenses.…
The brother of a deceased Nepali worker who fought for compensation on behalf of his sister-in-law said:
We received compensation from GOSI for my brother’s death after 15 years. I was determined to get compensation so kept following up consistently. Someone else would not have been able to do the same. My family members told me to give up, but I was determined to get the compensation at any cost. If required, I was ready to go to Saudi Arabia to fight my case. But at least we received the money: it is better than not receiving anything.… It has provided some relief.
The wife of a 34-year-old deceased Nepali worker who died in a road accident said:
I have saved the compensation amount in my bank account, and I am trying not to use it. I need to save it for my children’s future. I am trying to manage my household expenses through subsistence agriculture, cash transfer for widows from the Nepali government, and scholarships for children of deceased migrants through the Foreign Employment Board [scholarship scheme funded by the contributory migrant welfare fund].
Compensation from Either Saudi Arabia or Origin CountriesThe widow of 44-year-old Bangladeshi who worked in Saudi Arabia as a plumber for over two decades said:
I didn’t receive much financial help when the body arrived, but three months later, the Bangladesh government provided me with 350,000 Bangladeshi taka (US$2879). Neither the Saudi government nor the company provided any financial assistance. The company had previously promised to help me, but I never received any support.
The widow of 26-year-old Bangladeshi who worked in Saudi Arabia as a construction worker for over five years before being crushed to death by a loader said:
It took over three months to bring his body back to Bangladesh due to bureaucratic delays and the employer’s refusal to take responsibility.… The company did not pay any overdue wages, end-of-service benefits or additional compensation despite repeated requests. We received 300,000 Bangladeshi taka (US$2,466) from the government under the Expatriates’ Welfare Fund.…
The widow of a 32-year-old Bangladeshi laborer who died due to electric shock said:
At the time of his death, there was one month's unpaid salary left which the company later sent to us. But we did not get back any of the money that he had in the bank nor his other belongings.… We got 35,000 Bangladeshi taka (US$287) from the Bangladeshi government when we received the body and again BDT300,000 ($2,466), and his friends from work also sent us BDT150,000 ($1,233) as support. Other than the salary dues, the company did not provide any remaining benefits or insurance money.…
The widow of a 44-year-old Indian plumber who died due to “natural cause,” which the family does not believe, said:
The company paid 300,000 Indian rupees (US$3,511). We are not sure whether the money is pending salary or end of service benefits or compensation.…We had talked to Rajeev [another migrant worker in the company] who is the only communicator to the family from the company. He said the company is not willing to give any additional money. The company owes us more money as death compensation since it is a work site death.
No Compensation ReceivedThe widow of a 45-year-old Nepali man who worked in Saudi Arabia as laborer in outdoor road construction for over 11 years said:
I begged the company multiple times for insurance money. But they say it is not in their rules as they do not have life insurance policy, just accidental insurance. Our case is not considered work-related accident. Do you have to fall or be hit by a stone or be cut by a machine during work? He fainted because of high work pressure. I think the investigation into this case was incomplete. We are compelled to take their word at face value. We don’t have the ability to go there [Saudi Arabia] to better understand the situation. The compensation money would have worked like oxygen for us. We also did not receive compensation from Nepal’s government. His labor approval had expired so he was not eligible for compensation from the welfare fund or insurance.
Libya: ICC’s Role Critical for Justice
(New York) – The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor’s upcoming briefing to the United Nations Security Council on Libya highlights the court’s critical role to deliver justice in the country amid ongoing efforts to undermine its global mandate, Human Rights Watch said today. On May 15, 2025, the ICC prosecutor, Karim Khan, will provide his biannual briefing to the Security Council on his office’s investigation in Libya.
The briefing is taking place in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s sweeping executive order on February 6, 2025, that authorizes sanctions targeting the court’s work. The Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the first ICC prosecutor on February 26, 2011, mere days after the start of the revolution that ousted Libya’s former leader Muammar Gaddafi. The prosecutor’s office opened the investigation on March 3, 2011.
“The ICC’s role in Libya is critical to bring justice in the face of more than a decade of unchecked abuses by armed groups and quasi-security forces,” said Balkees Jarrah, acting Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “ICC members on the Security Council and beyond should reaffirm their support for the court and condemn any attempts to hamper its essential work.”
In November 2023, Khan announced that his office intended to complete its investigative activities in Libya by the end of 2025, meaning that it would not seek additional arrest warrants after that date. Civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have raised concerns about this timeline. They have cited the ongoing lack of effective cooperation with the ICC by the Libyan authorities, lack of credible domestic prosecutions for serious crimes that continue to be committed across Libya with impunity, and the absence of international oversight following the end of the mandate of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya in March 2023.
The Security Council resolution referring the situation of Libya to the ICC prosecutor requires Libyan authorities to cooperate with the ICC. That includes arresting and surrendering anyone wanted by the court who is in Libya. Without its own police force, the ICC relies on states to enforce its arrest warrants.
The ICC has issued arrest warrants against 12 individuals in relation to the Libya situation. These cases relate to crimes allegedly committed during the 2011 revolution, crimes related to the 2014-2020 hostilities in Libya, and crimes in detention facilities, including against migrants. Three of the people wanted by the court have since died and eight remain at large. ICC judges declared the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, former intelligence chief under Gaddafi, inadmissible before the court.
Consecutive interim authorities and governments in Libya have failed to arrest and surrender ICC suspects on Libyan territory, since 2011, limiting progress on justice. The Security Council has failed to respond to previous requests from ICC judges seeking the council’s support to ensure Libya’s cooperation.
On January 19, 2025, Osama Elmasry Njeem, wanted by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Libya, including against migrants, was arrested in Italy. Two days later, he was freed by Italian authorities on “procedural grounds” related to the arrest and sent back to Libya aboard an Italian state aircraft. Italy now faces a potential finding of non-cooperation with its obligations as an ICC member, which could then be transmitted to the court’s Assembly of State Parties or the Security Council for further action. Libyan authorities did not arrest Njeem upon arrival, as they were obligated to do, and have not commented on his status.
Security Council and ICC members should commit to backing the ICC’s mandate in Libya, including by ensuring effective cooperation with the court and enforcing findings of non-compliance by the court’s judges, said Human Rights Watch.
The February 6 executive order authorizes asset freezes and entry bans on ICC officials and others supporting the court’s work in investigations the United States opposes. The Trump administration has, so far, imposed sanctions on the ICC prosecutor.
President Trump’s order makes clear that his administration seeks to shield United States and Israeli officials from facing serious crimes charges before the ICC. ICC judges issued warrants of arrest for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in November 2024 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.
During his first term, President Trump imposed sanctions on then-ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and another senior court official following Bensouda’s decision to request authorization to open an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, which included potential cases against US nationals. The Biden administration rescinded the sanctions.
“ICC members should urge the Trump administration to revoke its executive order and condemn its attack on the court for what it is—an affront to the global rule of law,” Jarrah said. “Sanctions are a tool to be used against those responsible for the most serious crimes, not those seeking to deliver justice on behalf of victims of abuses.”
Syria: Türkiye-backed Armed Groups Detain, Extort Civilians
(Beirut, May 14, 2025) – Syrian National Army (SNA) factions that fought the Assad government with backing from Türkiye continue to detain, mistreat, and extort civilians in northern Syria, Human Rights Watch said today.
These fighters are being integrated into Syria’s Armed Forces, with their commanders appointed to key government and military positions, despite their past involvement in serious abuses. Syria’s transitional government should work to end and investigate ongoing abuses and exclude those with records of abuse from the Syrian security forces.
“The fall of Assad’s abusive government has meant decades of atrocities by that government have come to an end,” said Adam Coogle, deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “But Syrian National Army factions are continuing to detain, extort, and torture residents with impunity.”
Among the commanders involved in past abuses and who now hold influential posts in the new Syrian military are Mohammad al-Jassem (Abu Amsha) leading the 62nd Division; Saif Boulad (Saif Abu Bakr) leading the 76th Division; Fehim Isa as the defense minister’s assistant for northern affairs; and most recently, Ahmed al-Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) leading the 86th Division in the eastern region.
A February 2024 Human Rights Watch report documented SNA atrocities from 2018 to 2023. The primary targets were Kurds and those linked to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Türkiye considers part of the armed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which announced its dissolution on May 12.
Human Rights Watch interviewed two Kurdish civilians who were detained by pro-Turkish factions, and three whose relatives or neighbors were detained around the fall of the Assad government in December 2024. Researchers also spoke with a Syrian human rights researcher monitoring abuses in the region, a journalist, and an aid worker in northern Aleppo.
On December 1, 2024, emboldened by the military operations of Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamist coalition now leading the transitional government, the SNA initiated its own offensive. It focused on capturing northern Aleppo territory, including Shahba, an area that had largely served as a refuge for Kurds displaced during Türkiye’s takeover of Afrin in 2018.
On December 3, SNA forces raided the home of a Shahba resident, her husband, and three children. They arrested her husband, a 42-year-old construction worker, without explanation. After 40 days, she said, a relative found him in a hospital in Afrin:
They had forcibly removed his fingernails, toenails and teeth, and he had burn marks on his feet … He told me Turkish intelligence forces and the SNA’s Military Police tortured him in Maarata Prison and forced him to confess that he was building tunnels for the SDF. Then they took him to the hospital and left him there. A few days after he came home, he suffered a stroke and can no longer speak at all.
Residents of a village in Afrin described ongoing extortion by Mohammad al Jassem’s Sultan Suleiman Shah division, which they said imposes taxes on olive farmers and fines on returning families of US$2,000 to $5,000. Between December 2024 and January 2025, the fighters detained nine residents, accusing them of not paying taxes and demanding up to $3,800 each for their release.
On January 10, four masked armed men stormed one woman’s home, took her to their headquarters, and demanded $850 under threat of violence, she said. She promised to pay and was released but fled the area. The next day, neighbors told her the fighters had returned to her house three times, threatened guests at a family funeral, beat her niece, and detained her niece’s husband, releasing him only after the family paid $450. She remains afraid to return, describing it as a “never-ending nightmare.”
A 61-year-old man, returned to his village in Afrin in November 2024, eight years after he had left. On December 2, armed members of Said Abu Bakr's Hamzat Division abducted him, beat him with sticks and whips, and confiscated his phone and money. They accused him of ties to the SDF, and later transferred him to Afrin city, beating him en route. He was held for two days until his cousin paid $1,500 for his release.
A week later, he said, he sought a security clearance document from the SNA military police to minimize the risk of being detained again, but was instead detained and interrogated by Turkish intelligence and military police officers for six days, and had to pay $1,500 for his release.
A 37-year-old man, from Nairibiyah in eastern Aleppo, said the SNA’s Sultan Suleiman Shah faction took control of the village in December 2024. On January 14, 2025, armed members arrived in four pickup trucks, fired into the air, beat villagers, including older men, and stole their belongings. They arrested seven young men under the pretext of searching for weapons, he said. Two remained in detention as of early May.
A recent report by Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), a human rights group, documented 41 arrests by SNA factions and the affiliated Military Police in January and February. Ten occurred after the Syrian caretaker government’s newly formed General Security forces entered northern Aleppo cities on February 6 following an apparent deal to assume control from the SNA.
Despite the removal of most SNA checkpoints, sources in Afrin and elsewhere said that factions still operate from their former bases. Qussai Jukhadar, a researcher for STJ, said arrests decreased in March but hundreds remain detained in SNA-run, Turkish-supervised prisons.
On February 15, Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Afrin, pledging to extend government authority over northern Syria and restore residents’ rights. On March 10, a key agreement was signed between al-Sharaa and the SDF commander, Mazloum Abdi, focusing on integration into the Syrian army, including for the return of internally displaced people from areas like Afrin.
Syrian authorities bear responsibility for abuses by forces integrated into the army as well as for preventing abuses and ensuring accountability. Türkiye, which still oversees former SNA factions and continues to provide weapons, salaries, training, and logistical support to these factions, also bears responsibility for their abuses and potential war crimes.
The Syrian transitional government should urgently unify its military under an accountable command with civilian oversight and ensure adherence to international human rights standards. It should take steps to prevent further abuses against Kurdish and other residents in northern Syria, ensure the release of all arbitrarily detained people, and investigate past abuses with fair legal proceedings. Türkiye should discontinue support to abusive commanders and factions and provide reparations to victims.
The transitional government should create conditions for the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of displaced people, and grant independent monitors unrestricted access to all detention facilities, including those operated by former SNA factions and Turkish forces.
Other countries should provide technical and financial assistance to ensure that the new security forces protect civilians and observe the rule of law, including supporting an independent judiciary to ensure lawful detention and treatment of detainees.
“As Syria’s transitional government is integrating into its ranks SNA factions and other armed groups, it must exclude those in the SNA that are responsible for abuses and hold them accountable,” Coogle said. “If it doesn’t do so, the Syrian people will not be able to trust their armed forces and will be vulnerable to yet more abuse.”
Maldives: Communities Lack Equitable Access to Water
(Bangkok) – Marginalized island communities in the Maldives face limited access to water because of inadequate government consultations, poor monitoring, and economic barriers, Human Rights Watch said today. The Maldives government should ensure that its efforts to adapt to the climate crisis protect the rights of those most affected, including by addressing systemic problems that have led to inequities in accessing water.
The Maldives government has sought to secure vital financing for climate adaptation measures, but the authorities have often failed to engage affected communities, particularly those living far from major urban islands, in key decision-making processes. As a result, the design, implementation, and maintenance of foreign-funded water projects has not protected the rights of remote and poorer communities experiencing water shortages.
“The Maldives government’s lack of consultation with island communities has hindered essential water projects and is threatening the livelihoods of those most exposed to the effects of climate change,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “These deficiencies undermine the government’s efforts to secure vital funds for climate adaptation measures that are essential for the country's survival.”
The impacts of climate change, coupled with the Maldives’ growing population, are straining the country’s already limited freshwater supplies. Due to its low-lying geography, the Maldives is particularly exposed to sea-level rise, extreme weather events, saline intrusion, and increasingly unpredictable rainfall patterns. These factors, as well as the country’s lack of water infrastructure, have led to increasingly frequent water shortages across the country.
The right to water, recognized under several international human rights treaties, guarantees everyone, without discrimination, access to “sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic use.” The Maldives faces unique problems in realizing the right to water for its population as an expansive archipelago. The Maldives government has made a commitment to ensure access to safe water through relevant laws and strategic plans that generally align with the right to water and other international human rights obligations.
However, communities on the Maldives’ outer islands, especially those far from the country’s economic hubs, Malé and Addu City, face severe barriers to accessing safe, clean water. On the more remote islands, which include many low-income families and farmers, poverty rates are higher and water infrastructure such as piped water systems and desalination plants are in poor repair or nonexistent.
To respond to this situation, the Maldives government, with the support of the Green Climate Fund, the world’s largest fund dedicated to climate, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in 2017 initiated a US$28.2 million project to address water shortages in the country’s outer islands. The initiative aimed to provide 32,000 people on 49 islands access to reliable, safe water by introducing Integrated Water Resource Management systems, combining desalination, rainwater harvesting, and groundwater recharge to ensure better access to sustainable clean water.
In May and July 2024, Human Rights Watch conducted interviews and focus group discussions with 47 people from communities affected by water scarcity on two islands where the government undertook water projects with foreign funding, Kanditheem in Shaviyani Atoll and Nolhivaranfaru in Haa Dhaalu Atoll. On both islands, residents said the water projects were carried out hastily and remained only partially completed, years behind schedule. Community consultations were few and often excluded both local residents and at times island councils. Currently, some key elements of the projects, such as the water testing facilities, remain nonoperational, while others, such as securing piped water connections to 66 row houses in Nolhivaranfaru, were only recently completed, more than two years after the intended completion date.
After the projects were launched, residents raised concerns about water safety, affordability, and accessibility. On one island, council members said that up to 60 percent of the population still relied on bottled water for drinking due to concerns about water quality. Over two-thirds of those interviewed on Kanditheem and Nolhivaranfaru expressed concerns about the quality of available water on their islands, including water provided directly from the new systems.
System breakdowns and other operating problems were making the situation worse and were often left unaddressed for lengthy periods because of insufficient resources and maintenance and monitoring capabilities, Human Rights Watch found.
Human Rights Watch in 2023 reported on the Maldives government’s failure to adhere to and enforce its environmental protection laws in the context of land reclamation projects, and the harm those projects have caused to the environment and local communities. Such infrastructure projects – often funded by international climate finance – have also lacked meaningful public consultation with affected communities and adherence to recommendations in impact assessments.
In seeking financial support for adaptation measures made necessary by the climate crisis, the Maldives government should consult with affected communities – before, during, and after a water project is proposed and implemented – to ensure water systems are properly designed and safely implemented, maintained, and monitored. Given the mounting challenges arising from climate change and sea-level rise, the government should ensure the projects provide sufficient, safe, affordable, and accessible water for present and future generations, in line with the human right to water.
The government should adopt measures, including appropriate pricing policies and income supplements for users, to ensure that water is affordable for all and that projects do not entrench or exacerbate existing inequalities in access to water. It should particularly take into account that artificial sources of water, such as desalinated water, are much costlier than the groundwater and rainwater islanders historically have relied on.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ draft general comment on the environmental dimension of sustainable development requires countries to protect rights from the harm caused by the climate crisis on the basis of equality, nondiscrimination, and the use of maximum available resources.
Climate-financing countries have an obligation to provide international assistance and cooperation in accordance with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” This principle, incorporated in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, requires all countries to address climate change and environmental destruction, but recognizes that some are more responsible for the climate crisis and are economically better able to address it.
“The Maldives government has an obligation to provide all its people with safe water,” Pearson said. “Countries providing climate finance should support and work with the government to ensure it happens.”
Click to expand Image Concrete blocks are placed along the shoreline to try and prevent further coastal erosion in Mahibadhoo, Maldives, December 17, 2019. © 2019 Carl Court/ Getty ImagesHuman Rights Watch spoke with farmers, plantation owners, members of civil society organizations, and other local residents directly affected by water projects on the Maldives’ islands of Kanditheem and Nolhivaranfaru. They described their experiences with water quality, accessibility, and affordability, and the impact on their health and livelihoods. Human Rights Watch also interviewed members of island councils, including a council president and women’s development committee members, and water plant operators responsible for implementing and maintaining the projects. In some cases, names and other identifying information have been withheld at the request of the individuals interviewed.
Maldives and Climate ChangeThe Republic of Maldives is a low-lying archipelago made up of 26 atolls and 1,192 islands, 187 of which are inhabited, and another 130 of which operate as resorts. Due to its dispersed geography, Maldives is one of the world’s countries most exposed to the impacts of climate change, such as sea-level rise, coastal erosion, drought, and extreme and unpredictable weather and rainfall patterns. The climate crisis is also a human rights crisis, placing at risk Maldivians’ rights to life, water, health, an adequate standard of living, and a healthy environment, among others.
Water ShortagesA major human rights risk in the Maldives associated with the climate crisis is water shortage. Outer islands rely on two natural sources of water: rainwater collection and groundwater from freshwater aquifers. Resort islands and more populated islands, including the capital, Malé, also use artificial water sources, notably desalination plants. During the dry season, when outer islands run out of natural water supplies, the government has shipped emergency consignments of desalinated water to up to 80 islands, at significant financial and environmental cost.
Groundwater and rainwater on small islands are highly affected by climate change impacts such as sea-level rise, saline intrusion, extreme weather, and droughts, exacerbating chronic water scarcity and quality issues. The lengthy annual dry season, from December to April, means that rainwater collection tanks frequently run dry, particularly in outer islands that lack alternative sources.
Due to limited landmass, particularly of the smaller islands, low elevation, thin groundwater lens (a layer of freshwater floating above denser saltwater), and highly permeable sandy soil, groundwater supplies in the Maldives are highly susceptible to saline intrusion and contamination from human activity, notably from inadequate human waste disposal facilities.
Sea-level rise is a key driver of increased saline intrusion and groundwater depletion and is expected to accelerate in the coming years as climate change intensifies. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2022 assessment report projected that water quality degradation, which is increasing under climate change due to warming, enhanced floods, and sea-level rise, would drive water insecurity: a trend already evident in the Maldives.
This strain on the groundwater supply is compounded by increased extraction demands due to the Maldives’ high population growth in recent years, which also affects the availability of rainwater from collection tanks.
Climate FinanceWhile Maldivian administrations have varied in their approach to the existential threat caused by climate change, internationally they have consistently pressed high-income countries to provide greater financial support for mitigation and adaptation measures. In multilateral forums, the Maldives has been a leading voice for urgent action, including putting forward a UN Human Rights Council resolution recognizing the immediate threat climate change poses to human rights. The resolution was adopted by consensus in March 2008.
In September 2024, at a High-Level Meeting on Sea Level Rise at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu said that the international community should double climate adaptation financing and “remove the tedious approval procedures, and conditions to access finance.”
To address its water shortages, the Maldives has sought support for local-level water projects from donors including the United Nations Development Program and the Green Climate Fund. Over the years, the government has received grants and donations from ally nations, notably China and India. In 2024, China funded the construction of desalination plants on 5 islands and donated over 3,000 tons of bottled water to islands experiencing water shortages.
KanditheemIn 2019, the Maldives government initiated a project on Kanditheem island to integrate rainwater harvesting and desalination and to install piped drinkable water to 270 households, later expanded to 289. The project was financed by the Maldives Green Fund, established in January 2019 under the Public Finance Act. The fund receives its funding from the Green Tax: a daily US$6 fee paid by tourists, the national budget, and contributions from the private sector and international organizations, among other sources. Five years after the project’s intended completion date, many residents said they continued to rely on rainwater they collect themselves or bottled water for drinking, due to quality-related concerns with the piped water.
A member of the Kanditheem women’s development committee said: “No one wants to drink straight out of the tap. Even those who use it for drinking install secondary filters, and not everyone can afford that.”
Concerns about water quality are not unfounded. At the time of writing, the Kanditheem testing lab is still not operational, even though regular monitoring and testing of the water is a regulatory requirement and is included in the project tender documents. Instead, water samples are sent from Kanditheem to neighboring islands, including Sh. Milandhoo, for testing, the results of which are not publicly available to the community. The Kanditheem Council president, Ahmed Ahsan, said that this lack of transparency contributes to further erosion of public trust in the water project.
Cost represents another significant barrier to water access for residents in Kanditheem. As a result, a common practice on the island is water sharing; when families run out of rainwater, they often turn to neighbors with larger tanks to share drinking water. For nondrinking purposes, many residents who struggle to afford piped or bottled water still use groundwater. However, groundwater supplies are rapidly depleting and becoming increasingly saline due to sea-level rise, and contaminated due to sewage and wastewater from septic tanks being discharged directly into the ground.
Agricultural workers are particularly vulnerable to these shortages as they rely solely on groundwater for irrigation. Approximately 10 percent of households in Kanditheem depend on growing bananas for their livelihood, with plantation owners relying entirely on groundwater for irrigation, using electric pumps to draw groundwater from the lens. A banana plantation owner said: “If the groundwater becomes too saline, we won’t be able to afford desalinated water for irrigation. This will destroy our crops and income.”
A women’s farming group in Kanditheem said that if the groundwater becomes unusable and they are instead required to pay for water, they will not be able to continue growing bananas as it would become financially unsustainable for them and other small-scale farmers.
NolhivaranfaruIn September 2022, the Maldives government handed over an Integrated Water Resource Management system to Nolhivaranfaru island as part of its joint project with the UNDP and the Green Climate Fund titled “Supporting vulnerable communities in Maldives to manage climate change induced water shortages.” The project’s stated aim is to “secure year-round, safe, reliable, and uninterrupted water supply to residents of the most vulnerable outer islands” in the country.
In July 2024, council workers and island residents from Nolhivaranfaru reported that the system remained incomplete, over a year after the official completion date. They said that poor implementation and oversight of the project and inadequate monitoring of water quality was forcing islanders who could not afford bottled water to rely on existing groundwater and rainwater supplies, even when these were potentially unsafe.
In particular, 66 newly built row houses on Nolhivaranfaru lacked water connections for over two years after the project was launched, forcing residents to rely on groundwater in an area where, as a Nolhivaranfaru council member said, the groundwater is “contaminated” and “foul-smelling.” At an initial sensitization session held by the Green Climate Fund on December 18, 2017, Nolhivaranfaru council members asked specifically whether the project design would include newly built houses, to which a government representative assured them that all new development areas would be covered under the new water network.
“It’s been more than two years since people moved into the row houses, and they still don’t have water connections,” said Abdul Kareem Abdul Rahman, Nolhivarafaru Council vice president.
The design of the rainwater harvesting facilities, a key pillar of the system on Nolhivaranfaru, has also raised concerns among island communities. Rainwater – the primary source of drinking water on Nolhivaranfaru – is captured from government building roofs and directed to the plant, but inadequate infrastructure has resulted in frequent flooding. “The catch pits at government buildings are too small,” Abdul Kareem Abdul Rahman said. “After just an hour or two of rain, they overflow and flood the school and health center.”
Where piped water is available, the water quality has been a major issue, with residents noting visible discoloration, discouraging them from using it. “When the project started, the water was clear. Now it has a color, and no one drinks it without filtering,” a focus group participant said. This distrust is compounded by low capacity at on-site testing facilities and the limited training provided to staff who work at the facilities.
The government has an obligation under international human rights law to ensure that the water available for personal or domestic use in the Maldives is safe and does not constitute a threat to health. According to the World Health Organization’s Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality, water provided should be of an acceptable “taste, odour, and appearance”: a standard that a number of islanders said was often not met.
Much as in Kanditheem, the cost of water – for domestic use as well as for farming – is a pressing issue for families on Nolhivaranfaru. As groundwater supplies become increasingly scarce and saline, and in the absence of a functioning system providing safe water, islanders have felt compelled to resort to more expensive alternatives such as desalinated water and imported bottled water.
“When the groundwater becomes fully saline, we cannot buy piped desalinated water for irrigation,” one resident said “We don’t make much profit already. If we have to pay for water, we will need to stop farming. We can’t afford the water.”
A member of the Nolhivaranfaru council’s women’s development committee said: “We’re already struggling with electricity bills. Adding another bill for water will be a financial burden on many families.”
The vice president of the women’s development committee in Nolhivaranfaru, Aishath Ihusana, said that the rates for piped water were too high for families on the island to afford it.
Lack of Meaningful Consultation and CommunicationIn 2015, the Maldives government submitted its proposal to the Green Climate Fund for the Nolhivaranfaru project. The proposal stated that the government had conducted extensive consultations during development of the project, which brought together “all stakeholders at the island-level.” However, key stakeholders in Nolhivaranfaru said that the consultations were grossly inadequate.
Ihusana said: “Only the project involving the gallery system consulted farmers, but even that wasn’t enough. There wasn’t any meaningful and realistic consultation for the water project undertaken to provide water to households.”
Abdul Kareem Abdul Rahman, said, “there was one meeting for the entire island, and it was too technical. Even we, as council members, don’t fully understand the components of the project.”
Council members also highlighted the continuing inadequate communication by the government with the councils and affected communities. “We’re supposed to represent the community, but even we don’t know the specifics of these projects. There’s no proper communication,” said Ameena Mohamed, a Nolhivaranfaru council member.
The lack of engagement and transparency in decision-making has led to widespread dissatisfaction in both Kanditheem and Nolhivaranfaru among island residents who feel their concerns about water projects have not been taken into consideration.
Inadequate Monitoring and MaintenanceIsland residents said that the piped water in Nolhivaranfaru has visible discoloration, and the lack of fully functional on-site testing facilities, trained staff, and sometimes limited or expired chemical reagents – which are legally required – raise questions about safety. These problems also hinder the ability of plant operators to maintain the systems and perform basic repairs, leading to frequent, lengthy, and ultimately, costly disruptions to the water supply—at times leaving residents without access to piped water for days on end. “We weren’t properly trained, and we don’t have the tools to fix things when they break,” a water plant operator on Kanditheem said. “If something goes wrong, we have to wait for technicians from Malé.”
South Korea: Candidates Should Express Views on Rights
(Seoul) – South Korea’s three major political parties have an opportunity to present their views on key human rights issues prior to the presidential elections scheduled for June 3, 2025, Human Rights Watch said today. To ensure that human rights receive the attention they deserve, Human Rights Watch sent a questionnaire to the Democratic Party of Korea, the People Power Party, and the New Reform Party on May 12, and will publish the responses received by May 20.
“The December 2024 martial law declaration exposed how quickly and easily hard-won rights and freedoms can be put at risk,” said Lina Yoon, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Human Rights Watch’s questionnaire gives the presidential candidates an opportunity to share with the public their positions on the major human rights issues facing South Korea and their proposed reforms.”
The goal of the questionnaire is to encourage the three campaigns to provide South Korean voters with their views on human rights. The questionnaire consists of 16 questions on a range of human rights issues, including emergency powers and democratic safeguards; freedom of expression; discrimination against women, children, older people, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people; digital rights and online safety; environmental rights; the death penalty; and human rights policy toward North Korea.
“We hope that the political parties will carefully explain their human rights positions and policies to assist South Korean voters in making their choices for the next president,” Yoon said.
Nepali Lesbians Harassed While Registering Marriage
After two years together, Ramita and Shilu—both pseudonyms to protect their identities—traveled to Sindhuli this month to register their marriage under Nepal’s June 2023 Supreme Court ruling which allows for same-sex marriages. But instead of recognition, the couple reportedly faced harassment, delays, rejection, and were forcibly separated, with police complicity and family hostility exacerbating their ordeal.
As local officials stalled the registration process, citing uncertainty about legal procedures, Ramita’s family reported her “missing.” Despite Ramita’s insistence that she felt unsafe with her family and wanted to marry Shilu, police handed her over to relatives she described as abusive. According to both women, police mocked their relationship and subjected them to verbal harassment. One officer allegedly made demeaning comments questioning the legitimacy of their relationship.
The 2023 Supreme Court interim order instructed the Nepalese government to create a separate register for marriages between people of the same sex as well as third gender people, who have been recognized in principle based on self-identification for over a decade. The intention was to give queer couples interim legal recognition while the court deliberates a pending marriage equality case. But officials have been inconsistent in applying the order.
Since 2023, a handful of same-sex couples have successfully registered their marriages. Additionally, two same-sex couples in which one partner was Nepali and the other a foreigner were able to obtain spousal visas, but both had to take their cases to the Supreme Court.
Ramita and Shilu’s experience also reflects a broader pattern: lesbian women often face pressure, frequently enforced by their families, to conform to “compulsory heterosexuality,” a societal expectation that women should be in relationships with men. Ramita has said she fears being sent to a faith healer. “Even if you die or become disabled, I’ll still make you marry a man,” her sister-in-law reportedly told her. Shilu remains in fear and grief, unable to contact Ramita, whom she described as being held in a “hostage-like condition” since the attempted registration.
Rights advocates have condemned the incident as a grave human rights violation, calling for immediate protections and an investigation into local authorities’ conduct.
Same-sex couples who want to marry in Nepal have the legal right to do so. But the prolonged period under the interim order and lack of accountability for officials’ actions are undermining Nepal’s reputation as a global LGBT rights leader.
South Sudan: 3 Years On, No Justice for Abuses in Southern Unity
(Nairobi) – South Sudan’s authorities have yet to bring to justice those responsible for brutal and fatal attacks on civilians three years ago in southern Unity state, Human Rights Watch said today.
Between February and May 2022, county officials in Koch and Mayendit in Unity state, with the backing of government forces and local militia groups, carried out a series of systematic and coordinated attacks on civilians and civilian property in opposition-controlled territories mainly in Leer and in parts of Koch and Mayendit. Human Rights Watch research bolsters the findings of the United Nations investigations and ceasefire monitors.
“The lack of meaningful justice for the most serious crimes in southern Unity is giving rise to impunity that drives new cycles of abuse,” said Nyagoah Tut Pur, South Sudan researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Survivors of the horrific violence in southern Unity have lived for years with the consequences and deserve justice.”
The government established a commission of inquiry in April 2022 to investigate the Leer violence, but its findings were never made public. The government dismissed officials implicated in the violence in 2024, but no one has been prosecuted. The government should build on recent efforts to enhance justice in southern Unity and ensure credible prosecutions of those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in 2022.
In May and July 2022, Human Rights Watch interviewed 98 people in Leer county who had been displaced from villages in Leer, Koch, and Mayendit counties. Some were also survivors of previous cycles of violence in Unity state since 2013.
Human Rights Watch found that organized forces including police, army, and wildlife rangers, and local youth militias allied with Koch and Mayendit county officials killed, beat, and raped civilians, and looted livestock and essential goods in opposition-controlled areas in Leer, Koch, and Mayendit between February and April 2022.
The violence was rooted in power struggles between county commissioners of Koch and Mayendit, who oversaw government and allied militia groups, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) commanders and allied militia groups. The opposition also controlled key trade routes and markets, denying these county officials access to tax revenue, which compounded political tensions and fueled the violence.
The violence took place 10 months before elections initially scheduled for December 2022, but postponed to December 2024 and then again to December 2026. Human Rights Watch found that the violence appeared to be designed to weaken the opposition and displace populations deemed to be their supporters.
Human Rights Watch researchers found widespread burning and destruction of civilian homes and property in multiple villages in Leer that appeared to be designed to force displacement and discourage returns. Government allied forces and militias also burned children, older people, and people with disabilities in their homes and targeted civilians, especially men and boys who were attempting to flee or hide.
A woman said she saw government-allied forces force four people, including a woman who was deaf and blind and a man with a psychosocial disability, into a home and then set it on fire. She said all four were burned to death. “They stood by the house with a gun and watched it burn to the ground.”
Government-aligned forces also abducted and subjected women and girls to sexual violence. One woman said she saw five men gang rape two teenage girls in Pillieny on April 9, 2022: “When they finished, they left the younger one, age 13, by the roadside because she was heavily bleeding.”
Under international law, governments are obligated to investigate and prosecute serious crimes such as crimes against humanity and war crimes, ensuring victims’ rights to truth, justice, and an effective remedy while combating impunity.
On April 13, 2022, President Salva Kiir established an ad-hoc investigation committee to look into the “incidents in Koch, Leer, and Mayendit,” but the investigation stalled. The committee did not visit Leer until nearly a year after the events. Committee members met with President Kiir in March 2024 to present their findings, however, the committee’s findings have not been made public.
President Kiir subsequently dismissed state and county officials, some of whom were implicated in the abuses documented by ceasefire monitors, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, and the Leer Investigation Committee, but did not specify the reason for their dismissal.
South Sudanese authorities have not initiated any criminal proceedings to bring to justice those responsible for the grave violations in Leer. On March 15, 2025, authorities with the support of UNMISS deployed a mobile court to Leer to address a decade-long backlog of criminal cases in southern Unity state. While the court can hear cases on charges of murder, rape, and other serious crimes, it does not have jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes or crimes against humanity, meaning that justice for the scope and severity of the crimes in Leer in 2022 would be lost.
South Sudan authorities should take concrete steps to ensure accountability and effective remedies for victims of these most serious crimes. South Sudan’s partners should press the authorities to publish and disseminate the Leer investigation findings and ensure there is a credible, independent process to prosecute those responsible for crimes, Human Rights Watch said.
South Sudan’s leaders agreed in 2018 to carry out a comprehensive transitional justice process to address past atrocities. In September 2024, South Sudan’s parliament passed laws to establish a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing and a Compensation and Reparations Authority but did not move forward with legislation to set up the hybrid AU-South Sudan court which would try the most serious crimes.
The African Union (AU) and the South Sudanese government should take all necessary steps to ensure that the hybrid court is established and begins work to fulfill its important mandate, Human Rights Watch said.
International partners should continue to provide technical and financial support across these transitional justice mechanisms, while holding the South Sudanese government accountable for its commitments to establish the hybrid court.
Recent political tensions have led to a surge in violence in Upper Nile and Western Equatoria, including indiscriminate aerial bombardments on civilians and their forced displacement. On March 8, 2025, President Kiir pledged not to return the country to war. This pledge should come with practical steps to ensure attacks on civilians and other serious abuses stop, and that credible, independent justice processes move ahead with investigations and criminal prosecutions against those responsible for serious crimes, Human Rights Watch said.
“The unchecked violence in Leer was not an isolated event, but part of a recurring cycle of violence that is fueled by impunity,” Pur said. “South Sudan’s leaders need to provide a meaningful justice response to prevent further atrocities, prosecute those responsible, and ensure that survivors can receive adequate redress and start a process of healing.”
For more details regarding abuses in Leer and southern Unity, please see below.
Conflict Dynamics in Leer
Leer county, the birthplace and stronghold of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) historical leader Riek Machar, and home to the Dok people (a section of the Nuer ethnic group), has experienced political unrest, insecurity, and humanitarian challenges since South Sudan’s civil war started mid-December 2013.
Both government forces and the opposition SPLA-IO, carried out fierce large-scale attacks and counterattacks in key towns and positions, often accompanied by grave abuses and other disastrous consequences for civilians by both sides.
In April 2022, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism which monitors South Sudan’s 2018 peace deal documented that commissioners of Koch and Mayendit instigated allied forces, armed youth, and defected opposition soldiers to commit murder, mass rape, and destruction of villages and humanitarian facilities in Leer and Koch between February and April for political and economic reasons. It also found one opposition commander responsible for the violence.
In September 2022, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) reported that between February 11 and May 31, 2022, joint government forces and allied militia attacked civilians during operations against opposition groups in Leer and parts of Koch and Mayendit counties, affecting at least 28 villages and settlements. Approximately 173 civilians were killed and at least 44,000 people were displaced.
UNMISS also documented that women and girls were abducted as spoils of war and that 131 were subjected to sexual violence. UNMISS said it also received reports that the opposition force, the SPLA-IO, also killed, injured, abducted, and raped women and girls in Rubkuay, Mayendit county, and in the town of Koch.
UNMISS said that the violence was part of a long term government objective to increase its control in Unity state and mirrored tactics from past violence.
In April 2023, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (hereinafter referred to as the UN commission)reported that impunity fuels violence in South Sudan with detailed findings from investigations in Leer. It found that government-aligned forces and affiliated militias committed war crimes including killings, widespread sexual violence such as gang rape and sexual slavery, and use of starvation as a method of war, some of which and may also constitute crimes against humanity. The UN commission found that county officials “characterized the Dok Nuer as allies of ‘the enemy’ Riek Machar, the SPLM/A-IO leader,” and that they “must unite to cleanse the SPLM/A-IO from the area and drive out the Dok Nuer civilians in Leer County.”
Attacks on Civilians, February-May 2022
This section draws on UNMISS, the UN commission, and unpublished Human Rights Watch research from May and July 2022, including interviews with 98 victims and witnesses, and with 22 officials, humanitarian actors, and civil society members. A member of the Leer investigation committee and UNMISS were also interviewed in April 2025.
Unlawful Killings, Beatings, Torture, or Ill-Treatment
UNMISS estimated that government aligned forces and aligned militias killed at least 173 civilians during the 2022 attacks. The UN commission reported that killings were intentional, especially targeting males, and included public executions and killing by immolation. It found strong grounds to conclude that the deliberate killings constituted the war crime of murder and may also meet the threshold for crimes against humanity as they appeared to be part of a widespread and systematic attack on civilians.
Human Rights Watch also documented 48 killings including at-risk populations such as older people, people with disabilities, and children.
Families often left older people and people with disabilities behind, believing that they would be spared but a chief in Gandor said that government forces and aligned militias killed Baad Gatjang a 28-year-old shopkeeper and farmer with a mental health condition: “He was left behind when people fled. They shot him near his grandmother’s house. No one could bury him for two days because people had fled.”
A woman in her 70s with a visual disability was also left behind by her family. “We told the old woman to stay as we thought no one would harm her,” a family member said. “In the evening, I returned and found the house burned and the old lady burned to death.”
Witnesses in Buow told researchers that government forces and aligned militias killed three people: Geah Bul Buoy, a fisherman in his late 50s; 28-year-old Tut Puot Jal, a teacher in Buow primary school; and a blind woman in her late 70s. Witnesses in Yang said they found the bodies of two women in their 80s, Nyanong Row and Duany Deang, burned inside their home following attacks by government forces.
A woman from Adok, who was also gang raped, said she saw public executions by hanging and other abuses: “Those who refused to walk were hanged or beaten. I saw two men hanged from the tree. They were in their 40s. They also hanged two women from a tree; one was my age. An 18-year-old man was beaten severely and left for dead.”
Violence Against Women, Girls
Both UN bodies found that sexual violence was widespread and systematically used as a tactic of war. UNMISS documented 131 cases of rape that included numerous instances of gang rape. The UN commission found that sexual violence was planned and tolerated by commanders and used as a tool to punish the opposing community. It documented that government forces and aligned militias abducted dozens of women, including women who were pregnant and breast-feeding, some for sexual slavery. It also reported that 11 children were abducted.
Human Rights Watch researchers spoke to six survivors of sexual violence and multiple people who had witnessed rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, unlawful killings, and other abuses. Service providers told researchers that girls as young as 8 and women as old as 72 were raped.
One woman in her 50s said that she fled her home in Thonyor and spent four days hiding in the swamps and rivers along with other women. On April 11, 2022, government aligned forces captured her and seven other women as they fetched food and other essential items from their homes.
Two men raped her and then made her carry jerricans of cooking oil and buckets of washing powder 45 kilometers to a government camp in Pilliny. She witnessed and heard about rape, gang rape, and sexual slavery of other women and girls at the camp, including that of her 26-year-old niece:
Women were sitting in groups, some under trees, others in their homes. [The attackers] would just come and pick whoever they wanted. [Their leaders] would not stop them or even advise them to stop what they were doing. I saw six women and a breastfeeding mother being raped…. I met four breastfeeding mothers, whom I knew, three from Yang and one from Thonyor. All of them said they had been in the camp for two days and raped more than once. Every day they were there, anyone could rape them.
The woman from Adok said that on April 9 government allied forces set fire to the reeds where she was hiding and that five of them then gang raped her: “They pinned me down and pointed a gun at me. They didn’t even say a word. They beat me and raped me one after another.”
Another woman said that she was five months pregnant in February 2022 when government aligned forces caught her. They made her carry bags of sorghum from her village in Padeah to their base in Mirmir and beat her with sticks and tree branches, causing her to miscarry.
Destruction and Pillage of Food, Civilian Properties
UNMISS found that joint government forces and aligned militias engaged in widespread pillage and burning of civilian property. In some cases, attackers conducted house to house searches, stole valuables, and then burned dwellings. The UN commission found that government-aligned forces deliberately used starvation as a method of war and that fighters were rewarded with pillaged resources.
Human Rights Watch also found that government forces and allied youth militias burned homes and, in some cases, even entire villages as they moved through the southern part of Leer. People interviewed said that government forces and allied militias burned the food they did not loot. A woman from Rupjiech village said:
They took everything from my house. They took 3 sacks of sorghum, 20 goats, and one bag of maize, and burned my two houses and one kitchen. They also took all my clothes and utensils. They left the house empty. They beat me … and accused me of hiding food. They were hitting me with gumboots, slapping, and kicking me. They then ordered me to carry for them what they had taken from my house to [their base in] Mirmir.
Government and aligned militias stole tens of thousands of cattle and deliberately targeted civilians fleeing with livestock, effectively destroying the community’s livelihood. In mid-May 2022, allied youth targeted Muom, where displaced people had fled, with the purpose of raiding cattle. They also killed 9 civilians and injured 11, including a child. As a direct result of the attacks, many people said they could barely manage to put together one meal a day and others said they were plucking, cooking, and eating water lilies, roots, and wild fruits.
Attacks on Aid
UNMISS found that at least 18 facilities in at least 9 locations providing lifesaving assistance to vulnerable populations were pillaged and/or burned. The UN commission concluded that government-aligned forces pursued a strategy to deprive civilians of assistance and create conditions of starvation and dependence.
Human Rights Watch also documented the looting and destruction of warehouses, stores, and healthcare centers run by aid agencies and spoke to dozens of civilians who were made to carry the looted items to government and allied youth camps and bases. Researchers found that government-aligned militias killed at least two aid workers and injured another.
A local group that provides health and nutrition services said that government fighters ransacked and destroyed eight of their primary health care facilities during the April 2022 attacks.
Three local workers for nongovernmental groups in Leer said that seeing their colleagues killed and injured, as well as the challenging working conditions took a toll on their mental health.
Impunity Unchecked
Despite the gravity of events in Leer, neither the state nor the central government has taken meaningful steps to ensure criminal accountability for those responsible.
The UNMISS-backed peace dialogue meetings, including one in October 2022 involving commissioners from Leer, Koch, and Mayendit, paved way for reconciliation but did not end abuses. By November 2023, attacks on SPLA-IO positions by a splinter group led to renewed displacement and reported arbitrary detention of civilians. The UN commission later warned of ongoing risks due to unresolved power struggles and government efforts to orchestrate defections.
The United Kingdom, European Union, and United States issued sanctions against Gatluak Nyang, Mayendit county commissioner, and Koang Biel, Koch county commissioner. The United States also sanctioned Unity state governor Joseph Nguen Monytuil.
In May 2024, President Kiir replaced governor Monytuil with Justice Riek Bim Top, who implemented a number of rule of law reforms and directed county officials to curb violence or face dismissal.
In June 2024, President Kiir replaced Nyang as commissioner for Mayendit and dismissed Biel from his position in December 2024.
In April 2025, the state government—in cooperation with UNMISS—deployed a mobile court to Leer, to prosecute ordinary crimes and reduce rampant violence and insecurity.
Justice System in Leer
Rule of law institutions in Leer, as in many other places in South Sudan, are largely nonexistent. The police have very limited capacity and there is no prosecutor, judge, or court. Customary authorities handle most matters but in serious cases suspects must be transported to Bentiu, the state capital, for any formal judicial process. A burned and rusted shipping container, which was also the site of a massacre of Nuer men and boys in 2015 by government forces, serves as the prison.
Leer Investigation Committee
The Leer Investigation Committee suffered from similar shortcomings as other government-appointed investigation committees. It did not begin work until March 2023, a year after the events, and although it concluded its report in April 2023, it did not present its findings to President Kiir until March 2024. The committee reportedly recommended, among other actions, removing the officials responsible for abuses from their positions. The findings of the report, however, have never been made public.
UN-led Mobile Court in Leer
On April 15, 2025, the state government—in cooperation with UNMISS—deployed a mobile court in Leer which addressed 57 civil and criminal cases including murder, rape, theft, committed in Leer, Koch, Mayendit, and Panyijiar counties.
While the mobile court provides temporary relief to communities without access to the formal justice system, it does not have jurisdiction to prosecute serious international crimes such as war crimes or crimes against humanity.
A UN official told Human Rights Watch in April 2025 that he was not aware if formal complaints linked to the violence against civilians during the 2022 conflict had been filed, but that the UN was making efforts to encourage reporting such cases, including gender-based violence and particularly conflict-related sexual violence, and that fear of retaliation continues to limit disclosures.
To be effective, mobile courts should form part of a broader strategy to strengthen the rule of law, including building the state’s capacity to investigate and prosecute serious crimes under national and international law in a credible manner, and to protect victims, Human Rights Watch said. In this regard, the government should implement the recommendations of the Judicial Reform Committee report, submitted to the President Kiir in December 2024. The report, prepared by jurists from South Sudan and the region, offers practical and noncontentious reforms.
Transitional Justice
South Sudan has made incremental progress in implementing transitional justice mechanisms outlined in the 2018 Revitalized Agreement. In September 2024, parliament passed the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (CTRH) Act and the Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA) Act, with President Kiir signing both laws in November.
In September, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs issued a two-year strategic plan focusing on promoting human rights, harmonizing national laws with regional standards, and establishing institutions such as an independent public prosecution office and a legal training institute, as well as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. But in March, President Kiir fired Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister Ruben Madol, who had championed transitional justice and other human rights reforms.
In February 2025, the Justice Ministry called on the AU and UN to nominate their members to the Truth and Reconciliation commission. On April 18, media reported that the government was still waiting for the lists.
Despite these legislative advancements, the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, intended to prosecute serious crimes from the conflict period, remains stalled.
The establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing and the Compensation and Reparations Authority, and eventually the Hybrid Court is vital to addressing atrocities like those committed in southern Unity in 2022. Delivering justice for such crimes not only meets the rights of victims and their families but also sets a critical precedent: signaling that future abuses will not go unpunished and helping to break South Sudan’s entrenched cycle of impunity.
2025 Human Rights Roadmap for the African Union
On March 13, 2025, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf took office as the new African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson, the AU’s chief executive officer and legal representative, following his election at the 38th AU summit in mid-February. His election provides an opportunity for member states and AU organs to assess the record of the regional body in protecting and promoting human rights across the continent under his predecessor, Moussa Faki Mahamat, and take urgent action to better address key human rights issues.
In 2025, Angolan President João Lourenço is taking the rotating role of AU Chairperson, tasked with addressing peace and security across the continent, among other issues. While the Angolan presidency announced that it would cease its mediation work in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo on March 24, Lourenço should center human rights protection in other regional peace efforts as AU Chairperson.
This policy brief draws on Human Rights Watch research and engagement with the AU, notably during Mahamat’s second term from 2021 to 2025. Considering the proliferation of armed conflicts in Africa, with devastating consequences for civilians, the policy brief focuses primarily on civilian protection issues. It sets out policy recommendations to AU organs to urgently address grave violations and abuses of international humanitarian and human rights law in conflicts in Burkina Faso, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
The brief also covers issues across the continent related to the AU’s 2025 theme of reparations to address the ongoing impacts of historical crimes, as well as the defense of civil and political rights.
Failure of the AU to Prevent Atrocities and Protect Civilians in Conflicts
Warring parties in ongoing conflicts in Burkina Faso, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Sudan have committed serious violations and abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law. These conflicts are fueled by the near total impunity for abuses that have caused immense suffering to civilians. The AU has failed to address these crises with decisive action to protect civilians.
The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) established new mechanisms to tackle the Sudan crisis, including with a view to ensuring accountability, which are yet to yield significant results. In addition, it has given too little attention to the other extremely worrying crises in the Sahel, the Horn, and the Great Lakes regions.
Sudan
Over 12 million people are internally displaced while around 24.6 million face acute food insecurity since the armed conflict in the country between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias broke out two years ago in April 2023. This has created the world’s biggest current humanitarian catastrophe. Famine is present in at least five areas in Sudan, including in North Darfur’s Zamzam camp and parts of the Western Nuba Mountains, and is expected to spread to other parts of the country according to the UN.
Human Rights Watch has extensively documented violations and abuses by all parties throughout the conflict. The RSF and allies have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, including widespread killings, sexual violence, and targeting of civilian property, some of which constitute war crimes. In addition, the RSF and allied militias committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in a campaign of ethnic cleansing in West Darfur. The SAF has indiscriminately bombed populated areas, committed acts of sexual violence, summary executions, and tortured detainees. Both parties willfully obstructed aid – in violation of their obligations under international humanitarian law.
Human Rights Watch has called for the AU to deploy an UN-backed civilian protection mission under article 4(h) of the AU’s constitutive act, allowing it to intervene in a member state “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”
Despite efforts to take the lead on the international response to the crisis in Sudan, the AU has fallen far short, including by failing to follow through on its own commitments.
Shortly after hostilities began in April 2023, then-AUC Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat convened a high-level meeting, which resulted in the creation of the Expanded Mechanism for the crisis in Sudan, a common platform that includes non-African countries and international organizations.
On May 27, 2023, the PSC adopted a Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan, with the stated aims of securing a ceasefire, ensuring the protection of civilians, and promoting respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. The roadmap stated that the Expanded Mechanism on Sudan “should monitor the conduct of hostilities and draw the attention of the Parties to acts that breach [international humanitarian law], with a view, at the minimum, to preventing further violations.”
The Expanded Mechanism has yet to publicly report on its monitoring activities which, if any at all, have failed to deter ongoing atrocities. In addition, despite identifying civilian protection as a pilar of the Roadmap, the PSC did not include concrete measures to protect civilians.
In May 2024, the PSC requested the previously established High-Level Panel on Sudan to collaborate with the AU special envoy for the prevention of genocide, H.E. Adama Dieng, to develop a strategy to stop atrocities and protect civilians. In June, the PSC reiterated this request and further requested the AUC to set up a committee of five heads of state to facilitate engagement between the warring parties. It also requested the AUC, in coordination with the ACHPR, to investigate and make recommendations to protect civilians.
In September, the PSC repeated commitments to “exploring practical measures to ensure protection of all Sudanese civilians,” without defining a timeline for implementing its proposals nor following up on previous requests to the High-Level Panel on civilian protection.
In October, PSC representatives undertook a visit to Port Sudan during which they raised international law violations and “emphasized the importance of … protection of civilians” but did not take any tangible step in that direction.
While Sudan was on the PSC’s agenda at the 38th AU Summit, AU leaders focused largely on the AUC chairperson election and failed to take any meaningful decision aimed at protecting civilians or deterring abuses.
At its latest meeting on Sudan, on March 11, 2025, the PSC took no significant further action to address the situation.
As of today, the High-Level Panel has yet to present its civilian protection strategy as requested by the PSC, if any, and the Committee of five heads of state created in June, whose first meeting in October 2024 was canceled, took no concrete decision.
While encouraging, the AU’s initial steps and renewed public condemnations of grave abuses in Sudan, including during the October annual joint PSC and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting, have not translated into tangible measures to protect civilians. Yet, atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence, are persisting in a context of near total impunity in Sudan.
The ACHPR is yet to share recommendations to protect civilians as requested by the PSC. According to members of the joint fact-finding mission on Sudan, established by the ACHPR in August 2024, the mission has faced challenges in carrying out its investigative mandate into rights abuses and violations, including because of a lack of financial resources, lack of consent from the Sudanese authorities to access Sudan, and the reluctance of neighboring countries’ to grant the mission access. Members of the mission had said during a press conference on January 20, 2025, that they would start their investigative work remotely if they did not get access to Sudan or its neighboring countries.
Recommendations:
The PSC should take steps at its next meeting to roll out a comprehensive civilian protection mission in Sudan. The Committee of Five Heads of State and the PSC should place the protection of human rights and international humanitarian law at the heart of their engagements with the warring parties and urge them to abide by the laws of war and take all measures feasible to protect civilians. The AUC, Committee of Five, and PSC should urge both the SAF and RSF to cease obstructing aid and facilitate its access and delivery throughout Sudan, particularly in areas experiencing famine. The PSC should urge the High-Level Panel on Sudan to share its proposals to deter atrocities and protect civilians at its next meeting. The AUC, Committee of Five, and PSC should support the preservation of evidence of serious crimes under international law, including through providing substantive financial and political support to the ACHPR-mandated fact-finding mission on Sudan to ensure it has the resources and legitimacy to effectively carry out its mandate. The AUC, Committee of Five, and PSC should work together to ensure the Sudanese authorities and neighboring countries grant the ACHPR-mandated fact-finding mission access into Sudan and neighboring countries. The AUC and the PSC should integrate accountability for serious international crimes into their response to the crisis in Sudan. The fact-finding mission on Sudan should provide an update on its investigation work during the ongoing 83rd ACHPR ordinary session.Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso’s human rights situation significantly deteriorated throughout 2024. Islamist armed groups increased deadly attacks against civilians while government security forces and allied militias perpetrated gross human rights violations in counterinsurgency operations, including crimes against humanity.
Islamist armed groups control large swathes of territory in Burkina Faso and carry out attacks in neighboring countries. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), an estimated 6,000 civilians died in conflict-related violence between January and August 2024 alone. ACLED and Human Rights Watch documentation, however, only captured a fraction of the violence against civilians, as insecurity and government restrictions on independent scrutiny result in underreporting.
The military authorities have relied heavily on abusive militias to counter attacks from Islamist armed groups. In October 2022, the government began a campaign to bolster these militias by recruiting 50,000 civilian auxiliaries, called Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie, VDPs). This strategy has placed civilians at the center of violence. It further exacerbated tensions between ethnic communities while Islamist armed groups targeted civilians in communities that have created VDPs. In March 2025, extensive video footage and witness accounts collected by Human Rights watch revealed that pro-government militias have been implicated in a massacre of Fuani civilians in and around the western city of Solenzo.
The AU has not taken decisive action to protect civilians in Burkina Faso and appears to have bought into the authorities’ claims that they have been respecting international human rights and humanitarian law and are improving the country’s security situation.
From July 22 to 27, 2023, members of the PSC conducted a field mission to Burkina Faso, including to assess the security situation. The PSC’s mission report notes systematic attacks by Islamist armed groups against civilians in the country but does not explicitly cite abuses by state forces and allied militias. It further mentions that the government has established human rights compliance measures within military forces.
In the August 2023 communique that followed its mission to Burkina Faso, the PSC commended the authorities for “improving [the] security situation through fighting against terrorism.” However, Human Rights Watch has documented an upsurge in Islamist armed groups’ atrocities, which have escalated their assault on civilians from 2023 through 2024. Abuses by security forces and allied militias have also persisted.
The PSC mission report also flagged restrictions on civic space, urging the authorities to lift a ban on political parties’ activities to ensure an inclusive political transition.
In April 2024, the PSC commended the convening of the High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting, which highlighted the urgent need to tackle terrorism in the Sahel. In October, during their annual joint meeting, both the UNSC and the PSC underscored “the need for accountability for any violations” and the importance of “enhancing good governance and human rights” to prevent the spread of terrorism in the Sahel. This affirmation that impunity does indeed constitute a key driver for abuses across the Sahel is important, and makes it imperative that the PSC takes concrete action to press for accountability and enhance human rights in the region.
In 2023, the ACHPR called on the Burkinabè authorities to open an investigation into the November 2023 mass killings of civilians in Zaongo. The ACHPR requested the authorities to provide an update on investigations into serious international crimes and raised allegations of other abuses during Burkina Faso’s state reporting review in October 2024.
The AU mandated a Mali-based mission to implement its strategy on the Sahel and monitor the human rights situation in the region, including in Burkina Faso.
Burkina Faso effectively left ECOWAS in early 2025, eliminating the possibility for its nationals to seek justice through the regional body’s court.
In March, the AU’s envoy for the prevention of mass atrocities, Adama Dieng, described the massacre of civilians in Solenzo as “a flagrant violation of human rights.” No other AU or international body has publicly reacted on the atrocities.
Recommendations:
The AU should urgently call for an extraordinary session to address the conflict in the Sahel region, including widespread human rights abuses against civilians committed by all warring parties in Burkina Faso. The ACHPR, PSC, and AUC should urge Burkinabè authorities to ensure their counterinsurgency operations prioritize the protection of civilians and align with the Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa, including by publicly denouncing abuses and pressing national authorities to prosecute those responsible for grave international crimes. The ACHPR should carry out an investigation into rights violations and abuses in the context of the conflict in the Sahel, including in Burkina Faso, with a view of issuing recommendations to protect civilians and hold perpetrators to account. The MISAHEL should publicly report on the findings and recommendations resulting from its monitoring activities. It should also regularly provide updates to the PSC, including on ongoing national investigations into international crimes. The PSC should hold regular meetings on the situation in the Sahel region and request briefings from the ACHPR on the human rights situation in Burkina Faso, including on any accountability-related measures.Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
From 2021 through 2025, the M23 armed group, supported by the Rwandan military, has pursued its offensive in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo against Congolese security forces and an allied coalition of abusive militias called “Wazalendo” (Swahili for “patriots”). All parties to the conflict have carried out serious international humanitarian law violations, with grave consequences for civilians.
In 2024, Rwandan forces and M23 fighters indiscriminately shelled displacement camps and other densely populated areas near Goma, North Kivu’s capital. The Congolese army placed artillery positions and other military objectives close to the camps, putting civilians at unnecessary risk. Both sides perpetrated abuse against camp residents, including sexual violence.
In renewed fighting in 2025, the M23 and Rwandan forces captured Goma on January 27, and Bukavu, South Kivu’s capital, on February 16, heightening the risk faced by civilians and critically increasing humanitarian needs. In North and South Kivu provinces, M23 fighters have raided homes, made death threats, and threatened reprisals, undermining independent media and the work of civil society groups. M23 fighters have also detained civil society leaders and committed summary executions.
Human Rights Watch has called on the Rwandan forces and the M23 to ensure that civilians in eastern Congo, including displaced people, are not denied access to items essential for their survival.
The AU-backed Nairobi and Luanda Processes
The AU continually relied on subregional initiatives to address the crisis in eastern Congo, including the Nairobi and Luanda processes, under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), respectively.
Both initiatives were launched in 2022, with similar ambitions to put an end to hostilities through diplomatic avenues. They have focused mainly on mediation, with no tangible measures to protect civilians despite persisting conflict-related abuses, and stalled without yielding significant results.
The EAC-led Nairobi process was established during an April 2022 meeting between heads of state of the regional body. It includes a political track focusing on facilitating dialogue between warring parties, and a military aspect, which resulted in the deployment of troops “to help contain local and foreign armed groups” in November 2022. The EAC eventually withdrew its troops in December 2023. Tensions between Kenya and Congo and other issues have stalled the Nairobi process.
The Luanda process, aimed to mediate discussions between the Congolese and Rwandan governments, was established in the context of the ICGLR roadmap on the pacification process in the eastern region of the DRC (known as the Luanda roadmap) adopted in Luanda, Angola, on July 6, 2022, under the mediation of Angolan President João Lourenço. The process led to a ceasefire agreement in July 2024, but it was soon violated, months before a proposed meeting in December between President Paul Kagame and President Félix Tshisekedi was called off. Angola has since withdrawn from mediation efforts in the conflict.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also carried out efforts to address the crisis in eastern Congo, including deploying troops in support of the Congolese army in December 2023. The UN also maintains a peacekeeping presence in eastern Congo.
Other regional initiatives include the Quadripartite Summit of the EAC, ICGLR, SADC, and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), with UN participation, which the AU held in Luanda on June 27, 2023. The summit is said to have stemmed from the “need for a harmonized and coordinated approach […] to address the various security threats facing the Great Lakes Region.” Representatives from both Congolese and Rwandan governments participated. Participants adopted a joint framework aimed at coordinating existing peace initiatives “with a clear division of responsibilities and agreed timelines,” including creating a core group to foster information sharing and reporting to the PSC on a quarterly basis.
Chiefs of Defense from the participating organizations’ member states, Congo, and Rwanda convened in October 2023 as requested at the Quadripartite summit to further coordinate military activities in eastern Congo. No other Quadripartite Summit has been convened since then, whereas the deployment of several forces in eastern Congo calls for continued coordination of military activities, including ahead of the UN peacekeeping mission’s withdrawal requested by Congolese authorities.
The AU, including the PSC, has not explicitly called out abuses by all warring parties. In addition, it is yet to explicitly denounce Rwanda’s direct support to the abusive M23 armed group, despite clear evidence. Other partners of Rwanda have publicly called out its clear involvement with the M23 and some have adopted sanctions.
Regional Responses since Renewed Fighting in 2025
The renewed hostilities in late January prompted condemnation from the AUC. On January 28, the PSC also condemned the “heinous attacks by the M23” in its capture of Goma, and “any foreign military support being provided to M23 and any other armed group,” thus persisting in its unwillingness to explicitly name Rwanda’s support to the M23. The PSC mandated the AUC to immediately carry out a fact-finding mission to assess the situation.
The PSC also stated that “those concerned [in heinous attacks] will be held accountable for their actions” but it neither identified clear accountability avenues nor took any tangible steps in that direction. Impunity for abuses has been a key driver for ongoing cycles of abuses in Congo.
On February 8, EAC and SADC leaders met during a joint summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and decided to merge the Luanda and Nairobi processes. The summit did not address abuses committed by all parties and did not call out Rwanda’s support to the M23.
At the 38th AU Summit, African leaders did not take decisive action on eastern Congo and further failed to explicitly condemn Rwanda’s backing to the M23. Members of the PSC met at the heads of state level on February 14 but still took no strong decision to address the crisis. They did not follow up on previous announcements to carry out a fact-finding mission, disregarding steps requested by civil society. AU leaders, however, endorsed the merging of the Nairobi and Luanda processes.
On March 13, SADC announced the phased withdrawal of its troops, but reaffirmed its commitment to supporting peace in Congo.
On March 17, EAC and SADC ministers of defense agreed on a roadmap detailing measures to achieve peace in eastern DRC. On March 24, EAC and SADC leaders held a second joint summit directing the implementation of the roadmap and appointed five former presidents as members of a panel tasked with facilitating talks between Rwanda and Congo. The panel met for the first time on April 5, mainly to discuss the implementation of the roadmap.
On March 24, the Angolan presidency also announced ending its mediation role with regard to the conflict in eastern Congo, to focus on other priorities set up as part of their AU chairperson mandate.
The ACHPR has raised alarm about the situation facing civilians, including internally displaced people, and exhorted the Congolese government to put an end to impunity for all perpetrators of “acts of violence.” The human rights body is however yet to take strong action to address conflict-related abuses in eastern Congo, including investigating abuses and rights violations by all parties. Its statement following the M23’s Goma capture denounced abuses by non-state actors but was silent on Congolese and Rwandan forces’ responsibility for abuses.
Recommendations:
PSC, EAC, SADC, and ICGLR officials should press Rwandan forces and the M23 armed group to urgently ensure access to and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians, including displaced people, across North and South Kivu. The AUC, ACHPR, and PSC should explicitly call out Rwanda’s support to the abusive M23 armed group and Congo’s support to a coalition of abusive armed groups and denounce all warring parties responsible for abuses and rights violations. The AUC and PSC should ensure all regional peace initiatives and mechanisms center the protection of civilians and accountability for conflict-related abuses. The PSC should establish and set a timeline for the deployment of the fact-finding mission to assess the crisis as announced during its meeting on January 28 and clarify how it should coordinate with other regional peace initiatives. The AUC should urgently hold a new Quadripartite Summit to coordinate ongoing military operations, including to ensure that all initiatives have strong civilian protection and accountability components. The PSC should hold regular meetings on the situation in eastern Congo and seek briefing on the human rights situation from the ACHPR, the AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, and the UN Group of experts on Congo, with a view of enhancing civilian protection and developing an accountability plan. The five former presidents appointed as co-facilitators by the SADC and EAC should center the protection of international human rights and international humanitarian law and civilian protection in their engagement with Rwanda and Congo.Ethiopia
In Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, the two-year conflict between the federal government and allied forces, including Eritrean forces, against Tigrayan fighters, resulted in widespread and serious violations, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. In November 2022, warring parties signed an AU-led cessation of hostilities agreement that effectively ended active hostilities in the region. The warring parties have, however, continued to carry out abuses after signing the truce.
The AU established a monitoring mechanism to oversee the agreement. The AU’s efforts focused mainly on the disarmament of Tigrayan fighters, did not include gender or human rights monitors, and failed to provide regular, comprehensive public reporting on persistent violations in Tigray. In Western Tigray, authorities and Amhara regional forces and militias known as Fano have continued an ethnic cleansing campaign and forcibly expelled Tigrayans while Eritrean forces carried out killings, sexual violence, abductions, and impeded the work of AU monitors.
The AUC’s celebration of the anniversary of the agreement in March 2024 was thus hasty in the face of continued abuses.
The November 2022 agreement outlined measures to implement the Ethiopian government’s commitment to create a transitional justice policy aimed at “accountability, truth, redress, reconciliation, and healing.” Since then, the Ethiopian authorities have gradually weakened international involvement in the transitional justice process and shrunk the national civic space. This curtailed opportunities for objective scrutiny into the process, and to assess the transitional justice policy’s compliance with regional standards, including the AU’s transitional justice framework. It is unclear if the process will ensure the prosecution of perpetrators of grave abuses during the conflict in fair trials.
The ACHPR prematurely terminated the mandate of its Commission of Inquiry on Tigray, established in May 2021 to investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Tigray and identify perpetrators for accountability purposes. The Commission never published a report of its findings and recommendations despite some two years of work, setting a dangerous precedent for other ACHPR-mandated investigations.
The PSC has still not paid enough attention to other conflict-affected areas in Ethiopia, including in the Amhara region, where armed conflict broke out between Ethiopian government forces and Fano militia in August 2023 and is ongoing. The UN, human rights groups, and the media have reported on war crimes in Amhara, including unlawful attacks on civilians, summary killings, unlawful drone strikes, attacks on and unlawful use of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and mass arrests without due process. Fighting persists in the region and has triggered a human rights and humanitarian crisis in Amhara and the country more broadly, yet few of Ethiopia’s regional and international partners have responded or weighed in on the situation.
Recommendations:
The PSC should hold regular meetings on the human rights and humanitarian situation in conflict-affected parts of the country, including Amhara, Tigray, and Oromia regions, with a view to taking measures to protect civilians and ensuring accountability. The AUC, ACHPR and PSC should urge warring parties to abide by international humanitarian and human rights law and publicly condemn violations. The PSC should urge warring parties in Amhara to ensure civilians are not denied access to goods and essential services, notably by condemning attacks on healthcare, and take all feasible steps to facilitate the safe passage of civilians seeking to leave areas under their control. The AUC and PSC should closely oversee the November 2022 agreement, including providing public reporting on persistent rights violations in Tigray. The AUC, ACHPR, and PSC should urge the Ethiopian government to allow independent scrutiny and participation, including from national civil society and regional and international experts, into its transitional justice process to ensure it aligns with regional and international standards and delivers on transparent, meaningful, and credible accountability. The AUC and the PSC should urge the ACHPR to release the report of the terminated Commission of Inquiry on Tigray.Inability of the AU to Fully Uphold Civil and Political Rights
Under Mahamat’s second term and throughout 2024, authorities in several African countries undermined the rule of law and respect for civil and political rights, including during elections. Several governments have shown growing aversion to dissent and have worked to eliminate independent scrutiny into their rights record and abuses, restricting the lawful activities of real or perceived critics, with mixed reaction from the AU.
In 2024, civil society members, peaceful protesters, political opponents, and journalists have faced brutal crackdowns, including killings, abductions, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions at least in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, DR Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Security forces have used excessive force to disperse peaceful protests, at times killing demonstrators or bystanders, including in Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda.
Governments in Eswatini, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe used the judiciary to bring politically motivated cases against the opposition and independent civil society. Authorities have also enacted laws or taken administrative measures to restrict the lawful activities of critics. Governments suspended prominent rights organizations and parties in Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Mali, while authorities in Angola, Burkina Faso, and Niger adopted security-related laws that did not comply with international standards and pose a risk to basic freedoms.
Those seeking to independently denounce abuses or question government policies continue to face dire repression in Africa, in violation of regional norms and standards. Governments have used both legal and illegal means to target critics, with detrimental consequences for democratic engagement on the continent overall.
In 2024, the ACHPR indicated that enforced disappearances remain “a major concern” in Africa and investigated cases of alleged extrajudicial executions in the context of security or law enforcement operations. It flagged individual cases of targeted critics, denounced pervasive impunity for abuses facing human rights defenders, and requested authorities of concerned countries to conduct investigations into alleged abuses. Its requests have met with limited results.
Outbreaks of violence linked to mass protests prompted condemnation from the AUC chairperson, including in the context of protests in Kenya and Mozambique. While such high-level AU condemnations are important, the AU should go further and follow up with authorities to ensure those implicated in abuses are prosecuted in credible and impartial trials.
Elections in Chad, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Tanzania were conducted in environments widely viewed as neither free nor fair, with authorities severely restricting opponents, media, and voters’ rights. Military juntas that obtained power through coups in countries whose AU membership was subsequently withdrawn, including in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, did not transition to civilian rule and instead further entrenched their hold on power.
The AU’s response to unfair elections and military coups has been underwhelming, often failing to appropriately address related abuses or press juntas to return to civilian rule promptly.
For instance, on July 23, 2024, the AUC chairperson congratulated Rwandan authorities for the “conduct of the elections judged to be peaceful, transparent, free and fair” despite their crackdown ahead of the polls. During a July 2024 meeting on a report from the AU Commission on Elections in Africa, the PSC “congratulated” states for “successfully” organizing elections, including Chad. Human Rights Watch found, however, that violence marred the electoral process in the country, including the killing of civilians by security forces who celebrated Mahamat Idriss Déby’s victory by shooting their weapons randomly across urban areas. The PSC further reiterated the “AU’s total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government,” without naming any specific country or taking any strong decisions to press coup leaders to return to civilian rule besides the usual cursory calls.
In May 2024, the PSC held a meeting on political transitions in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger where it expressed concern over “shrinking political and civic spaces.” It called on the authorities to return to civilian rule based on their roadmaps, but failed to comment on the lack of transparency surrounding the processes that established roadmaps, including exclusion of civil society.
Recommendations:
The ACHPR and AUC should work together to come up with an AU declaration on the protection of human rights defenders in Africa. The AUC and PSC, in collaboration with sub-regional blocs, should support the speedy ratification of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance by all member states. The AU should strengthen the independence of African human rights institutions and adopt measures to protect regional human rights institutions from interference or political control by member states. The AUC should urge members states to respect fundamental freedoms, including during elections and mass protests, through stronger actions, including systematically calling out human rights violations and abuses and pressing for accountability. The AUC and ACHPR should press member states to review and reform their military and security institutions in accordance with the Guidelines for the policing of assemblies by law enforcement officials in Africa, to ensure these institutions fully respect and promote human rights and do not undermine freedom of expression and association. The PSC should ensure roadmaps to civilian rule in countries in political transition are developed through inclusive processes that allow for meaningful civil society and other stakeholders participation and appreciation.
Reparations: Centering Victims of Historical Crimes and their Descendants
Upon deciding its 2025 annual theme of “Justice for Africans and People of African Descent through Reparations,” the AU stated that it expected to “build a common and united front for the cause of justice […] and reparations to Africans,” both on the continent and in the diaspora, for historical crimes and mass atrocities, including transatlantic-enslavement, colonialism, and apartheid. The stated objectives of the theme include:
Operationalizing reparations as an AU flagship project, which are key initiatives under Agenda 2063; stablishing a committee of experts tasked with defining an African common position on reparations; and enhancing the capacity of member states and regional economic communities to mainstream reparations in their policies.Through this theme, the AU seeks to coordinate different initiatives from its organs to advance reparatory justice, raising hope that the AU and its member states will shift the dynamic of how the ongoing impacts of historical wrongs and their profound and ongoing legacies are currently addressed. Until now, affected communities in Africa and the diaspora have been the main catalysts of any reparations efforts to seek accountability from the governments of European countries responsible for abuses during colonization and their legacies. European governments’ refusal to recognize a right to reparations for abuses with continuing impact has resulted in few meaningful processes, which have excluded communities.
Human Rights Watch documented how, over 50 years ago, the Indigenous peoples of the Chagos archipelago were forcibly displaced from their islands by the United Kingdom, with support from the United States. The two governments have since then denied them the right to return to live on the Islands, which constitutes an ongoing colonial crime against humanity.
The Mauritius government is currently negotiating a treaty with the UK on the status of the Chagos Islands. In October 2024, the AUC chairperson commended the apparent decision to grant Mauritius sovereignty over the islands, which it described as a “major victory for the cause of Decolonization.” The AUC chairperson however failed to mention the imperative of the meaningful participation of the Chagossian people or their right to reparations, including to return to their homeland.
In its 2024 and 2023 reports, the ACHPR’s Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities and Minorities in Africa did not mention the Chagossians.
In the lead up to its 38th Summit, the AU had indicated that reparations included a wide range of initiatives aimed at addressing past wrongdoings, including financial reparations and land restitution, raising hope that the AU will lend its weight to ensure the Chagossians can permanently return to their homeland in addition to receiving full compensation for the loss and harm they have endured.
Recommendations :
The AU’s common position on reparations:
The proposed AU committee of experts on reparations should adopt a human rights and victim-centered approach to reparations. It should seek input from victims and descendants of victims of historical crimes in a truly inclusive process to ensure that the AU’s position reflects the needs and aspirations of those whose rights are violated. The AU should support affected communities on the African continent and in the diaspora in their struggle for reparations to seek accountability for past and present impacts of historical wrongs. In its relations with the European Union, including the European Union-African Union summit scheduled for June 2025, the AU should place reparations high on the agenda.Applying the AU’s common position on reparations to the Chagossian people:
The AU, including the ACHPR, should recognize the Chagossians as an Indigenous people and acknowledge that their initial forced displacement and the denial of their permanent return to their homeland constitute ongoing colonial crimes against humanity. The AU should call on the parties to the current negotiations over the future of the Chagos Archipelago to center, meaningfully consult, and provide binding, full, and effective reparations to the Chagossians, including their unfettered permanent return to all the Chagos Islands.
Nepal: Ensure Credible Transitional Justice Appointments
(Geneva) – The Nepal government should urgently heed the demands of conflict victims and amend the process for appointing commissioners to the country’s two transitional justice bodies, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists said today. To successfully implement the transitional justice law adopted by parliament in 2024, it is crucial to have a transparent and rigorous process that results in the appointment of credible and highly qualified commissioners.
In August 2024, Nepal’s parliament adopted a law that victims’ groups broadly accepted as a viable basis for the long delayed transitional justice process to address widespread human rights violations and abuses committed during the 1996-2006 conflict between Maoist insurgents and Nepali security forces. Under the legislation there will be two bodies – a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons. However, survivors and victims’ representatives have rejected a short list of candidates published by a committee to appoint commissioners.
“The appointment of competent, impartial commissioners fully independent from any political party is crucial to the credibility and success of transitional justice in Nepal,” said Isabelle Lassée, deputy regional director for South Asia at Amnesty International. “The government should immediately allow a revision of the appointment process to include more candidates and strengthen procedures.”
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2006, included a commitment to reveal what happened to victims of enforced disappearance within 60 days, and to establish “a High-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission … to probe into those involved in serious violation of human rights and crimes against humanity.” For almost two decades these commitments have been thwarted through political maneuvering, unnecessarily deepening the pain of thousands of victims and their families, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists said.
Nepal has established similar commissions in the past, which have received over 60,000 complaints. However, the previous commissions failed to deliver on their mandate, partly due to political interference in appointments and overall lack of political will to ensure their independence and effectiveness.
In 2015, the Supreme Court determined that an earlier transitional justice law was unconstitutional and violated Nepal’s international human rights obligations. While the amended transitional justice law has some positive elements, it also contains some unacceptable provisions, including allowing for amnesty of those involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Therefore, the manner in which commissioners interpret and implement their mandates will be of critical importance to ensure that the commissions’ work does not violate international law. The appointment of highly qualified, impartial, and independent people is therefore crucial.
In a statement published on May 1, 38 groups of victims and survivors wrote that the short-listed candidates are “unlikely to carry forward the national responsibility of transitional justice,” leaving victims “once again denied justice” and suffering “a deep sense of betrayal and humiliation.”
They stressed that the “list was developed through a non-transparent, superficial, and politically influenced process based on power-sharing and [political] access, rather than merit.” The appointments committee had failed to “publicly disclose the criteria, basis, and transparent procedures used to prepare the shortlist.” According to the groups, the list “includes … individuals who have defended perpetrators, and many who lack knowledge, contribution, or expertise in transitional justice.”
Many survivors and the families of those subjected to violations and abuses have lived in hardship for years, often suffering lasting mental harm and physical injuries. They are struggling to learn the truth about their loved ones, are longing to see those responsible for abuses brought to justice in fair trials, and remain in desperate need of reparations and official recognition. The lack of accountability for serious crimes under international law has contributed to ongoing rights violations and a wider crisis of impunity.
The victims said that the appointments committee had “failed to consult them even once,” resulting in “a process controlled by the perpetrators' side.”
“Conducting a successful transitional justice process is of importance to all Nepalis, but above all to conflict victims who have struggled for decades to receive truth, justice, and reparations,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “It has become routine for successive governments to promise that transitional justice will be ‘victim centric,’ but these words have little meaning unless victims’ concerns are addressed and they are able to meaningfully engage in the process.”
In their statement, the victims and survivors groups warn that they will “be compelled to initiate the formation of a parallel civil commission” to investigate conflict era abuses if the authorities continue to ignore their concerns and pursue a “superficial process that further inflicts pain and despair on the victims.” They say that the United Nations and “entire international community” should only support “a credible transitional justice process.”
At a public event organized by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in collaboration with several local organizations in March in Kathmandu, the prime minister of Nepal and leaders of major political parties publicly committed to establishing a credible, victim-centric transitional justice process that rises above political differences.
Nepal’s international partners, including donor governments and the United Nations, have a significant role to play in supporting the process and helping to assure its credibility. They should make clear that they will support a process that is genuinely victim-centered and upholds human rights standards.
In a separate statement published on May 6, 10 Nepali human rights organizations called for consultations with victims to be integrated into a selection process that incorporates clear selection criteria, transparency, background checks, and public hearings. They point out that the law gives the government powers to “remove obstacles” to a successful outcome and extend the appointment process.
Nepal’s transitional justice process is a crucial opportunity to provide redress for victims and survivors, strengthen the rule of law in Nepal, and establish a significant precedent in the region. Urgent steps for the government to address shortcomings of the appointment process may include:
Publishing a revised scheduleMeaningfully consulting with the victim community and identifying additional suitable candidatesPublishing a revised shortlistEnsuring representative participation of victims and survivors, civil society, and the media in public hearings to maintain transparencyAnd, if needed, invoking the authority granted by the law to remove obstacles and extend the committee’s term“The delivery of effective justice for those suffering from the atrocities of Nepal’s armed conflict is decades overdue, but there is finally a chance to conduct a successful process that enhances human rights and the rule of law in Nepal,” said Ian Seiderman, Senior Legal and Policy Director at the International Commission of Jurists. “The government owes it to the victims and survivors, and to all Nepalis, to ensure that credible candidates meeting the highest standards are appointed as commissioners.”
Holy See: Review Vatican-China Agreement
(London, May 12, 2025) – The new Pope, Leo XIV, should direct an urgent review of the Vatican’s 2018 agreement with the Chinese government that allows Beijing to appoint bishops for government-approved houses of worship, Human Rights Watch said today. He should also press the government to end the persecution of underground churches, clergy, and worshipers.
The Chinese government has continued to install Chinese Communist Party-compliant clergy. AsiaNews reported that during the mourning period for Pope Francis, who died on April 21, 2025, that the Chinese government had moved forward on the appointments of an auxiliary bishop in Shanghai and the bishop of Xinxiang, Henan province.
“Pope Leo XIV has an opportunity to make a fresh start with China to protect the religious freedom of China’s Catholics,” said Maya Wang, associate China director at Human Rights Watch. “The new Pope should press for negotiations that could help improve the right to religious practice for everyone in China.”
The Chinese government has long restricted the country’s estimated 12 million Catholics to worship in official churches under the leadership of the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, and has persecuted Catholics who have attended underground “house churches” or pledged allegiance only to the pope. The government has conducted frequent raids on underground churches and arrested unapproved clergy and congregants.
Pope Leo should press the Chinese government to immediately free several Catholic clergy who in recent years have been imprisoned, forcibly disappeared, or subjected to house arrest and other harassment, Human Rights Watch said. They include James Su Zhimin, Augustine Cui Tai, Julius Jia Zhiguo, Joseph Zhang Weizhu, Peter Shao Zhumin, and Thaddeus Ma Daqin, as reported by the Hudson Institute.
The 2018 Provisional Agreement regarding the Appointment of Bishops, the full text of which has never been made public, ended a decades-long standoff over who had the authority to appoint bishops in China. Under the agreement, Beijing proposes future bishops, and the pope has veto power over those appointments.
Since the 2018 agreement, the two parties have agreed on the appointment of 10 bishops, covering about a third of the over 90 dioceses in China that remained without a bishop. The Vatican has never exercised its veto power, however, even when the Chinese government violated the agreement by unilaterally appointing bishops in 2022 and 2023, appointments that Pope Francis later accepted.
In a 2024 news statement renewing the 2018 agreement, the Vatican stated that it aimed to “benefit … the Catholic Church in China and the Chinese people as a whole.” The Holy See and the Chinese government have renewed the agreement three times.
The Chinese government, which restricts all religious practice in China to five officially recognized religions, regulates official church business and retains control over personnel appointments, publications, finances, and seminary applications.
The 2018 Holy See-China agreement was reached during President Xi Jinping’s drive to tighten already stringent controls over religions in China in the name of “Sinicization” of religion. In recent years the authorities have demolished hundreds of church buildings or the crosses atop them, prevented adherents from gathering in unofficial churches, restricted access to the Bible, confiscated religious materials not authorized by the government, and banned Bible and religious apps.
The 2018 Holy See-China agreement was reached during a period of intensified repression, including crimes against humanity, of the predominantly Muslim Uyghur population. Since 2017, Chinese authorities in the Xinjiang region have arbitrarily detained about one million Uyghurs, many for practicing Islam, and have damaged or destroyed two-thirds of the region’s mosques, according to the think tank Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs remain imprisoned in China and subject to strict controls.
The Chinese government’s Sinicization of religion has meant ruthless repression of Buddhism in Tibet, where the Chinese authorities have imposed strict controls over the process of selecting Tibetan lamas, including by forcibly disappearing the six-year-old Panchen Lama since 1995, and by controlling the process for the selection of the future Dalai Lama.
“Chinese Catholics worshiping in underground churches are among the ‘ordinary people’ on whom Pope Leo has said the church should focus its attention,” Wang said. “It’s critical for religious freedom in China that the Catholic church stands on their side, and not on the side of their oppressors.”
US: Major Companies Violate Gig Workers’ Rights
(Washington, DC) – Major digital labor platforms, also known as gig companies, operating in the United States misclassify gig workers as independent contractors, denying them labor rights, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.
The 155-page report, “‘The Gig Trap’: Algorithmic, Wage and Labor Exploitation in Platform Work in the US” focuses on seven major companies operating in the US: Amazon Flex, DoorDash, Favor, Instacart, Lyft, Shipt, and Uber. These companies claim to offer gig workers “flexibility” but often end up paying them less than state or local minimum wages. Six of the seven companies use algorithms with opaque rules to assign jobs and determine wages, meaning that workers do not know how much they will be paid until after completing the job.
May 12, 2025 The Gig Trap“Digital labor platforms have created a business model that evades employer responsibilities while keeping workers under tight algorithmic control, driven by opaque and unpredictable decisions,” said Lena Simet, senior researcher on poverty and inequality at Human Rights Watch. “They promise flexibility but, in reality, they leave workers at the mercy of unstable and subminimum wages, little social protection, and in constant fear of termination without recourse.”
Workers for the seven platforms examined are assigned orders, supervised, paid, and fired by algorithms. All except Amazon Flex, which uses a flat hourly wage, use opaque and frequently changing algorithms to calculate pay per job or shift. Apps and platforms are designed to keep gig workers on the job for long hours and low pay, and dynamic pricing algorithms make it extremely difficult for them to plan their schedules and manage their earnings. Managed by algorithms, workers cannot fully understand how they are assigned work, or how their wages are calculated. Without any transparency, it’s extremely difficult for them to challenge decisions made about their work or pay.
Human Rights Watch examined the working conditions of ride-hailing, shopping, and food delivery workers, with a focus on Texas. The report is based on semi-structured interviews with 95 platform workers in Texas and 12 other US states, as well as a survey of 127 workers in Texas.
Low wages, algorithmic control and barriers to unionizing trap many workers in economic insecurity, even as multi-billion-dollar companies expand their market share and revenue, Human Rights Watch found.
Weak regulations allow these companies to misclassify workers as independent contractors rather than employees, despite the nature of the work and degree of control exercised by the companies often meeting legal criteria for employee status. This enables companies to avoid compliance with minimum wage laws, overtime pay, and contributions to nonwage benefits. For workers, it means providing their own vehicles, fuel, insurance, and maintenance as well as paying the employer’s share of Social Security and Medicare contributions.
The Texas workers surveyed earned nearly 30 percent below the federal minimum wage and about 70 percent below what the Massachusetts Institute of Technology estimates is a living wage in Texas. These findings reinforce those of local governments, academic institutions, and policy researchers, who have consistently found that these workers earn at or below local minimum wages and well below the thresholds needed for a decent standard of living.
The US is home to one of the largest global markets for digital platform work, and the number of people earning income from gig work has surged in recent years. Estimates suggest that by 2021, 16 percent of US adults had worked for a digital labor platform at least once. Platform workers are disproportionately Black or Latinx and live in lower income households.
Workers who responded to the Human Rights Watch survey received an average of US$16.90 per hour (including tips), but nearly half of that was spent on work-related expenses. After accounting for nonwage benefits that employers often cover for other workers, their effective pay fell to $5.12 per hour. Some workers reported earning nothing at all after expenses.
Click to expand Image © 2025 Human Rights WatchThree-quarters of surveyed workers said they struggled to pay for housing in the last year, and most reported difficulty paying for food, groceries, electricity, and water. More than one-third said they would not be able to cover a $400 emergency expense.
Workers told Human Rights Watch they lived in near-constant fear of being “deactivated” or fired by an app, often without explanation or recourse. Nearly half of those who had been automatically fired were later cleared of wrongdoing, suggesting a high rate of erroneous account deactivations.
Click to expand Image © 2025 Human Rights WatchThe financial insecurity of platform workers stands in stark contrast to the soaring revenues of the companies themselves. Uber, which holds a 76 percent share of the US rideshare market, reported $43.9 billion in revenue in 2024, a 17.96 percent increase from the previous year, and a net income of $9.8 billion. As of April 2025, Uber has a market capitalization of $169.41 billion. DoorDash, with 67 percent of the US food delivery market, recorded $10.72 billion in revenue in 2024 and as of April 2025 was valued at $81.03 billion.
By misclassifying workers as independent contractors, platform companies also avoid contributing to Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance, depriving public funds of critical resources. Based on tax data from the Census Bureau’s Nonemployer Statistics, Human Rights Watch estimates that Texas could have collected over $111 million in unemployment insurance contributions between 2020 and 2022 from platform companies if rideshare, delivery, and in-home platform workers had been classified as employees. The actual shortfall is likely much higher when accounting for unreported income.
In response to Human Rights Watch’s request for comment, Lyft said: “App-based work provides millions of Americans uniquely flexible work opportunities, leaving room for them to meet other goals, commitments, or obligations. It allows them to work around their many real and unpredictable commitments and their busy schedules in ways that traditional 9-5 jobs don’t provide.” Amazon met with Human Rights Watch to discuss the report but did not give an on record response. The other companies did not reply.
International human rights law requires just and favorable working conditions for all workers, including workers for digital platforms.
The US Department of Labor, the Federal Trade Commission, the Texas Workforce Commission, and equivalent agencies in other states should take immediate steps to ensure workplace safety for gig workers and protect their rights to unionize, Human Rights Watch said.
“Digital labor platforms have created a workforce with none of the rights and protections that workers have fought for over decades,” Simet said. “As more people are drawn to platform work to make ends meet, federal and state authorities should step up to guarantee them the protections they are entitled to, and should work with the International Labour Organization to establish a binding global standard for platform work.”
Burkina Faso: Army Directs Ethnic Massacres
(Nairobi) – The Burkina Faso army led and participated in the massacre of more than 130, possibly many more, ethnic Fulani civilians by pro-government militias in the western Boucle du Mouhoun region in March 2025, Human Rights Watch said today. Mass killings of civilians by government security forces, militias, and Islamist armed groups amount to war crimes and other possible atrocity crimes.
The massacre around the town of Solenzo, which Human Rights Watch previously reported on, occurred during operation “Green Whirlwind 2” (Operation Tourbillon Vert 2), a major weeks-long campaign led by Burkinabè special forces that resulted in widespread civilian deaths and massive displacement of Fulani people. The Al Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, or JNIM) then carried out a series of retaliatory attacks in Sourou province apparently targeting villages the armed group viewed as assisting the military, killing at least 100 civilians.
“The viral videos of the atrocities by pro-government militias near Solenzo sent shock waves through Africa’s Sahel region, but they told only part of the story,” said Ilaria Allegrozzi, senior Sahel researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Further research uncovered that Burkina Faso’s military was responsible for these mass killings of Fulani civilians, which were followed by deadly reprisals by an Islamist armed group. The government needs to impartially investigate these deaths and prosecute all those responsible.”
Between March 14 and April 22, 2025, Human Rights Watch interviewed by phone or in person 27 witnesses to the attacks, 2 militia members, and 4 journalists and civil society members. Witnesses came from Solenzo, Larihasso, Pinpissi, and Sanakuy in or at the border with Banwa province, and Gonon, Lanfièra, Mara, and Tiao in Sourou province. Human Rights Watch also reviewed at least 11 videos showing abuses by Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie or VDPs) against Fulani civilians near Solenzo. Additionally, researchers analyzed information detailing such abuses posted on social media and by media outlets.
The Green Whirlwind 2 campaign began on February 27 in Banwa province and continued north toward Sourou province until April 2. Burkinabè and international media reported that Rapid Intervention Battalions 7, 10, 18, and 23, under the command of Rapid Intervention Group 2, took part in the operation, along with hundreds of local VDP militiamen.
Villagers from Banwa province described military operations across several locations over at least six days. The VDPs would shoot in the air or at civilians and loot their cattle, forcing villagers to flee. In the area between the villages of Béna and Lékoro, the army and VDPs blocked their flight in an apparent pincer move, then massacred at least 100 civilians and possibly several hundred trapped in the bush. Witnesses said that most of the victims in Banwa province were women, children, and older people. Military helicopters and drones surveilled the area, indicating direct command control of the operation.
“Thousands of Fulani families from over 20 villages set out for [neighboring] Mali in search of protection,” said a Fulani herder, 44, from Solenzo, whose 8 family members were killed in the attacks beginning on March 8. “However, we couldn’t reach Mali without crossing villages [that were] occupied by the VDPs and the army. The VDPs shot at us like animals, while drones were flying over our heads. Many women and children died because they could not run.”
Villagers said that in the days and weeks prior to the attacks, village chiefs, friends, and even militia members had alerted them that preparations for a military operation were underway and expressed concerns that Fulani civilians would be targeted. “My friend [an ethnic Bobo] who is close to the VDPs told me that the VDPs and the military were getting organized and strengthening their units,” said a man from Sanakuy. “He drove me to the Malian border just one day before the killings.”
Human Rights Watch’s earlier research on the killing of at least 58 Fulani civilians near Solenzo was based on videos filmed by the militiamen. As VDPs walked among dozens of dead bodies, several called for the extermination of the Fulani people.
In a March 15 statement, a government spokesperson said that on March 10, militia and security forces repelled a “terrorist” attack and killed about 100 assailants before chasing stragglers through the bush. He said the security forces and VDPs “took over the forest to dismantle the terrorist base.” They found women, children, and older people “whom the terrorists tried to use as human shields, as well as a large herd of stolen cattle and goats,” and took them to safety. Government media reports stated that the authorities provided shelter and support for 318 displaced people from Solenzo at a reception center in the capital, Ouagadougou.
Witnesses said, however, that there was no fighting near Solenzo between government forces and the Islamist fighters. They also said that the military operation appeared to have been well planned.
Islamist armed groups have concentrated their recruitment efforts on the Fulani community, and the government and its supporters have long conflated the Fulani community with Islamist armed groups.
Fulani witnesses said that they believed the campaign had displaced most Fulani people from Banwa province. “Today, in the whole province, there are no more Fulani – they all fled or were killed or taken hostage,” said a 53-year-old man from Solenzo. “But the other [ethnic] communities remain.”
Following the operations near Solenzo, the military continued toward the northern province of Sourou, which had been under JNIM control for more than seven years. The international media and witnesses reported that the army entered several villages between March 21 and April 2. However, villagers said that the military only stayed in the villages for about two days, leaving people without protection from attack. JNIM fighters then returned and carried out reprisal killings against residents, targeting the men whom it considered to be military collaborators.
“All the men had been executed in front of the health center,” said a 60-year-old woman who witnessed JNIM abuses in Tiao village on April 5. “I counted up to 70 bodies.”
All parties to the armed conflict in Burkina Faso are bound by international humanitarian law, which prohibits attacks on civilians, summary executions, looting, and other abuses. Individuals who commit serious violations of the laws of war with criminal intent are responsible for war crimes. Murder and other offenses committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population constitute crimes against humanity. Commanders who knew or should have known about serious abuses by their forces and did not take appropriate action may be prosecuted as a matter of command responsibility. Burkina Faso is also a party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other core international human rights treaties.
“The scope of the atrocities committed by government forces, militias, and Islamist armed groups in western Burkina Faso remain grossly overlooked,” Allegrozzi said. “The United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council should urgently put Burkina Faso high on their agendas and act to protect civilians still at grave risk.”
For additional details of the attacks, please see below.
The abuses by Burkinabè military forces, pro-government militias known as VDPs, and the JNIM took place in March and April 2025 in Banwa and Sourou provinces of the Boucle du Mouhoun (“Bend of the Mouhoun River”) region, western Burkina Faso, and at least one village in Houet province, Hauts-Bassins region.
Banwa Province
Click to expand Image Locator map of Solenzo, Burkina Faso. © 2025 Human Rights WatchPlanning for Military Operations
Residents of the Boucle du Mouhoun region said that friends, village chiefs, and militia members had informed them that the Burkina Faso military was planning a large-scale operation in Banwa province.
A Fulani man, 50, from Lahirasso said that on the evening of March 7, a traditional leader “called us in private and advised us to leave, because an operation by the VDPs and the military was under way and that if they found us, it would be bad for us.”
A Fulani herder in his 40s who fled the village of Pinpissi on March 10 said that, about two weeks before he left his village, “we noticed that the VDPs were holding many meetings,” and that some of his ethnic Bobo friends who joined the VDPs told him what was being discussed in these meetings. “They said that the VDPs wanted to kill all Fulani, that for them ending terrorism means killing all Fulani people.… They told us that we better leave because a big military operation would soon be carried out in the area.”
Forced Displacement
Witnesses said that from March 7 until at least March 12, VDP militias attacked Fulani civilians in various towns and villages, including Lahirasso, Pinpissi, Solenzo, and Sanakuy, causing thousands of people to flee into the bush.
A Fulani man, 45, from Lahirasso village said that on March 7 and 8, “VDPs started chasing us by shooting everywhere and taking our cattle, so we had to leave.” A Fulani man, 50, from Solenzo, said that on March 8 at about 5 a.m., VDPs stormed the eastern outskirts of the town where many Fulani families lived, “shooting, looting our animals, and forcing us to abandon our homes.” A Fulani herder, 60, from Sanakuy village said that on March 10, “we had no choice but to leave [because] between 4 and 5 p.m., VDPs began shooting in the air until about 6 p.m., when we took our baggage and left.”
Summary Executions
Witnesses said that between March 8 and 12, VDP attacks caused a mass flight of Fulani people, who attempted to reach the Malian border for safety. But few were able to cross the border because the VDPs, along with the military, ensnared them in the bush and either killed them on the spot or captured and later executed them. They said most of the killings occurred between the villages of Béna and Lékoro, which are 14 kilometers apart in Banwa province.
The 44-year-old Fulani herder from Solenzo said VDPs attacked his group on March 8 between Béna and Lékoro. “Fulani were everywhere, and they would keep coming,” he said. “Suddenly, at around 10 a.m., the VDPs and the military attacked us. They started shooting.… When the shots rang out, we dispersed.… I lost eight family members, including my son.”
“We were very worried … knowing that few had managed to cross Béna without being intercepted,” said a Fulani man, 30, from Pinpissi who survived a VDP attack on March 11 in the same area. He said that “between 6 and 7 a.m., the VDPs on about 10 motorcycles came, opened fire on us. We heard constant gunfire.… Sometimes bursts, sometimes more sporadic.”
A man, 60, from Sanakuy, said VDPs attacked his group on March 11 near Béna: “I saw a lot of VDPs coming, shooting at us indiscriminately.… We ran. But they chased us, caught some of us and executed them.”
Human Rights Watch geolocated a video showing armed men wearing uniforms reading Groupe d'autodéfense de Mahouna (Mahouna Self-Defense Group) and Force Rapide de Kouka (Kouka Rapid Force)—identifiable as VDPs—throwing a man onto a three-wheeled vehicle loaded with what appears to be at least 10 dead or dying men and women. The video was recorded close to a dry riverbed crossing just east of the village of Mahouna, about 10 kilometers west of Béna. At the end of the video, the truck departs in the direction of Béna.
Click to expand Image Geolocation of the video showing VDP militia throwing bodies into a three-wheeled vehicle close to a dry riverbed east of Mahouna, Burkina Faso, based on satellite imagery from March 29, 2025. Image © 2025 Planet Labs PBC. Graphic © Human Rights Watch. Click to expand Image Geolocation of the video showing VDP militia throwing bodies into a three-wheeled vehicle close to a dry riverbed east of Mahouna, Burkina Faso, based on satellite imagery from March 29, 2025. Image © 2025 Planet Labs PBC. Graphic © Human Rights Watch.Death Toll
Human Rights Watch was not able to estimate a total death toll for the attacks in Banwa province because survivors had not been able to return to the areas where the killings occurred to bury the dead. They believe that hundreds died or went missing, which they determined by comparing the number of people who reached safety with the numbers of people who fled their respective villages, or by counting how many relatives each family had lost.
“When the VDPs and the army stopped chasing us, we gathered one by one, at nightfall, near Kouka,” said the 44-year-old Fulani man from Solenzo who witnessed the March 8 attack. “Everyone began to look for their relatives and that is how we established the death toll of more than 40 killed on the spot in Béna.”
A Fulani man, 50, who survived the same attack in Béna on March 8 said:
We concluded that the death toll [for our group] could be as high as 100. There wasn’t a single survivor among us who didn’t lose some loved ones.… When we gathered after the attack, we could hear some say they had lost 20 or 30 relatives, some 40 ... and so on. Based on this, we determined that the casualties following these days of killings were enormous. We also estimated the number of deaths based on the observation that many of us fled and few arrived.
A 45-year-old man from Lahirasso said that one of his relatives and 10 of his friends were killed and that he believed hundreds were killed or disappeared. “There were thousands of us walking toward Mali and after the attack by VDPs and soldiers, our number had considerably decreased.”
A man, 30, from Pinpissi, said that VDPs attacked his group of over 100 people, on March 11 near Béna. “There was intense shooting, some people fled, but many were shot and killed,” he said. “When we crossed the border, we found out that at least 18 people had gone missing, including four children, two women, and one man.”
A religious leader from Solenzo who consulted several people from various villages affected by the operation said: “All the people I spoke with provided a death toll that started from 300 and up.”
Human Rights Watch was unable to independently verify the figures from witnesses.
Human Rights Watch received eight lists of people killed in the attacks. These lists were compiled by survivors and have the names of a total of 130 victims, including at least 32 children ages between 1 month and 17; 30 women, ages 23 to 70; and 68 men, ages 20 to 80. Of the 130 victims, 34 were from Solenzo, 38 from Lahirasso, 19 from Sanakuy, and 39 from Pinpissi. Witnesses who viewed the 11 videos, previously analyzed for the Human Rights Watch March 14 report, said they recognized 14 people.
Role of the Military
Witnesses described the direct participation of the Burkina Faso army as well as VDPs in the operation. Two villagers said that, alongside VDPs, they saw soldiers attacking people near Béna. “We were hiding under a tree when the soldiers passed by with their vehicles and the VDPs on motorcycles,” said a Fulani woman, 50, about the March 8 attack.
All of the witnesses interviewed said they saw camouflage-patterned military helicopters, and many also said they saw gray drones circling overhead while the operation was ongoing and while the VDPs committed killings.
“When the shooting stopped, we attempted to go back to where we had been ambushed to look for survivors or to bury the dead,” said a 40-year-old man from Pinpissi who witnessed the March 11 attack near Béna. “But a military helicopter was flying over us, so we gave up.”
Targeting of Civilians on an Ethnic Basis
Witnesses consistently described the military operation as a “hunt for Fulani” and said that all the victims were ethnic Fulani civilians.
The 50-year-old Fulani man from Solenzo said:
For them it was a military operation against the terrorists, but [for them] we are the terrorists.… The military and the VDPs just prepared an operation to cleanse the area of all the Fulani.… They went into the bush to kill all the Fulani they saw, they wanted to exterminate us all.
The 50-year-old woman from Solenzo said: “I heard the VDPs saying in the Djoula language: ‘Nobody will escape! Look for the Fulani everywhere. We are going to kill all Fulani.’”
These accounts corroborate statements heard in the videos reviewed by Human Rights Watch that include VDP militiamen calling for the “extermination” of the Fulani people.
In a March 18 interview with a Senegalese newspaper, Adama Dieng, the African Union Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities, said that he was “profoundly shocked” by the killings of civilians around Solenzo and that “targeting individuals based on their ethnicity is a reprehensible act that must be punished by national, continental, and international authorities.” He said that the authorities should investigate the killings with the support of external partners including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations.
The reported ethnic-based slurs against the Fulani also prompted the prosecutor of the High Court in Ouagadougou to issue a statement on March 20 informing the population that “calls for the extermination of people belonging to an ethnic group, on grounds that these people are terrorists … constitute grave threats to peace and social cohesion,” as well as “offenses of discrimination,” and announcing the opening of investigations aimed at apprehending those responsible.
Sourou Province
Click to expand Image Locator map of Sourou, Burkina Faso. © 2025 Human Rights WatchMilitary Operation
Around March 21, Burkinabè security forces participating in Operation Green Whirlwind 2 reached Sourou province, which the JNIM had been controlling for at least the past seven years. Witnesses described a major operation involving hundreds of soldiers and militiamen, drones, helicopters, and armored vehicles. They said friends, relatives, and JNIM fighters had warned them that the operation was being organized, and after hearing of the attacks in Banwa province, caused them to fear for their own safety.
An ethnic Mossi man, 47, from Gonon said:
I learned from a relative based in Bobo-Dioulasso that there was a meeting in Bobo-Dioulasso around February 27 in which Malian and Burkinabè officers discussed the planning of the operation, how to deploy forces in the area, how to reconquer the area.… We also had heard about what had happened in Solenzo and that had amplified our fears.
Social media posts and witnesses reported that beginning March 21, the army and VDPs entered several villages and towns, including Di, Gonon, Gouran, Guiédougou, Lanfièra, Mara, and Tiao, and claimed to have liberated them from the JNIM. A video published on social media on March 22 and geolocated by Human Rights Watch shows people celebrating in Guiédougou. However, witnesses and the media said that the military quickly withdrew, leaving the villages without protection, and that the JNIM returned and retaliated against civilians.
“The military came, they put on their show.… with motorcycles, tanks, helicopters, and they left for Tougan,” said a 49-year-old man from Tiao village. “And then the jihadists [JNIM fighters] came back to surround the village and kill people. The army left us at the mercy of the jihadists.”
Deadly JNIM Reprisals in Gonon, Lanfièra, Mara, and Tiao
In a video posted on social media on March 14, a man identified as Ousmane Dicko, brother of Jaffar Dicko, head of the JNIM in Burkina Faso, threatened to avenge the killings of civilians around Solenzo.
On April 1, the JNIM attacked Lanfièra, a village mostly populated by ethnic Mossi, Bobo, and Dafing, at about 5 p.m. Two witnesses said that the fighters started shooting, causing many villagers to flee. They then went door-to-door taking all men who had not left.
“My husband and his brother hid in the house while I stayed in front of the door,” said a woman, 36, from Lanfièra. “Three jihadists … asked me if there were any men in the house. I said no, but right then my husband walked out followed by his brother. The jihadists took them north of the village. This was the last time I saw them.” The woman said that the fighters ordered her out of the village and that when she was about to leave, she heard multiple gunshots.
Human Rights Watch reviewed a list compiled by survivors with the names of at least 13 civilians killed by the JNIM in Lanfièra on April 1, all males ages 16 to 55.
On April 5, the JNIM killed over 100 people in three coordinated attacks on the villages of Gonon, Mara, and Tiao, mostly populated by ethnic Mossi, Bobo, and Dafing, near the Mali border, and looted homes. Nine witnesses from the three villages said that hundreds of JNIM fighters riding motorbikes entered the villages between 4 and 6 p.m., went door-to-door, ordered men to gather in one place, and then opened fire on them.
A woman, 30, from Tiao said she was home with her husband, 40, and father, 65, when two JNIM fighters appeared:
They ordered my husband to stand up and join other men in front of the health center. They also took my father. They went to every house and rounded up men there. A couple of hours later, we started hearing the first gunshots. Then the gunshots became more intense. They shot for over two hours. I remained home crying, until I didn’t hear any more noise.… I went out. All the women were crying, screaming, and fleeing. One told me: “All our husbands have been massacred. You need to leave.” … On my way out of the village, I saw at least six bodies scattered in the bush.
A woman, 32, from Gonon said she was home with her husband, 36, and two children when two young JNIM fighters appeared:
They ordered my husband to follow them to the mosque. They spoke Fulfulde and Djoula.… My husband left and that was the last time I saw him. Two hours later, we started hearing gunshots. It was deafening gunfire…. Some bullets even landed in our courtyard. There was shooting until it was dark…. Women and children were fleeing. A group of women passed in front of my door, they said that all our men had been killed. So, I took my two children and left.
A woman, 60, from Tiao said she was home with her sick husband, 80, and son, 35, when JNIM fighters knocked at her door. “They might have come with lists because they called my son by his name. They ordered him to go with them to the health center but left my husband.” She said that she heard intense shooting from 6 to 8 p.m. when “all survivors, mainly women and children started to leave.” She said she opted to stay because of her sick husband and remained in the village for four days. “The village was empty. The jihadists returned the day after the massacre to loot homes.”
A Bobo woman, 34, from Mara said villagers started hearing gunshots at about 6 p.m. from the direction of Tiao, two and half kilometers away. “When we started packing our things to leave, we heard people screaming ‘The jihadists are coming!’” she said. “Gunshots were getting closer to us. I saw the jihadists coming, in big numbers, on their motorbikes.” The woman said she fled Mara and later learned that the men who did not or could not flee were rounded up and executed.
The witnesses from the villages believed that the attacks were retaliation against male residents whom the JNIM accused of collaborating with the army, including by indicating a willingness to join the VDPs. The 49-year-old man from Tiao said:
The military told us that they had reconquered the Sourou province and that the terrorists had all been driven out or neutralized.… [B]ut we who had lived with the jihadists for seven years, we knew that it was not over.… But we could not contradict the army for fear of reprisals and that’s why some men offered to collaborate and join the VDPs. VDP lists were drafted.
Online media reported that men in the Sourou province had registered to join the VDPs, and that this list had been obtained by the JNIM, although Human Rights Watch could not confirm this.
Summarily executing anyone in custody, including those who had joined militia forces, is a war crime.
The 60-year-old woman from Tiao said that she walked to the health center where she found “at least 70 bodies of men, including the one of my son,” and that she also saw more bodies “scattered across the village.”
Witnesses from Tiao provided a list with the names of 32 victims, all ethnic Bobo and Mossi men and boys, ages 15 to 50. They said that the list was partial and reiterated that at least 70 civilians were killed.
The total number of people that the JNIM forces killed in the three attacks is unclear. Witnesses in Gonon said that they did not see the bodies of those killed because they fled after the massacre, but that they estimate the number of victims at over 70.
A man from Gonon said:
No one can tell you exactly how many people have been killed because everybody fled, and we don’t know who buried the bodies. Some say the army did. What is sure is that many were massacred in cold blood. People estimate the number of victims at over 70. Each family counted how many relatives it lost. All villagers from Gonon fled to Mali, none remained in Burkina Faso. So, if they were still alive, we would have known, we would have found them here.
A 45-year-old man from Mara who fled the village when JNIM fighters approached, said that survivors of the attack later told him that the JNIM had killed at least 20 men.
The international media and social media publications reported the death toll of the JNIM attacks in Sourou province in early April could reach 200.
Displacement
Witnesses from Gonon, Lanfièra, Mara, and Tiao said that villagers fled the area to seek refuge in neighboring Mali.
The 32-year-old women from Gonon said:
There’s not a single soul in Gonon now. We all fled. I took my two children and my very old and sick father, put them on a wheelbarrow, and pushed them until the border…. We stopped in several Malian villages, but everywhere we went the jihadists ordered us to leave. We walked for a week.
“There’s no one left. People have dispersed. All the villages in the Sourou valley have fled,” said the 49-year-old man from Tiao. “Our village is completely empty; the men have been killed, and the houses have been looted.”
“The whole village fled,” said the 34-year-old Bobo woman from Mara. “Everyone has abandoned Mara.”
Syria: New Government Restricts Aid Operations
(Beirut) – The Syrian transitional government’s stringent application of registration and operational requirements on aid groups is hampering their ability to scale up operations, Human Rights Watch said today. While the authorities have signaled a willingness to engage with international organizations, bureaucratic and administrative hurdles continue to impede efforts to address Syria’s escalating humanitarian crisis.
Under the Assad government, the authorities tightly controlled humanitarian operations, forcing international nongovernmental groups to coordinate and obtain approvals for their operations through state-affiliated organizations, a system that allowed for manipulation of aid for political purposes. Independent organizations seeking to maintain a principled operational space faced severe bureaucratic hurdles, restrictions on access, and government interference, undermining their ability to operate effectively and limiting partnerships with Syrian national organizations. Despite the collapse of the Assad government, some of the same restrictions remain in place or the new authorities have reinforced them.
“The transitional government has an opportunity to dismantle the restrictive framework that hindered independent humanitarian work for years,” said Adam Coogle, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Instead of reinstating practices that undermine neutrality and efficiency, the authorities should be prioritizing getting all available assistance to those in need.”
Human Rights Watch spoke to six aid workers between February and April 2025, all of whom highlighted the reintroduction of previous registration regulations. These rules require independent groups to work under an “umbrella system,” which gives vast authority to a designated “national partner” that effectively functions as a third-party regulatory body. On April 27, Human Rights Watch contacted the Foreign Ministry to request details about these measures and their impact on humanitarian operations, but had not received a response as of the publication date.
In the past, the Assad government used the same system. It required nearly all international groups to operate under the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) or the Syria Trust for Development (STD), which are both government-linked entities that played a central role in coordinating aid efforts. This, at times, allowed for aid distribution to be channeled according to political priorities rather than strictly humanitarian needs.
Human Rights Watch documented that, under the Assad government, Syrian security services regularly engaged with these entities and could access their beneficiary lists and programming at any time. This system severely constrained independent organizations, limiting their operational autonomy, reducing transparency in aid allocation, and enabling government interference in donor-funded relief efforts.
As part of broader governance reforms, the Syrian caretaker government, which governed the country until the transitional government was sworn in on March 29, introduced some restructuring to these key entities. It replaced Khaled Hboubati as head of SARC with Mohammad Hazem Baqlah, who previously led its volunteer medical services. It renamed the Syria Trust for Development to the Syrian Development Organization (SDO), dissolved its board of trustees, and appointed a committee to take over its financial and administrative functions.
However, as one senior aid worker on the ground in Damascus told Human Rights Watch, the problem lies not with those entities, but with the system itself, which would most likely continue to compromise neutrality and efficiency and restrict operational independence.
“In the early days [after the fall of the previous government], we were optimistic that [humanitarian] operations will be more effective,” the humanitarian worker said. “But day after day, it turns out this is not the case.”
Humanitarian workers also told Human Rights Watch that transitional authorities have imposed a reregistration requirement on all organizations operating in Syria, even those that have maintained humanitarian operations on the ground for years and decades. Humanitarian workers said the onerous requirements are even more complex than those the Assad government imposed, requiring aid groups to divulge minute details about their operations and sources of funding.
The Syrian transitional government should prioritize the delivery of impartial and effective humanitarian aid by removing the restrictive systems that limit operational flexibility and compromise humanitarian principles, Human Rights Watch said. UN agencies and donor states should also ensure transparency and accountability in humanitarian programming.
“The humanitarian crisis continues to worsen, and without immediate action to remove arbitrary restrictions, the suffering will only grow for Syrians across the country,” Coogle said.